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Abstract 
 
 Global Value Chains (GVC) analysis, which is increasingly used in development studies to 
connect production in developing countries with consumption in developed countries, is used in this 
work to analyse the Malawi tobacco industry.  This work engages with three key concepts of GVC 
analysis - territoriality, governance, and upgrading - in order to map the geography of the chain 
and its actors, examine power relationships in the chain, and determine which actors benefit from 
participation and how.  In order to complement the firm focus of GVC analysis and incorporate a 
role for the state and producers, we draw on selected concepts from other theoretical traditions.   
Empirical evidence used in our analysis of the global tobacco industry was collected 
through a combination of a desktop-survey of the scant academic literature available, semi-
structured interviews with industry experts and stakeholders outside of Malawi, a synthesis of 
various primary sources, as well as a field visit to tobacco sites in the United States.  The Malawi 
case study draws on evidence collected over the course of three fieldwork trips to Malawi and 
through observation, informal conversations, a firm-level survey, and over 50 semi-structured 
interviews with industry stakeholders and officials in farmer organizations and government there.     
We find that whilst firms have played a dominant role in transforming and determining 
participation in the Malawi tobacco industry, government and farmer associations have also been 
decisive.  In particular, government policy has contributed to the territoriality of, as well as 
governance of and upgrading in the chain.  Likewise, smallholder producers have used their 
associational power in order to upgrade in the chain.  This work therefore contributes to the 
empirical literature on the global and Malawian tobacco industries, as well as to debates on the 
theoretical underpinnings of the GVC literature.   
 
 
 
5 
 
Table of Contents 
Tables ............................................................................................................................ 8 
Figures......................................................................................................................... 10 
Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................................... 11 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... 17 
PART 1:  THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND METHODS ............................................................ 19 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview ......................................................................... 20 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 20 
1.2 Global Value Chains: Key Concepts ................................................................................. 21 
1.2.1 A GVC Understanding of the Formation of Power Imbalances in the Global Economy .. 21 
1.2.2 The Birth of the Literature ............................................................................................... 25 
1.2.3 Governance ...................................................................................................................... 30 
1.2.4 Upgrading ......................................................................................................................... 41 
1.3 Expanding the GVC Framework ...................................................................................... 46 
1.3.1 Environmental Conditions of Production......................................................................... 47 
1.3.2 Consumption .................................................................................................................... 48 
1.3.3 Labour, Codes, and Gender.............................................................................................. 49 
1.3.4 Power Relations in Global Value Chains .......................................................................... 52 
1.3.5 The Role of the State ........................................................................................................ 60 
1.4 Summing Up and Case Overview .................................................................................... 72 
1.4.1 Reasons for Selecting Tobacco, Malawi, and the GVC Concept to Connect Them .......... 73 
1.4.2 Research Questions.......................................................................................................... 77 
1.4.3 Thesis Structure ............................................................................................................... 83 
Chapter 2: Methodology .............................................................................................. 86 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 86 
2.2 Summary of Methods..................................................................................................... 86 
2.3 Fieldwork Trips in Malawi .............................................................................................. 88 
2.4 Positionality .................................................................................................................. 93 
2.5 Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 97 
PART 2:  THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN FOR TOBACCO ...................................................... 99 
Chapter 3: The Global Value Chain for Tobacco .......................................................... 100 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 100 
3.2 Territoriality and Governance ....................................................................................... 103 
3.2.1 Evolution of the Chain .................................................................................................... 103 
3.2.2 Lead Firms ...................................................................................................................... 120 
3.2.3 First Tier Suppliers: Independent Leaf Merchants ......................................................... 144 
3.2.4 Second Tier Suppliers: Growers ..................................................................................... 152 
6 
 
3.3 Upgrading .................................................................................................................... 160 
3.3.1 Process Upgrading ......................................................................................................... 160 
3.3.2 Product Upgrading ......................................................................................................... 161 
3.3.3 Functional Upgrading ..................................................................................................... 162 
3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 168 
PART 3:  THE MALAWI SMALLHOLDER BURLEY TOBACCO VALUE CHAIN ..................... 171 
Chapter 4: Historical Formation of the Smallholder Burley Tobacco Sector in Malawi . 172 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 172 
4.2 “Why not Persuade Them to Grow Tobacco”: Tobacco in Colonial Malawi ..................... 173 
4.2.1 The Beginnings: Tobacco in the Southern Region ......................................................... 173 
4.2.2 Colonial Tobacco Policies from the 1930’s until Independence .................................... 177 
4.3 The Rule of His Excellency Life President H.K. Banda ..................................................... 183 
4.4 Democratisation and Liberalisation .............................................................................. 190 
4.4.1 The Economics of Liberalisation .................................................................................... 191 
4.4.2 Liberalisation, Household Poverty, and Profitability ..................................................... 199 
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 207 
Chapter 5: Territoriality of the Malawi Smallholder Burley Tobacco Value Chain ........ 209 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 209 
5.2 End-Market Bifurcation ................................................................................................ 212 
5.3 Leaf Merchants and Farmers Cater to Different End-Markets ........................................ 217 
5.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 226 
Chapter 6: How the International Cigarette Companies Govern and Control Upgrading in 
the Malawi Tobacco Chain ......................................................................................... 229 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 229 
6.2 Governance ................................................................................................................. 230 
6.2.1 Governance as Drivenness ............................................................................................. 230 
6.2.2 Governance as Coordination.......................................................................................... 242 
6.3 Upgrading .................................................................................................................... 253 
6.3.1 Product and Process Upgrading: The Case of Contract Farming ................................... 255 
6.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 265 
Chapter 7: The Role of Government and Associational Power in Value Chain Governance 
and Upgrading ........................................................................................................... 268 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 268 
7.1.1 The State ........................................................................................................................ 269 
7.1.2 Farmer Associations and Associational Power .............................................................. 273 
7.2 Governance ................................................................................................................. 279 
7.2.1 Malawi Leaf .................................................................................................................... 279 
7.2.2 Minimum Prices ............................................................................................................. 281 
7.2.3 Quotas and Participation ............................................................................................... 283 
7.2.4 Definition of Functions ................................................................................................... 288 
7.2.5 Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 290 
7 
 
7.3 Upgrading .................................................................................................................... 293 
7.3.1 Functional Upgrading ..................................................................................................... 293 
7.3.2 Product and Process Upgrading ..................................................................................... 295 
7.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 299 
Chapter 8: Conclusion ................................................................................................ 302 
8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 302 
8.2 What Does it All Mean?: The Dynamic and Regional Impacts of Key Actors .................... 303 
8.2.1 Putting Malawi in a Regional Context ............................................................................ 303 
8.2.2 Explaining Territoriality: The Malawi-Mozambique Comparison .................................. 305 
8.2.3 Wider Regional Impact: Mozambique and Zambia ....................................................... 307 
8.3 Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 311 
8.3.1 Territoriality ................................................................................................................... 311 
8.3.2 Governance as Drivenness ............................................................................................. 314 
8.3.3 Governance as Coordination.......................................................................................... 316 
8.3.4 Upgrading ....................................................................................................................... 317 
8.3.5 Contributions of the Research ....................................................................................... 320 
8.4  Areas for Future Research: Global Tobacco Industry ..................................................... 321 
8.4.1 Shaping the Value Chain ................................................................................................ 322 
8.4.2 Regulation ...................................................................................................................... 324 
8.5 Areas for Future Research: Malawi ............................................................................... 328 
8.5.1 President Joyce Banda and Changes in Tobacco Policy ................................................. 329 
8.5.2 Impact on Chain Governance and Upgrading ................................................................ 331 
8.5.3 Impact on End-Market Bifurcation ................................................................................ 332 
8.5.4 Impact on Farmer Associations and Their Associational Power .................................... 333 
8.5.5 Other Developments ...................................................................................................... 334 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 336 
Appendices ................................................................................................................ 354 
CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES .................................................................................................... 354 
Appendix 2.A: Respondent Rosters ........................................................................................ 354 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Tables  
 
Table 1.1: International Commodity Agreements for Sugar and Cocoa…………………………………………24 
Table 1.2: Distribution of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables in the UK by Market Outlet (% Share of  
     Value)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..34 
Table 1.3: Key Determinants of GVC Governance…………………………………………………………………………39 
Table 3.1: Tobacco Consumption, England and Wales 1620-1702………………………………………………104 
Table 3.2: Market Share of Leading Cigarette Brands in the U.S., 1925-49………………………………….106 
Table 3.3: Predominance of Cigarette Consumption in Selected Countries in 20th  
     Century………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………107 
Table 3.4: Filter-tipped Average Share of U.S. Cigarette Market, 1951-5 to 1981-5…………………….108 
Table 3.5: Increase in Cigarettes per Pound of Tobacco Leaf in U.S., 1939-1980…………………………108 
Table 3.6: Cigarette Advertising Expenditure in U.S., Selected Years…………………………………………..109 
Table 3.7: Tobacco Leaf Production by Region, 1970-1999 (farm weight '000 tonnes)……………….110 
Table 3.8: Decline of Tobacco Production in Selected Developed Countries, 2000-2009…………….110 
Table 3.9: Top Seven Exporters of Unmanufactured Tobacco Leaf (2006)…………………………………..112 
Table 3.10: Brazilian Exports of Tobacco Leaf, Selected Years…………………………………………………….113 
Table 3.11: Estimated Oriental and Semi-Oriental Production (million green kilos), 2010- 
       2012…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………114 
Table 3.12: Estimated Flue-Cured Exports by Major Exporting Countries, 2011………………………….114 
Table 3.13: Estimated Flue-Cured Production (million green kilos), 2011-2013…………………………..115 
Table 3.14: Estimated Burley Exports of Top Exporters, 2011……………………………………………………..115 
Table 3.15: Estimated Burley Production (million green kilos), 2011-2013………………………………….116 
Table 3.16: Comparison of BAT CEO Incentive Schemes……………………………………………………………..124 
Table 3.17: International Cigarette Companies and Selected Brands………………………………………….126 
Table 3.18: Number of Tobacco-related Cases Pending against PMI, 2010-2012………………………..131 
Table 3.19: PMI Field Technician Training on ALP Code, by Region……………………………………………..140 
Table 3.20: Communication of PMI Code to Farmers, by Region…………………………………………………141 
Table 3.21: Universal Corporation Tobacco Inventories, 2012-2013……………………………………………149 
Table 3.22: South African Crop Estimate 2009/2010…………………………………………………………………..164 
Table 4.1: Changes in Tobacco Production Schemes (in pounds), 1926-1938……………………………..180 
Table 4.2: The Collapse of FCV Tobacco in Malawi, 1928-1935…………………………………………………..180 
Table 4.3: Percentage of Total Nyasaland Tobacco Produced by White Farmers, 1915- 
     1937…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..181 
Table 4.4: ADMARC Pricing Policies for (dark) Peasant Tobacco………………………………………………….187 
Table 4.5: Increase in Number of Registered Burley Growers, 1980's…………………………………………189 
Table 4.6: Prevalence of Independent Buyers (excluding ADMARC) of Burley Tobacco, 1994- 
     2001…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..193 
Table 4.7: Volume of Burley Tobacco Marketed through Burley Clubs, Liberalisation-  
     era………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………194 
Table 4.8: The Decline of the Tobacco Estate Sub-Sector in the 1990's……………………………………….195 
Table 4.9: The Rise of Smallholder Burley Production in Malawi, Liberalisation-era……………………196 
Table 4.10: Yield Declines During the Liberalisation-era (kgs/ha)………………………………………………..199 
Table 4.11: Selected Findings from Studies on the Relationship between Burley Liberalisation and  
       Poverty……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..201 
 
9 
 
Table 4.12: Proportion of Agricultural Households who Cultivated Tobacco according to  
       Background Characteristics, 2005…………………………………………………………………………….204 
Table 4.13: Source of Labour in Tobacco Production (Person Days per Hectare) in Takane’s  
       (2005) Study……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..204 
Table 4.14: Decline in Aggregate Smallholder Tobacco Net Profits, 1997-2001…………………………..205 
Table 4.15: Net Returns (US$) for NASFAM Smallholder Burley Growers, 1997-2001…………………206 
Table 4.16: Gross Margins (US$/ha) for Burley Production, 1993/94 and 2003/04  
       Seasons…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….206 
Table 4.17: Levies and Deductions on Auction Floors in 2004…………………………………………………….207 
Table 5.1: CSFs for BCs and NBCs According to Leaf Merchant MDs……………………………………………214 
Table 5.2: Percentage of Tobacco Accruing to Each End-Market…………………………………………………218 
Table 5.3: Leaf Merchant (Average) Market Share in Malawi……………………………………………………..220 
Table 5.4: Farmer Responses to CSF Survey………………………………………………………………………………..222 
Table 5.5: Difference in Responses on Blue Chips between Leaf Merchants (MDs) and  
     Farmers………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………222 
Table 5.6: Difference in Responses on Non-Blue Chips……………………………………………………………….223 
Table 5.7: Difference in Perception of End-Market Bifurcation, Leaf Merchants (MDs) and  
     Farmers………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………223 
Table 6.1: CSF Survey with Leaf Merchant ADs……………………………………………………………………………231 
Table 6.2: Level of Perceived End-Market Bifurcation by Various Chain Nodes/Sub- 
     Nodes…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………232 
Table 6.3: Smallholder-Related Agronomy Employees at AOI, 2012……………………………………………240 
Table 6.4: Agronomy Department Employees at Limbe Leaf, 2012…………………………………………….241  
Table 6.5: Key Determinants of GVC Governance……………………………………………………………………….243 
Table 6.6: Lead Firm-First Tier Supplier Chain Governance…………………………………………………………249 
Table 6.7: AOI IPS Quality Benefits, 2006-11……………………………………………………………………………….258 
Table 6.8: Yield Estimates for AOI Contract Growing, by Tier (2011/12)……………………………………..260 
Table 6.9: Limbe Leaf Yield Estimates for Contract Farming, According to Tier……………………………261 
Table 6.10: Input Levels in Premium-TAMA Contracts, According to Tier……………………………………261 
Table 6.11: AOI Desired IPS Projected through 2015 Crop………………………………………………………….262 
Table 6.12: Premium-TAMA Farmer Objectives by Tier………………………………………………………………262 
Table 6.13: AOI Compliance Levels by Tier………………………………………………………………………………….264 
Table 7.1: Contract (Burley) Farming Allocations and Purchases for Major Tobacco  
     Companies, 2009-2011……………………………………………………………………………………………….284 
Table 7.2: Burley Tobacco Contract Farming Allocation as Percentage of Total Crop, 2009- 
     2011…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..285 
Table 7.3: Percentage of Burley Tobacco Contract Farming Allocation by Company, 2009- 
     2011…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..289 
Table 7.4: Comparison of Burley Tobacco Contract Farming Allocation Shares and Overall  
     Market Shares…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….289 
Table 7.5: Percentage of NASFAM Burley Tobacco by Contract Type, 2011………………………………..297 
Table 7.6: Number of Farm Produce Farmers by Contract Type, 2012………………………………………..298 
Table 7.7: Number of Phindu Clubs by Contract Type, 2012……………………………………………………….298 
10 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Wade's (1990) Forms of Government Policies…………………………………………………………….69 
Figure 3.1: Schematic of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco……………………………………………………..102 
Figure 3.2: Tobacco Production (quantity) by Region, 2007………………………………………………………..111 
Figure 3.3: Cigarette Consumption (billions of cigarettes) in Selected Key Markets, 2007- 
       2011…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………118 
Figure 3.4: Cigarette Consumption (billions of cigarettes) in China, 2007-2011………………………….118 
Figure 3.5: ICC Global Market Share, 2011………………………………………………………………………………….121  
Figure 3.6: Marlboro Global Market Share, 2010-2012……………………………………………………………….127 
Figure 3.7: Cigarette Marketing Expenditures by Category in the U.S.A., 2008……………………………129 
Figure 3.8: Number of Countries with Medium to Large Warning Labels, by Country Income  
      Group………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..136 
Figure 3.9: Excise Tax as Percent of Cigarette Price, Selected Countries……………………………………..137 
Figure 3.10: Universal Corporation’s Revenues from Major Customers (US$ millions), 2011- 
         2013……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….146 
Figure 3.11: World Uncommitted Tobacco Stocks, 2008-2012……………………………………………………149 
Figure 4.1: Volume (kg) of Tobacco Sales in Banda Era……………………………………………………………….184 
Figure 4.2: Average Price of Sold Tobacco in Malawi (tambala/kg), by Type……………………………….189 
Figure 4.3: Tobacco Sold (kg) in Malawi by Type, Liberalisation-era……………………………………………197 
Figure 4.4: Tobacco Prices (US$/kg) in Malawi by Type, Liberalisation-era…………………………………198 
Figure 5.1: Schematic of Malawi Tobacco Value Chain……………………………………………………………….219 
Figure 6.1: Levels of Perceived End-Market Bifurcation by Chain Nodes/sub- 
      Nodes………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..233 
Figure 6.2: AOI Agronomy Department Budget (US$ Millions)……………………………………………………237 
Figure 6.3: Limbe Leaf Agronomy Department Budget (US$ Millions, Rough  
      Estimates…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..238 
Figure 6.4: Smallholder-Related Agronomy Employees at AOI, 2004-2012…………………………………239 
Figure 6.5: Cigarette Per Capita Consumption in Selected Countries………………………………………….255 
Figure 6.6: Degree of Buyer Involvement in Contract Farming (Process  
      Upgrading)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………259 
Figure 6.7: Degree of Compliance and Traceability (Product Upgrading)…………………………………….263 
Figure 6.8: The Continuous Nature of Upgrading………………………………………………………………………..265 
Figure 7.1: Average Burley (Nominal Current) Prices, US C/KG, 1995-2011…………………………………283 
Figure 7.2: World Uncommitted Burley Stocks (million kgs, dry weight), 2008- 
      2012………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….287 
Figure 8.1: Estimated Burley Production (million green kilos) in Mozambique, 2003- 
      2013………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….308 
Figure 8.2: Illicit Share of the Total Cigarette Market in Selected Countries……………………………….324 
 
 
 
11 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
AABTC  - Action-Alert-Brand-Targeting-Campaign 
ACA  - Agricultural Commodity A 
AD  - Agronomy Director 
ADMARC - Agriculture Development and Marketing Corporation 
AfDB  - African Development Bank 
Afubra              - Associação dos Fumicultores do Brasil (Brazilian Tobacco Growers’ 
Association) 
AHL  - Auction Holdings Limited 
AOI  - Alliance One International 
APMB  - Agricultural Production and Marketing Board 
ARET  - Agricultural Research and Extension Trust 
ASAC  - Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit 
ATC  - Associated Tobacco Company 
B&EA  - Blantyre and East Africa Company 
B&W  - Brown and Williamson 
B2B  - Business-to-business 
BAT  - British American Tobacco 
BATSA  - British American Tobacco South Africa (pty) Ltd. (subsidiary) 
BC  - Blue Chip 
12 
 
BDCC  - Buyer-Driven Commodity Chain 
BWI  - Bretton Woods Institutions 
C&T  - Compliance and Traceability 
CDC  - Center for Disease Control (U.S.) 
CEO  - Chief Executive Officer 
CoC  - Codes of Conduct 
CNTC  - China National Tobacco Corporation 
CR  - Corporate responsibility 
CSF  - Critical Success Factor 
CSR  - Corporate social responsibility 
CT  - Convention theory 
DC  - Developed country 
DFID  - Department for International Development (U.K.) 
DPP  - Democratic Progressive Party 
ECF  - Extended Credit Facility 
ECLT  - Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Foundation 
EOI  - Export-oriented industrialization 
ETI  - Ethical Trading Initiative 
EU  - European Union 
FAO  - Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FCTC  - Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
13 
 
FCV  - Flue-cured Virginia 
FDA  - Food and Drug Administration (USA) 
FDI  - Foreign direct investment 
FFV  - Fresh fruits and vegetables 
FISP  - Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
FMB  - Farmers Marketing Board 
FUM  - Farmers’ Union of Malawi 
FY  - Financial year 
GAP  - Good Agricultural Practices 
GCC  - Global Commodity Chain 
GDB  - Global Drive Brands 
GDP  - Gross Domestic Product 
GFB  - Global Flagship Brands 
GLT  - Green leaf threshing plant 
GPN  - Global Production Network 
GVC  - Global Value Chain 
GVCT  - Global Value Chain for Tobacco 
HH  - Households 
IB  - Independent Buyer 
ICA  - International Coffee Agreement 
ICC  - International Cigarette Company 
14 
 
ICO  - International Coffee Organisation 
IFI  - International Financial Institution 
IGO  - Inter-Governmental Organisation 
ILO  - International Labour Organisation 
IMF  - International Monetary Fund 
IMS  - International marketing standards 
IPS  - Integrated production system 
ITC  - Imperial Tobacco Company 
ITGA  - International Tobacco Growers’ Association 
IUF                    - International Union of Food, Agriculture, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, 
Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Association 
JT  - Japan Tobacco Inc. 
JTI  - Japan Tobacco International 
LDC  - Less developed country 
LL  - Limbe Leaf (Malawi subsidiary of Universal Corporation) 
MCP  - Malawi Congress Party 
MD  - Managing Director 
MFA  - Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
ML  - Malawi Leaf 
MNC  - Multi-national corporation 
MRFC  - Malawi Rural Finance Company 
15 
 
MSA  - Master Settlement Agreement 
MTRA  - Malawi Tobacco Research Authority 
NASFAM - National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi 
NBC  - Non-Blue Chip 
NGO  - Non-Governmental Organisation  
NGP  - Next Generation Product 
NIC  - Newly Industrialized Country 
NSO  - National Statistics Office 
NTB  - Native Tobacco Board 
NTRM  - Non-Tobacco Related Materials 
OBM  - Own-brand manufacturing 
OEM  - Original equipment manufacturing 
PDCC  - Producer-Driven Commodity Chain 
PMI  - Phillip Morris International 
PMUSA - Phillip Morris USA 
PP  - People’s Party 
PPP  - Public-Private Partnership 
PR  - Public relations 
PT  - Premium-TAMA 
R&D  - Research and development 
RAI  - Reynolds American Inc. 
16 
 
RJR  - R J Reynolds 
RYO  - Roll Your Own cigarettes 
SADC  - Southern African Development Community 
SADP  - Smallholder Agricultural Development Project 
SAL  - Structural Adjustment Loan 
SMI  - Supplier Managed Inventory 
SSA  - Sub-Saharan Africa 
STR  - Sindicato de Trabalhadores Rurais (Rural Workers Union, Brazil) 
TAMA  - Tobacco Association of Malawi 
TAPS  - Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship  
TCC  - Tobacco Control Commission  
TNC  - Trans-national corporation 
TRIM  - Tobacco Research Institute of Malawi 
UC  - Universal Corporation 
UDF  - United Democratic Front 
UDI  - Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia) 
WB  - World Bank 
WHO  - World Health Organisation 
WST  - World Systems Theory 
 
 
17 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 First and foremost I would like to thank my parents for their continued support 
throughout the PhD programme and for having encouraged me to undertake doctoral 
studies.  I would also like to thank my brother Juani for his moral and academic support 
throughout the past three years, in particular for his patience and feedback in our 
countless conversations about the Malawian tobacco industry and how I wanted to 
structure my research. 
 I would like to thank my supervisor, Deborah Johnston, for her guidance and 
feedback throughout the programme.  Special thanks is also due for her strong support in 
me meeting my deadline,  including through frequent supervisory meetings and reviewing 
chapters at not the most opportune times.  Juggling the demands of the PhD with those of 
other work commitments in order to complete in time also would not have been possible 
without Deborah’s structured guidance and encouraging me to get writing early and 
always have some new writing to show her at our meetings.  I am extremely grateful for 
this support.  
 I would also like to thank Martin Prowse, one of a small collection of people who is 
fascinated by and has written about the contemporary Malawian tobacco industry.  From 
chatting about research ideas when I first chose this topic to co-authoring papers together, 
his knowledge of and insight into the Malawian tobacco industry has helped shape this 
project over the course of the last three years. 
 I would also like to thank anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Agrarian Change 
and Development Policy Review, who reviewed articles which were partially based on 
and/or similar to some of the content in this thesis.   
 My research in Malawi, which was based primarily on semi-structured interviews 
and a firm-level survey, would not have been possible without the generous collaboration 
18 
 
of numerous individuals and organisations.  In particular I would like to thank all of my 
anonymous interview respondents, who of course cannot be named here, but who have 
provided me with a tremendous amount of information, in particular, officials at the 
tobacco companies and farmer associations.  I would also like to thank the Tobacco 
Control Commission and the Economics Association of Malawi for providing me with 
research affiliations and introductory letters to help gain access to informants.  
 In addition to interview respondents, two individuals at tobacco farmer 
associations deserve special mention.  Felix Thole, of the Tobacco Association of Malawi, 
gave an enormous amount of his time to helping me with my research- be it via lengthy 
informal conversations about the industry or by allowing me to shadow him into the field 
to meet with tobacco farmers or onto the auction floors countless times.  Zikomo 
kwambiri!  The same can be said for Alifeyo Nyasulu, of the National Smallholder Farmers’ 
Association.  Both of these men, trained in agronomy, also helped me to get my head 
(slowly) around the basics of tobacco agronomy.   
 During my three trips to Malawi I was very fortunate to be staying with two 
families without whose hospitality and friendship my experience would have been very 
different.  In addition to treating me as an additional family member, I would to think 
Mary and Chifundo Kachale in particular for the countless stimulating conversations about 
Malawian politics, and Daniel and Upile Grem for all their support in my attempts to speak 
Chichewa.    
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
PART 1:  THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND 
METHODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Tobacco has long been Malawi’s primary source of foreign exchange, often 
accounting for up to 60% of earnings.  Production of tobacco in Malawi is mainly 
smallholder-based and almost entirely orientated towards exports (Prowse and Moyer-
Lee, forthcoming).  The global tobacco industry - upon which the economic fate of Malawi 
rests - is unique in a number of ways.  The main end-product of this industry – cigarettes - 
are best known for their lethality, and are subject to an ever-increasing barrage of 
demand-reducing regulations on an international scale.  The selection of the Malawian 
tobacco industry as this work’s object of inquiry was based on the peculiarities of the 
industry as well as on Malawi’s dependence on it.   
It has become quite fashionable in a number of disciplines to address development 
issues in a manner which connects producers in developing countries with consumers in 
developed countries.  Various “systems”, “networks” and, in particular, “chain” 
approaches have attempted to achieve this aim in different ways.  There is an extensive 
literature on as well as comparing these approaches, which in the interests of space, will 
not be engaged with here1.  For our purposes we are predominantly interested in the 
Global Value Chain (GVC) approach, and to a lesser extent its intellectual predecessor, the 
Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach.   
                                                          
1
 For example, on a discussion of commodity chains, Global Commodity Chains (GCC), value chains, Global 
Value Chains (GVC), and Global Production Networks (GPN), see Campling (2012b).  For a comparison of the 
French filière and GCC approaches, see Raikes et al. (2000).  For a discussion and comparison of commodity 
chains, GCC, and GVC approaches, see Bair (2005).  For a comparison of GCC/GVC with an (albeit very brief) 
discussion of commodity chains, “commodity systems analysis”, systems of provision, filiere, GPN, supply 
chain management, and value chain approaches, see Bair (2009).  For “cross continental food chains” see 
Fold and Pritchard (2005b).    
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In Section 1.2 we will present some of the key literature on Global Value Chains, with 
particular emphasis on the concepts of territoriality, governance, and upgrading.  In 
Section 1.3, we will present some critiques of the GVC literature, both from within and 
without of the literature, with an eye towards expanding our analytical framework.  In an 
effort to more explicitly incorporate the role of the state in developing countries, we will 
draw on some of the developmental state literature.  Likewise, in order to incorporate a 
role for smallholder farmers as key actors in global value chains, and following Selwyn 
(2007; 2012) we will draw on Wright’s (2000) associational power.   
In Section 1.4 we will provide an overview of our case.  We will first summarize our 
analytical approach.  We will then expand on our reasons for choosing the global tobacco 
industry, Malawi, and a GVC approach for the purpose of interrogating the connection 
between the two.  Next we will present a number of research questions arising as well as 
substantive areas of GVC analysis which will not be fully incorporated into this work and 
why.  The section will conclude by presenting an outline of the rest of the thesis.    
 
 
1.2 Global Value Chains: Key Concepts  
 
1.2.1 A GVC Understanding of the Formation of Power Imbalances in the Global 
Economy 
 
In the period from the end of World War II to the oil embargos of the 1970’s, rich 
countries2 attained unprecedented levels of wealth.  Gibbon and Ponte (2005) argue that 
this led to an eventual saturation of markets for many basic commodities, requiring the 
companies selling these commodities to come up with new and innovative ways of 
attracting buyers (e.g. product differentiation and branding).  The stagflation in rich 
                                                          
2
 Rich countries (or developed countries) in this work will refer essentially to Western Europe, North 
America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.   
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countries resulting from the OPEC embargos was followed by the elections of Reagan and 
Thatcher and the birth of the neoliberal era.  These regimes engaged in substantial 
deregulation which in part led to the financialisation of the Anglo-Saxon economies.   
 Financialisation gave rise to what Gibbon and Ponte (2005) refer to as the 
shareholder value doctrine, which stipulates that publicly listed companies come under 
pressure first and foremost to maximize the values of their shares3.  Share values tend to 
increase with an increase in perceived returns on physical capital (which is intended to 
proxy for company efficiency).  The shareholder value doctrine therefore increased 
pressure on firms to disassociate (re: outsource) themselves from activities requiring 
substantial physical capital such as manufacturing (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).  Or as 
Palpacuer (2008, p 395), paraphrasing Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000), describes: 
Major US corporations shifted from a ‘retain and reinvest’ strategy, 
primarily using cash flows to sustain growth, to a strategy of ‘downsize and 
distribute’ coupling work externalization and lay-offs to greater cash flow 
distribution to shareholders in the form of dividends and share buy-backs. 
 
 In addition to increasing pressures to increase return on capital by outsourcing 
manufacturing, Palpacuer et al. (2005) suggest two other ways in which the shareholder 
value doctrine may influence firms’ relations with their suppliers.  First, there may be a 
tendency towards focussing on and increasing control over key suppliers in order to 
improve efficiency.  Second, there may be an increased focus on monitoring of suppliers in 
an efficient manner which facilitates communication of key indicators to shareholders4.      
The post-war boom also had positive effects for developing countries as they 
produced many goods that rich-country consumers demanded.  Furthermore, relatively 
                                                          
3
 Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) suggest a number of factors which contributed to the increasing corporate 
emphasis on shareholder value.  These factors include but are not limited to: competitive pressures on giant 
U.S. corporations (especially from Japan), the academic influence of agency theory in financial economics, 
and support from institutional investors.  Milberg (2008) further attributes the rise in importance of the 
financial sector to non-financial corporations to the increasing gap in the rate of return on financial and 
manufacturing investments in the 1970s.  Milberg argues that tight monetary policy and financial sector 
deregulation increased returns on financial investments while increased competition from Japan decreased 
manufacturing investment returns. 
4
 Also, see Raikes et al. (2000) on the trend towards the prioritization of lead firms of maximizing share 
values, and its consequence for relations with suppliers.   
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symmetrical bargaining positions of rich country consumers and developing country 
producers existed for a variety of reasons, a full exposition of which is beyond the scope of 
this chapter.  However, some potential explanatory factors include: the nature of cold war 
politics, the presence and strength of agricultural state marketing boards in developing 
countries and the consequential existence of the producer country as an economic 
agent/unit, and the existence of international commodity agreements (Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005).  The agricultural state marketing boards (many of which were introduced in the 
1930’s) dramatically reduced entry barriers for smallholders as they often supplied credit 
and inputs as well as reduced risk through guaranteeing purchase of smallholder output 
(Daviron and Gibbon, 2002).  The international commodity agreements raised and 
stabilized prices through export quotas or buffer stocks and were noteworthy in that they 
were agreed upon by both producer and consumer countries (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; 
Ponte, 2002a).  See Table 1.1 below for data on some of these agreements with relevance 
to Africa.      
According to Gibbon and Ponte (2005), the 1980’s and the end of the cold war saw the 
demise of the international commodity agreements and state marketing boards.  Rich 
countries, and the international financial institutions (IFIs) they ran, pressed for 
deregulation, privatisation, and free trade policies for less developed countries (LDCs).  
Neoliberalism saw free trade as a cure-all for LDC preoccupations such as growth and 
poverty, despite inconclusive empirical evidence (Deraniyagala, 2005).  As the role of 
agricultural parastatals decreased and developing country supply of agricultural 
commodities became increasingly fragmented, many multi-nationals increased their direct 
sourcing through various forms of contract farming (Fold and Pritchard, 2005a, p 19).  
Occurring simultaneously with the increasing concentration of buyers and fragmentation 
of suppliers was a “capture of control over product differentiation by those in ‘buyer’ 
segments” (Daviron and Gibbon, 2002, pp. 152-3) 5, and the increasing importance of 
intangible assets such as branding (Gereffi, 2013).   
 
                                                          
5
 We will return to this theme in our discussion of upgrading below.  
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Table 1.2: International Commodity Agreements for Sugar and Cocoa 
 
Commodity Title and start 
year 
Price control 
mechanism 
Years when 
economic 
provisions 
were 
operational 
Number of 
years during 
which average 
price 
exceeded 
recommended 
level 
Number of 
African 
producing 
country 
signatories 
Sugar ISA, 1954 Export 
controls 
1954-1961, 
1969-1973, 
1978-1984 
10 years 7 
Cocoa ICCA, 1972 Buffer stocks 1973-1979, 
1981-1989 
8 years 8 
Source: modified from Gibbon and Ponte (2005, p 48) 
  
 The interaction of the trends described above led to an increase in buying power 
(defined below) in those companies or chain segments located in developed countries 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005), in particular in retail and finance (Gibbon et al., 2008).  
Amanor’s (2009, p 251) description of the impact of these changes on developing country 
coffee producers can be somewhat generalized to developing country producers of other 
goods: 
Deregulation and the collapse of the old coffee agreements have served to 
undermine stability of production and have increased the bargaining power 
of roasters and suppliers and their ability to make profits through the 
manipulation of the marketing and branding of coffee.  Thus the largest 
profits accrue from symbolic marketing rather than from improvements in 
production conditions, enabling roasters and suppliers to extract greater 
profits while making farmers absorb costs of production and most of the 
risk. 
Milberg (2008) further suggests that many of the trends described thus far are self-
reinforcing.  More specifically, he argues that the oligopsonistic buying power of non-
financial corporations which maintain production networks in developing countries helps 
sustain the process of financialisation in two ways.  First, the combination of higher buying 
power and lower costs enables these firms to maintain cost mark-ups without investing in 
productivity improvements.  Given the predominance of the shareholder value doctrine, 
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the profits generated by these mark-ups are then returned to shareholders.  Second, the 
increased dollar revenues accruing to the developing countries participating in these 
production networks, in particular China, are then re-invested in American financial 
markets.     
 
 
1.2.2 The Birth of the Literature 
 
Paralleling the trend in economic policy outlined above was a trend in academic 
economics toward neoclassical extremism.  Given this hegemonic discourse it is 
understandable that literature on GVCs would lag behind the emergence of GVCs and be 
established by geographers, sociologists and “heterodox” economists (Bernstein and 
Campling, 2006a).   
The GVC literature’s intelectual roots are found in World Systems Theory (WST) 6 and 
its vision of the global economy being divided into core and periphery countries7 (Gibbon 
et al., 2008; Bair, 2005; Selwyn, 2011).  Whilst the WST literature on commodity chains 
drew attention to how developing and developed countries were linked through 
commodities, and how the latter extracted surplus value from the former, the GCC (and 
later GVC) literature distinguished itself by focussing more on the role of lead firms, the 
potential for upgrading, and the impact on national development in developing countries 
(Bair, 2005; Selwyn, 2012).  The post-WST (global) commodity chain literature has also 
distinguished itself from its intelectual predecessor by operationlising the theoretical 
concepts with contemporary empirical case studies (Henderson et al., 2002; Bair, 2005; 
Selwyn, 2011).   
                                                          
6
 Selwyn (2011, 2012) also traces the intellectual foundations to Schumpeter’s (1954) concepts of leading 
sectors and creative destruction. 
7
 Although the emphasis of this literature appears to be on the core-periphery divide, Selwyn (2011, 2012) 
distinguishes WST from Dependency Theory in that the former also allows for a semi-periphery. 
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 Unequivocaly, the most important early work on GCCs is a chapter by Gary Gereffi in a 
collection edited by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz in 1994.  Gereffi (1994) set the terms 
according to which future work on commodity and value chains would be discussed and 
analysed.  In this work Gereffi establishes the difference between producer- and buyer-
driven chains.  Producer-driven chains tend to occur in industries which are intensive in 
physical and human capital.  These chains are dominated by large multinational 
corporation (MNC) manufacturers/producers, which in turn tend to locate near the main 
consumer markets, such as the automobile industry (Gereffi, 1994; 1999a).   
Buyer-driven chains, on the other hand are 
…those industries in which large retailers, brand-named merchandisers, 
and trading companies play the pivotal role in setting up decentralized 
production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in 
the Third World (Gereffi, 1994, p 97)8. 
As can be seen by the above definition, these chains are particularly relevant for 
developing countries.  For this reason this chapter will focus on buyer-driven chains.  
Although much of the literature on GVCs ignores (or superficially deals with) development 
policy (more on which below), Gereffi (1994) associates buyer-driven chains with export-
orientated industrialization (EOI) strategies as both phenomena emerged in the early 
1970’s in the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs).  In this work, Gereffi (1994) also 
identified three key elements of GCCs: the input-output structure, territoriality, and 
governance.  The first two elements are primarily descriptive: input-output structure 
refers to the different products and services that flow through chain, while territoriality 
refers to the geographical coverage as well as the actors in the chain.  Indeed these two 
elements have received far less attention in the literature than the third element, 
governance9.  However, we are particularly interested in the concept of territoriality to 
the extent that it can incorporate end-market segmentation.  The question of what 
                                                          
8
 For conceptual similarities between Gereffi’s buyer-driven chain, and (the earlier) work of Stephen Hymer 
on multi-national corporations, see Bair (2009) and Campling (2012b).  
9
 Daviron and Ponte (2005, p 27) even amalgamate the two descriptive elements into one, stating that 
Gereffi (1994; 1995) originally identified three key elements of global commodity chains.  The three 
elements include the later addition of “institutional framework”, more on which below.   
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constitutes a global value chain has been asked but not definitively answered, within the 
GCC and GVC literatures.  For example, Raikes et al. (2000, p 400) ask:  
Is a GCC just any channel, or set of channels, by which produce crosses the 
world, or should the notion itself include the specific power and 
governance structures seen by Gereffi to define GCCs?   
 
Similarly, Gibbon (2003b, p 1812) notes: 
With regard to the geographic and economic boundaries of chains, 
methodological questions have been raised concerning whether 
“GCC/GVCs” refer to the input-output and geographical structures for 
entire commodities, in which case difficulties of coherence may be entailed, 
or whether they refer also to the input-output and geographical structures 
concentrated on production and trade for/by certain groups of lead agents, 
or even certain individual lead firms.  This relates to an underlying issue of 
the identity criteria for commodity chains, which is posed most acutely 
when the production and trade for the same commodity appears to take 
quite different forms in different contexts.  
 
  Indeed, Gibbon’s (2003b; 2008a; 2008b) work on African clothing exports (in particular 
from Mauritius) recognises end-market segmentation, as does Selwyn’s (2007; 2012) work 
on grape exports from North East Brazil.  Approaching GVC segmentation from a 
downstream perspective, Palpacuer et al. (2005) discuss the differentiation of the E.U. 
market for clothing (specifically by comparing the U.K., France, Denmark, and Sweden).  
The authors differentiate the value chain segments ending in these different countries by, 
among others, the lead firms’ concentration of supply bases, relations with suppliers, 
types of suppliers preferred, and entry barriers and opportunities for upgrading for 
suppliers.  Palpacuer et al. (2005) attribute some of these differences to the level of 
maturity of the lead firms, which is in turn associated with the increasing financialisation 
of the lead firm sector of a particlar chain segment.  Similarly, Riisgaard (2009) 
differentiates between two strands of the value chain for cut flowers ending in Europe- 
one led by major U.K. retailers, and the other by a multitude of buyers who purchase their 
flowers at the Dutch auctions.         
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As can be see in the above examples, end-market segmentation in GVC literature 
has often been explained as a function of one or more of the following characteristics: 
geographic location (e.g. E.U. versus U.S.)10, the degree and form of regulations in an end-
market, high-end versus low-end, type of lead firm (e.g. manufacturer versus marketer, or 
degree of capture by the shareholder value doctrine), and type of marketing channel 
(Gibbon, 2003a; 2008a; 2008b; Selwyn, 2007; 2012; Palpacuer et al., 2005; Riisgaard, 
2009).        
With regard to the identification of different strands or threads of the value chain, 
throughout this work we will employ the nomenclature developed by Daviron and Ponte 
(2005, p xxiv) for their analysis of coffee using a global value chains framework.  Thus, we 
will refer to the Global Value Chain for Tobacco (GVCT) when analysing “general features 
in relation to the movement of… from production to consumption,” and we will refer to 
the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain when discussing the strand of the 
GVCT which originates in Malawi.       
Governance, on the other hand, is a concept used for analysing the role of key 
actors in the chain, which we will return to below.  In a later work, Gereffi (1995) added 
“institutional framework” as a fourth element of GCCs.  This refers to “how local, national, 
and international conditions and policies shape the globalization process at each stage of 
the chain” (p 113).  However, the role of “institutional framework” has been emphasized 
by some GCC/GVC analysts primarily with regard to upgrading (more on which below) 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Daviron and Ponte, 2005).       
 It is necessary to clarify one important aspect of the edited collection by Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz (1994).  The works in this collection refer to global commodity chains 
(GCCs) rather than global value chains.  The change in nomenclature resulted from a 
collaborative research effort in 2000 on global production networks.  The GVC 
terminology was deemed to be the most inclusive11 (Bair, 2009).  Bair (2005, p 154), 
                                                          
10
 For example, Gibbon (2008a) stresses the historical and cultural reasons for the differentiation of the U.S. 
and E.U. end-markets for clothing, as well as the influence of various trade regulations.   
11
 The “commodity” concept has been criticised on numerous fronts, including those proposing alternative 
approaches such as Global Production Networks (GPN).  In particular, Henderson et al. (2002, p 444) argue 
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however, posits a more important distinciton between Global Commodity Chains and 
Global Value Chains:  
What distinguishes the GVC approach from the GCC paradigm to which it is closely 
related is the greater influence of the international business literature on its analysis 
of global production networks, as opposed to the more sociological orientation of 
the earlier GCC framework, and a more pronounced interest in the policy 
implications of chain research.   
 
However, Bair (2008) points out that some work (e.g. Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Daviron 
and Ponte, 2005) has seen the shift as merely a change in nomenclature while other work, 
in particular Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005), represents a change in approach.  
 Building on Bair (2008), we recognise two principal variants of GVC analysis in this 
work.  The first variant, associated with Gibbon, Ponte, and Daviron, will be denominated 
as GVC-GPD.  This variant’s theoretical underpinnings are more closely related to Gereffi’s 
original work (1994; 1995) and to the GCC tradition, while its empirical focus consists 
primarily of African agriculture.  The second variant, associated with Gereffi, Humphrey 
and Sturgeon (in particular with their work on upgrading within the value chains 
framework and on the their jointly authored theory of value chain governance, more on 
which below), will be denominated as GVC-GHS.  This variant more closely aproximates 
Bair’s (2008) description of the GVC (as opposed to GCC) literature12.   
 Given our explicit recognition of various strands of literature within the GVC 
tradition, it would be difficult to argue that GVC analysis represents a coherent and unified 
theoretical approach.  Indeed, following Campling (2012b) and Gibbon et al. (2008), who 
argue that it perhaps is better understood as a methodological approach, we will treat the 
GVC literature as an approach which incorporates a number of main ideas or concepts (e.g. 
lead firm governance, upgrading, etc.) in both the GVC-GHS and GVC-GPD variants.    
                                                                                                                                                                                 
that the term “…clearly does not capture adequately the post-fordist forms of activity that characterise 
many of the industries that the GCCs framework, for instance, was designed to analyse.” 
12
 Our identification of each variant with these specific authors is not an attempt to state that these are the 
only, but rather the more prominent authors.  Other GVC analysts can be loosely associated with one of the 
two variants.  For example, Kaplinsky with GVC-GHS and Palpacuer with GVC-GPD.  Both of these 
approaches and their differences will be discussed further below.  
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However, this is not to say that the GVC literature is devoid of theoretical insights.  Indeed, 
one of the defining characteristics of the GVC-GHS variant (in particular Gereffi et al., 2005) 
is these authors’ attempt to develop a theory of value chain governance, in which a 
number of independent variables can predict dependent variables such as value chain 
governance type and level of power asymmetries (more on which below)13.  Indeed, the 
GVC literature’s compatability with and/or dependence on other theoretical traditions has 
been presented as both weakness and strength.  For example, Gereffi et al.’s (2005) 
theory of value chain governance has been widely critiqued for its dependence on 
transaction cost economics (more on which below).  On the other hand, Selwyn’s (2007; 
2012) coherent incorporation of Wright’s (2000) theory of class compromise into a GCC 
framework served as one of the main building blocks for the construction of our analytical 
framework (more on which below).     
 
 
1.2.3 Governance  
 
This work will engage with two of the main interpretations of GVC governance.  In the 
first interpretation, predominant in the GVC-GPD variant, governance is drivenness, and 
the main object of inquiry is how lead firms exert their power throughout the chain.  In 
the second interpretation, favoured by the GVC-GHS variant and associated with Gereffi et 
al. (2005), governance is coordination (explained below).  In this sub-section we will 
discuss governance as drivenness, drawing on two widely cited case studies to illustrate 
the concept.  We will then discuss two important contributions to our understanding of 
power relations between lead firms and first tier suppliers, folowed by an exposition and 
assessment of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) theory of value chain governance (as coordination)14. 
                                                          
13
 Interestingly, given Gereffi’s leading role in the attempt to theorise key aspects of Global Value Chains, 
Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2011) also refer to Global Value Chains as a “methodology.” 
14
 Gibbon et al. (2008) propose a third (and new) type of value chain governance: normalization, understood 
as “a project of realigning a given practice so that it mirrors or materializes a standard or norm” (p 324). 
Drawing heavily on convention theory, governance as normalization appears to be in part a reaction to the 
31 
 
Gereffi (1994, p 97) defined governance as: “authority and power relationships that 
determine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a 
chain.”  In other words, who does what in the chain, and who decides who does what?  In 
order to get a clearer picture of this one can imagine a chain with four links for 
Agricultural Commodity A (ACA).  For the sake of simplicity let’s suppose that producers in 
a developing country produce ACA and sell it to local exporting companies.  The local 
exporting companies then sell ACA to rich-country importing companies who in turn sell 
ACA to rich-country stores.  In this simple schematic the rich-country stores would be the 
“lead firms” meaning they control who produces ACA and how ACA is produced, the 
importing companies would be the “first tier suppliers” and the exporting companies the 
“second tier suppliers”.  To analyse the governance in this ACA chain we would be 
interested in how the lead firms exert their influence on the other chain segments further 
upstream (i.e. towards the producers), i.e. how the chain is driven.   
The drivenness conceptualization of governance does not ignore issues of coordination, 
however.  It indeed recognises that at one end of the spectrum there is “hands-off” co-
ordination where lead firms exert influence upstream on (nominally) independent 
companies who are nonetheless beholden to their buyers15.  At the other end of the 
spectrum there is “vertical integration” where first and second tier suppliers are 
subsidiaries of the same company as the lead firms.  It is important to keep in mind that 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
other two governance concepts, and is associated with the GVC-GPD variant.  Indeed, Gibbon and Ponte 
(2008, p 381), in which the authors “continue their effort of understanding GVC governance in terms of 
normalization through the lenses of governmentality” (Gibbon et al., 2008, p 327), critique both (the 
drivenness and coordination) governance approaches for claiming to be empirical, yet:  
Both are nonetheless constructed without reference to the programmatic formulation of 
buying objectives and practices found in the purchasing trade.  Thus, their findings tend 
mainly to reflect the theoretical biases of the variant of GVC analysis that they arise from. 
Although in this work we will engage with some aspects of GVC governance which could be more associated 
with the normalization approach (e.g. incorporation of the role of non-firm actors, investigating the 
objectives of buyers in their purchasing decisions), our empirical investigation, and hence our discussion in 
this chapter, more closely approximates the drivenness and coordination approaches to governance.  
Likewise, with its main emphasis on asymmetrical power relations throughout the chain and on how lead 
firms use these power asymmetries to control the entire chain, we argue that the drivenness approach to 
governance dominates in much of the GVC-GPD variant of the literature.  Therefore, whilst not dismissive of 
other approaches to governance, and bearing in mind the confines of space, our emphasis in this work will 
be primarily on governance as drivenness, and to a lesser extent as coordination.   
15
 Being beholden to a buyer is usually explained in the literature in terms of asymmetrical bargaining power 
which is in turn usually explained through buyer market share and/or ability to impose standards and 
relegate functions upstream.   
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different points of the chain can be characterized by different levels of buying power and 
market relations.  In accordance with the above narrative of the global economy, lead 
firms have become increasingly concentrated and powerful and exert their influence in a 
more “hands-off” way (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Gereffi and Lee, 2012).  Indeed, with 
regard to the producer-driven versus buyer-driven governance dichotomy - a key element 
of the conceptualization of governance as drivenness - Bair (2005, p 159) notes that  
…what is most significant about the dichotomy between these ideal types is the 
theorization of commercial capital (what are often called ‘big buyers’ in the GCC 
literature) as the power brokers that call the shots for the many firms involved in the 
buyer-driven commodity chains they control, although they may have no equity 
relation to the firms actually producing the goods made on their behalf. 
 
Buyer power of lead firms is usually treated as synonymous with market share (of 
either rich-country or global markets)16.  Gereffi (1994, pp 115-116) argues that this buyer 
power increased in the global garment industry as a result of greater retailer 
concentration on the one hand and oversupply due to the number of overseas factories 
on the other.  The author also stresses contextual factors such as the influence of the 
multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) and the recent (at time of writing) recession which caused 
higher demand for low-priced goods.  In terms of how lead firms exercise power, Gibbon 
and Ponte (2005, p 123) state that  
...the most important element of power relations between lead firms and 
first-tier suppliers is control over the definition of the functions that first-
tier suppliers should play, rather than the externalization of low-profit 
functions as argued in earlier literature. 
 
Lead firms use their power of defining functional roles along the chain to increasingly 
relegate functions further upstream.  A common example of this is Supplier Managed 
                                                          
16
 Gereffi and Lee (2012) also emphasize the importance of the power of lead firms in buyer-driven chains 
derived from “their ability to shape mass consumption via strong brand names” (p 25).  Likewise, Gibbon 
and Ponte (2008, p 366) identify “access to capital and proprietary technologies or marketing devices such 
as brands” as the key attribute of lead firms in the conceptualization of governance as driving.  Also, see 
Raikes et al. (2000) on the implications of branding and retailing for power relations between lead firms and 
suppliers.      
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Inventory (SMI). This means that first tier suppliers must bear the costs of stocking a 
commodity until it is required by the lead firms.  These costs include but are not limited to 
insurance, costs of physical storage, and finance.   
Although originally developed for manufactures, many of the key concepts of the 
global value chains literature are increasingly applied to agricultural chains (Fold and 
Pritchard, 2005a).  Dolan and Humphrey (2004) illustrate the concept of governance as 
drivenness with their case study of the Kenyan horticulture chain (ending in the U.K.).  In 
this chain, from the 1960’s until the 1980’s Kenyan smallholders sold horticultural 
products to Kenyan exporting companies who in turn sold to U.K. importers and/or 
wholesalers.  The importers/wholesalers would then go on to sell the goods to retail 
stores and/or consumers.  From the 1980’s on, supermarkets started to focus more on 
selling fresh produce as a marketing strategy for a variety of reasons.  Fresh fruit and 
vegetables were seen as a “destination category” (the availability of these products could 
determine where consumers shopped).  They also had among the highest returns per 
shelf space of any items supermarkets sold17.  This strategic importance and high 
profitability led supermarkets to increase their purchases (imports) of fresh produce, 
thereby collectively constituting the majority of fresh produce purchases in the U.K. which 
in turn enhanced their buying power and gave them increasing influence over their 
suppliers (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004).  Some of the rapid changes in purchasing patterns 
can be seen in Table 1.2 below.    
From the 1980’s onwards also saw increased consumer concern (and consequently 
rich-country legislation) with food safety, epitomized by the 1990 (U.K.) Food Safety Act, 
which required retailers to ensure food safety and monitor production all the way 
upstream to the farm.  The combination of stricter standards (higher entry barriers) and 
increased buyer power of supermarkets led to greater power asymmetries between 
supermarkets and their suppliers (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004).  According to Dolan et al. 
(2000) this power assymmetry is reflected by the ease with which a supermarket may 
switch suppliers and the level of investment required for suppliers and growers to 
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 Dolan, Humphrey, and Harris-Pascal (2000, cited in Gibbon, 2001) argue that supermarkets’ increasingly 
exclusive knowledge of consumer trends like this one added to the buyer-drivenness of the supermarkets.  
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participate in the chain.  The supermarkets exerted this power over importers by raising 
their requirements such as for a year-round supply of fresh (safe) produce and by 
outsourcing increasingly complicated and risky tasks such as “category management.”   
Dolan and Humphrey (2004, p 22) describe the “category management” idea as 
follows: 
Products are grouped into a number of categories, and within each 
category the value chain is consolidated and a large part of its management 
transferred from the supermarkets to the “category captain” or “category 
manager”.  
 
In this model the category manager, which is also a supplier, is expected to coordinate the 
other suppliers to ensure that demand is met and develop the category (through 
marketing) among other things.   
 
Table 1.2: Distribution of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables in the UK by Market Outlet (% 
Share of Value) 
 
Outlet 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Supermarkets and 
major retail 
chains 
63 68 72 76 
Greengrocers and 
market stalls 
26 21 18 15 
Independent 
grocers 
6 6 6 5 
Farm shops/other 5 5 4 4 
Source: Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascal (2000, p 9) 
 
This case study is a good example of what Gereffi and Lee (2012) argue to be one of the 
more prominent methods of lead firm governance: the use of quality standards.  In 
particular,  
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Growing consumer awareness of social and environmental concerns also leads 
retailers to tightly coordinate with their suppliers.  A relatively new phenomenon of 
private quality standards set by powerful individual retailers aims to dictate which 
products are to be supplied, and how, when and where they will be produced (p 28).   
 
Standards are particularly prominent in food and agriculture, and are increasingly the 
domain of multi-national corporations (often in stricter form) in addition to public 
regulatory bodies in developed countries (Barling and Lang, 2005).   
 The conceptualization of governance as drivenness is also clearly displayed in 
Ponte’s (2002a; 2002b) work on coffee.  Like many other commodities, the demand for 
coffee tends to increase in line with increasing consumer income.  However, once 
consumer income reaches a certain level  (i.e. that of rich countries) the demand flat-
lines18.  In the 1960’s the global coffee trade was dominated by the international coffee 
agreements between both producer and consumer countries which used a system of 
export quotas to raise and stabilize coffee producer-prices.  The demise of these 
agreements in the 1980’s therefore led to lower and more volatile prices (Ponte, 2002a).   
Roasters - the lead firms in the coffee chain - became increasingly concentrated, with 
merely five firms eventually obtaining more than two thirds of the world market share for 
(roasted and instant) coffees (Ponte, 2002a).  As Ponte and Gibbon (2005, p 12) point out, 
roasters “have complete information on quality when they buy coffee, and they release 
next to no information to their clients.” According to these authors, the roasters use this 
asymmetric information to maintain their status as lead firms.  The roasters use their lead 
firm power to implement a system of supplier-managed inventory (SMI).  The original 
outsourcing of this task can be interpreted as a sign of lead-firm status among roasters as 
it occurred in the 1990’s when the futures market for coffee was “backwarding.”  This 
means that future stocks of coffee were valued less than current stocks.  In other words 
first tier suppliers were forced to bear the costs of stocking coffee if they wanted to be 
able to sell to roasters.  In later years the futures market for coffee was “carrying” 
meaning that there was the potential for a profit to be made in stocking coffee.  However 
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 Ponte (2002a) refers to the fact that growth of coffee consumption from 1989-1997 was at a stable low of 
around 1 % per year.   
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it is argued that SMI was maintained as roasters were captivated by the shareholder value 
doctrine and hence felt the need to reduce operations requiring high levels of physical 
capital (Ponte, 2002a).  In an effort to differentiate their products and spread their risk 
roasters started blending coffees from a variety of countries.  However, they required that 
producer countries and/or farms be capable of producing a minimum amount before they 
would purchase from them (Ponte, 2002a).  
However the concept of drivenness and the buyer-driven versus producer-driven 
dichotomy did not escape criticism.  One of the problems with the dichotomy (although 
not necessarily with the concept of drivenness per se), is that not all chains fit neatly into 
one or the other of the two categories.   For example, Talbot (2009) describes the 
difficulty in classifying the coffee chain as buyer-driven or producer-driven in that it 
displays elements of both, as coffee roasters combine technology-intensive manufacturing 
with diversified global sourcing and a focus on branding.  Furthermore, as the empirical 
scope of the GVC literature expanded, there arose a need to conceptually account for 
chains where relations between buyers and their (multi-national) suppliers displayed a 
certain amount of symmetrical power.  Important contributions in this area include work 
by Sturgeon (2002) and Fold (2002, 2005)19.  Sturgeon developed the terminology modular 
production networks, whereas Fold (2002) suggested a bi-polar governance structure.  
More specifically, Fold (2002) argues that the producer driven versus buyer driven 
dichotomy of GCC governance structures (discussed above) was inadequate in application 
to the global cocoa-chocolate industry because power in the chain lay with two different 
sectors of lead firms: cocoa grinders and chocolate manufacturers20.  Fold (2002) argues 
that a high level of concentration in both segments has increased mutual dependence, 
which grinders and manufacturers attempt to overcome by developing cocoa-based 
products for alternative outlets in the case of the former and by sourcing from 
international traders in the case of the latter.  However,  
                                                          
19
 Also see Daviron and Gibbon (2002) for a discussion on this topic with specific application to agriculture.  
Also, Palpacuer (2008), building on Gibbon (2002), argues that the increasing financialisation of (particularly 
Anglo-Saxon) GCCs has led the lead firms in these chains to place greater emphasis on economies of scale 
and monitoring of their suppliers, and hence in turn led to higher levels of concentration in first tier supplier 
segments of these chains.   
20
 Fold (2005) later employed Sturgeon’s (2002) terminology to describe the relations between grinders and 
branders/manufacturers.  
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The delicate balance in the global cocoa-chocolate chain is only maintained 
by the enormous cost of crossing the boundaries between existing 
segments on the basis of mergers and acquisitions; large-scale ‘green-field’ 
investments are out of the question (p 244).    
 
 Similarly, Sturgeon (2002, p 6) describes how the trend of increasing outsourcing 
by lead firms (in particular those in the American electronics industry) leads to the build-
up of both scale and capabilities in the supply base: 
As an industry’s supply-base comes to be comprised of large, highly capable 
turn-key suppliers the prospects for increased outsourcing are improved.  
In this way, turn-key suppliers and lead firms co-evolve in a recursive cycle 
of outsourcing and increasing supply-base capability and scale, which 
makes the prospects for additional outsourcing more attractive, not just to 
the lead firms that drove the upgrading of the supply base in the first 
instance, but for those lead firms just beginning to seriously consider large 
scale strategic outsourcing… 
 
However, and similar to Fold’s concept of bi-polarity, Sturgeon (2002) stresses the level of 
independence of first tier suppliers from the lead firms.  Sturgeon (2002) attributes this 
independence to the level of codifiability of transactions, which in turn mitigates against 
asset specificity and the build-up of transactional dependence of first tier suppliers on 
particular lead firms.   
Building on Sturgeon’s (2002) work on modular value chains, Gereffi, Humphrey, 
and Sturgeon (2005) elaborated a more complex theory of GVC governance, whose 
objective was to identify the coordination used by lead firms.  In other words, this work 
represents a conceptual shift from governance as drivenness to governance as 
coordination21.  Gereffi et al. (2005) designate five possible governance schemes: markets, 
modular, relational, captive, and hierarchical.  There are three factors whose combination 
and interaction determine the type of governance: complexity of transactions, ability to 
codify information, and supplier capability.  According to the theory these factors can 
have either “high” or “low” values.  The complexity of interactions increases when lead 
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 For more on the difference in governance approaches, see Bair (2005, 2008, 2009). 
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firms “place new demands on the value chain, such as when they seek just-in-time supply 
and when they increase product differentiation” (p84).  Codifying information - 
establishing the new demands in technical and/or process standards - is a mechanism 
used to decrease the complexity of transactions.  Supplier capability, in turn, refers to the 
ability of the upstream chain participants to meet the demands and requirements of the 
buyers further downstream.   
 In GVCs governed by markets, information is easily codified and transactions are 
simple, thereby allowing buyers and sellers to switch easily amongst one another.  In 
modular value chains transactions are complex but information is easily codified and 
suppliers have high levels of capabilities.  Buyers pre-specify their orders and suppliers 
carry them out.  In relational value chains there are “high levels of asset specificity,” about 
which information is not easily codified.  This leads to mutual dependence between 
buyers and suppliers which mitigates bargaining asymmetries.  In captive value chains 
suppliers have low capabilities and find it difficult to switch buyers, thereby leaving 
suppliers at the mercy of the buyers.  Finally, hierarchical value chains are characterized 
by vertical integration: buyers exert complete control over the modes of production22.  
See Table 1.3 below. 
 Gereffi et al. (2005) use the examples of the global apparel industry (more on 
which below) and the horticulture chain (into the U.K., as above) to illustrate their ideas.  
According to the authors, the global apparel industry was characterized by captive 
governance from the 1950’s to the 1980’s.  During this time period production (i.e. 
assembly) was located in Japan and subsequently in some of the NICs and depended on 
the provision of inputs and detailed instructions by the purchasers.  The global apparel 
                                                          
22
 For a discussion of the similarities between Gereffi et al.’s (2005) theory of GVC governance and 
transaction cost economics, see Bair (2008).  For example, describing the contribution to transaction cost 
economics by Oliver Williamson, Bair (2008, pp. 342-43) writes:  
Although Williamson’s theory initially focused on elaborating the circumstances under 
which hierarchy (i.e. firms) may represent an efficient alternative to markets, he later 
acknowledged that intermediate forms of organization that mix elements of market and 
hierarchy are also possible.  
…Williamson identified a ‘hybrid’ organizational form between market and hierarchy, 
which describes various kinds of long-term contracting arrangements or other situations in 
which there are repeated exchanges between autonomous parties that share some degree 
of mutual dependence… 
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industry of the 1990’s was characterized by relational governance as the NIC apparel 
companies switched to “full-package supply”.  This meant that they were responsible for 
an increasing number of tasks including sourcing their own inputs. 
 
 
Table 1.3: Key Determinants of GVC Governance 
 
Governance type Complexity of 
transactions 
Ability to 
codify 
transactions 
Capabilities 
in the 
supply-base 
Degree of 
explicit 
coordination 
and power 
asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low 
Modular High High High  
Relational High Low High  
Captive High High Low  
Hierarchy High Low Low High 
Source: Modified from Gereffi et al. (2005, p 87) 
 
 
Gereffi et al. (2005) give the example of the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to U.K. 
horticulture value chain before the mid 1980’s as an example of market governance.  As 
can be seen by the above description, this chain originally started with African 
smallholders and ended with U.K. wholesalers, most of the transactions along the way 
being characterized by arms-length market relations.  The authors suggest that the 
governance of the chain became modular from the 1980’s onwards as U.K. supermarkets 
reduced the number of suppliers/importers they used and increased the responsibilities 
required of them.  The increased requirements of U.K. supermarkets in turn led to vertical 
integration of many African exporters backwards (upstream) to have greater control over 
quality and standards.  In other words many African exporters started producing their own 
food in addition to sourcing from other farms.  Therefore, this node of the chain is 
characterized by hierarchical governance (Gereffi et al., 2005).      
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Gereffi et al.’s (2005) theory of value chain governance has been widely cited and 
critiqued.  It has notably been accused of ignoring the bigger picture with regard to chain 
governance (i.e. how lead firms govern the entire chain), the influence of external actors 
on chains (Gibbon et al., 2008; Gibbon, 2008a; Bair, 2008), as well dehistoricizing value 
chain governance (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, p 83).  However, whilst deemed inadequate 
for the purposes of evaluating the overall governance of a chain, Gibbon (2008a) suggests 
that the theory’s potential usefulness lies in examining interactions between chain agents 
at one specific node: 
Depending on the complexity of a given commodity, there will be any 
number of ‘make or buy’-type decisions needing to be made by a wide 
variety of agents at different links along a chain.  The model suggested by 
Gereffi et al. is ideal for examining each of these individually.  But it 
provides us with little indication of how to move from this level of analysis 
to a characterization of the overall pattern of decisions along a chain (p 38).    
 
Likewise, Gereffi (2013) emphasizes the usefulness of theory for comparing governance 
structures at different nodes of a single chain (also see Talbot, 2009).  Therefore, this 
theory has been understood to represent both a narrowing of the scope of GVC 
governance (from an entire chain to one node of a chain) and a shift in focus from 
drivenness to coordination (Bair, 2008).  Indeed, even one of the theory’s authors, in an 
evaluation of the theory four years after publication (Sturgeon, 2009), appears to 
acknowledge the limited scope: 
As a theory of linkages, the GVC governance framework is not intended to 
provide a complete theory of economic development, but a transaction-, 
firm - and industry-centric theory of governance among the firm - and 
establishment-level actors in the chain.  As such it cannot provide a full 
accounting of the characteristics and consequences of GVCs (p 133).   
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1.2.4 Upgrading             
 
The concept of upgrading has received an increasing amount of attention in the GVC 
literature and both its conceptual and empirical coverage has expanded over the course of 
the last decade.   Gereffi (1999b)23 uses the example of the apparel chain to illustrate 
possibilities for what became known as functional upgrading, i.e. moving up the chain.  
Faced with many of the same pressures and incentives as other chains described above, 
rich-country clothing companies (retailers, branded-manufacturers) looked to increase 
their organizational flexibility and lower their costs.  They did this by outsourcing 
production to the NICs in the 1960’s.  In the 1970’s and 1980’s, in response to new rich-
country importing quotas established by the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) and a series 
of domestic supply constraints (e.g. rising wages, labour shortages, currency appreciation) 
the NICs started to relocate their factories to foreign sites which did not face the same 
constraints.  However, due to the established (trust-based) relationships between rich-
country buyers and NIC producers, the buyers continued to place their orders with NIC 
producers.  The NIC producers would then have their outsourced manufacturers complete 
the job and the goods would be shipped from the (less quota-constrained) third country 
directly to the consumer country.  Gereffi refers to this system as “triangle 
manufacturing”.   
“Triangle manufacturing” is relevant for our discussion of upgrading in that in order for 
it to occur the NIC producers had to move up the chain beyond simple assembly (of 
manufacturer-provided inputs) to “full-package supply” or “original equipment 
manufacturing” (OEM) production.  The latter is a model of production whereby the 
concerned firms produce garments according to the buyers’ designs but are responsible 
for sourcing their own inputs and managing the upstream segments of the chain.  OEM 
often involves research and innovation in a continuous quest to better meet buyers’ 
demands.  OEM results from learning from lead firms and leads to greater flexibility and 
increased value added.   
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 The following discussion is based on this article unless stated otherwise. 
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Some of the companies in the NICs moved beyond this model into marketing their 
own brands (i.e. own-brand manufacturing or OBM).  However, whilst the above 
illustrates an  isolated example of succcessful functional upgrading there appears to be 
much agreement in the literature that lead firms tend to block functional upgrading 
further upstream (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Kaplinsky et al., 
2003). 
In one of the first applications of the upgrading concept to agricultural chains24, 
Gibbon (2001) outlines three important possibilities for upgrading primary commodities, 
suggests that they may be logically sequenced in the order in which he presents them, and 
emphasizes the potential role of the state in each.  The first, “capturing higher margins for 
unprocessed commodities” (p 352), can be achieved  
…by moving up the quality grade ladder, increasing volumes and reliability 
of supply, securing more remunerative contracts through forward sales and 
becoming active in hedging risk via utilizing futures and options 
instruments (p 352). 
 
The author suggests that in smallholder-dominated sectors of developing countries that 
this type of upgrading implies a need for public action25.  The second form of upgrading 
entails “producing new forms of existing commodities (p 353),” and the example of gene-
manipulated food crops is given.  The final form of upgrading presented, “localizing 
commodity processing” (p 354), displays similarities to Gereffi’s functional upgrading.  
Gibbon outlines a number of state interventions which can be used to promote this form 
of upgrading, which include: 
…bans, restrictions or disincentives (e.g., taxes/tariffs) on exports of given 
commodities in raw material form, and various types of public investment 
(and/or support to private investment) in processing itself- as well as in 
communications infrastructure, in increasing the availability/reliability of 
local raw material supply, export finance, workforce training and 
international marketing efforts (p 354). 
                                                          
24
 More specifically, the article was dedicated to international trader-driven chains.  However, we argue that 
the concepts can be applied to agricultural value chains more broadly.   
25
 We argue that there is potential for this type of upgrading to occur for individual smallholders or 
smallholder cooperatives via certain forms of contract farming (more on which below). 
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The GCC/GVC literature (in particular the GVC-GHS variant) later went on to 
identify and focus on four main categories of upgrading within a GVC framework: process, 
product, functional, and intersectoral26 upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, cited in 
Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, pp 89-90; Kaplinsky et al., 2003; Barrientos et al., 2010).  Process 
upgrading refers to producing a given product more efficiently, e.g. through acquisition of 
more advanced technology.  Product upgrading entails producing an improved product, 
usually meaning a product characterized by higher value added.  Intersectoral upgrading is 
the process of transfering the competencies used to produce one product to production 
of another product in a different chain, whereas functional upgrading refers to “moving 
up the chain” (as seen above). 
  Taking as starting point the fact that agricultural commodities (products) can be 
differentiated through process atributes (Humphrey, 2006), that given the amount of 
existing agricultural socially-related process standards that these diffentiated products 
could be classified as “credence goods” (Reardon et al., 2001), and that if of higher value 
these goods could be considered upgraded, Moyer-Lee and Prowse (2012, p 10) argue 
that in agricultural value chains  
…it is apparent there is considerable scope for simultaneous process and product 
upgrading27.  This occurs, for example, when smallholders undertake processes to 
differentiate and upgrade products (e.g. to produce credence goods) in order to 
meet buyer requirements, which also result in improved efficiency, yields, quality, or 
reduced risk.     
 
Functional upgrading, however, remains the main focus in the GVC-GHS literature.  
Gereffi (1999b, p 39) stresses the importance of partcipating in a commodity (value) chain 
for functional upgrading as partcipation places “firms and economies on potentially 
dynamic learning curves.”  Policies regarding (functional) upgrading have been the centre 
of much debate in development policy circles.  Cramer (1999) warns of the inherent 
difficulties arising from the generally highly aggregated nature of this debate and the 
                                                          
26
 Also referred to as “chain upgrading”.   
27
 By emphasizing the occasional simultaneous nature of product and process upgrading in agricultural value 
chains, it is hoped that we can overcome the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between the two, identified 
by Gibbon and Ponte (2005). 
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pervasive disregard for country and commodity specifics by the proponents of both sides 
of the debate.  Within this highly aggregated framework Cramer (1999) outlines some of 
the more common reasons for pessimism about developing country upgrading: rich-
country protectionism and product/process standards and difficult competition against 
well-established vertically integrated firms.  He also points to potential domestic 
constraints to upgrading such as capacity, infrastructure, and power shortages.   
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) critique the GVC-GHS literature’s over-emphasis on the 
supposed importance of functional upgrading when it may not be the most beneficial 
form for developing country farms or firms28.  Alternatively, the authors note: 
Another way forward in unpacking the relations between governance and 
upgrading in GVCs may be through detailed empirical analyses (on a chain-
by-chain basis) that identify concrete roles that offer suppliers higher and 
more stable returns, as well as the routes that they typically use for arriving 
at them (p 91). 
 
With regard to upgrading in value chains originating in Africa, the authors emphasise an 
upgrading strategy centred on improving economies of scale in particular, yet also 
mention cases of upgrading based on improving security of contract, product quality, and 
cutting out intermediaries to sell directly to retailers, among others.  However, in what 
could be interpreted as a broad summing-up of the approach, Gibbon (2008a, p 29) argues 
that “it is more enlightening to think of supplier upgrading in terms of conditions for 
profitable survival than in terms of normatively-defined development paths.”    
Daviron and Ponte (2005, p 30) further expand the concept of upgrading to focus in 
particular on the creation and control of  value associated with certain quality attributes.  
The authors then go on to identify three types of quality attributes (for their case study of) 
coffee: material, symbolic, and in-person service.  Material quality attributes are 
associated with the intrinsic properties of the commodity such as taste, aroma, etc.  
                                                          
28
 This emphasis on functional upgrading can be seen in the work of one of the concept’s main proponents:  
The challenge of economic upgrading in GVCs, therefore, is precisely to identify the 
conditions under which developing as well as developed countries and firms can ‘climb the 
value chain’ from basic assembly activities using low-cost and unskilled labor to more 
advanced forms of ‘full package’ supply and integrated manufacturing (Gereffi, 2013, p 10). 
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Within the category of symbolic attributes, the authors highlight three sub-categories 
which derive from: trademarks and branding, sustainability attributes, and geographical 
origin.  Finally, in-person service, which occurs at the point of consumption, “is the relation 
between the employees and the consumer, including a component of affective labour” (p 
46).  The authors give the example of the consumption of a coffee at Starbucks to 
emphasize the extent to which value (associated with the three above-listed quality 
attributes) is created at this node of the chain29.   
As lead firms (and in turn first tier suppliers) relegate an increasing number of 
functional activities further upstream, it often becomes more difficult for upstream 
suppliers/producers to participate in the chain leading to “exclusion” or “marginilization” 
(Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).  As Gibbon (2003a, p 616) notes: 
Those actors who can move into roles embracing some of the functions that lead 
firms seek to offload, and/or otherwise provide these firms with greater flexibility, 
can attain significant levels of upgrading.  In practice, though, relatively few 
producers in the South (and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa) have these capacities.  
Therefore, the more demanding the functional attributes that lead firms seek from 
suppliers, the more these suppliers will experience economic differentiation. 
 
For example, exclusion is seen in the Kenya-U.K. horticultural chain where (difficult-to-
implement) standards led to Kenyan-exporter backward integration to and/or sourcing 
from large estate producers thereby excluding Kenyan smallholders (Dolan and Humphrey, 
2004).  McMichael (2009) points to a similar trend of smallholder exclusion and 
differentiation in general in SSA.  These are due to imports of rich country subsidized 
foods and increased entry barriers to participating in agro-food value chains, respectively.  
These trends would lead us to believe that there is a decline in the livelihoods of peasants.  
Working conditions on larger farms are occasionally treated but overall impact on the 
quality of smallholder livelihoods rather than on smallholders (as units of production) was 
not (originally) adequately addressed in GVC literature. 
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 For a discussion on how the value associated with the quality derived from a particular origin-identity 
(specifically in the case of Coffee from Toraja, Indonesia) is controlled by “non-local, and therefore 
geographically ‘disembedded’, actors” (p 194), see Neilson (2005).    
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Within the GVC framework, later work has attempted to address this, as well as the  
disjuncture in the literature between a ‘firm focus’ that treats labour as a 
factor of production, and a ‘rights focus’ that examines conditions and 
entitlements of workers (Barrientos et al., 2010, p 5).   
 
For example, the Capturing the Gains project30, as seen in Barrientos et al. (2010), 
presents the concept of social upgrading (as opposed to economic upgrading) as “…the 
process of improvement in the rights and entitlements of workers as social actors, and 
enhances the quality of their employment” (p 7).  Barrientos et al. (2010) subdivide social 
upgrading into two categories: measurable standards and enabling rights.  While 
measurable standards, as the name implies, refer to concrete and quantifiable aspects 
such as terms and conditions or wages, enabling rights refer to “…less easily quantified 
aspects, such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, non-
discrimination, voice and empowerment” (p 7).  Barrientos et al. (2010) stress that 
economic upgrading does not necessarily imply social upgrading, and that indeed the two 
sorts of upgrading may occur simultaneously yet in opposite directions.  Taking the 
example of the transition from smallholder to estate production above, Barrientos et al. 
(2010) point out that if the smallholder who now works for an estate is a formerly 
uncompensated female (family) worker, that this could represent a form of social 
upgrading.   
 
 
1.3  Expanding the GVC Framework 
 
The GVC literature, in particular the GVC-GHS variant, has been widely critiqued, from 
both within and without the GVC tradition.  By understanding the criticisms, we will be 
able to conduct a more thorough GVC analysis.  Therefore we will engage with some of 
                                                          
30
 The project was launched in 2009 by GVC academics with funding from the U.K. Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark, 2011). 
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the more prominent critiques here, with an eye towards highlighting how others have 
attempted to expand the GVC framework, and attempting to expand it ourselves.   
 
 
1.3.1 Environmental Conditions of Production 
 
Commodity chains frameworks have been critiqued for ignoring the ecological and/or 
environmental conditions of production (Campling, 2012b; Talbot, 2009).  Indeed this 
point seems particularly important when a chain framework is applied to extractive 
industries (such as oil or Campling’s case study of tuna31).  However, the relevance of 
ecological/environmental conditions of production, or of “nature” more broadly, will 
depend to a large extent on the production processes associated with the commodity in 
question as well as the technological ability to manipulate these processes32.  Or as 
Bernstein and Campling (2006b, pp. 420-1) write:  
The physical or material attributes of agricultural commodities usually imply limits 
on substitutability, although the engineering of cultivars (now including their genetic 
modification, GM) production technologies, labour processes and/or processing 
technologies continue to relax those limits.   
 
For example, in his work on the poultry supply chain (although not an agricultural 
commodity), Burch (2005, p 174) minimizes “nature”’s importance: 
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 Although not written strictly within a commodity chains approach, Campling et al.’s (2012) introduction to 
a special issue of the Journal of Agrarian Change on capture fisheries, mentions some of the ways in which 
environmental conditions impact production.  For example, Kerala’s dual monsoon season has a (temporary) 
exclusionary impact on smaller boats.  Also, see Campling (2012a) on the same.   
32
 For relations between capitalism and nature more broadly, see Moore (2010), who writes that “All great 
waves of capital accumulation have unfolded through a greatly expanded ecological surplus, manifested in 
cheap food, cheap energy and cheap inputs” (p 392).  Putting this idea in a historical context, Moore (2010, 
p 401) states that  
The sixteenth century Dutch grew rich thanks to cheap grain from Poland’s Vistula; the 
nineteenth century English had Ireland, the Caribbean and the American Midwest.  When 
the USA came to world power, it had the Midwest, plus the American South and California, 
and Latin America.  Decisive food surpluses were won in all cases from untapped frontier 
zones, coupled (increasingly) with the productivity-maximizing genius of capitalism.    
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This commodity is produced within a closed system, and relies upon a wide 
range of standardized inputs which can be modified and controlled in order 
to maximize efficiencies and reduce uncertainty in the production of a 
predictable and standardized product. 
…While nature can never be entirely eliminated from such a system, 
nevertheless the specificity and unpredictability of ‘nature’ can be so 
significantly reduced that, to all intents and purposes, what we see in the 
modern system of poultry production is an industrial process, which is as 
flexible and mobile as that in any manufacturing industry.       
 
However, Talbot (2009) argues that chain analyses of tropical commodities are particularly 
well-placed to engage with discussions of the environmental conditions of production and 
the impact of these on chain structuring. For example, Talbot (2009, p 95) suggests that  
For the tropical commodities, the nature of the initial processing that is 
needed immediately after harvesting affects the scale of these processing 
operations and who controls them. 
 
 
1.3.2 Consumption 
 
Much GVC work did not orginally fully incorporate analyses of consumption; the 
emphasis of analysis centred on how lead firms govern chains rather than on how 
consumption patterns shape lead firm strategies33.  Convention Theory (CT) indirectly 
adresses some of these consumption concerns.  Various authors of the GVC-GPD variant, 
including Gibbon and Ponte (2005) have drawn on CT to complement their analyses34.  CT 
focuses (in part) on consumers’ different conceptions of “quality” (Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005; Gibbon et al., 2008).  For example, Eymard-Duvernay  (1989, cited in Gibbon and 
Ponte 2005, p 170) identify four conventions: market, industrial, domestic, and civic.  
Market conventions approximate what one would associate with a microeconomics 
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 This is changing rapidly as increasing attention is paid to “ethical” consumption, more on which below. 
34
 In fact they dedicate an entire chapter (out of a total of 7) to it.  The filière concept also draws heavily on 
CT (Henderson et al., 2002).   
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textbook where price indicates quality.  Industrial conventions concern goods where 
quality is established (e.g. audited) by a third-party.  Domestic conventions are related to 
goods where consumers and producers have thickened relations through repeated 
experience and/or trust.  An example of this is wine, cheese, or rice associated with 
specific countries or regions.  Civic conventions concern goods consumed by people who 
evaluate quality based on social or environmental processes of production.     
 
 
1.3.3 Labour, Codes, and Gender 
 
GVC literature has also been criticized for largely ignoring or downplaying issues 
regarding labour (Bernstein and Campling, 2006b; Bair, 2005; Barrientos et al., 2010; 
Selwyn, 2012; Riisgaard, 2009).  For example, Barrientos et al. (2010, pp 4-5) state that  
Analysis of labour in value chains has largely been restricted to the 
aggregate number of workers at different nodes of the chain, with an 
occasional breakdown of employment by job category, skill or gender.  The 
exceptions have mainly been case studies examining conditions of 
employment, protection and the rights of workers in GPNs. 
 
Much of the work that has attempted to incorporate labour into GVC analysis has placed 
analytical emphasis on lead firms’ role, either through codes of conduct or through 
sourcing strategies more broadly (more on which below).  Neglect of labour is particularly 
evident in that Chang and Wong (2005) describe the same evolution of the global apparel 
industry as Gereffi yet in terms of squeezing labour35.  The model presented by these 
authors portrays the shift of global garment production from the United States to Japan in 
the 1950’s, from Japan to the NICs in the 1970’s and from the NICs to Asian LDCs in the 
1990’s all as a function of employment and employment-related costs36.  The authors 
                                                          
35
 Gereffi (1995) does discuss labour costs as one of the motivating factors in relocation of garment 
production in Asia, but it was not the main focus of his work. 
36
 The former refers primarily to wages whereas the latter includes such costs as taxes, health care, etc. 
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argue that the threat of relocation is a key tactic used by employers to keep their workers 
passive.        
Firms have attempted to capitalise on increasing consumer concerns over “ethical” 
production by simplifying, weakening, and marketing “ethical” standards through codes of 
conduct (CoC, more on which below).  Daviron and Vagneron (2011) argue TNCs use CoC 
to re-commoditize goods that were initially differentiated by ethical practices.  The 
authors argue that the premium placed on auditability and pressure on substitutability 
waters down the original objectives of the codes.  CoC, many of which are implemented in 
the business-to-business (B2B) model of second-party auditing (i.e. companies enforcing 
their codes on themselves or on upstream suppliers) are plagued by the problem of 
“capitalists ‘monitoring’ capitalists” (Chang and Wong, 2005, p 142).  Codes of conduct 
(more on which below) will be treated in this work primarily in regard to the increasing 
entry barriers they often create for suppliers. 
A number of authors have attempted to incorporate labour into GVC analysis 
through a gendered lens (e.g. Barrientos, 2001), justifying the approach on the need to 
understand how gender influences employment, upgrading potential and power 
asymmetries in the workplace, among others.  Barrientos (2001) focuses on the 
concentration of female employment in temporary/seasonal and lower-paid work in the 
production node of GVCs.  She explains this position in terms of perceptions that female 
workers’ primary responsibilities are reproductive (i.e. domestic chores, child-rearing, etc.) 
and that their productive activities (employment) are therefore complementary.  
Furthermore, she argues that the perception that females are more dexterous and 
submissive makes them attractive employees in certain sectors.   
Barrientos (2001) applies this concept to the deciduous fruit sectors in Chile and 
South Africa where a small number of exporters buy from a large number of growers.  Due 
to their concentration and connections with developed country firms and markets, the 
exporters dominate relations with the growers.  The exporters use this asymmetrical 
power to shift the risks (i.e. volatile prices) and costs (i.e. investment in quality 
improvement) associated with the deciduous fruit industry onto the growers.  Presumably 
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the growers have no choice but to accept the extra burden as they do not have an 
alternative profitable outlet for their products.  However, in an effort to lessen the impact 
of these new burdens, the growers use their asymmetrical power over unemployed 
female workers to employ them at low wages and with few or no benefits37.  Barrientos et 
al. (2001) extend and expand upon this original analysis to incorporate codes of conduct 
(and their gender-sensitivity) in the deciduous fruit sector in South Africa, and the 
horticulture sectors in Kenya (flowers) and Zambia (flowers and vegetables).  In all three 
case studies the majority of workers are female and temporary, for the reasons outlined 
above.  Pointing out that there is an increasing tendency for lead firms to assume 
responsibility for ethical issues further upstream, the authors identify three categories of 
codes: independent international social codes, company codes, and sectoral codes.  
Barrientos et al. (2001) evaluate the gender-sensitivity of both the content 38  and 
enforcement processes39 of the codes.  
Mayer and Pickles (2010) further highlight a number of ways in which working 
conditions have come to be regulated from the top down, noting that   
Efforts outside of state agencies to regulate firm behaviour and compliance in their 
value chain have ranged from largely voluntary efforts to expand CSR across the 
supply chain, to activist and consumer pressure for ethical sourcing and clean 
clothes, to investor movements to create markets for social responsibility (p 5).  
 
Following on from this, Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi (2010) compare CSR compliance issues - 
in particular with regard to child labour - in the football manufacturing clusters of Sialkot, 
Pakistan and Jalandhar, India.  Whilst also engaging with literature on cluster governance, 
what is of interest for our purposes is the authors’ findings that there was major 
restructuring and reforms in the Sialkot cluster, due in part to the fact that the buyers of 
products from this cluster are more prominent branded firms.   
                                                          
37
 Barrientos’s (2001) treatment of governance here corresponds to the conceptualization of governance as 
drivenness. 
38
 Which they deem largely gender-insensitive. 
39
 For example, in the worst cases auditing is done by male technicians with little or no training regarding 
labour and gender issues.   
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Barrientos et al. (2010) also draw attention to the state of and potential for 
improving conditions of labour in a GVC context.  Like Barrientos’s earlier work (e.g. 
Barrientos et al., 2001, seen above) and contrary to Selwyn’s work (more on which below), 
Barrientos et al. (2010) emphasize primarily (though not exclusively) the role of lead firms 
in promoting social upgrading40.  The notion that conditions of labour are determined by 
lead firm policies stands in stark contrast to Selwyn’s (2011, p 3) postulation that labour 
plays a “co-constitutive role in the capitalist development process.”  This is brought out in 
the following passages on economic and social upgrading from Barrientos et al. (2010, p 
14): 
Higher status lead firms in both buyer-driven and producer-driven chains tend to 
have a greater stake in decent work conditions, and hence social upgrading 
(especially those in buyer-driven chains, where retailers and marketers are 
concerned with price point, quality, and brand visibility of the products they sell).  
However for more traditional partners, poor working conditions or violations of 
worker rights in their supply chain can negatively affect their reputation, both in 
terms of brand image and product quality…… 
Our hypothesis is that there are competing pressures for both outcomes within 
GPNs as suppliers balance higher quality with lower cost.  For example, since 
functional upgrading implies the need for a stable, skilled and formalized labour 
force, we can assume that economic and social upgrading (especially in its 
measurable standards) can be positively correlated, especially when it increases 
workers’ productivity.  At the same time, pressures to reduce cost and increase 
flexibility might lead employers to combine economic upgrading with social 
downgrading (for example by outsourcing employment to a labour contractor), 
although this raises questions about commercial sustainability if quality is to be 
assured.    
 
 
1.3.4 Power Relations in Global Value Chains 
 
Ironically, the GVC literature’s treatment of power - even though this is a core focus of 
the literature - is somewhat simplistic.  For example, although using different language 
                                                          
40
 Selwyn (2011) also welcomes the focus on labour offered by the Capturing the Gains project and draws 
certain parallels between the concepts of the project and his own work.  However he critiques Barrientos et 
al. (2010) for under-theorizing their observations. 
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than that found in the GVC literature, Chang and Wong (2005) challenge the notion that 
lead firms (commerical capital) always have as much power over upstream chain 
participants (manufacturing capital) as they are assumed to have.  The passage below 
shows the authors’ scepticism regarding lead firm power in the context of what they term 
as the Action-Alert-Brand-Targeting-Campaign (AABTC), that is the idea of consumers 
using their buying power to enforce minimum social requirements on producers.  
The “absolute domination” argument that identifies commercial capital as 
having the motivation and the power to control the surplus value 
extraction of the manufacturing capital works only on a one-on-one basis.  
Indeed, in some cases commercial capitalists like Nike can exercise huge 
power over individual suppliers but it is not always so.  The assumed 
effectiveness of AABTC is based on the illusion of some successful cases in 
which the buyers are open to dialogue with the campaign organizations 
and pressure their suppliers, rather than scientific evidence of better 
performance and, therefore, better leverage of commercial capital over 
manufacturing capital.  Further examples have shown either the reluctance 
of individual brand/retail companies to cooperate, or suppliers dropping 
the buyers rather than giving in to their demands, especially in cases 
regarding freedom of association and factory relocation (p 144). 
 
In addition to a lack of thorough treatment of power relations at chain nodes near 
the retail and consumption end, worker and producer power is often omitted from GVC 
analysis entirely.  In particular, Selwyn (2012, p 27) accuses the GCC literature of "firm 
centrism" where  
Workers in the global South are regularly portrayed as subject to firm's strategies of 
cost-price rationalisation, which are in turn a function of the suppliers' 
subordination to northern lead firms.   
 
Riisgaard (2009) attempts to address this gap by analysing the role of labour (albeit in 
response to mainly retailer-instigated private social codes) “as an input with agency” (p 
326)  in cut flower production in East Africa41.  Indeed, the generally antagonistic response 
of (national-level) unions in Kenya to both private social codes and to the engagement of 
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 Riisgaard (2009) also criticizes the literature on CSR for marginalizing labor’s potential agency.   
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labour NGOs with these codes, highlights the importance of incorporating the agency of 
labour as well as the differentiated response to social codes where they “touch down”, in 
an analysis of social codes.  However, of particular interest is Riisgaard’s (2009, p 335) 
finding that “highly driven retailer chains offer more room for labour to exert its agency 
than the traditional auction strand of the value chain.”  This is somewhat counter-intuitive 
given the predominant narrative of drivenness corresponding to increased power at the 
retail node of a value chain and the consequently increasing submission of suppliers to the 
demands of the lead firms located at that node.        
To broaden our understanding of labour’s agency, we can draw on Wright (2000), who 
writes on worker power in the context of what he terms positive class compromise where 
labour and capital come to mutually beneficial agreements.  In particular, the author 
argues that  
…the possibilities for stable, positive class compromise generally hinge on the 
relationship between the associational power of the working class and the material 
interests of capitalists (p 958). 
 
Although Wright’s (2000) model is essentially a gross simplification of rich country 
industrial relations where labour is pitted against capital in class struggle, some of the 
author’s concepts can be usefully applied to a smallholder- first tier supplier relationship.  
Wright focuses on worker power as a key determinant of labour’s achievements in class 
struggle.  Structural power of workers is derived from their point of insertion in the 
economy and production process, for example through tight labour markets or engaging 
in production tasks which greatly affect capitalists’ profits.  Associational power, on the 
other hand, refers to the ability for collective action which includes  
…unions and parties but may also include a variety of other forms, such as works 
councils or forms of institutional representation of workers on boards of directors in 
schemes of worker codetermination, or even, in certain circumstances, community 
organizations (p962).   
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As we are concerned with agricultural global value chains it seems that farmer 
organisations, associations, and cooperatives would fit well with the above description. 
Wright’s (2000) main contribution is to challenge the necessarily antagonistic nature of 
labour-capital relations and to postulate that whilst at first increased worker power will 
diminish the gains accruing to capitalists, that after attaining a certain level of 
associational power that further increases in this associational power will actually benefit 
capital in that it will “help capitalists solve certain kinds of collective action and 
coordination problems” (p 978).   
Wright (2000) argues that the positive class compromise described above may occur in 
three different institutional spheres: exchange, production, and politics.   However, the 
first two spheres are of particular interest for our study. In this author’s simplified model 
of rich country industrial relations, the sphere of exchange concerns what capitalists buy 
(labour) and sell (finished goods).  The interests of capitalists therefore revolve around the 
ability to hire reliable, adequately skilled, cheap labour in a loose and unregulated labour 
market whilst at the same time having a market for all of their output.  Wright points out 
that wages will be influenced by the tightness of the labour market and the reservation 
wage in the economy.  Given the relationship between overall wage levels in an economy 
and aggregate demand, the author suggests that Keynesian demand-boosting policies in 
social democracies, with the consent of both centralized labour unions and capitalists, is a 
typical example of positive class compromise.   
Applying these concepts to an agricultural global value chain where first tier suppliers 
buy from smallholders in an African country, one could presume that the first tier 
suppliers’ (capitalists’) interests would be much easier to realize.  First of all, the profits 
that smallholders can obtain from producing goods outside of a global value chain (in our 
case the parallel to Wright’s reservation wage) are likely to be very low and the number of 
smallholders willing to participate in the value chain (similar to looseness of labour market) 
very high.  Furthermore, the key market for the finished goods of agricultural global value 
chains are very unlikely to be located in poor African countries, thereby greatly reducing 
the possibility of aggregate-level positive class compromise in the form of Keynesian 
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demand-boosting.  However, other forms of positive class compromise in this sphere 
should not be entirely ruled out (as will be seen in our case study).  
In Wright’s (2000) sphere of production,  
…on the one hand, capitalists have interests in being able to unilaterally control the 
labor process (choosing and changing technology, assigning labor to different tasks, 
changing the pace of work, etc.), and on the other hand, they have interests in being 
able to reliably elicit cooperation, initiative, and responsibility from employees (p 
981).   
 
From this quote it is clear that there is broad scope for positive class compromise in order 
for capitalists to achieve their objectives and the author suggests that this can be seen in 
cases where workers who have achieved greater job security are less adverse to the 
introduction of new technologies and changes in production processes.  Wright’s sphere 
of production is of particular interest to us for, as we have seen above, a common trend in 
agricultural global value chains is to shift towards thicker relations between first or second 
tier suppliers and (farmer) producers, often in the form of contract farming.  Key 
components of contract farming usually include the introduction of yield-enhancing, 
labour-saving technologies or processes as well as other changes in process to address 
lead firms’ concerns such as pesticide and chemical use.  However, also inherent in the 
nature of contract farming is the increased assurance of an outlet for the farmer’s 
produce (similar to Wright’s increased job security).            
Selwyn (2007) applies Wright’s concepts within a commodity chains framework in the 
case of the grape sector in North East Brazil.  Selwyn argues that workers can use their 
structural and associational power to gain improvements in wage and welfare issues.  
Structural power is particularly relevant in non-traditional agricultural exports (as in the 
grape sector in North East Brazil) in that a small interruption in the timing or process of 
production can have serious consequences for export profits.  The unionized workers in 
this sector achieved in 2002 (through a strike in 2001), among other things, a wage ten per 
cent above the legal minimum, higher wages and more protection for workers dealing 
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with pesticides, day-care facilities for employees, and three months paid maternity leave 
(Selwyn, 2007). 
As can be seen from our discussion thus far, the incorporation of labour into GVC 
analysis is intricately related to issues of power relations and governance.  Improvements 
in labour conditions are variably interpreted as a reflection of lead firm power (e.g. 
Barrientos et al., 2010), worker power (e.g. Selwyn, 2007), or worker, lead firm, and non-
firm actor power (e.g. Riisgaard, 2009).  However, Selwyn (2011) also argues that a focus 
on the role of labour is particularly relevant to the concept of upgrading.  Following on 
from our application of Wright’s associational power to farmer associations and 
cooperatives, there are abundant empirical examples of how product and process 
upgrading was achieved through the realisation of associational power.  Many agricultural 
co-operatives emerged in rich countries towards the end of the 1800s and in many 
instances improved quality and access to credit, among other things (Chang, 2009b)42.  A 
wide variety of approaches recognize the potential usefulness of co-operatives to increase 
productivity and profits, improve competitiveness, and “...reduce transaction costs in 
markets, achieve some market power, and increase representation in national and 
international policy forums” (World Bank, 2007, p 14).  Therefore, and to the extent that 
we conceptualize upgrading in the Gibbon-Ponte sense of improving the position of 
developing country firms and farms, we would hypothesize that there is considerable 
scope for farmer cooperatives achieving upgrading as they can reduce costs through joint 
investments and facilitated access to credits and improve yields and quality through 
facilitated access to improved technologies.       
 Whilst Wright’s focus on, and Selwyn’s application of, associational power has the 
potential to enrich GVC analysis, when considering the associational power of farmers, a 
particularly pertinent issue to consider is rural differentiation.  Indeed, much work treats 
“smallholders” or “peasants” as a social class and therefore overlooks significant 
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 For example, see Warming (1923) on the case of cooperatives in Denmark. 
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differentiation in rural settings (Oya, 2004; Bernstein, 2010)43.  An additional reason for 
this occultation of rural differentiation is survey design.  As Oya (2004, p 309) notes:  
Arguably, conventional surveys do not ask the right questions to a large number of 
small-middle peasants on labour arrangements, so the image of farming done on the 
basis of family or unpaid labour is pervasive44. 
 
When attempting to understand rural differentiation, our starting point should be that 
particular attention should be paid to the issues of context and history, as rightfully 
stressed by Oya (2004).  This is especially important because attempting to classify all of 
the developing world’s farmers into broad categories (e.g. small, middle, and large) is 
nearly as simplistic and reductionist as assuming that rural differentiation does not exist in 
the first place.  As further evidence of this, Hazell et al. (2007, p 1, cited in Bernstein, 2010, 
p 4) note: 
A 10-hectare farm in many parts of Latin America would be smaller than the national 
average, operated largely by family labour, and producing primarily for subsistence… 
The same-sized holding in the irrigated lands of West Bengal, on the other hand, 
would be well above the average size for the region, would probably hire in much of 
the labour used, and would produce a significant surplus for sale. 
 
Engels classified rural populations into small, middle, and big peasants.  His concept of 
small peasants is similar to neo-populist notions of “smallholders” and “peasants” 
whereas his middle and big peasant categories were based on the farmers’ amount of 
land and recourse to hired labour (Mueller, 2011).  Kautsky and Lenin later classified the 
rural classes into poor, middle, and rich peasants with the definitions corresponding to the 
degree of ownership of means of production and the use (hiring/selling) of wage labour.  
                                                          
43
 For an example of this in the “mainstream literature” on Mozambique, see Cramer and Pontara (1998).  
For the example of fair trade Costa Rican coffee, see Luetchford (2008). 
44
 To the extent that academic and policy circles do distinguish between different groups of farmers it is 
often according to the size of landholding.  However, Oya (2004, p 298) points out that overlooking 
differentiation entirely or restricting its application to land holding sizes will “conceal significant dynamics, 
which should be examined in more depth.” 
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Wheras the poor peasants had to sell their labour in order to survive, the middle peasants 
corresponded more closely to Engels’s “small peasants”45 (Mueller, 2011). 
Historical materialists show broad support for two criteria to be used in class 
identification: “nature of labour appropriation” and “degree of reliance on their own 
means of production” (Oya, 2004, p 304).  In a similar vein, Deere and de Janvry (1979, p 
602) argue that “…the integration of the peasantry into the labor market… most closely 
characterizes the process of class formation among direct producers…” 
Bernstein (2010, p 22) proposes four questions: i) “who owns what?” ii) “who does 
what?” iii) “who gets what?” iv) “what do they do with it?”  Ownership applies in 
particular to land, and the author suggests that owning land is a defining characteristic of 
capitalism (p 23).  The second question can be answered by categorisations such as class, 
gender, and what’s produced (p 23).  The third question is intended to apply to more than 
monetary income (e.g. own-production, among other things) (p 23).  The fourth question 
refers mainly to Bernstein’s (2010, p 23) categories of “consumption, reproduction and 
accumulation.”   
Oya (2004, pp. 307-08), in a study of mid and large scale farmers in Senegal, expands 
the criteria for class classification beyond those of land and labour to include: “nature of 
labour relations”, “patterns of land use/ownership”, “degree of capitalisation”, 
“education”, and “surplus use patterns”.  He then places the farmers in one of three 
categories according to the above criteria: non-capitalist, semi-capitalist, and capitalist. 
In a survey of farmers in the West Usambara Mountains in Tanzania, Mueller (2011) 
finds that farmers fall into different class or production categories depending on 
definitions of these categories.  He concludes that:  
If anything, this shows that the borders between peasant differentiation and an 
undifferentiated peasantry depend on the particular interpretation of particular 
classification criteria of the relevant groups, and the hopelessly positivist nature of 
                                                          
45
 Bernstein (2010), using similar classifications as Kautsky and Lenin, notes that the poor peasants may not 
be in this category merely as a result of no or little land but quite possibly as a result of owning low quality 
land and/or lacking access to inputs and/or labour.   
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such an attempt in the first place.  It also shows how arbitrarily set definitions can 
greatly alter the outcome of the analysis, and that whichever set is chosen a 
multitude of important factors are doomed to be omitted, like migration, remittance 
flows, off-farm business, use of advanced inputs and technologies to name only a 
few (p 36).  
 
We strongly agree with the conceptual understanding of differentiation in terms of being 
on a continuum rather than in terms of simply pertaining to a small number of strictly 
defined categories as done in some works (Oya, 2004; Deere and de Janvry, 1979; Shivji, 
1975).  However, and in sum, our objectives in this greatly abbreviated discussion do not 
lie in evaluating the literature on rural differentiation or in elaborating a methodology to 
be used in assessing the extent of rural differentiation in Malawi.  Rather, we have 
attempted to highlight some of the issues one needs to be aware of when engaging in a 
discussion of “smallholders” or better yet of “smallholder associational power”.  The 
relevance of rural differentiation to our work will be discussed further below.    
 
 
1.3.5 The Role of the State 
 
The literature on GVCs would have us believe that in general, increased standards 
and market concentration have led retailers to have overwhelming control over their 
value chains46.  With few exceptions, the GVC-GHS variant of the literature discusses the 
role of rich country government primarily with regard to public regualtions (e.g. legislation 
regarding food safety such as the 1990 U.K. Food Safety Act) and trade policy47.   The role 
                                                          
46
 Gibbon (2003a) breaks this trend by discussing how government intervention in the form of regulations 
and trade preferences decreases buyer power in certain contexts, and mitigates against the exclusion of 
smallholders in FFV value chains.   
47
 This is not to discount the importance of these themes.  Indeed, Dolan and Humphrey (2004) and Gereffi 
(1995) put forward a convincing case of the major impacts that food safety regulations and the multi-fibre 
arrangement have had on value chains originating in Kenya and East Asia, respectively.   
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of developing country government in the GVC-GHS variant of the literature is minimal at 
best48.  Bair (2005, p 174) succinctly sums up this idea by stating: 
While the global value chain literature does not necessarily express scepticism or 
hostility towards the state, the role of governments as potential facilitators (or 
inhibitors) of development receives scant attention as compared with the emphasis 
placed on lead firms as agents of upgrading in most of the GCC and GVC literature. 
 
Whilst the GVC-GHS approach provides a welcome focus on the activities of 
(especially lead) firms, enriching our analyses beyond sector- or country-specific 
approaches, it is important not to focus so much on firms as to negate the role of other 
actors.  This point has been made both from within and externally to the GVC tradition.  
For example, with regards to chain governance, we shall take the following statement 
from Gibbon (2008a, p 28) as our starting point: 
…it is evident that the definition of ‘governance structure’ employed by all 
these authors was rather narrow, focussing almost exclusively on the 
actions of firms along the chain.  Agents, formal institutions and normative 
systems external to these firms and their actions, but bearing on them, 
could and should have been considered as components of chain 
governance systems.    
 
Indeed, some of the GVC-GPD literature has placed more analytical emphasis on 
the role of the state.  For example, Thomsen (2007) attempts to incorporate the role of 
government into the governance of the clothing chain in Vietnam, with a particular focus 
on how government shapes chain participation, coming to the conclusion that  
                                                          
48
 Gereffi (1995) does develop a very limited discussion of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) policies in 
East Asia and their contribution to development, however the discussion is somewhat superficial and does 
not engage significantly with any body of theoretical literature on the subject.  It is also interesting to note 
that, writing in the context of the emergence of the GCC framework out of World Systems Theory, Sturgeon 
(2009, p 114) states:  
Gereffi (1994) revived the GCC concept by refocusing it on the strategies and actions of firms, in part 
because of the restricted ability of states to set tariffs and local content rules in the context of trade 
liberalization.   
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...the entry of Vietnamese suppliers into GVCs is less buyer- and more state-driven 
than it is normally recognised in the literature on GVCs, increasing the significance of 
the political economic context within the supplying countries (p 759). 
 
One of the principal reasons for this is the tradition of a very strong state in Vietnam.  For 
example, the author points out how a number of private clothing company 
owners/managers have benefited through contacts in the government or how many of 
them were former government employees.   
Also, Ponte’s (2002b) work on coffee49 emphasizes the positive relationship between 
government intervention (i.e. lack of liberalisation and de-regulation) and the ability of 
developing country producers to protect their positions.  The author writes:    
New openings provided by increased differentiation of consumption in 
industrialized economies and the emergence of ‘niche’ markets for high-
quality products can be best exploited through product differentiation, 
systems of appellation and the improvement of quality standards and 
reputation in producing countries.  This is unlikely to be achieved in 
liberalized markets and where regulatory and institutional settings do not 
facilitate voluntary coordination in the realm of quality control (pp. 270-1). 
 
Other work in the GVC-GPD tradition has emphasized the link between the retraction of 
the state and the decrease in quality of agricultural commodities (e.g. Fold, 2002).  
Furthermore, and as mentioned above, Gibbon (2001) provides for a theoretical role for 
the state in promoting upgrading in primary commodities, and in his case study of the 
Tanzanian table fish commodity chain, shows how state intervention did promote (an 
albeit short-lived) episode of upgrading into processing.  Gibbon and Ponte (2005) further 
expand the concept of market intermediation for the purposes of protecting the position 
of producers by discussing the “publicly regulated break” in certain African value chains, 
and the extent to which this market intermediation protects quality (p 145).  However, 
developing country governments in agricultural value chains have more often than not 
been discussed in terms of the extent to which they have withdrawn, with Daviron and 
Gibbon (2002, p 156) noting that “Degrees of state intervention in agriculture today are 
directly proportional to the wealth of the country concerned.” 
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 Ponte (2002b) discusses the Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania coffee chains in depth.   
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 Our purpose in this section is not to replace or dismiss the Gibbon-Ponte approach 
to incorporating the role of the state in upgrading, but rather to build on it.  Whilst the 
Gibbon-Ponte approach focuses primarily on market intermediation as a function of the 
degree to which a producer country has liberalized and de-regulated, we will attempt to 
incorporate other forms of government intervention which are not necessarily best 
understood in relation to the liberalization process.  We will also attempt to develop an 
understanding of the factors driving certain government interventions and how the latter 
fit into the overall “development” objectives of developing country governments.            
We will therefore need to draw on a wider literature on the role of government.  
Given that our focus in this study is on the nodes of global value chains found in 
developing countries we will draw on the developmental state literature to complement 
our GVC literature to enable a more comprehensive understanding of how GVCs operate 
in developing countries.  The developmental state literature is selected not just for the 
fact that it provides an extensive amount of theoretical and empirical accounts of 
developing country government policy, but also because this literature has a number of 
similar concerns as the GVC literature, the most salient of which is upgrading.  As Wade 
(2010, pp. 152-53) notes: 
Many middle-income countries are today caught in what could be called a ‘middle-
technology trap’, their firms stuck in the relatively low value-added segments of 
global production chains, unable to break into innovation-intensive activities or into 
the market for branded products, where the high profits are to be made. 
 
Indeed even some of the developmental statists and GVC-GHS authors have used the 
same case studies as empirical evidence for their respective approaches.  This is notable in 
the case of Gereffi’s apparel chain in the newly industrialised economies, which has been 
explained in the developmental state literature as (primarily) a result of government 
intervention rather than dynamic learning curves accessed through participation in 
commodity chains (Wade, 2010)50.  Furthermore, Chang (1993, p 144) notes that:  
                                                          
50
 Indeed, the skepticism of the GVC-GHS variant to the developmental statist interpretation of East Asian 
development can be seen in the following quote from Hamilton and Gereffi (2009, p 160): 
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For the textiles and dyeing industries, which were identified as industries with 
satisfactory technological capabilities but aging capital stocks, the priority was 
capacity upgrading, and therefore subsidies were given to producers for scrapping 
old machines and installing new ones. 
 
The role of the state in development and economic growth has been at the heart of 
major controversy in policy and academic circles.  Much of this debate has centred on 
interpretations of the growth miracles of East and South East Asia51, as well as on the 
potential for replicability.  For whilst some more liberal economists may (grudgingly) 
accept that the state played a role in economic development in East Asia, they argue that 
the East Asian states had a number of unreplicable characteristics such as a particular 
culture, ethnic homogeneity, and a “capable” bureaucracy (Chang, 2009a, p 4)52.  The 
replicability debate is particularly contentious with regard to Africa53. 
Chang (2002; 2007a; 2007b; 2009a; 2009b) has also used the historical records of 
today’s rich countries to advocate for a developmental role for the state.  For example, 
Chang (2009a) points out that many of today’s rich countries heavily regulated foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  Chang (2009b) also demonstrates how, in the interests of 
developing their agricultural sectors, today’s rich countries provided credits and extension 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Much of the literature on the developmental state overstates the rationality and expertise 
of these government officials and exaggerates the accuracy and impact of their policies.  
Although state policies and programs may enhance an economy’s ability to grow and 
change, the effects of state actions are often much more limited than is represented in the 
literature on the developmental state.  In terms of Asian industrialization, it is clear that 
decisions made in reference to the economy were, in fact, often solutions to noneconomic 
problems (such as nationalism in times of martial law) that were made after it was made 
apparent that the intended goals of the policies would be reached without the actual 
policies being implemented.  The five-year plans developed in both South Korea and 
Taiwan are cases in point. 
51
 For a discussion of this debate, see Wade (1996). 
52
 Fine (2012), however, has critiqued the developmental state literature in that it is necessarily applied to 
successful developmental states, without offering much in the way of explanation of why other 
interventionist states did not succeed in developing and hence are not considered developmental states, ex 
post.  Similarly, Fine (2012) suggests that the developmental statists’ preoccupation with industrialisation 
and the “catch-up” phase of development necessarily excludes the approach from analysing other phases of 
development which occur either before or after this phase.  
53
 For contributions to this debate, see Stein (2000), Chang (2009a), and Mkandawire (2001). 
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services to farmers, as well as investments in agricultural research and infrastructure54.  In 
terms of assessing these policies in the context of agricultural global value chains, one 
could see how they have potential for impacting on the governance of and upgrading 
potential in different chains. 
Whilst even within the World Bank, the experience of Japan, for example, has 
helped spur the drive towards the Post Washington Consensus, which allows for a greater 
role for the state in development, there remain significant differences between the role of 
the state as prescribed by the Post-Washington Consensus and the developmental state 
literatures (Fine, 1999). The former focuses on good governance and correcting market 
failures, or what Khan (2007) refers to as market-enhancing governance, whilst the latter 
attempts to promote major economic structural transformation and development, or 
what Khan (2007) refers to as growth-enhancing governance55.  
The current nature of the differences between the neo-liberals and the 
developmental statists is incarnated in a debate in Development Policy Review between 
Justin Lin (chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank) and Ha-Joon 
Chang (Lin and Chang, 2009).   One interesting point to note, and of particular relevance 
to our study, is that both authors assign a role to the state in terms of promoting 
upgrading, as Lin notes:  
What is it that makes it possible in one or two generations for a country to go from 
exporting wigs and plywood to competing in the most technologically advanced 
sectors?  The answer is not simply ‘a dynamic private sector’, though that is the 
ultimate driver.  Historical examples make it clear that the answer must include 
                                                          
54
 It is interesting to note the parallels between the objectives of Chang’s policies and the supposed benefits 
of contract farming.  Contract farming is an increasingly common characteristic of agricultural global value 
chains as lead firms wish to exert greater control over production processes all the way upstream to the 
farmer level.  However, in terms of benefits to the farmer, it is often argued that through contract farming 
farmers can obtain easier access to credits, improved agricultural inputs and technologies, and a reduction 
in risk as the purchase of their produce is arranged in advance.  However, if one follows Chang’s (2009b) 
policy prescriptions, farmers can obtain credit and access improved agricultural technologies through 
governments.  Chang also advocates for policies which reduce risk for the farmers such as price stabilization 
schemes.  Indeed, it is the very retraction of these policies that Daviron and Gibbon (2002) and Ponte (2002b) 
refer to as contributing to increased buyer power.     
55
 Market-enhancing governance is usually concerned with such things as property rights, low expropriation 
risk, a good legal system, low corruption, the provision of public goods, accountability and transparency.  
Growth-enhancing governance, on the other hand, focuses on transferring assets to productive sectors and 
on promoting acquisition of new technologies (Khan, 2007). 
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effective government policies to catalyse private-sector growth (Lin and Chang, 2009, 
p 484).   
 
One can note the parallel between Lin’s “dynamic private sector” and Gereffi’s “dynamic 
learning curve”, which occurs among private sector actors.  Furthermore Chang writes: 
Both of us recognise that ‘climbing up the ladder’ is a hard slog that involves more 
than ‘getting the prices right’.  It requires, inter alia, intelligent industrial policy, 
organisation building, and efforts to accumulate technological capabilities through 
R&D, training and production experiences (Lin and Chang, 2009, p 500).   
 
Although the analogy of climbing the ladder of development is favoured, in part because it 
was used by Friedrich List56, one could replace the expression with “moving up the chain” 
when applying the same concepts to individual industries.  Whilst Gereffi and other GVC 
approach proponents would undoubtedly recognize that government is important, the 
fact that (developing country) government is often marginalized in their analyses is 
striking, especially given that even some neo-classical economists from the World Bank 
emphasize the importance of government in upgrading57.   
                                                          
56
 List is a 19
th
 century economist who was a famous promoter of industrial policy as a tool for Germany to 
catch up with the United Kingdom, more on which below.   
57
 However, in a critique from a different perspective, Selwyn (2009) categorises the developmental statists 
as neo-Listians for their similar policy prescriptions as Friedrich List (for more on which, see Chang, 2002).  
Selwyn’s (2009, p 158) main critique of the developmental statists can be seen in the following quote:  
...despite extracting important lessons from history, such approaches are based on a partial 
understanding of class relations under capitalism and consequently obfuscate many of the negative 
consequences of capitalist development.   
Selwyn takes the argument further by underlining what he sees as a key similarity between the neo-Listians 
and the neo-liberals who the former are so preoccupied with criticising: a model of development based on 
the repression of wage labour.  However, regarding both the accusations of the corrupt African state and of 
the state representing the interest of capital, Mkandawire (2001a, p 300-01) writes:  
If there was anything that the state in Africa failed to do, it was to allow the local business class 
effective presence in policy-making.  Or, conversely, if there is anything that the African business 
classes failed to do it was to ‘capture’ state policies.  ...Conceptually, state policies were never a 
“class project” in Africa.  Import substitution was neither the result of successful lobbying by rent 
seeking groups nor a consciously devised strategy to support the emergence of a national bourgeoisie; 
and even the small capitalists that emerged almost inadvertently, and at times despite state 
harassment, were to be abruptly left out in the cold as governments danced to the tunes of the BWIs.  
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Lin’s key argument is that government’s role is to promote a country’s 
comparative advantage rather than defy it.  Addressing market failures, externalities, and 
coordination failures are among those roles prescribed to Lin’s state.  Chang argues that 
Lin’s analysis and promotion of more liberal trade regimes is based on flawed theory. In 
particular, the use of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory of comparative advantage 
assumes perfect factor mobility and ignores technological capabilities.  In short, Chang 
argues that government intervention in some cases needs to be comparative advantage-
defying rather than conforming.   
Mkandawire (2001) identifies two key aspects of a developmental state: ideology and 
structure.  The former refers to a government which derives its legitimacy from and claims 
its essential goal to be economic development, the existence of which is seen in economic 
growth, accumulation, and industrialisation.  Structure on the other hand refers to the 
ability of the state to implement developmental policies and is usually associated with 
such adjectives as capacity or autonomy58. 
Ideology and structure can indeed be mutually reinforcing in that a state that is more 
legitimate in the eyes of the people may acquire more authority, power, and autonomy 
over its institutions.  As Woo-Cumings (1999, p 20) notes: “...the power of the 
developmental state grows both out of the barrel of the gun and its ability to convince the 
population of its political, economic, and moral mandate.”59 
Regarding ideology, pointing out the sometimes overwhelming influence of exogenous 
forces on developmental outcomes, Mkandawire (2001, p 291) redefines the 
developmental state  
                                                          
58
 Structure, and in particular state autonomy, are often seen in the Weberian sense of rationality 
(Mkandawire, 2001; Selwyn, 2009a).  The state is considered “rationalised” when it enables the efficient 
allocation of resources in the economy (Selwyn, 2009, p 163), and the more successful developmental states 
are those with more autonomous and less politicised bureaucracies (Woo-Cumings, 1999; Vartianen, 1999).  
For more on the “Weberian” Japanese developmental state, see Johnson (1982).  For the importance of 
state autonomy and the relevance of the state-business power balance, see Wade (2010).  For the 
relationship between the autonomous and the authoritarian developmental state, see Wade (2010) and 
Johnson (1999). 
59
 Similarly, Khan and Gray (2006, p 49) note: “The capacity of a state to impose discipline also depends on 
its legitimacy, which in turn depends on its ability to deliver growth in living standards to wide 
constituencies.” 
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...as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously 
attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic 
development60.   
 
There are a number of different economic policies associated with developmental 
states, as the successful developmental states incarnate a mix of interventionist policies 
which were successful in different contexts (Fine, 2012)61.  Wade (1990) distinguishes 
between macroeconomic and industrial policies, where the former targets such things as 
aggregate demand and the latter targets specific industries.  He further identifies two 
categories of industrial policies: functional industrial policies and industry-specific 
industrial policies.  The former targets an aspect or input that can affect numerous 
industries whereas the latter, as the name implies, aims to aid a particular industry.  
Within the category of industry-specific industrial policies he makes a final distinction 
between following the market and leading the market (see Figure 1.1 below).  
Followership is where 
... the government does not do anything by itself, and does not force anything on 
the private economy.  It does, however, establish a consultation process in which 
government, management, and labor can enter into strategic agreements about 
consumption, investment, incomes, and work practices to which the government 
brings its own ideas about the long run evolution of the economy and in which 
government help is given only in return for stipulated performance by the other 
parties (pp. 261-62).    
 
As an important component of following the market industrial policy, Wade (2010) argues 
that in addition to shaping the incentive structure for private firms that government needs 
to have a method of rewarding and punishing firms based on performance.   
 
                                                          
60
 The focus on goals rather than achievements is also noted in Wade’s (2010, p 150) emphasis on the 
importance of a “public service mindset among state officials.”  This notion of developmental state being 
defined by goals rather than results has been applied elsewhere in the literature (Woo-Cumings, 1999).  
61
 However, it has been argued that the state’s ability to control and direct finance for purposes of 
development is among the most important characteristics of a developmental state (Woo-Cumings, 1999; 
Chang, 1993). 
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Figure 1.1: Wade's (1990) Forms of Government Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership policies, on the other hand, are often associated with creating comparative 
advantage and in the case of Taiwan (or for developing countries more generally) this 
would imply a focus on capital- and technology-intensive industries (Wade, 1990).  
Leadership policies were undoubtedly at the heart of the major structural transformation 
of the East Asian NICs and are in line with what Chang characterises as comparative 
advantage-defying policies (Lin and Chang, 2009).  Wade (1990) gives the example of the 
three phases of South Korean governmental support for the semi-conductor industry to 
illustrate followership and leadership interventions.  The first phase focused on 
encouraging FDI in the industry (followership), the second phase on developing 
infrastructure and technology (leadership), and the third on supporting private firms 
(followership).  
 Despite the attention that leadership policies receive in both popular and 
academic literature, Wade (2010) stresses that followership policies were more prevalent 
in the East Asian developmental states and were used to promote upgrading and domestic 
sourcing of inputs among other things.  For example, using FDI from multinationals in Latin 
America for the purpose of illustration, Wade (2010) argues that without government 
intervention multinationals present in developing countries will often source their inputs 
from abroad rather than domestically.  At best this is a missed opportunity to develop new 
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domestic sectors and at worst it destroys existing domestic sectors which are unable to 
compete with the imports.   
Wade (2007) provides an example of how the situation described above can be 
remedied through followership policies in Taiwan’s creation of the Industrial Development 
Bureau (IDB), whose rationale was to provide industrial extension services.  One 
responsibility of the IDB was to identify domestic producers willing and able to engage in 
import substitution.  Wade (2007) provides the example of IDB identifying two domestic 
glass producers who were near meeting the requirements to provide Phillips with glass for 
its production of TVs in Taiwan in the 1980s.  The company had previously been sourcing 
the input from Japan but after the IDB identified the domestic producers the government 
took steps to make the Japanese imports less accessible and Phillips ended up in a long-
term supply agreement with one of the domestic producers.  In response to the offered 
contract the supplier invested in increasing its technological capacity to provide a better 
product.   
In terms of how government implements its policies, Wade (1990) makes the 
important distinction between government control and ownership.  Whilst one would 
normally associate government ownership with more interventionism, Wade stresses that 
this is not a necessary association62.  For example, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) may not 
make any structural change in an industry and government may induce structural change 
without an SOE63.   
To further enhance our understanding of how (developing country) states may act, we 
draw on Khan and Gray’s (2006) treatment of the complexities of rent-seeking and 
corruption.  Of particular interest is their discussion of political corruption and primitive 
accumulation, which concern efforts by government to placate certain groups or interests.  
The first often refers to off-budget transfers while the second concerns non-market asset 
transfers.  With both of these, the authors point out the similarities to legal policies which 
                                                          
62
 Without wanting to stretch the conceptual parallels between the GVC and developmental state (DS) 
literatures too far, it is interesting to point out the similarity in Wade’s point to Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) 
characterization of lead firms increasing their drivenness yet through hands-off forms of coordination.   
63
 For more on the role of SOEs and the economic arguments for their existence, see Chang (2007b).  For a 
discussion of the various types of SOE management, see Lioukas et al. (1993). 
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occur in rich countries.  For example, the enormous tax and transfer aspect of rich country 
governments is similar to political corruption in developing countries whereas the 
difference between non-market asset transfers in rich and developing countries is often 
that in rich countries the assets are transferred to productive uses whereas in developing 
countries they become unproductive (Khan and Gray, 2006). 
Indeed farmer income and price stabilisation schemes in poor African countries 
could be understood in the context of political stabilisation measures which could be 
compared to tax and transfer schemes in rich countries but which may also induce a 
certain amount of rent-seeking.    Chang (2009b, p 504) notes that 
The most frequently adopted measure to stabilise farm income is a price 
stabilisation scheme through government price-setting and stockpile management.  
Governments have provided price floors by guaranteeing to purchase (unlimited 
quantities of) certain agricultural products at pre-announced prices64.   
 
Chang (2009b) gives the example of Holland in the 1930’s which established minimum 
prices for wheat at roughly twice the international price of the commodity65.   
Despite the negative attention given to price distortions as a result of government 
intervention, Chang (2009b) offers two compelling reasons for tolerating price distortions.  
First of all they may be necessary as a short term measure to promote long term efficiency 
gains.  Second of all, and somewhat more unusually even within the developmental state 
literature, Chang argues that such measures as price stabilisation schemes may be the 
closest thing some developing country governments can offer to a social safety net and 
are hence justified.  It is argued that this latter function is of particular importance to poor 
farmers in developing countries in that their livelihoods are particularly volatile due to the 
(among other things) impact of the weather, a lack of pest and disease control 
mechanisms, lack of storage, and a lack of ability to diversify agricultural income sources 
                                                          
64
 By pointing out once again the similarities in Chang’s discussion of the role of the state with Daviron and 
Gibbon’s (2002) discussion of the state’s retraction, we would re-iterate that we are not attempting to 
replace - but rather, enhance - the latter with the former. 
65
 However, Chang (2009b) warns about the potential downside of inflated minimum prices in that they can 
serve as a disincentive for diversification, as in the case of maize in Zambia. 
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(Chang, 2009b).  Presented in this manner, the lines between political stabilisation, tax 
and transfer regimes, social safety nets, market-mediation, and upgrading, become quite 
blurred.   
 
 
1.4  Summing Up and Case Overview 
 
In our discussion in this chapter we have highlighted some of the key concerns of GVC 
literature such as territoriality, input-output structure, governance, institutional 
framework, and upgrading.  Within governance we have pointed to two important 
conceptualizations: governance as drivenness (associated witht the GVC-GPD variant) and 
governance as coordination (associated with the GVC-GHS variant).  With regards to 
upgrading we have discussed the commonly used categories (product, process, functional) 
as well as the more expansive understandings advanced by the GVC-GPD literature.  In an 
effort to enrich our analysis of the incorporation of non-firm actors into the governance 
and upgrading of global value chains, we have drawn on other theoretical traditions to 
complement the GVC literature.  In particular, and inspired by Selwyn (2007; 2012), we 
have drawn on Wright’s (2000) associational  power in order to interrograte the role of 
farmer associations in upgrading.  We have also discussed various types of (developing 
country) policies presented in the DS literature in order to enhance our understanding of 
how and why developing country governments might intervene in value chains.     
Of course, ours is hardly the first attempt to expand the GVC framework beyond its 
firm-centrism.  Of particular relevance is the Global Production Networks framework (e.g. 
that advocated by Henderson et al., 2002) which challenges GVC conceptions of power 
and emphasizes the influence of entities such as government institutions and trade unions.  
Whilst drawing attention to other actors is of course a welcome contribution, the 
framework has been critiqued for over-extending its reach by attempting to be all-
encompasing (Selwyn, 2011).  However, there does exist a similarity in aims between 
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some of the GPN work and the theoretical framework we have developed in this chapter.  
Indeed, we would see Bair’s (2008, p 257) following description of the ‘Manchester school’ 
of GPN work as equally applicable to our framework: 
…they have also been more attentive to the role of non-firm actors, whose 
importance for global production networks might be underplayed by a 
more linear, firm-centred commodity chain heuristic.  The GPN framework, 
in directing attention to the importance of other kinds of economic and 
political actors such as governments and labour unions, supplements the 
GCC approach, and in this sense might be more usefully viewed as a 
complementary rather than a contending paradigm.   
 
1.4.1 Reasons for Selecting Tobacco, Malawi, and the GVC Concept to Connect Them 
 
There are a number of reasons for using Global Value Chains to analyse the 
international tobacco industry as well as Malawi’s role in it.  Having engaged in a 
discussion of the key concepts of the GVC literature as well as drawing on other literatures 
above, below we will explain why the theoretical literature used here was chosen to 
examine our case study, as well as why our case study was chosen in the first place.   
First, the tobacco industry is truly global in nature, with the most lucrative end markets 
determined as much by population or particular consumption patterns as by overall levels 
of wealth per se.  In 2007, the five biggest national markets for manufactured tobacco 
products were China, Russia, Japan, Indonesia and the US (Shafey et al., 2009, pp 32-33).  
Of these, all but Indonesia are among the biggest exporters of manufactured tobacco 
products, in addition to some rich countries such as Germany, France, and the U.K. 
(Shafey et al., 2009, pp 52-53).  Some 5.7 trillion cigarettes are consumed in the world 
annually (JT, 2012, p 51).  However, and despite the extensive dispersion of both 
production and consumption (more on which in Chapter 3), nearly all of the (small 
number) of lead firms and their multi-national first tier suppliers are headquartered in rich 
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countries, making this industry particulary ideal for a GVC analysis, and potentially 
illuminating for broader concerns of development studies66.     
Second, tobacco is unique in a number of ways.  Tobacco killed approximately 100 
million people in the twentieth century and is estimated to have killed 6 million in 2010 
alone (Shafey et al., 2009, p 38).  The deadly nature of cigarettes and the politics of their 
regulation have repercussions in every node of the chain.  Unlike many other commodities, 
an enormous amount of resources are mobilized for the purpose of discouraging 
consumption67.  The extent of regulation of cigarettes would be politically unacceptable in 
most contexts with any other legal commodity.  The tobacco industry also struggles to 
gather support from international/intergovernmental organizations.  For example, as 
World Bank economist Steven Jaffee (2003, p 5) points out: 
Since 1991, the World Bank has had a formal policy that it will not lend 
directly for, invest in, or guarantee investments or loans for tobacco 
production, processing, or marketing.  Bank loans also cannot be used to 
finance imports of tobacco or tobacco products, tobacco processing 
machinary or other related equipment or services.  Bank activities in the 
health sector discourage the use of tobacco products.  The Bank has been 
an active participant in international efforts to reduce demand for tobacco 
products, especially in client countries and to induce countries to adopt 
policies which curb tobacco products use and internalize the externalities 
associated with their use68.  
 
Despite the extensive regulation, efforts at demand reduction, and its pariah status 
among donors and governments, tobacco is the most cultivated non-food crop in the 
world and is grown in over 120 countries (ITGA: “Tobacco Types”, 
                                                          
66
 For example, Talbot (2009, pp 93-94) writes that 
Analysis of the structures of tropical commodity chains thus provides insights into the 
nature of relationships between the core and periphery, and into the structure of 
international inequality and how it has been maintained over long historical periods. 
67
 For example, in 2012 the (U.S.) Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services announced a US$ 54 million anti-smoking campaign, designed to persuade 50,000 smokers 
(in the U.S.) to quit (Tobacco Journal, 2012a, http://www.tobaccojournal.com/Graphic_anti-
smoking_media_campaign_launched.51125.0.html). 
68
 The Bank makes an exception for extremely tobacco-dependent economies.  At the time of Jaffee’s (2003, 
p 5) writing, only Zimbabwe and Malawi fit the Bank’s criteria for extreme tobacco-dependency.   
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http://www.tobaccoleaf.org/conteudos/default.asp?ID=18&IDP=5&P=5).  Tobacco is an 
attractive crop due to its high returns relative to other crops (more on which below) and 
low climatic/environmental requirements, such as soil fertility and water (ITGA: 
“Alternative Crops”, 
http://www.tobaccoleaf.org/conteudos/default.asp?ID=50&IDP=20&P=5). We argue that 
a GVC approach is particularly well-placed to incorporate the effects of some of these 
peculiarities into an analysis of tobacco production in a developing country. 
Third, despite the economic importance of tobacco leaf production in a number of 
developing countries, and the amount of attention (academic, political, and press) given 
to certain aspects of tobacco (in particular health, consumption, and regulation), there has 
been scant application of GCC/GVC concepts to the global tobacco industry69.  This 
therefore presents an opportunity to contribute to the GVC (empirical) literature by 
covering a new chain. 
Fourth, tobacco is an extremely important industry in Malawi, often accounting for 
roughly 60% of export earnings, 25% of government revenue, and 13% of GDP (Prowse 
and Moyer-Lee, forthcoming).  Therefore, to the extent that GVC analysis can be used to 
gain insight into broader issues of economic development of developing countries, 
analysing Malawi’s tobacco industry is a useful starting point for understanding economic 
development in the country. 
Fifth, Malawi’s tobacco industry is almost entirely export-oriented (Prowse and 
Moyer-Lee, forthcoming).  Therefore, to the extent that GVC analysis can be used to 
understand how a developing country is “inserted” into the global economy, and how this 
insertion affects the prospects for upgrading, analysing Malawi’s tobacco industry would 
appear to be a particulary fruitful exercise.   
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 For example, in a search of the 705 publications listed on the Global Value Chains website 
(www.globalvaluechains.org), the word “tobacco” produces zero results.  Vargas (2001) applies GCC analysis 
to the tobacco cluster of the Rio Pardo Cluster in Southern Brazil.  Likewise Prowse and Moyer-Lee 
(forthcoming) and Moyer-Lee and Prowse (2012) use a GVC approach to analyze the Malawian tobacco 
industry and Moyer-Lee (2013) to discuss the global tobacco industry.  However, Moyer-Lee and Prowse 
(2012) and Moyer-Lee (2013) draw extensively from the present work and are yet to be published.   
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 Sixth, as will be seen in Chapter 4, the historical formation of the Malawian 
smallholder burley sector stands in distinction from a number of other GCC/GVC case 
studies in Africa (e.g. those covered in Daviron and Gibbon, 2002), both in terms of timing 
(it did not technically exit before the 1990s) and in terms of the role of the state.  Whilst 
the general trend in the case studies covered in Daviron and Gibbon (2002) and Gibbon 
and Ponte (2005) has been for the state to withdraw from active intervention (noting 
exceptions such as cocoa in Ghana and coffee in Kenya), it could be argued that the state 
in Malawi, particularly under President Mutharika, has increased its intervention in the 
industry (more on which in Chapter 7).  Therefore, tobacco in Malawi serves as a 
particularly useful (if perhaps somewhat unique) case study for an analytical framework 
which attempts to incorprate the state as one of the key actors in a GVC analysis of 
governance and upgrading. 
 Seventh, Malawi’s long history of tobacco production engendered the creation of a 
number of organisations and institutions, such as the Tobacco Association of Malawi and 
the tobacco auction (more on which in Chapter 4).  These institutions predate the 
cigarette multinationals’ current concern with sourcing traceabile and compliant tobacco 
leaf (more on which in Chapters 3-8).  Therefore, analysing the demands of the cigarette 
multi-nationals on this industry (Chapters 5 and 6), and the responses of both government 
and the more prominent farmer associations (Chapter 7), provides insight into the 
dynamics of global value chain governance and upgading.  In other words, the historical 
peculiarities of the Malawi case allow us to examine how well-established local and 
national institutions and organisations respond to and interact with the international 
cigarette companies (lead firms) and their attempts to drive the chain.            
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1.4.2 Research Questions 
 
 Given our discussion of both the literature and our reasons for investigating the 
Malawian tobacco industry, a number of topics merit inquiry.  Some of these topics have 
been formulated into explicit research questions while others have necessarily been 
excluded due to the confines of space.  Below we will present our eight research questions 
and the reasons for choosing them.  This will be followed by a discussion of what we have 
excluded and why.   
 
1. Territoriality 
a. What is the territoriality of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco?  What 
is the territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value 
Chain?  How are these connected?   
b. How has the territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco 
Value Chain come to be shaped over time?  
2. Governance as drivenness 
a. Is the Global Value Chain for Tobacco driven?  If so by who? What 
enables the drivers to maintain their power?  How do lead firms drive 
the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain?  
b. Does the Malawian government play a role in driving the Malawi 
(smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain? 
3. Governance as coordination 
a. How is the lead firm-first tier supplier node of the Malawi Tobacco 
Value Chain coordinated?  Does the coordination observed correspond 
to the predictions of Gereffi et al. (2005)? 
4. Upgrading 
a. Have lead firms promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in what form and 
for whom? 
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b. Has the Malawian government promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in 
what form and for whom? 
c. Has farmer associational power contributed to upgrading in Malawi?  If 
so, in what form and for whom? 
 
Our research questions on territoriality have been posed, first and foremost, 
because mapping the chain is an essential first step when undertaking any type of chain 
analysis.  However, and following Daviron and Ponte (2005), by mapping both the Global 
Value Chain for Tobacco and the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain and then connecting them, 
enables us to better understand how Malawi fits into the big picture.  Furthermore, by 
posing Research Question 1.b on how the territoriality has been shaped over time, we 
seek to move beyond the firm-centrism of the GVC-GHS variant by engaging with the 
historical formation of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  Therefore, with our first set of 
research questions we attempt to move beyond the merely descriptive element of 
territoriality by questioning why the chain is shaped the way it is. 
We pose a number of questions on the role of lead firms.  With regard to driving, 
we have asked Research Question 2.a for two reasons.  First, and bearing in mind our 
discussion of why the GVC literature was chosen to analyse the Malawian tobacco 
industry, understanding how the dynamics of a major industry in a poor African country 
may or may not be subject to the corporate strategies of rich country firms has the 
potential to prove partially illuminating on economic relations between developing and 
developed countries more broadly.  Second, the concept of drivenness, with its focus on 
chain-long dynamics, is ideal for examining the ramifications of the uniqueness of tobacco 
as a consumer product (discussed above) on tobacco producers and producing countries.  
Similarly, we have posed Research Question 3.a, on governance as coordination, in order 
to better understand the mechanics of how lead firms govern their first tier suppliers in 
Malawi.  By testing Gereffi et al.’s (2005) theory, we also seek to contribute to the 
discussion in the GVC literature on governance in general and to the debate on the 
usefulness of the theory in particular.  Finally, we have asked Research Question 4.a, on 
lead firm promotion of upgrading, in order to enhance our understanding of whether 
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value chains benefit developing country suppliers.  By engaging with both the GVC-GHS 
and GVC-GPD variants of the literature, we want to know if participation in a GVC entails a 
dynamic learning curve with the potential to improve the rewards structures for 
developing country suppliers. 
We pose Research Questions 2.b, 4.b, and 4.c in order to interrogate the roles of 
non-firm actors in the value chain.  The answers to Research Questions 2.b and 4.b, on the 
role of the state, have the potential to prove illuminating in our understanding of the 
likelihood and effectiveness of state intervention in export industries in developing 
countries.  In other words, in today’s neo-liberal world, can developing countries still 
shape the nature of their participation in international trade in a beneficial way?  Likewise, 
Research Question 4.c is asked in order to obtain a better understanding of the role of 
smallholder producers in chains characterized by the powerful concentration of 
commercial capital and the dispersion and fragmentation of production.  In other words, is 
there potential for collective action as a method of changing the power balance in value 
chains and improving the position of smallholder producers?        
Before turning to what we will not address in this work, it is worth briefly 
commenting on our approach to governance, lest it appear contradictory to GCC/GVC 
practitioners.  Indeed, and as can be seen both in our literature review and in our research 
questions, we are engaging with governance both as drivenness and as coordination.  Bair 
(2005; 2009) discusses the interpretation of governance as one of the key features 
distinguishing Global Value Chains from Global Commodity Chains, its intellectual 
predecessor.  Likewise, we treat the interpretation of governance as one of the 
distinguishing features between the two variants of GVC literature engaged with in this 
work (GVC-GHS and GVC-GPD).  Furthermore, and as seen in our discussion of Gereffi et 
al.’s (2005) theory of value chain governance (as coordination), the theory has been widely 
critiqued, mainly for its narrow focus.   
However, we argue that incorporating both approaches to governance in our 
analysis is both conceptually coherent and useful.  Firstly, and whilst Gereffi et al.’s (2005) 
theory does represent an intellectual break from the GCC tradition, much of the GVC-GPD 
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work on governance focuses on drivenness.  Secondly, we argue that drivenness and 
coordination are indeed more complementary than mutually exclusive70.  Whilst our main 
approach to governance in this work is one of drivenness, our application of governance as 
coordination is limited to the narrow confines for which it was intended: the lead firm-first 
tier supplier node of the chain.  By not losing sight of the “big picture” or the historical 
aspect of governance (as these are treated elsewhere in the thesis), testing Gereffi et al.’s 
(2005) theory at one node of the chain has the potential to prove illuminating for our 
broader discussion of how lead firms govern the chain in Malawi.      
With regard to those topics discussed yet not formulated into explicit research 
questions, institutional framework is perhaps the most glaring omission.  However, whilst 
not embodied in one particular question, various aspects of this concept will be addressed 
throughout this work.  To the extent that institutional framework has been understood 
mainly in relation to upgrading (e.g. in the GVC-GPD variant), this issue will be discussed 
briefly in our treatment of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco, and in much more detail in 
our case study of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  To the extent that institutional 
framework refers to regulatory structures, in our discussion of entry barriers to the lead 
firm sector we will discuss at length various regulations (public and private) faced by lead 
firms and first tier suppliers.  To the extent that institutional framework is understood as 
“rules of the game”, this will also be addressed via our discussion of state intervention in 
the Malawian tobacco industry.  What we will not address in this work are trade 
regulations and their impact on governance and upgrading in our case study.  Whilst a 
treatment of trade regulations would no doubt enrich our analysis, it has been excluded 
for three reasons.  First, and bearing in mind the tension between the limitations of space 
and the ambitious nature of our investigation, we have had to excise a number of aspects 
of GCC/GVC analysis which feature more prominently in other works71.  Second, our 
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 For example, Bair (2009, p 25) notes:  
Within the GCC framework, the BDCC-PDCC distinction aims to describe the composite 
power structure of a chain but offers no predictions about the way in which particular 
activities or the relationship between specific links are coordinated; the opposite would 
seem to be true of the GVC governance theory. 
71
 For example, the extensive discussion of the new international trade regime in Gibbon and Ponte (2005), 
the discussion of AGOA in Gibbon (2003b), and the discussion of the MFA and “triangle manufacturing” in 
Gereffi (1994).   
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reading of primary sources (mainly annual reports, shareholder reports, webcasts) of the 
international tobacco companies, as well as of the tobacco industry press (e.g. Tobacco 
Journal International, Tobacco Reporter), suggests that international trade regulations do 
not feature as a major concern of tobacco multinationals or as major factor in sourcing 
decisions.  Third, trade laws did not appear to be a major determinant of the territoriality 
(and much less of the governance and upgrading) in the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  
Although various trade regulations were occasionally mentioned in passing by (primarily 
industry) respondents, they were not often presented as an important determinant of 
which firms bought Malawian tobacco and/or where these firms were located.   
 A discussion of input-output structure of the value chain under study will be woven 
into our treatment of the chain’s territoriality, governance, and upgrading.  Indeed we 
argue that it would be near impossible to engage in serious discussion of territoriality, 
governance, and upgrading, without at least a broad overview of the chain’s input-output 
structure.  As such, this topic will not constitute an object of inquiry in and of itself. 
 A political economy approach to agrarian change, especially one which analyses a 
global value chain whose starting point is a smallholder farmer, should be cognizant of 
rural differentiation.  However, due to the confines of space and time - the former with 
regard to the length of this thesis, the latter with regard to our research priorities during 
fieldwork in Malawi - we are unable to thoroughly investigate the extent of rural 
differentiation of the smallholder burley sector in Malawi and its impact on governance 
and upgrading.  Therefore, our discussion of rural differentiation in this chapter should be 
understood as issues to be aware of rather than objects of investigation, and will serve to 
inform and qualify both our discussion of tobacco farmers in the Global Value Chain for 
Tobacco as well as our analysis of farmer associational power and the role of the latter in 
upgrading in Malawi.   
 The environmental conditions of production, whilst undoubtedly an important 
feature of any value chain, are perhaps less important in our case of tobacco than in 
extractive industries (e.g. tuna or oil).  Indeed, one of the characterizing features of 
tobacco agriculture is the crop’s wide adaptability to various agro-ecological conditions, 
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which has made it a particularly attractive cash crop across both time and space.  The 
environmental conditions of production will not be ignored.  Indeed they will work their 
way into our discussions on upgrading, on the types of tobacco grown in different places, 
on quality, and elsewhere.  However, and once again with space limitations in mind, the 
environmental conditions of production will not feature as a main section in this work. 
 Our discussion of consumption will also be anecdotal.  Tobacco consumption has 
been studied extensively from the perspective of other disciplines72, and a review of this 
enormous literature for our purposes could be superficial at best.  An extension of this 
work could potentially attempt to filter and incorporate some of this research into a GVC 
analysis in a highly selective manner.  Indeed some of the very recent trends in 
consumption and regulation may even necessitate a more serious engagement with 
consumption and how changes in the latter may cause ripples or ruptures throughout the 
chain.  We will briefly discuss some of these trends and suggest an outline for future 
research on this topic in our conclusion. 
 Although we will discuss codes of conduct and engage with Wright’s associational 
power, both of which have featured prominently in GVC analyses - by Barrientos et al. 
(2001) and Selwyn (2007, 2012), respectively - for the purposes of incorporating labour73, 
an incorporation of labour will not be attempted in this work.  In the study of a value chain 
which originates with a smallholder sector, a serious incorporation of labour would 
necessitate a form of household survey to assess the prevalence of hired labour use by 
smallholders (which anecdotal evidence suggests - and our discussion of rural 
differentiation would predict - is highly varied).  However, we opted for a fieldwork 
approach based primarily on semi-structured interviews, with our main points of inquiry 
consisting of chain nodes downstream from smallholders.  The justification for focusing on 
semi-structured interviews and a firm-level survey will be discussed later in this work 
(Chapter 2).  In addition to restricting the focus of this work in the interests of space, time 
constraints - in particular one year for fieldwork in a three year programme in which 
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 Fletcher Krebel noted, in a December 1961 edition of Reader’s Digest (cited in Goodman, 1993, p 1) that 
“It is now proved beyond doubt that smoking is one of the leading causes of statistics.” 
73
 See Johnston and Moyer-Lee (2013) for a critique of this incorporation.   
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fieldwork is not the only method of investigation - also played a role in limiting the scope 
of inquiry.  Therefore, labour has been excluded from this work. 
 We will engage only partially with the historical formation of the value chain in 
study.  More specifically, we will discuss at length the historical formation of the 
smallholder burley sector.  However, we will engage with only a selection of key features 
of the historical formation of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco.  Due to tobacco’s 
historically expansive coverage (across both time and space), and once again cognizant of 
our space restrictions, a detailed exposition of the historical formation of the Global Value 
Chain for Tobacco simply is not possible.    
  
 
1.4.3 Thesis Structure  
 
 This work is divided into three parts.  In the remainder of Part One (Theory, 
Structure, and Methods) we will discuss our methodology (Chapter 2).  In particular we 
will discuss our various approaches to researching the global tobacco industry, the 
historical formation of the Malawi smallholder burley sector, as well as key issues in our 
three fieldwork trips to Malawi.   
 Part 2 (The Global Value Chain for Tobacco) consists of Chapter 3, in which we 
discuss the territoriality of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco.  In particular, we discuss at 
length the lead firm and first tier supplier sectors and their relative levels of concentration 
and important entry barriers.  We also engage with governance as drivenness and discuss 
main features of governance of the chain.  Tobacco agriculture and upgrading in the chain 
are discussed to a lesser extent, and mainly for the purpose of contextualizing our Malawi 
case study, rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive analysis of the global 
tobacco industry, which could constitute a thesis in and of itself.     
 Part 3: The Malawi Smallholder Burley Tobacco Value Chain contains four chapters.  
In Chapter 4 we provide a brief history of the formation of the smallholder burley sector in 
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Malawi, which contributes to our understanding of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain’s 
contemporary territoriality.  Given that we have clearly delineated our chain case study as 
originating with the smallholder burley sector, and because this sector did not exist prior 
to the early 1990s, a discussion of its historical formation is of particular relevance.   
 In Chapter 5 we will assess the territoriality (at the time of fieldwork) of the chain.  
Whilst Chapter 3 viewed territoriality from the perspective of the lead firms looking 
upstream, Chapter 5 will view territoriality from the perspective of the Malawian 
smallholder burley sector looking downstream.  In other words, where does the 
smallholder burley tobacco go?  Of particular emphasis is the nature of end-market 
segmentation.  Although we will not explore the origin of the segmentation in this chapter, 
we will extensively consider the features which distinguish different end-markets. 
 In Chapter 6 we will purposefully connect the two end points of our chain in order 
to analyse governance and upgrading in the international cigarette company-Malawi 
(smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain.  In this chapter we are interested in particular 
in the role of lead firms in Malawi.  We will assess the extent to which they govern the 
chain, both in terms of drivenness as well as coordination.  We will also assess the extent 
to which upgrading in the chain is promoted and/or controlled by lead firms.     
 Chapter 7 will continue our discussion of upgrading and governance; however it 
will do so by isolating and analysing the roles of the state and farmer associational power.  
After briefly introducing some of the key state institutions and farmer associations we will 
discuss the extent to which aspects of the value chain can be said to be driven by the state.  
This will follow by an (intricately related) analysis of the extent of state-promoted 
upgrading in the chain, as well as upgrading which has occurred as a result of farmer 
associational power. 
 Chapter 8 will present our conclusions.  Since in Chapters 6 and 7 we attempt to 
disentangle the roles of the state, lead firms and their suppliers, and farmer associational 
power in governance and upgrading, Chapter 8 will be dedicated (in part) to bringing 
these chapters together for the purposes of presenting a more coherent set of findings.  
We will also attempt to briefly address the territoriality which was subject of Chapter 5, by 
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drawing on our theoretical framework.  This discussion will end by a concise overview of 
recent developments in (international) tobacco products regulations as well as domestic 
Malawian tobacco policy, and a consequential potential future research agenda.    
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
In my investigation of chain governance and upgrading in the Malawi Tobacco Value 
Chain, a number of areas in particular required tailored research approaches74.  In 
addition to investigating the internal dynamics of chain governance, and pertinent to our 
research questions regarding the influence of farmer organisations and governments on 
chain governance, it was necessary to investigate the extent of influence of non-lead firm 
actors on the chain.  In particular, one needed to establish the role of farmer organisations 
and the extent to which these contributed to shaping the chain.  Furthermore, it was 
necessary to investigate the role of government in shaping the chain either in conjunction 
with or in opposition to lead firms and/or farmer organisations.  In this chapter we will 
briefly discuss some of the methodological issues confronted in this investigation.  Section 
2.2 will summarize the methods employed, Section 2.3 will discuss the fieldwork trips to 
Malawi, Section 2.4 will discuss positionality, and Section 2.5 will conclude.   
 
 
2.2  Summary of Methods 
 
A number of research methods were employed in this investigation, namely a desktop-
survey of secondary literature, secondary data from government and private sector 
sources, semi-structured interviews, direct observation, and a firm-level survey.  The 
research occurred in four phases: 
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 Empirical research for this thesis was required not merely for the country case study of Malawi (Chapters 
4-7) but also for the Global Value Chain for Tobacco more broadly (Chapter 3).   
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a. Research on the global tobacco industry; 
b. Research on the history of tobacco production in Malawi; 
c. Preliminary fieldwork trips in Malawi; 
d. Core fieldwork trip in Malawi. 
 
Research on the global tobacco industry was originally done for the purposes of a 
background chapter on the Global Value Chain for Tobacco.  The intention was for the 
research to be done in a desktop-survey manner, relying principally on secondary 
literature.  However, the research for this chapter (Chapter 3) did not develop in this 
fashion, for a number of inter-related reasons.   
The first and potentially most important complicating factor was the dearth of 
academic literature on the global tobacco industry.  Academic articles on tobacco tend to 
either be case studies of tobacco agriculture in particular countries or regions of countries, 
or studies of a variety of industry sectors in a particular country or region, one of which is 
tobacco.  There is also an abundant literature on tobacco concerning smoking and health, 
but which for our purposes is of a lesser importance.  A full investigation into the reasons 
for this thin literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, however anecdotal evidence 
(from fieldwork and interviews) suggests that given the taboo nature of the tobacco 
industry, governments, donor agencies, and academics alike are loath to conduct research 
on the topic (more on which below).  At the time of the research for Chapter 3 - primarily 
in my first year - I was also unable to find any application of the global value chains 
concept to the international tobacco industry75.  
This lack of academic material led me to rely on other sources such as news articles 
(in particular from tobacco industry press such as Tobacco Journal International and 
Tobacco Reporter), secondary data from tobacco leaf companies, and annual reports and 
webcasts of shareholder meetings of the international cigarette companies.  I also 
conducted a number of semi-structured interviews with academics or industry insiders, 
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 A potential exception to this is Vargas (2001), however this article is still much more focused on the local 
nodes of the chain in Southern Brazil, rather than on the global value chain as a whole. 
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and consulted agronomy sources, such as growers’ guides76.  Finally, I visited a tobacco 
farm and a tobacco research site in South Carolina, U.S.A.  On this visit I was able to 
observe the agronomical research being conducted as well as interview a tobacco 
agronomy extension officer77 and a big tobacco farmer78.  This visit was useful not in that 
the farmer interviewed or agronomy practices observed were representative of global 
tobacco agronomy, but rather in that they were representative of tobacco agronomy best 
practice79.   
 Research on the history of tobacco production in Malawi was also conducted 
essentially in my first year.  However, this research was done almost entirely as a review 
of published academic articles.  Whilst none of this literature was written in a global value 
chains framework, there was quite a lot written on the topic, probably due to a number of 
factors, e.g. the country being English-speaking, the predominance of tobacco in the 
country’s economy, and the long history of tobacco production in the country.  This 
literature was complemented by some secondary data from Malawi government sources 
as well as a semi-structured interview with Martin Prowse, a specialist who has published 
on the topic.   
 
 
2.3  Fieldwork Trips in Malawi 
 
My preliminary fieldwork trips to Malawi consisted of two one month trips and the 
main methods employed were direct observation, 32 semi-structured interviews with 30 
respondents80, informal conversations, and reading the daily newspapers81.  I interviewed 
officials in leaf companies, farmer organisations, government ministries, parastatal 
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 For example, North Carolina State University (2011) and Tobacco Farm Quarterly (2007). 
77
 See Gooden (2011). 
78
 See DuRant (2011). 
79
 More on this in Chapter 3.  
80
 For a list of anonymous respondents and dates of interviews see Appendix 2.A, Table 2.A.1. 
81
 In particular the two national dailies, The Nation and The Daily Times.   
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agricultural or tobacco companies, as well as officials in the donor community.  The focus 
of this phase of the research was not as much on acquiring detailed and specific 
information, but rather on understanding the big picture by acquiring information from as 
many relevant sources as possible. This phase of my research was also inspired by what 
appeared to be common practice in other GVC work.  For example, Ponte (2001) 
conducted a similar style of broad interview-based research in his work on the coffee 
chain in East Africa82.  In Kenya and Uganda Ponte  
interviewed officers of the coffee regulatory bodies, cooperative unions, farmer 
organizations, trade federations, and a small sample of traders/exporters and 
processors (p 5).   
 
In Tanzania Ponte conducted interviews with a number of large estate owners/managers 
as well as  
…with all types of actors in the domestic marketing chain downstream from 
producers.  These included actors handling coffee (agents, traders, cooperatives, 
curing/hulling plants, exporters, local roasters, transporters) and providers of 
services to the industry (finance, inputs, extension, research, brokerage, quality 
control, auditing, information, logistics).  Specifically, the author interviewed 22 out 
of 30 registered export companies (including all the top ten by market share), 18 out 
of 19 licensed coffee curing/hulling plants, and 21 out of 30 licensed domestic 
traders (including all the top ten) (p 5).      
 
During my core fieldwork trip to Malawi my original plan was to do a household survey 
of tobacco farmers83.  However, a number of factors led me to abandon the household 
survey and instead opt for a series of semi-structured interviews84 and a firm-level survey.  
First of all, during my two preparatory fieldwork trips to Malawi, I was surprised by the 
ease of access I had for interviews.  By the end of my second trip I had interviewed or had 
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 Also, Selwyn (2012) is based on interviews and “author’s observations”; Thomsen (2007) is based on 68 
semi-structured, open-ended interviews.  
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 Household or farmer surveys are somewhat unusual but not unprecedented in GVC research.  For 
example, see Ponte (2001), who conducted a survey of 250 smallholder coffee producers in Tanzania for his 
research on the coffee chain in East Africa.   
84
 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted on this trip.  For a list of anonymous respondents and 
dates of interviews, see Appendix 2.A, Table 2.A.2.   
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informal conversations with an official in almost every major bank, donor agency, relevant 
governmental body, major tobacco farmer organisations, and tobacco company.  I did not 
expect to get this sort of access, and found that with the access I was uncovering new 
information of particular relevance to GVC analysis, e.g. on power dynamics within the 
chain, governance, upgrading, etc.  This was despite the fact that the country was in a 
state of political crisis and the tobacco industry in particular had become extremely 
politicised85. 
In addition to the unexpected ease of access, my research during the two preliminary 
fieldwork trips revealed that the tobacco industry was at a turning point.  Pressure was 
building for the main marketing system to shift from being auction-based to being 
contract farming-based, due to the insistence of the international cigarette companies.  
However President Bingu wa Mutharika was heavily resisting this transition.  Seeing these 
dynamics play out led me to focus the research more on the governance of the value 
chain and the influence of (Malawi) government.  Whilst a survey of tobacco farmers 
would no doubt be useful in terms of uncovering the impact of these dynamics on one 
sector/node of the chain, the method would not be the most useful in understanding how 
the international cigarette companies were enforcing their demands or how government 
was influencing the chain.   
The final factor influencing the shift in focus from a household survey to semi-
structured interviews and a firm-level survey, was the death of President Bingu wa 
Mutharika.  The president died while I was in London between the second preparatory 
fieldwork and the main fieldwork trip.  Arguably an autocratic president86, who had also 
taken positions contrary to the interests of the donor community and the international 
cigarette and tobacco leaf companies, was about to be replaced by Vice-President Joyce 
Banda, a politician who was viewed favourably by international media and donor agencies.  
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 The president at the time, Bingu wa Mutharika had become increasingly autocratic (according to civil 
society organisations, journalists, and donors, as revealed in articles in the national dailies) and journalists, 
activists, and others were being persecuted and killed.  Furthermore, a number of high-level deportations 
had occurred, particularly in the tobacco industry. 
86
 These accusations were levied against the President in the opinion pages of the national newspapers, 
especially The Nation, as well as by civil society organizations and the donor community, as seen in 
newspaper articles in The Nation, The Daily Times, and in interviews conducted by the author.   
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She gave every indication of aligning the Malawian tobacco industry with the interests of 
the international tobacco leaf and cigarette companies, i.e. enabling the shift from auction 
to contract farming based marketing systems.  The replacement of Mutharika with Banda 
had potential significance for my research in two areas.  Firstly, if Banda’s policies actually 
turned out to be as accommodative towards the tobacco industry as they appeared they 
were going to be, the policy impact of the change would present evidence of the extent to 
which Mutharika’s policies were influencing the shape and nature of the tobacco value 
chain.  Secondly, given that Banda appeared to be much less autocratic, there was great 
potential to gain even more access to privileged informants in government and the 
tobacco industry, who would have less fear of retribution or deportation. 
I therefore decided to focus my core fieldwork trip on a series of semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, as well as to conduct a firm survey on the basis of that 
outlined in Kaplinsky and Morris (2000, pp. 55-69)87.  The objective of this survey is to 
identify the relative importance of “critical success factors” (i.e. important factors for lead 
firms such as price or quality) in a value chain, and the ability of different actors in the 
chain to “hear” the lead firms by comparing the relative importance assigned to different 
factors by different actors in a chain.  I established seven factors88, based on previous 
semi-structured interviews, observation, and informal conversations.  Survey respondents 
were asked to rate each factor on a scale of 1 (not at all important) to 7 (extremely 
important).  Scores could be repeated for more than one factor.  The idea of this survey is 
to conduct it with actors at different nodes of the chain to compare the scores that actors 
give in order to understand the ability with which lead firms are able to make their 
demands heard.  I therefore conducted the survey with the managing directors of the four 
tobacco leaf merchants in Malawi, the agronomy directors of these four companies, as 
well as farmers in executive positions of four of the major tobacco farmer associations in 
the country.  However, my survey departed from its original intended use (in Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2000, pp. 55-69) in that it was conducted twice at each node of the chain, in 
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 For an application of a similar survey, see Kaplinsky et al. (2003). 
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 These were price, quality, long term relationships with suppliers, non-tobacco related materials (NTRM), 
child labour, volume (ability to buy large quantities from a single supplier), and good agricultural practices 
(GAP).     
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order to correspond to two different end markets.  For a detailed elaboration and analysis 
of the results, see Chapters 5 and 6.   
In addition to conducting the survey, the core fieldwork trip also allowed me to 
conduct semi-structured interviews with a number of important stakeholders whom I had 
not previously interviewed.  These included other officials in tobacco leaf companies and 
important farmer organisations, as well as the Minister of Agriculture.  Conducting a series 
of interviews of key actors at different nodes of the chain has precedence in GVC research 
such as in Dolan and Humphrey (2004).  These authors conducted research on the fresh 
vegetables value chain from Africa to the U.K.  Their fieldwork consisted of interviews with 
U.K. supermarket chains, U.K. importers, wholesalers, and trade associations, as well as 
with exporters in Kenya and Zimbabwe (p 495).  In their study of the global wood furniture 
value chain, Kaplinsky et al. (2003) also rely on interviews and firm level surveys.  However 
their interviews appear to be heavily orientated towards the buyer end of the chain.        
Japan Tobacco (JT), the only international cigarette company purchasing tobacco leaf 
directly in Malawi, was the only organisation which refused to grant me an official 
interview.  This is despite repeated efforts, informal conversations with senior managers, 
an affiliation with the Tobacco Control Commission (the governmental regulatory body), 
and having interviewed officials in all of the major tobacco leaf companies in the country.  
In my view it is not a coincidence that the only “lead firm” operating in the country was 
also the strictest and most tightly controlled organisation89.  Therefore the fact that this 
organisation did not grant me an interview can be used as evidence in and of itself, of the 
structure of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain and the nature of lead firms in the chain.  
This issue is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5.   
In addition to the semi-structured interviews and the survey, direct observation and 
informal conversations served as major methodological tools for this phase of my research.  
After having built up personal relationships with key individuals in tobacco farmer 
organisations (e.g. head of customer service in Tobacco Association of Malawi and head of 
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 I was never formally denied the interview, but rather was told repeatedly that the interview was pending 
clearance from headquarters in Geneva.   
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tobacco operations in National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi), during my 
core fieldwork trip I shadowed these individuals in their jobs on average once per week.  
This shadowing included visits to the auction floors, participation in “field day” events 
where new agronomical practices or techniques were disseminated to tobacco farmers, 
and visits with tobacco farmers during which their organizations educated them on the 
transition to contract farming or disseminated contracts with different leaf companies for 
the farmers to sign.  Whilst these methods of observation may not appear as rigorous as a 
survey or a series of interviews, I found them to be extremely informative for my research.  
They could indeed be looked upon as a sort of triangulation whereby I could verify the 
assertions of senior figures in tobacco leaf companies or tobacco farmer organisations as 
to what was happening with tobacco farmers throughout the country. 
     
 
2.4  Positionality 
 
There are significant challenges that come with this research, especially regarding 
biases.  Stevano (2011, p 1), paraphrasing Harding (1987) notes: 
Feminist epistemologies offer interesting insights to reflect on issues of power that 
shape the relationship between the researcher and the researched and, therefore, 
the research itself. 
 
In this same line of thinking, England’s (1994, pp 251-252) conclusion served as my 
starting point:  
…fieldwork is intensely personal, in that the positionality [i.e. position based on class, 
gender, race, etc.] and biography of the researcher plays a central role in the 
research process, in the field as well as in the final text.    
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From colonial times until today the Malawian tobacco sector (estate owners in the 
former, leaf company managers in the latter) has been dominated by White foreign males.  
These individuals have occupied the positions most associated with exploitation (e.g. 
efforts to exclude Black farmers from cultivating burley, low leaf prices).  In addition to 
being a White, foreign male myself, I was aware of the fact that I would immediately be 
perceived as comparatively wealthy due to my: ability to move around the country, having 
the luxury of being able to study rather than work, ability to travel to Africa, etc.  My 
personal characteristics would undoubtedly affect what people would say to me, how I 
would interpret what they say to me, and more generally the nature of the relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee.  As England (1994) points out, feminist 
methodologies do not eliminate these problems but can make the researcher more aware 
of these issues and serve as guidance in designing a methodology which attempts to 
minimize the resulting biases.   
The political situation in the country was probably the most interesting contextual 
factor which influenced my results.  On my first preliminary fieldwork trip to Malawi a 
number of respondents spoke freely, signed “consent to be named” forms allowing me to 
cite them, and criticised the government, although they usually did not want to be cited 
on that issue.  Others were more reticent and careful not to say or do anything that could 
be perceived as anti-establishment.  Respondents on my second preliminary fieldwork trip 
were less open.  Fewer “consent to be named” forms were signed, and people were 
notably more careful in their words.  The core fieldwork trip was by far the best in terms 
of open access to respondents.  By this time I had decided that even with permission I 
would not cite my respondents’ name or position (with rare exceptions) as a way of 
protecting their identities, so “consent to be named” forms were a non-issue.  However, I 
was able to get access to a number of individuals that I couldn’t get access to beforehand, 
and people were notably less cautious.   
The attitudes of my respondents coincided with the political situation in the country 
during these three periods.  In the first preliminary fieldwork trip (October-November, 
2011) President Mutharika was becoming increasingly autocratic, however in the second 
trip (February-March, 2012) the country had come to the brink of chaos due, in part, to his 
95 
 
leadership style.  Journalists and politicians were being harassed or killed, diplomats 
deported, etc.90.  By the time of the third visit (June-July, 2012) Mutharika had died and 
been replaced by Joyce Banda who appeared to be doing everything possible to please the 
international media, donor community, and tobacco industry. 
However, beyond the general political environment, there were a number of 
(unexpected) factors concerning my positionality which I believe gave me greater access 
to certain groups of people.  Although the literature on positionality and feminist research 
methods is often preoccupied with power relations, I believe this issue was not as 
pertinent in many interviews.  Many of the people I interviewed were members of the 
Malawian educated elite or expat community, and were not intimidated by or on (socially 
perceived) unequal footing with a young foreign student.  To the extent there were 
unequal power relations, they were often in favour of the respondent as I had to try to 
make my research relevant to the respondent in order for them to grant me reasonable 
time for an interview.  However, there are a number of reasons why I believe that the 
respondents did give me access. 
I interviewed a number of expats and White Malawians.  From numerous interactions 
with these people it is my belief that many of them identified with me as either being a 
foreigner or being White.  I believe that the nationality and race factors were crucial here 
in that there was less common ground with many of these respondents on other issues 
such as education level, political views, personal interests, etc.  I do not intend to imply 
any sort of racial bias among these people but rather that they identified with me and 
hence were open and helpful.   
Another group of people that I felt identified with me and hence was particularly 
helpful was highly educated Malawian government officials.  Many of these had either 
already completed a PhD or were in the process of writing their PhD dissertations.  In the 
former case, we had informal conversations about writing chapters, supervision, etc.  In 
the latter case we often exchanged articles or authors’ names as our topics tended to 
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 As observed through articles in the national newspapers (The Nation and The Daily Times) as well as 
revealed in interviews, in particular with the donor community.   
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have considerable overlap.  In both cases, doctoral studies created a significant 
connection between me and the respondents. 
Another factor was language.  As most of the people I was interviewing were in the 
business community or in government, their English was impeccable.  The fact that there 
was a common language made communication much easier.  Also, although my Chichewa 
was far from fluent, I was able to have basic conversations.  I used this as a form of 
breaking the ice with many of my respondents. 
Another factor, and one of obvious interest to feminist research methodologies, is 
gender.  The Malawian tobacco industry is heavily male-dominated and characterised by a 
macho mentality, in my opinion.  All of the agronomy managers and managing directors of 
the tobacco companies, as well as the most important people in the farmer organisations, 
were men.  Although it is impossible to know how respondents would have responded to 
me had I been female, I believe it is safe to assume that being male gave me considerable 
access to respondents. 
In an industry which is hyper-sensitive to its taboo nature, not being perceived as anti-
tobacco also facilitated my access to informants.  Given that the entire Malawian tobacco 
industry was in the process of transforming itself, mainly to respond to public criticism of 
cigarette companies for engaging (indirectly) child labour, respondents were particularly 
vigilant towards any attempts to amass evidence which could be used to damage the 
public image of their clients.  Being an occasional smoker myself, and making clear that my 
only agenda was academic interest in the economics of tobacco production in Malawi, I 
believe helped to assuage concerns among my respondents that I was collecting evidence 
to support anti-tobacco objectives.       
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2.5  Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have reviewed the variety of methods used to conduct the research 
for the remainder of this thesis.  Chapter 3, which applies the GVC approach to the global 
tobacco industry, was based mainly on a desktop survey of secondary literature as well as 
primary sources from within the industry, a limited number of semi-structured interviews, 
and a farm and research site visit in the U.S.A.  Chapter 4, which discusses the historical 
formation of the smallholder burley tobacco sector in Malawi, was mainly based on a 
review of secondary literature.   
Chapters 5, 6, and 7, on the other hand, are the outcome of two one-month 
preliminary fieldwork trips to Malawi as well as a core six-week fieldwork trip.  In total, 52 
semi-structured interviews were conducted, as well as a firm-level survey of tobacco leaf 
company managing directors, agronomy directors, and farmers in executive positions in 
four of the leading farmer associations.  In addition, I conducted dozens of informal 
conversations with industry insiders and field visits (observation) to triangulate the 
information being provided to me in more formal interviews.  These interviews, informal 
conversations, and to a certain extent, survey respondents, have remained anonymous91.  
In Appendix 2.A I numbered the respondents and provided the dates of the interviews.  As 
one can observe from the repetition of certain respondent numbers I have interviewed 
some of the respondents more than once.  Despite the fact that a number of respondents 
signed “consent to be named” forms, I have left all respondents (except the Minister of 
Agriculture) anonymous.  I have also not listed the categories (e.g. leaf merchant, farmer 
association, etc.) of each respondent in Appendix 2.A.  This is because many, if not a 
majority, of respondents did not want to be named.  Given the fact that the key actors in 
the Malawian tobacco industry all know each other and that there are a limited number of 
tobacco leaf companies and key farmer associations, if I were to name some respondents 
and not others, it would be easier to track down the source of information for those who 
did not want to be named.  I also found that when I guaranteed anonymity that 
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 Although not ideal, there is precedent for maintaining the anonymity of semi-structured interviews for 
similar reasons as those outlined above, e.g. Hughes (2005).   
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respondents were much more forthcoming with information, particularly sensitive 
information which was of particular interest to this research, e.g. on the policies of 
international cigarette companies on such things as child labour and the extent to which 
child labour was being employed in the industry.  In sum, the tension between 
guaranteeing confidentiality to my informants and producing verifiable research is one 
which I have thought much about.  I have come to the conclusion that the approach which 
is both most ethical and which enhanced access to information was for me to leave all 
informants anonymous.     
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PART 2:  THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN 
FOR TOBACCO 
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Chapter 3: The Global Value Chain for 
Tobacco 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Tobacco leaf is used in a variety of products including chewing tobacco associated with 
American baseball players, pipe-tobacco á la Sherlock Holmes, snuff, bidis  (a sort of hand-
rolled cigarette popular in South Asia), and kreteks (a type of cigarette filled with tobacco 
and cloves and popular in Indonesia).  However, manufactured cigarettes will be the focus 
of this chapter as they comprise 92 per cent of total manufactued tobacco products 
(Eriksen et al., 2012, p 1).         
There are four main types of tobacco, distinguished by both the plant species and form 
of curing (preliminary, on-farm processing).  These types are flue-cured Virginia (FCV), 
burley, oriental, and dark.  Snuff, cigars, and pipes tend to use dark tobacco.  Cigarettes on 
the other hand are usually either Virgnia Style (using just FCV) or American Blend (using a 
mix of FCV, burley, and oriental).  As will be discussed in more detail below, the use of 
burley tobacco in cigarettes is dependent upon both the combination with flue-cured 
tobacco as well as additives and/or flavourings.  This is because burley tobacco is 
considered to be harsh and unpalatable as cigarette tobacco by itself.   
Production of the different tobacco types is dependent on different inputs and suitable 
to different agro-ecological conditions and marketing systems.  For example, oriental 
tobacco is considered to be very labour-intensive, whereas flue-cured tobacco is more 
capital-intensive, due to the nature of the curing barns required (more on which below).  
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Although we do not have access to extensive comparative price data92, flue-cured tobacco 
is generally perceived to be a more valuable product than burley.   
Similar to Ponte’s (2002a) point that the portion of the price of a cup of coffee at 
Starbucks actually spent on coffee is minimal, in 1997, the tobacco content of a pack of 
cigarettes in the U.S. constituted only 4 per cent of the cost of the pack (van Liemt, 2002).  
The lead firms in the chain, the international cigarette companies (ICCs), are similar to 
lead firms in producer driven chains in that these firms don’t outsource (cigarette) 
production, production is capital-intensive, and they tend to locate near main consumer 
markets.  However they are more similar to buyer-driven chains in that the value added in 
their products is derived to a large extent from branding, they have decentralized 
production networks in developing countries, and their main objective is to maximise 
share values.  Additionally they are highly concentrated, seek to distinguish themselves 
through product differentiation, are protected by high entry barriers, and have increased 
their power over their suppliers in recent decades.   
Currently, the lead firms in this chain are undoubtedly the international cigarette 
companies (ICCs) (more on which below).  Like Ponte’s (2002a) coffee chain, ICCs are not 
the end-node of the chain (pre-consumption) but maintain their lead firm status through 
branding and a lack of retailer competition (e.g. unlike fresh fruits and vegetables one 
can’t buy supermarkets’ own-brand cigarettes).  The first tier suppliers in the chain are the 
leaf merchants which procure tobacco leaf from around the world, process the leaf, and 
sell it in large quantities to the ICCs.  The second tier suppliers are the tobacco farmers.  Of 
course, as the Global Value Chain for Tobacco (GVCT) operates in such a large number of 
countries, the chain will take slightly different forms depending on the market or type of 
tobacco, but the above description and Figure 3.1 below are broadly representative. 
 
                                                          
92
 Personal communication with tobacco economist Blake Brown (26 April, 2011), confirmed our suspicion 
that there is not a reliable source on international tobacco prices.  Dr. Brown pointed out that looking at 
export and import prices is not a very reliable proxy since often exports and imports of unmanufactured 
tobacco are merely intra-company transfers.    
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Figure 3.1: Schematic of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco 
 
 
     
 
 
 
This chapter will partially answer Research Questions 1.a and 2.a.  In particular, we will 
address the first part of Research Question 1.a: What is the territoriality of the Global 
Value Chain for Tobacco?  We will also address the following parts of Research Question 
2.a: Is the Global Value Chain for Tobacco driven?  If so, by who?  What enables the drivers 
to maintain their power?  The final part of Research Question 2.a - What are the 
consequences of the drivenness throughout the chain? - will be answered elsewhere 
(primarily in Chapter 6).  In answering these parts of our research questions, we will also 
attempt to partially heed Talbot’s (2009) call for more comparative analysis in commodity 
chain studies.  Although we will not engage in a systematic comparison of the GVCT with 
another value chain, we will attempt to point out similarities with other chains throughout 
this chapter.     
In Section 3.2 we will discuss the territoriality of the GVCT by engaging with three 
principal chain nodes: international cigarette companies (lead firms), tobacco leaf 
merchants (first tier suppliers), and tobacco farmers (second tier suppliers).  We will also 
analyse the governance  (as drivenness) of the chain.  Section 3.3 will discuss the prospects 
for upgrading in the chain, and Section 3.4 will conclude.  It is important to emphasize that 
our discussion of the tobacco farmer node of the chain, as well as our treatment of 
upgrading, primarily serve the purpose of contextualizing our later study of Malawi.  A 
comprehensive GVC analysis of the global tobacco industry is far beyond the scope of this 
work and will not be attempted here. 
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3.2  Territoriality and Governance 
 
3.2.1 Evolution of the Chain 
 
The tobacco crop is indigenous to the Americas and was originally used by Native 
Americans as a cure for various illnesses93 (Goodman, 1993; Alan, 1995).  It spread back to 
Europe through the colonizers so that by 1600  
…in London alone there were over 7000 tobacconists, engaging in retail 
trade estimated at over 300,000 pounds annually, constituting a significant 
component of the English economy (Alan, 1995, p 239). 
 
Indeed, the increase in consumption in England in the 17th century was particularly 
notable (Goodman, 1993; see Table 3.1 below), marking the beginning of this country’s 
disproportionate importance in the global tobacco industry, which continues until the 
present time.  Tobacco use was quickly assimilated by a broad swath of European social 
classes94 (Goodman, 1993, p 47).  Tobacco also spread throughout the rest of the world 
(both in terms of production and consumption) by the end of the 17th century.  As 
Goodman (1993, p 37) notes: 
By the turn of the century tobacco was also growing in the Philippines, 
India, Java, Japan, West Africa and China.  Chinese merchants introduced 
the plant into Mongolia, Tibet and eastern Siberia so that, only one century 
after Columbus’s voyage, tobacco was either grown or consumed in most 
of the known world. 
 
                                                          
93
 Goodman (1993, pp 24-25) suggests that it was the most widely used crop in shamanistic practices among 
Indigenous people of the Americas, and that its widespread use as a hallucinogenic may be partly 
attributable to the much higher nicotine content of the tobacco used.   
94
 Goodman (1993, p 61) suggests “that tobacco emerged as a European mass-consumed commodity in the 
eighteenth century, probably by 1750.”  The most common form of tobacco consumption during its initial 
adoption in Europe appeared to be smoking; either with pipes in Northern Europe, or cigars in Southern 
Europe (Goodman, 1993, p 67). 
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By the time of American independence, tobacco was the most important export crop in 
that country, with over 100 million pounds exported in 1776 (Alan, 1995).   
 
Table 3.1: Tobacco Consumption, England and Wales 1620-1702 
 
Years Annual Consumption (lb. per capita) 
1620-9 0.01 
1630-1 0.02 
1669 0.93 
1672 1.10 
1682, 1686-8 1.64 
1693-9 2.21 
1698-1702 2.30 
     Source: modified from Goodman (1993, p 60) 
 
 Whilst production of tobacco in the New World was dominated by Brazil and the 
Chesapeake Colonies95 (Goodman, 1993, p 146), the eighteenth century saw a shift in 
consumption patterns in Europe from smoke to snuff.  This trend is interesting for our 
discussion of tobacco in that the production of snuff was less tobacco-dependent than its 
smokable counterparts (Goodman, 1993, p 73).  As Goodman (1993, p 73) notes: 
A given amount of tobacco leaf was stretched further in the manufacture of 
snuff than in that of smoking tobacco: not only did snuff contain many 
additives absent in smoking tobacco but there was much less waste in the 
former… 
 
The shift in consumption to snuff also saw a proliferation of branding and the increasing 
importance of secret production recipes (Goodman, 1993, pp 74-75).  These are all 
themes we will return to below.  
The 1800’s saw a move away from snuff and back towards smokable tobacco products 
in Western Europe, specifically of cut tobacco and cigars (Goodman, 1993, p 92).   In the 
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 Currently the states of Virginia and Maryland.   
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19th century in the U.S., with the advent of the railroad and the invention of the cigarette-
rolling machine, U.S. tobacco companies started to focus on volume and benefit from 
economies of scale.  Towards the end of the century five companies had a (U.S.) market 
share of 92 per cent.  In 1890 these companies joined forces and became known as the 
Tobacco Trust, a highly coercive and controversial entity (Alan, 1995).  The key firm in the 
Tobacco Trust - the American Tobacco Company - attempted to enter the British market 
around the turn of the century.  However, a number of British tobacco companies 
responded by merging to create the Imperial Tobacco Company.  In 1902, the Imperial 
Tobacco Company and the American Tobacco Company agreed that the American 
Tobacco Company would return to America, the Imperial Tobacco Company would remain 
in the U.K., and the two companies would create a new company together - British 
American Tobacco - which would operate in non-U.S. and non-U.K. markets (Goodman, 
1993; Wilshaw, 1994).  Partly in response to the aggressive tactics of the American 
Tobacco Company (and then British American Tobacco), Japan nationalized its tobacco 
industry in 1904 (Suzuki and Miwa, 2009).  The government tobacco monopoly, which 
later became the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation in 1949 (JT, 2012, p 38), was 
the precursor to today’s Japan Tobacco Inc.   
In 1911, the US Supreme Court ruled the Tobacco Trust was a monopoly 96 .  
Consequently the Trust broke into 16 companies among which emerged Lorillard and R.J. 
Reynolds (Alan, 1995).  In 1913 RJ Reynolds invented the American Blend cigarette (which 
mixes flue-cured, burley, and oriental tobacco) in the form of the Camel brand, which 
came to revolutionize the American (and later global) tobacco industry (Goodman, 1993, p 
104)97.  By the 1920’s the American cigarette market was already characterized by a high 
level of branding, as can be seen in Table 3.2 below.  As may be expected, these brands 
were promoted with millions of dollars spent on advertising (Goodman, 1993, p 105).     
  
                                                          
96
 Through the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Eriksen et al., 2012, p 88). 
97
 The American Blend cigarette and the consequential demand for burley tobacco also had a particularly 
profound effect on the Malawian tobacco industry, as will be seen in Chapter 4.   
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Table 3.2: Market Share of Leading Cigarette Brands in the U.S., 1925-49 
 
Year Brand (owned by) Market Share (%) 
1925 Lucky Strike (American 
Tobacco Company) 
16.7 
Camel (RJ Reynolds) 41.6 
Chesterfield (Liggett and 
Myers) 
24.0 
1939 Lucky Strike 21.2 
Camel 23.7 
Chesterfield 18.3 
1949 Lucky Strike 23.9 
Camel 25.0 
Chesterfield 17.6 
  Source: modified from Goodman (1993, pp. 104-05) 
 
The first half of the twentieth century saw a number of developments bearing 
implications for our discussion below on the drivenness of the Global Value Chain for 
Tobacco (GVCT).  Firstly, tobacco consumption in Europe and the U.S. increased 
dramatically.  Secondly, consumption shifted increasingly towards a much more 
homogenous and commoditized product: the cigarette (Goodman, 1993, pp. 93-94).  By 
mid-century, cigarettes already represented the predominant form of tobacco 
consumption in a number of these countries98 (see Table 3.3 below).  The trend towards 
cigarette consumption only intensified throughout the course of the century, with an 
estimated 80% of (global) tobacco destined for cigarettes at the end of the 1980s 
(Goodman, 1993, p 97) and 92% by 2012 (Eriksen et al., 2012, p 1).  
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 Cigarette consumption increased in the United States by 1,100 per cent between 1900 and 1924 (Alan, 
1995).    
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Table 3.3: Predominance of Cigarette Consumption in Selected Countries in 20th 
Century 
 
Country % of Total Tobacco 
Consumption, 1950 
Year in which Cigarette 
Consumption Reached 50% 
of Total Tobacco 
Consumption 
Austria 76 1939 
Belgium 44 1961 
Denmark 44 1961 
France 53 1943 
Germany 37 1955 
Netherlands 43 1972 
Spain 31 1955 
Sweden 49 1951 
United Kingdom 84 1920 
United States 72 1941 
    Source: modified from Goodman (1993, p 94) 
 
Although the impact of tobacco consumption on health had long been the subject 
of debate in one form or another, the debate intensified profoundly with the publication 
by the American Cancer Society in 1954 of research establishing causality between 
cigarette consumption and lung cancer.  One of the ways in which the cigarette industry 
responded was by promoting filter-tipped cigarettes, which rapidly came to dominate the 
American market (Goodman, 1993, pp 109-110) (see Table 3.4 below).  A number of 
technological innovations such as filters, as well as the way tobacco leaf was processed, 
greatly reduced the amount of tobacco required per cigarette (Goodman, 1993, pp 111-
112) (see Table 3.5 below).        
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Table 3.4: Filter-tipped Average Share of U.S. Cigarette Market, 1951-5 to 1981-5 
 
Year(s) Share (%) 
1951-5 6.5 
1956-60 42.1 
1961-5 58.1 
1966-70 74.6 
1971-5 85.2 
1976-80 90.6 
1981-5 93.7 
              Source: modified from Goodman (1993, p 110) 
 
Table 3.5: Increase in Cigarettes per Pound of Tobacco Leaf in U.S., 1939-1980 
 
Year Cigarettes per pound of tobacco leaf 
1939-53 324 
1958 380 
1970 467 
1980 523 
                Source: created by author from Goodman (1993, pp. 111-12) 
 
 Another trend which developed in earnest in the second half of the 20th century in 
the American tobacco industry is the exponential growth in advertising (Goodman, 1993, 
p 114), as can be seen in Table 3.6 below.  This simultaneous increase in importance of 
marketing and decrease in importance of tobacco leaf (as seen above in the reduction of 
tobacco leaf needed per cigarette) is of particular relevance to our discussion of buyer-
driven chains in Chapter 1. 
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Table 3.6: Cigarette Advertising Expenditure in U.S., Selected Years 
 
Year Advertising Expenditure (US$ millions) 
1939 47 
1959 148 
1970* 361 
1975* 491 
1983* 1,900 
     *Data in “current” dollars 
     Source: modified from Goodman (1993, p 114) 
  
The GVCT exhibits a number of additional trends over recent decades similar to other 
GVCs.  Power asymmetries have increased in the chain as lead firms have become more 
concentrated and entry barriers to the sector have risen while production has shifted to 
developing countries (see Table 3.7).  Lead firms have placed increasing emphasis on 
product differentiation and increasing shareholder value, as business strategies and 
backwards vertical integration from ICC to farm is rare.     
Global tobacco leaf production has doubled since 1960 with an even more marked 
increase in developing countries, although production in developed countries (DCs) has 
fallen by about 50% (Shafey et al., 2009, p 48)99.  At the turn of the century over 40 million 
people engaged in tobacco cultivation (ILO, 2003) in more than 120 countries.  The total 
amount of land used globally for cultivation is about 4 million hectares, roughly the same 
employed for the production of bananas or oranges.  In 2006, these 4 million hectares 
produced 7 million tonnes of tobacco leaf (Shafey et al., 2009), up from 4.3 million tonnes 
in 1970 (ILO, 2003).  The total value of global tobacco cultivation was recently estimated 
at US$ 7 billion (Shafey et al., 2009), and as with commodities in other buyer-driven chains, 
prices tended to be higher in the 1970’s and 80’s than in the early 90’s (ITGA, 1993).  As 
with other buyer-driven chains, a high proportion of this crop (85%) was cultivated in 
developing countries (Shafey et al., 2009, p 48).  As can be seen in Table 3.7 below, 
production has shifted increasingly towards concentration in developing countries.  For 
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 This trend has continued in recent years.  For example, in Japan the number of tobacco growers decreased 
from 18,000 in 2005 to 9,000 in 2012.  Likewise, the area under tobacco cultivation decreased from 21,000 
ha in 2005 to 13,000 ha in 2012 (JT, 2012, p 177). 
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the decline of production in selected developed countries in recent years, see Table 3.8 
below.  
 
Table 3.7: Tobacco Leaf Production by Region, 1970-1999 (farm weight '000 tonnes) 
 
Region Year 
 1970-
72 
1980-
82 
1990-
92 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
World 4743.7 6061.4 7706.9 8307.0 6438.1 6309.6 7423.1 8982.6 6937.0 6972.2 
Developed 
Countries 
1997.3 2177.3 1843.3 1667.6 1537.9 1339.6 1438.7 1627.8 1495.6 1404.6 
Developing 
Countries 
2746.4 3884.2 5869.2 6639.5 4900.2 4970.0 5984.3 7354.8 5441.4 5567.6 
 Source: modified from FAO (2003a, p 67) 
 
Table 3.8: Decline of Tobacco Production in Selected Developed Countries, 2000-2009 
 
Country Tobacco Production 
(tonnes) 2000 
Tobacco Production 
(tonnes) 2009 
Per cent Change in 
Tobacco Production, 
2000-2009 
Australia 7,762 4,315 -44.4 
Austria 230 0 -100.0 
Belgium 1,200 153 -87.3 
Canada 53,010 45,991 -13.2 
France 25,252 17,838 -29.4 
Germany 10,985 8,223 -25.1 
Greece 136,593 27,501 -79.9 
Hungary 10,485 6,679 -36.3 
Italy 129,937 119,119 -8.3 
Slovakia 1,870 2 -99.9 
Switzerland 1,182 953 -19.4 
USA 477,753 373,440 -21.8 
  Source: modified by author from Eriksen et al. (2012, pp. 107-113). 
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Figure 3.2: Tobacco Production (quantity) by Region, 2007 
 
 
Source: reproduced from Shafey et al. (2009, p 48) 
 
 
Currently the top five producers of tobacco leaf in the world are China, Brazil, India, the 
United States, and Malawi (Afubra: “maiores por tipo”, 
http://www.afubra.com.br/principal.php?acao=conteudo&u_ID=1&I_ID=1&menusite_ID=
302).  However, global production should not be confused with global exports.  For 
example, China, by far the largest producer of tobacco leaf in the world, exports only 5% 
of its leaf (Shafey et al., 2009, p 52).  Global exports are considerably smaller than global 
production, averaging 2.4 million tonnes per year from 2006 to 2008 (Parker, 2009).    See 
Table 3.9 for top exporters of tobacco leaf. 
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Table 3.9: Top Seven Exporters of Unmanufactured Tobacco Leaf (2006) 
 
Country Amount Exported (Tonnes) 
Brazil 566 027 
Malawi 177 630 
India 158 254 
China 147 028 
United States 138 579 
Turkey 120 892 
Argentina 100 498 
       Source: created by author from Shafey et al. (2009, p 52) 
 
The shift towards production in developing countries comes from major producing 
countries (such as Brazil and China) dramatically increasing production as well as from 
some diversification of sourcing among different developing countries.  See Table 3.10 for 
the example of Brazil’s increased exports. Tobacco production is gaining steadily in 
importance in sub-Saharan Africa.  Growth of tobacco production in the region averaged 
3.7% per year from 1970 to 2000100.  The FAO (2003a) attributes this growth to initially 
high prices, FDI by tobacco companies, and improved technology and transportation.  
Zimbabwe, a major tobacco producer before its recent crisis, is still heavily dependent on 
tobacco as it contributed roughly a quarter of GDP in 2009.  Tobacco leaf exports along 
with mining are considered by many to be the drivers of the country’s economic recovery 
(NKC Independent Economists, 2009). 
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 We will return to this expansion in Chapter 8. 
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Table 3.10: Brazilian Exports of Tobacco Leaf, Selected Years 
 
Year Quantity of Tobacco Leaf 
Exported (tonnes) 
1990 156 030 
1995 193 190 
2000 276 310 
2001 326 770 
2002 355 680 
2003 360 570 
2004 457 600 
2005 478 050 
2006 425 460 
2007 543 390 
2008 516 200 
2009 529 470 
Sources: Modified from Afubra: “Exportação Kg”                   
(http://www.afubra.com.br/principal.php?acao=conteudo&u_ID=1&I_ID=1&menus_site_ID=
299) 
 
The strategy of sourcing tobacco from developing countries is consistent among the 
three major types of cigarette tobacco (subject to how one classifies the countries of 
Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, the major producers of Oriental tobacco, see 
Table 3.11).  As one can see from Tables 3.12-3.15 below, the major producers and 
exporters of both burley and FCV tobacco are all developing countries except for the U.S.A.  
The United States has been able to maintain its status as a major producer and exporter of 
both types through its quality niche.  Tobacco produced in this country is widely 
considered to be top quality and is often added to cigarettes made of cheaper tobacco as 
flavouring (more on which below).     
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Table 3.11: Estimated Oriental and Semi-Oriental Production (million green kilos), 
2010-2012 
 
Country Year 
 2010 2011 2012* 
Turkey 50 44 55 
Macedonia 26 21 24 
Greece 17 18 19 
Bulgaria 29 17 18 
Thailand 10 8 10 
India 9 4 2 
         *Estimate  
         Source: modified from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2012, p 13) 
 
 
Table 3.12: Estimated Flue-Cured Exports by Major Exporting Countries, 2011 
 
Country Quantity (million kgs, declared weight) 
Brazil 441 
India 149 
U.S.A. 116 
China 103 
         Source: created by author from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2012, p 3) 
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Table 3.13: Estimated Flue-Cured Production (million green kilos), 2011-2013 
 
Country Year 
 2011 2012* 2013** 
China 2,354 2,580 2,580 
Brazil 708 590 630 
India 278 273 276 
U.S. 169 204 230 
Zimbabwe 132 144 165 
Tanzania 122 70 125 
Bangladesh 87 90 95 
Argentina 87 74 85 
Indonesia 37 48 48 
Philippines 45 44 47 
          *Estimate **Projection 
          Source: modified from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2012, p 4) 
 
 
Table 3.14: Estimated Burley Exports of Top Exporters, 2011 
 
Country Quantity (million kgs, declared weight) 
Malawi 113 
Brazil 57 
U.S.A. 43 
Mozambique 50 
          Source: created by author from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2012, p 6) 
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Table 3.15: Estimated Burley Production (million green kilos), 2011-2013 
 
Country Year 
 2011 2012* 2013** 
Malawi 208 65 160 
U.S.A. 71 91 91 
Brazil 111 85 90 
Mozambique 66 53 65 
Argentina 42 35 38 
China 37 37 37 
Thailand 36 28 32 
Bangladesh 16 16 20 
India 12 14 17 
Philippines 19 14 17 
       *Estimate **Projection 
       Source: modified from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2008, p7) 
 
 
 
 This aggregate-level trend of increased sourcing from developing countries can be 
seen at a more individual level as well, as one ICC, British American Tobacco (BAT), states: 
In 2009, our companies bought some 400,000 tonnes of tobacco leaf, 
grown by more than 250,000 farmers, about 80 per cent of it by volume 
coming from suppliers in emerging economies (BAT, 2010b, p 6). 
 
Likewise, another ICC, Philip Morris International (PMI) states that it sources over 70% of 
its global tobacco leaf requirements from the following ten countries: Brazil, Turkey, 
U.S.A., Malawi, Indonesia, China, Argentina, Philippines, Mozambique, and Tanzania (PMI, 
2012c, p 7).  
The shift in sourcing to developing countries represents major cost advantages for 
the lead firms.  This is in part due to a lower quality crop but also due to diminshed 
bargaining power of producers as producer-units are likely to be much smaller than the 
1000 acre farms typical of North Carolina (the biggest tobacco-producing state in the U.S.).  
In rich countries powerful governments also have an easier time (both practically and 
politically) implementing measures which increase costs of tobacco procurement on 
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companies. In the U.S., for example, the federal government implemented a costly quota 
system which inflated tobacco prices at the expense of the procuring companies (Womach, 
2003).  
This shift in production to developing countries also accentuated the shift in the 
scale of production from bigger to smaller.  As Goodman (1993, p 193) writes: 
…it was the absence of economies of scale that permitted the spread of 
cultivation as it tended to be small or even marginal growers who were in 
the forefront of expansion.  For most of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries the social and economic history of tobacco cultivation has been 
characterized by a distinct dualism, between the small scale of growing 
operations and the giant scale of manufacturing and marketing.  Only in the 
last few decades in the West, as mechanization has finally begun to make 
considerable inroads into traditional procedures of cultivation and 
harvesting, has the age of the small planter come under threat of extinction.  
In other parts of the world, in Africa and Asia especially, this dualism still 
exists.   
 
We will discuss the level of concentration of cigarette manufacturers, as well as the 
numerous entry barriers protecting them, below.  However, what is important for our 
purposes here, is to emphasize the simultaneous trends - as seen in other agricultural 
global value chains discussed in Chapter 1 - of increasing size and concentration of the 
retail node of the chain and the increasing dispersion and fragmentation of the farming 
node.  The power asymmetries that these simultaneous trends entail is a central theme of 
this work.   
Coinciding with the shift in production from rich countries to low- and middle-
income countries has been a concomitant shift in key consumption markets (in terms of 
volume) from rich countries to emerging markets.  For example, in 2012, 61% of PMI’s 
sales (in terms of volume) were in non-OECD countries (PMI, 2013).  For the recent decline 
in cigarette consumption in the traditional markets of Japan and U.S.A., as well as the 
increase in emerging markets of China and Indonesia, see Figures 3.3 and 3.4 below. 
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Figure 3.3: Cigarette Consumption (billions of cigarettes) in Selected Key Markets, 2007-2011 
 
 
Source: Created by author from JT (2012, p 52) 
 
Figure 3.4: Cigarette Consumption (billions of cigarettes) in China, 2007-2011 
 
 
      Source: Created by author from JT (2012, p 52) 
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At the same time that production has shifted to developing countries and consequently 
the average bargaining power of producers has decreased, a number of trends has 
increased the bargaining power of buyers.  As with other GVCs, more stringent regulation 
in key markets has become increasingly difficult to overcome.  These regulations include 
bans on advertising, increased taxes, and regulation of pesticide use among others (more 
on which below).  Most of the major cigarette companies and their first tier suppliers also 
have codes of conduct (CoC) which are expected to be implemented all the way upstream 
to the farmers (more on which below).   
As with lead firms in other GVCs, the lead firms in the GVCT are characterised by high 
levels of (global) market share (more on which below).  Indeed by 1988 35% of global 
cigarette production was accounted for by merely 8 multi-nationals, all of which were 
based in either the U.S. or Europe101 (Goodman, 1993, p 10).   
Van Liemt (2002, pp 15-16) notes: 
Worldwide, concentration has placed considerable market share into the 
hands of a few players, enhancing their market power vis-à-vis their 
suppliers and subcontractors…  Similar to what is occuring in other 
industries, the tobacco companies seek to do business with fewer suppliers 
but in the framework of long-term agreements. 
 
Consolidation of the ICCs accelerated in the 1990’s as the ICCs took advantage of the 
massive market liberalization occurring by aggressively targeting new markets and buying 
up former state monopolies (van Liemt, 2002)102.  JT is somewhat unusual in that its 
origins lie in a state-owned company that became market-oriented and started acquiring 
other ICCs103.  Indeed, JT’s acquisitions of RJR Nabisco Inc.’s non-U.S. tobacco business and 
                                                          
101
 Another 60% was accounted for by state monopolies (Goodman, 1993, p 10). 
102
 For example, on the case of Turkey see Aydin (2010), who describes how the country shifted from 
developmentalist policies during the post-war period to neoliberal policies supported by the IFIs, the E.U., 
and American agribusiness from the 1980s on.  At the beginning of the 21
st
 century these policies resulted in 
the privatisation of the state tobacco company and the elimination of tobacco support purchases.   
103
 At the time of writing the Japanese government still owned over 30% of JT shares (JT, 2012).  
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Gallaher Group Plc. in 1999 and 2007 respectively (JT, 2012), have become the basis of JT’s 
international operations.         
 The combination of a simultaneous increase in market concentration and the 
importance of branding (more on which below), has enabled ICCs to engage in what 
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) refer to as “oligopolistic rent seeking.”  This can be seen most 
clearly in the numerous examples of ICCs increasing profits in markets characterized by 
declining shipment volumes, through favourable pricing104.  For example, whilst JT’s 
adjusted EBITDA105 decreased by 93.6 billion yen in the Japanese cigarette market in 2012 
due to lower volumes, this was more than compensated for by an increase of 99.1 billion 
yen due to “price and product mix effect” (JT, 2012, p 18).  Likewise, overall shipment 
volumes for BAT were down by 1.6% in 2012 yet the company was able to increase profits 
by 15% (BAT, 2012, p 4).  
    
 
3.2.2 Lead Firms 
 
The lead firms of the GVCT are highly concentrated and dominated by multinationals.  
However, as can be seen in Figure 3.5 below, the cigarette company with the largest 
global market share is China’s state-run monopoly.  Like other sectors dominated by 
multinationals, the global tobacco industry is characterized by a number of mergers and 
acquisitions (both within and beyond the tobacco sector) and parent companies often 
work through subsidiaries and affiliates.  This complicated web of ownership and control 
can often be confusing when attempting to discern which companies are dominant in 
given markets.  For example, R.J. Reynolds has traditionally been a leading cigarette 
company.  However their international division has recently been acquired by Japan 
Tobacco International (JTI) and their American division is an “associate company” of 
                                                          
104
 Or as PMI (2012a, p 1) notes, part of its “resilience” is due to its “relatively unique pricing power driven 
by the strength and vibrancy of our industry-leading brands” 
105
 “Operating profit + depreciation and amortization + impairment losses on goodwill ± restructuring-
related income and costs” (JT, 2012, p 18).    
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BAT106.  Therefore, in some cases the same brand is sold by two different companies in 
two different countries.   
 
Figure 3.5: ICC Global Market Share, 2011 
 
 
   Source: Created by author from JT (2012, p 52); Also see BAT (2010a) for broadly similar breakdown. 
 
A further caveat to the breakdown of global market share is that different ICCs have 
market niches in different countries.  For example, while British American Tobacco has the 
third largest market share internationally, this company has the largest market share in 
over 50 individual countries (BAT, 2010c).  Also, Imperial Tobacco Group (ITG), the 
smallest of the ICCs depicted in Figure 3.5, is the market leader in both the U.K. and Spain 
(ITG: “Group at a Glance”, http://www.imperial-tobacco.com/index.asp?page=16).  
Furthermore, when the Chinese market is removed from the market share equation, the 
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 More specifically, Reynolds American Inc. (RAI) is the outcome of a merger between Brown & Williamson 
(B&W) and R J Reynolds (RJR) in 2004 (BAT, 2012, p 116).  BAT currently holds a 42% stake in RAI (BAT, 2012, 
p 175).   
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remaining ICCs account for roughly two thirds of the global tobacco market (JT, 2012, p 
52).  Excluding both China and the U.S. markets, PMI accounted for 28.8% market share in 
2012107 (PMI, 2012a, p 1).    
Of the 19% of the global tobacco market not accounted for by the China National 
Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) and the four leading multi-nationals, part is accounted for by 
large corporations which specifically target the American market.  These firms are similar 
to the leading multi-nationals in a number of ways (highly concentrated, driven by 
shareholder value, etc.) and can be considered to be the lead firms in the American 
market.  In this group of firms are Reynolds American Inc. (RAI), Lorillard, and Altria Group 
Inc., which owns Philip Morris USA.  However, also included in this 19% are a number of 
smaller cigarette manufacturers which do not enjoy the asymmetrical bargaining power 
over their suppliers to the same extent as the sector’s lead firms.  A number of these firms 
are state-owned.  Indeed, it is estimated that state (monopoly) production constituted 6.2% 
(excluding China) of global cigarette production in 2012 (Universal Tobacco Leaf Company, 
2012, p 18).  We will return to these non-lead firm cigarette manufacturers in our case 
study of Malawi (in particular in Chapter 5).  However, as one of the main aims of this 
work is to analyse the extent to which lead firms are driving the Malawi (smallholder 
burley) Tobacco Value Chain, these non-lead firm cigarette manufacturers will not be 
engaged with in this chapter.   
It can be seen by some of the stated objectives of the ICCs that they appear to 
conform to the shareholder value doctrine, as outlined by Gibbon and Ponte (2005).  Philip 
Morris International (“Company Overview”, 
http://www.pmi.com/eng/about_us/company_overview/pages/company_overview.aspx) 
claims that:  
Our aim is to generate superior returns for shareholders, provide high 
quality and innovative products to adult smokers, and reduce the harm 
caused by tobacco products.   
                                                          
107
 This is up from 28.3% and 27.6% in 2011 and 2010 respectively (PMI, 2012a, p 2). 
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British American Tobacco claims: “Our Group vision is to achieve leadership of the global 
tobacco industry to create shareholder value” (BAT, 2010b, p 2).  Imperial Tobacco states:  
To deliver sustainable shareholder returns by driving sustainable sales growth, 
optimizing costs and effectively using the cash we generate (ITG: “Delivering Value”, 
www.imperial-tobacco.com). 
  
The importance of share values (as opposed to other indicators of business success) 
can be seen in a number of ways.  For instance, share buyback schemes (where companies 
purchase shares to boost value) are commonplace among ICCs.  For example, between the 
spin-off in 2008108 and the end of 2012, PMI has spent US$ 27.9 billion in share 
repurchases, which represented over a fifth of all outstanding shares109.  To put this figure 
in perspective, it is interesting to compare with the much smaller US$ 3.7 billion that this 
same company spent on tobacco leaf in 2011 (PMI, 2012b). Executive remuneration can 
also serve as anecdotal evidence of the pre-eminence of shareholder value.  As can be 
seen in Table 3.16 below on the two performance-related incentive schemes for the BAT 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), compensation is higher for achieving greater shareholder 
returns than for improving more traditional metrics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
108
 Prior to 2008 PMI was owned by Altria Group Inc., as is its counterpart Philip Morris USA (PMUSA) 
currently.  
109
 Also, JT was “considering allocating up to approximately 250 billion yen for a share buyback program (JT, 
2012, p 9).  Likewise, BAT announced a programme worth £1.5 billion for 2013, which followed on one 
valued at £1.25 billion in 2012 (BAT, 2012, p 30).  BAT’s associate company, Reynolds American Inc. (RAI), 
similarly conducted share buy-back programmes worth £71 million and £262 million in 2011 and 2012 
respectively (BAT, 2012, p 34).   
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Table 3.16: Comparison of BAT CEO Incentive Schemes 
 
 Performance-related bonus- 
International Executive 
Incentive Scheme (IEIS) 
Long-term incentives 
Purpose -incentivise the attainment of 
corporate targets on an annual 
basis 
-attract and retain key 
management talent 
-incentivise growth in earnings 
per share and total shareholder 
return (TSR) over a three-year 
period 
-attract and retain key 
management talent 
Policy -four measures for performance 
for 2012 with the following 
weightings: adjusted profit 
from operations (40%); Group’s 
share of key subsidiary markets 
(20%); Global Drive Brand 
volumes (20%); and cash flow 
from operations (20%) 
-the annual ‘on-target’ bonus 
opportunity for the Chief 
Executive is 100% of base salary 
with a maximum award of 200% 
of salary 
-maximum annual award of 
400% of salary 
-three year performance period 
-TSR performance (50% of the 
total award) combines both the 
share price and dividend 
performance during the three-
year performance period as 
against two comparator groups 
(25% for each measure): (1) 
constituents of the FTSE 100 
index; and (2) a peer group of 
international FMCG companies 
-earnings per share measure 
(50% of the total award) relates 
to earnings per share growth 
(on an adjusted diluted basis) 
relative to inflation (measured 
as RPI) 
   Source: modified from BAT (2012, pp. 74, 76) 
 
Operating in a context of stagnating global demand for tobacco products in the 1990’s 
and of decreasing demand in some traditional markets such as North America110 (van 
Liemt, 2002), the ICCs have resorted increasingly to product differentiation, which is 
                                                          
110
 Global cigarette production continues to increase at a very moderate rate.  For example, production 
increased by 1.1% per annum between 2001 and 2011.  However, excluding China, global cigarette 
production decreased by 0.2% per annum (Universal Tobacco Leaf Company, 2012, p 17).  This is relevant for 
our discussion of lead firms in that the Chinese market is essentially the domain of the CNTC, thereby 
leaving the remaining firms to compete in a context of declining demand.   Although, and as explained in 
Chapter 1, an analysis of tobacco products consumption will not be directly engaged with in this work, it is 
worth briefly highlighting two (consumption) factors, both of which are somewhat unique to tobacco.  On 
the one hand, the addictive nature of the product (specifically of the nicotine component) mitigates against 
major volatilities in consumption patterns.  On the other hand, deliberate efforts by governmental and non-
governmental organizations to decrease consumption for health reasons, are seen to be particularly 
effective in developed countries.   
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particularly important with cigarettes.  For example, JT President and CEO Mitsuomi 
Koizumi, states: 
…under the GFB111 strategy, the international tobacco business will concentrate 
resources on key brands and implement a number of initiatives to increase value 
added product offerings.  Product innovation, in particular, is increasingly important 
if we are to outperform competitors in a context of intensifying competition.  So all 
of our business units will step up efforts in this respect (JT, 2012, p 9). 
 
The blends used in cigarettes involve different types of tobacco, flavourings, and 
additives, and are usually top-secret.  The secret nature of these blends creates a serious 
disconnect between tobacco farmers, leaf merchants, and end-users of cigarettes.  This 
has major implications for upgrading (more on which below).     
Original product differentiation of cigarettes in the twentieth century includes key 
innovations such as filters, menthol cigarettes or cigarettes of different sizes (Alan, 1995).  
These categories have since been further differentiatied and other sources of 
differentiation have been introduced112, usually targeting a particular market segment 
such as women, young people, low-end buyers, etc. (van Liemt, 2002).  Women are seen 
as a particularly lucrative target group as according to a recent statistic only 250 million 
females smoke in the world as compared to 1 billion males, hence there is scope for 
growth.  Long and thin cigarettes, menthols, and caramel flavouring have all been used in 
attempting to attract female smokers to a given brand (Shafey et al., 2009, pp. 22-24). 
In recent years product differentiation has become increasingly complex and 
technology-intensive.  For example some brands have incorporated designs which 
                                                          
111
 GFB refers to “Global Flagship Brands” which JT considers to be its most important brands.  These are 
listed in Table 3.17 below and include Winston (2
nd
 largest brand in the world) and Camel.  In 2012 GFB 
represented 60.2% of JT’s total shipment volume (JT, 2012, p 24).  Likewise, BAT’s “Global Drive Brands” 
(GDB) are four of the company’s more important brands (out of over 200 brands total), and account for over 
a third of the company’s volumes (BAT, 2012, pp. 1, 6).  Additionally, PMI’s top ten brands (by volume) 
represented over three quarters of total cigarette shipment volume in 2012 (PMI, 2012a, p 27). As can be 
seen from these examples, similar to Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) point that multi-national lead firms are 
increasing focus on their key brands, it is common for ICCs to develop marketing strategies based on a small 
selection of more prominent brands.   
112
 BAT (2010b) and ITG (2012) identify “packaging” as a source of product differentiation.  JT (2012, p 20) 
also refers to “package design” as a source of product differentiation.  Despite ICC claims to the contrary, it 
has been alleged that in some instances packaging is designed to attract youth smokers (Laurance, 2012).  
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minimise the amount of visible smoke emitted, and others contain capsules which can be 
crushed inside the cigarette to release certain flavours (JT, 2012, p 23).   
 
Table 3.17: International Cigarette Companies and Selected Brands 
 
Company Selected Brands 
Philip Morris International Marlboro, L&M, Bond Street, Philip Morris, 
Chesterfield, Parliament, Lark, A Mild, 
Morven Gold, Dji Sam Soe 
British American Tobacco Pall Mall, Lucky Strike, Dunhill, Kent 
Japan Tobacco Inc. Winston, Camel, Mild Seven, LD, Sobranie, 
Benson & Hedges, Silk Cut, Glamour 
Imperial Tobacco Group* Davidoff, Gauloises Blondes**, West, JSP 
*This company is probably more known for its non-cigarette products such as Montecristo and Cohiba    
cigars and Rizla+ rolling papers. 
**This is ITG’s largest brand. The company attributes the brand’s success to its association with “freedom” 
and “joi de vivre.” 
Sources: PMI: “Key Facts and Financial Data” 
(http://www.pmi.com/eng/about_us/company_overview/pages/key_facts_and_financial_data.aspx); BAT 
(2010b); ITG (2009, p iii; 2012); JT (2012, p 23) 
 
 The importance of branding and the emphasis placed by ICCs on lead brands can 
be seen in the example of Marlboro, the world’s best-selling cigarette brand113 (owned by 
PMI and PMUSA).  Marlboro accounted for 42.6% of market share in the U.S. in 2012 
(Altria Group Inc., 2013).  For recent global market share of the brand, see Figure 3.6 
below.  Furthermore, the pre-eminence of branding in cigarettes, and the extent to which 
branding depends on non-tobacco aspects of consumption114, can be seen in the following 
description by PMI (2012a, p 13) of the change in marketing strategy for Marlboro: 
For decades, the brand image of Marlboro was built upon the famous cowboy 
campaign115.  We recognized that Marlboro needed a new communications platform 
                                                          
113
 According to WHO (2013, p 25) Marlboro has enjoyed this status since the 1970’s.   
114
 Similar to Ponte’s (2002a) coffee chain, one could argue that the tobacco content of the final 
consumption experience of smoking is minimal, compared to the psychological content.  Ponte (2002a, p 
1099) in the case of coffee writes: “…the relative coffee content of the final consumption “experience” in 
these outlets is extremely low.  Coffee bar chains sell an ambience and social positioning more than just 
“good” coffee.”  For more on the differentiation of coffee based on non-material attributes, and on how 
lead firms control that differentiation and hence the coffee chain, see Daviron and Ponte (2005).   
115
 Ironically, Marlboro was originally introduced as a cigarette for women in 1924 (Eriksen et al., 2012, p 88). 
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for today’s world.  We developed the new “Don’t Be A Maybe- Be Marlboro” 
campaign, which was initially implemented in Germany and rolled out to 
approximately 20 markets in 2012.  With the new campaign, Marlboro encourages 
adult smokers to be decisive, trust themselves and follow their inspiration.  
Marlboro does not believe in “Maybes.”  The campaign is proving successful and 
contributed to the market share growth of our flagship brand in 2012. 
 
Figure 3.6: Marlboro Global Market Share*, 2010-2012 
 
 
*Excluding China and U.S.A. 
Source: modified from PMI (2012a, p 2). 
 
Similar to lead firms in other GVCs, the lead firms in the GVCT are characterised by 
enormous entry barriers.  A tobacco farmer wishing to upgrade to become a cigarette 
producer must invest in more than just a cigarette-rolling machine (more on which below).  
Some of these entry barriers have been alluded to above.  For example, the asymmetric 
information the ICCs have regarding blend recipes vis-à-vis their suppliers represents an 
entry barrier for leaf merchants wishing to produce marketable cigarettes.  Cigarette 
manufacturing, unlike tobacco agriculture, is capital- and technology- intensive and 
requires investment in specific and expensive machinary.  For example, Imperial Tobacco 
has machines that produce up to 14,000 cigarettes per minute (ITG: “Our Operations”, 
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http://www.imperial-tobacco.com/index.asp?page=276).  Other major entry barriers 
safeguarding the ICC’s status as lead firms include costs associated with marketing, 
litigation, research and development, regulation and lobbying, and public relations.    
      
Marketing.  Like many other industries, marketing is a major cost, and especially 
important in the context of promoting product differentiation.  In 2006, marketing costs, 
on average, constituted just under US$ 0.75 per pack of cigarettes (Shafey et al., 2009, p 
58).  As British American Tobacco (2010b, p 18) states: 
Successful marketing is the bedrock of growth for any fast-moving 
consumer goods business and ours is no exception… We invest in gathering 
comprehensive insights into their preferences and buying behaviour, then 
invest in developments across the marketing mix to be truly relevant to 
consumers’ tastes, attitudes, pockets and purchasing patterns.       
 
The costs associated with what is described above would be prohibitively expensive for 
most businesses attempting to venture into cigarette production.  For example, PMI alone 
spent US$ 402, US$ 464, and US$ 483 million on advertising in 2010, 2011, and 2012, 
respectively (PMI, 2012a, p 73), and it is estimated that over US$ 10 billion is spent 
annually on advertising by the tobacco industry in the U.S.116 (WHO, 2013, p 22).  Yet 
without marketing, the ICCs cannot promote their brands, which is an ICC’s greatest asset.  
It is even more complicated to market in a context where more and more of the normal 
modes of marketing/advertising are becoming illegal.  As van Liemt (2002, p 23) put it: “It 
takes millions of US dollars to introduce a new tobacco product.  Who wants to do so 
when you can’t even advertise its name?”  However, a number of marketing options 
remain for ICCs117.  For example, 
                                                          
116
 Eriksen et al. (2012, p 60) suggest that the tobacco industry spent US$ 34 per person on marketing in the 
U.S. alone in the year 2008. 
117
 Marketing a lethal product also implies more challenges than less controversial or more socially accepted 
products.  As the WHO (2013, p 23) notes: “To sell a product that kills up to half of its users requires 
extraordinary marketing savvy, and tobacco companies are some of the most manipulative product sellers 
and promoters in the world.” 
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PMI promotes its products with advertising, consumer incentives and trade 
promotions.  Such programs include, but are not limited to, discounts, rebates, in-
store display incentives and volume-based incentives (PMI, 2012a, p 59). 
 
For the relative importance of different marketing strategies employed by the U.S. 
tobacco industry, see Figure 3.7 below. 
 
Figure 3.7: Cigarette Marketing Expenditures by Category in the U.S.A., 2008 
 
 
        Source: modified by author from Eriksen et al. (2012, p 60) 
 
In addition to complying with different national regulations regarding marketing, 
most of the ICCs voluntarily adhere to the “International Marketing Standards” (IMS) or 
other internal marketing codes.  The IMS concern targeting of and exposure to youth and 
disclosure of health concerns in cigarette advertisements (JTI, 2008)119. 
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Litigation120.  Legal expertise, which is particularly necessary for ICCs doing 
business in the U.S., is another enormous expense that characterizes the global tobacco 
industry.  Whilst any multinational will need to have legal experts, the ICCs are being 
constantly sued, especially in the U.S. where potential punitive damages and 
compensation tend to be the highest121.  For the most part, ICCs appear to be successful in 
fighting off major court cases. For example, JT has never lost a smoking and health-related 
litigation case (JT, 2012, p 62).  Also, PMI (2012a, p 79) states: “To date, no tobacco-
related case has been finally resolved in favor of a plaintiff against us, our subsidiaries or 
indemnities.”  However, there are still major cost implications of the high extent of 
litigation.  Lawyers still need to be paid and the occasional loss and/or settlement for the 
ICC can be extremely costly.  Furthermore, JT (2012, p 62) states: 
…regardless of the results of specific lawsuits, critical media coverage of such 
lawsuits may reduce social tolerance of smoking, strengthen public relations 
concerning smoking and prompt the filing of a number of similar lawsuits against JT 
or its subsidiaries, forcing JT or its subsidiaries to bear litigation costs that could 
materially affect JT’s business performance. 
 
Similarly, Eriksen et al. (2012, p 82) highlight a number of other non-monetary effects of 
successful (from the anti-smoking lobby’s perspective) litigation against the tobacco 
industry: 
…the release of internal industry documents; agreements from the industry to 
restrict marketing; the channelling of settlement money to public health; increased 
media attention to the problem of tobacco use; decreased youth access to tobacco 
products; and improvements in protection from secondhand smoke. 
 
Van Liemt (2002, p 19) succinctly describes the history of tobacco litigation: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
119
 For example, JT’s “Global Tobacco Products Marketing Standard” includes provisions on print advertising 
(publication needs to have a 75% adult readership), and on radio, TV, and internet advertising (only allowed 
if viewer/listenership is 100% adult) among others (JT, 2012, p 61).  
120
 Van Liemt (2002) emphasizes this entry barrier heavily in his analysis of the global tobacco industry. 
121
 It is important to note that legal expertise is required and costs incurred for reasons other than claims 
against the ICCs.  For example, PMI responded to plain packaging legislation in Australia (more on which in 
Chapter 8) by filing a lawsuit against the Australian government for allegedly violating the Australian 
Constitution, as well as by commencing international arbitration proceedings with regards to the Hong 
Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty (PMI, 2012a, p 31).  
131 
 
The first (in the 1950s) and the second wave (that started in the 1980s) consisted of 
individual personal injury suits122.  The third wave of tobacco litigation that began in 
1994 was different in that litigation was no longer limited to individual claims by 
individual smokers.  For the first time, States and other third-party payers of medical 
costs sued the tobacco industry…     
 
Another significant category of litigation is comprised of class action suits where plaintiffs 
are a group of individuals with similar characteristics, e.g. having smoked x amount of 
cigarettes per day in a given location in a given time period (JT, 2012; BAT, 2012)123.  For 
an example of the extent of different types of cases against PMI in recent years, see Table 
3.18 below.   
 
Table 3.18: Number of Tobacco-related Cases Pending against PMI*, 2010-2012 
 
Type of Case Number of Cases 
Pending as of 
December 31, 2010 
Number of Cases 
Pending as of 
December 31, 2011 
Number of Cases 
Pending as of 
December 31, 2012 
Individual Smoking and 
Health Cases 
94 75 76 
Smoking and Health 
Class Actions 
11 10 11 
Health Care Cost 
Recovery Actions 
10 11 15 
Lights Class Actions 2 2 2 
Individual Lights Cases 
(small claims court) 
10 9 7 
Public Civil Actions 7 3 4 
Total 134 110 115 
   *Includes subsidiaries and indemnities 
    Source: modified from PMI (2012a, p 79) 
 
In recent years the third-wave lawsuits have been filed by U.S. states and 
territories, the U.S. Department of Justice, and various Canadian provinces, among others.  
A number of these lawsuits have resulted in costly settlements for the ICCs.  For example, 
                                                          
122
 These suits continue, and in the case of BAT there were 329 of these cases pending (outside of the U.S.A.) 
at the end of 2012 (BAT, 2012, p 184). 
123
 For example there were ten on-going class action suits against BAT companies in Canada, three in Brazil, 
and one in Italy, at the end of 2012 (BAT, 2012, p 183). 
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individual settlements with the states of Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas, 
resulted in compensation of more than US$ 40 billion over 25 years (Redhead, 1999). 
An even bigger settlement, the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), was signed 
on November 23, 1998 between the attorneys general of 46 U.S. states, 5 U.S. territories 
and the District of Columbia with 4 of the biggest U.S. tobacco companies.  As the main 
rationale behind the lawsuit was to recoup Medicaid124 costs, companies agreed to pay a 
total of US$ 206 billion by 2025 to the suing entities for this purpose.  The money was 
divided among the suing entities according to a formula based on estimated Medicaid 
costs from tobacco and number of smokers.  In addition, the defendants agreed to pay 
US$ 5.15 billion in compensation to tobacco farmers and quota holders affected by the 
MSA and nearly US$ 1.5 billion to fund an anti-smoking campaign through the newly 
created American Legacy Foundation.  The MSA also had non-monetary components such 
as restrictions on advertising (Redhead, 1999).   
These settlement costs were to a large extent passed on to consumers.  As 
Redhead (1999, p 1) notes: “On the day the settlement was signed, the major cigarette 
companies raised prices by 45 cents a pack to cover the cost of the annual payments.”  
The power of the ICCs over their consumers, represented by the ease with which they 
were able to shift the monetary burden of the MSA onto the latter, is indeed an entry 
barrier unto itself125.  
 
Research and Development.  Research and Development is another prohibitive expense 
for firms wishing to venture into cigarette production.  For example, British American 
Tobacco alone invested £171 million in R&D in 2012 (BAT, 2012, p 19)126.  Likewise PMI 
spent US$ 391, US$ 413, and US$ 415 million on R&D in 2010, 2011, and 2012, 
respectively (PMI, 2012a, p 73), and JTI spent 48,866 and 51,461 million yen on R&D in 
                                                          
124
 A U.S. government health care programme for low-income people.   
125
 Also, see Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) “oligopolistic rent seeking”. 
126
 This increased from £112 million in 2009 (BAT, 2010c) and £166 million in 2011.  For an interesting non-
financial measure of the extent of R&D operations, BAT submitted 29 research papers to peer-reviewed 
journals for publication (BAT, 2012, p 19). 
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2011 and 2012, respectively (JT, 2012, p 131).  ICCs invest in R&D on a variety of topics 
ranging from tobacco leaf agronomy to consumer trends and innovation of new products.  
In the context of increasing global regulation of the tobacco industry, when certain 
products become outlawed, the ICCs need to have another product ready to introduce.     
PMI (2012a, p 10) states that 
Our primary R&D challenge is to deliver a world-class portfolio of innovative Next 
Generation Products supported by robust scientific evidence of their potential to 
reduce the risk of smoking-related diseases in comparison to conventional cigarettes.  
 
The company’s website boasts that it  
…recently opened a new, state-of-the-art R&D center in Neuchâtel, Switzerland 
(PMI- Company Overview, 
http://www.pmi.com/eng/about_us/company_overview/pages/company_overview.
aspx),  
 
and that their  
…Research and Development Department includes a team of scientists with 
expertise across a range of disciplines including biology, chemistry, and computing  
(PMI: “R&D at PMI”, 
http://www.pmi.com/eng/research_and_development/r_and_d_at_pmi/pages/r_a
nd_d_at_pmi.aspx).   
This company also funds agronomists and entomoligists associated with universities in the 
U.S. working on issues such as pest control, disease control, and new tobacco varieties.   
 
Regulation and Lobbying.  Regulation in the tobacco industry is pervasive and 
represents enormous costs to the ICCs.  ICCs have to be more efficient and effective when 
operating in such hostile environments.  In lucrative markets with tight regulations (e.g. 
the U.S.) the ICCs also invest substantially in lobbying.  For example, Eriksen et al. (2012, p 
62) estimate that in the U.S. Altria Group Inc. alone spent more than US$ 10 million on 
lobbying in 2010.  Furthermore, Imperial Tobacco states: “We employ a number of senior 
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and experienced corporate affairs specialists to manage regulatory risk and engage with 
regulators” (ITG, 2009, p 10).  Even in smaller markets, overcoming regulation requires 
investing in lobbying and legal expertise.  For example Philip Morris International has filed 
a lawsuit against the Uruguayan government due to what it sees as unfair enforcement of 
“extreme and ineffective measures” (PMI, 2010). 
Regulations have become increasingly guided by the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which was adopted by member 
states in 2003.  One of the FCTC’s principal aims is to reduce demand for tobacco 
products127 (WHO, 2013, pp. 11-12).  As of 15 June, 2013 there were 176 Parties to the 
FCTC128 (WHO, 2013, p 16).  Tobacco products regulations and other demand-reduction 
policies such as mass media campaigns, also appear to be expanding at a rapid rate.  For 
example, between 2010 and 2012 alone, an additional 22% of the world’s population was 
exposed to mass media anti-smoking campaigns (WHO, 2013, p 15).   
As mentioned above, a common regulation is restriction on marketing, such as 
limitations on where cigarette advertising can occur.  For example, in 2012 128 countries 
engaged in some form of restriction or ban on advertisement of tobacco products (WHO, 
2013, p 15).  Furthermore, the FCTC legally binds parties to implement a comprehensive 
ban on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS)129 within five years of 
adhering to the treaty (WHO, 2013, p 18).   
There are also moves to increase the proportion of cigarette packages that are covered 
with health warnings and/or graphic pictures of the dangers of smoking, which are 
intended to dissuade smokers from purchasing tobacco products.  For example, in 2012 
                                                          
127
 The FCTC’s demand-reduction measures include:  
Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies, Protect people from tobacco smoke, Offer help to quit 
tobacco use, Warn people about the dangers of tobacco, Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship, and Raise taxes on tobacco (WHO, 2013, p 12).  
128
 In 2012 87.4% of the world’s population was covered by this treaty (Eriksen et al., 2012, p 1). 
129
 Exceptions are made when a comprehensive TAPS ban is deemed to violate a signatory’s constitution 
(WHO, 2013, p 18). 
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122 countries issued some form of warning labels for tobacco products (WHO, 2013, p 
15)130.   As WHO (2013, p 44) notes: 
The number of people worldwide who are exposed to strong, graphic health 
warning labels on cigarette packs has nearly tripled in the past five years, from 356 
million (5% of world population) in 10 countries in 2007 to more than 1 billion 
people (14% of world population) in 30 countries by 2012.  
 
Bans on smoking locations, e.g. restaurants, public buildings, etc. are also pervasive 
throughout the world131.  According to WHO (2013, p 86), smoking bans is one of the most 
rigorously applied measures within the FCTC.  For example, this source indicates that 32 
countries  
passed complete smoking bans covering all work places, public places and 
public transportation means between 2007 and 2012, protecting nearly 900 
million additional people. 
 
Bans on flavourings and additives in cigarettes have been a contentious issue in 
regulatory bodies such as WHO and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)132.  
Canada recently banned additives, which essentially makes American Blend cigarettes 
unsellable there (Brown and Snell, 2011, p 6).  This is because harsher types of tobacco, 
such as the burley used in American Blend cigarettes are considered unpalatable without 
flavourings or additives.  The U.S. has now banned all flavourings except menthol, and is 
considering whether menthol should be banned as well (Brown, personal communication, 
26 April, 2011). 
                                                          
130
 The FCTC suggests that health warnings should occupy 50% of the tobacco products (visible) packaging 
(WHO, 2013, p 62). 
131
 In New York City it has even become illegal to smoke in Times Square. 
132
 The FDA commenced regulation of tobacco products in the U.S. with the passing of the 2009 Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Universal Corporation-UC, 2013, p 32).  Whilst ostensibly a 
public health law, one of the more interesting provisions of the law requires cigarette packs to identify the 
percentage of tobacco in the product that is domestically grown (Alliance One International- AOI, 2012a, p 
14).  This provokes further questions with regards to the debate about how DCs use regulations as trade 
protection.  Further investigation on this topic is required to understand the motivations for and 
consequences of this provision, however.  For a discussion on the relationship between food standards and 
trade protection more generally, see Barling and Lang (2005).     
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One interesting aspect of the FCTC and the regulations that it promotes, is that 
contrary to the general focus of GVC analysis on DC regulations, the bulk of new FCTC-
inspired regulation in recent years has occurred in developing countries (WHO, 2013).  
Indeed, rather than the U.K. having the strictest regulations (as in Dolan and Humphrey, 
2004; Selwyn, 2012) the country that has the highest level of FCTC implementation is 
Turkey133, a major tobacco-producer (WHO, 2013, p 47).  This appears to break with a 
trend in food standards, identified by Barling and Lang (2005), whereby the health and 
needs of developing country consumers tend to be largely overlooked.  For the example of 
health warning labels on cigarette packs, and the extent to which medium- and low-
income countries have adopted these, see Figure 3.8 below. 
 
Figure 3.8: Number of Countries with Medium to Large Warning Labels*, by Country Income 
Group 
 
 
*The WHO (2013, p 94) defines the medium and large sizes as occupying at least 30% of the visible 
display of a cigarette pack. 
Source: modified by author from WHO (2013, p 63). 
    
                                                          
133
 Strict tobacco regulations have historical precedent in this country, as in 1633 Turkey introduced capital 
punishment for smoking (Eirksen et al., 2012, p 86). 
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Taxes are another highly prevalent and controversial form of tobacco products 
regulation.  For example in the U.S. there are both federal and state excise taxes on 
cigarettes and in the U.K. and France, taxes constituted 76% and 80% (respectively) of the 
retail price of cigarettes in 2008 (Brown and Snell, 2011, p 6).  Given the relative price-
inelasticity of cigarettes, there is considerable scope for investigation into the extent that 
governments implement taxation for the purpose of obtaining a reliable stream of 
revenues, rather than just for public health objectives.  For the percentage of cigarette 
sales prices accounted for by excise taxes in selected countries, see Figure 3.9 below. 
   
Figure 3.9: Excise Tax as Percentage of Cigarette Price, Selected Countries 
 
 
Source: modified by author from Eriksen et al. (2012, pp. 106-112). 
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Compliance, CSR, and Public Relations.  Otañez et al. (2006, 227) show how labour 
exploitation and child labour issues in particular have become a key concern to the ICCs134, 
in particular British American Tobacco:  
A BAT presentation entitled ‘Child labour in the leaf-growing sector’ circa 1999 
noted that the child labour issue had ‘the potential to become an issue with 
sweeping repercussions in the national and international media’ and included 
several highlighted consequences such as ‘exploitation by the anti-smoking 
movement’.  BAT’s efforts to ‘manage’ child labour and other social responsibility 
issues show how the company seeks to control or evade problems of labour 
exploitation that can harm BAT’s corporate reputation.   
 
This company’s attempt to manage the child labour issue can be seen in other initiatives 
such as the collaboration with the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, 
Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Association (IUF) and the International 
Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA) in a “Conference on the Elimination of Child Labour” 
in Kenya in 2000.    Otañez et al. (2006, 228) describe how the ICCs respond to child labour 
issues:  
Just as the industry has used “youth smoking prevention” programmes as a strategy 
to displace meaningful tobacco control efforts and shift the responsibility for 
increased youth smoking on to parents and “peer pressure” and away from the 
industry’s advertising and marketing practices, the industry has successfully 
sidestepped the child labour issue by funding modest efforts to rehabilitate schools, 
build wells, train villages in bookkeeping, and build community awareness on child 
labour issues. 
 
The immense amount of attention that the tobacco industry receives, due to such 
issues as targeting youths and the deadly nature of the products, is not lost on tobacco 
labour groups.  For example, Eldring et al. (2000, p 8) note: 
                                                          
134 Otañez et al. (2006) claim that substituting child labour with adults compensated at the minimum 
agricultural wages in Malawi would cost US$ 10 million per year, much more than the social programmes 
and publicised efforts that the ICCs make in the country (as in other tobacco producing countries) to address 
the issue.  For more on the pervasiveness of child labour in tobacco production in Africa, see Eldring et al. 
(2000).  
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A crucial point from the workers’ and the unions’ perspective should be that the 
attention attracted to the tobacco industry provides some opportunities for action 
when it comes to improving employment practices within the sector.   
 
The influence of public relations concerns on ICC’s supply chain and labour policies in 
general, and the case of child labour in particular, will be developed further in our case 
study of Malawi (in particular in Chapters 5-8)135.  
Labour issues in tobacco production (beyond just the child labour aspect) have become 
increasingly contentious.  For example, in 2011 PMI together with the NGO Verité, 
developed the Agricultural Labour Practices (ALP) Code136, which is based on ILO 
conventions (PMI, 2012c).  The code concerns the following seven areas: child labour, 
income and work hours, fair treatment, forced labour, safe work environment, freedom of 
association, and compliance with the law (PMI, 2012c)137.  PMI (2012a, p 35) states: 
To date, over 2,900 field technicians in 30 countries have received in-depth training 
on the ALP code, including child labor, forced labor prevention and safe work 
environment requirements.  During 2012, these field technicians communicated our 
expectations to approximately 497,000 farmers with whom our affiliates or 
suppliers138 have contracts.   
                                                          
135
 For a discussion on child labour in the cocoa industry, and the response of the industry (which displays 
striking similarity with that of the tobacco industry), see Fold (2005).   
136
 We will return to the ALP Code and its significance for our country case study of Malawi in Chapter 6.  
However, it is important to note that our purposes with regards to the ALP Code do not lie in an evaluation 
of its effectiveness, but rather in an evaluation of its relation to and impact on power asymmetries and 
governance.  As a complementary endeavour to the code, PMI also participates in the Eliminating Child 
Labour in Tobacco Foundation (ECLT) and in funding Total Land Care, an NGO with similar child labour 
objectives, specifically in Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania (PMI, 2012c, pp 4, 24).  This endeavour is 
similar to others in agro-food chains whereby multi-nationals increasingly collaborate with NGOs to increase 
the social and/or environmental standards of production (Fold and Pritchard, 2005a, p 19).   
137
 The aims of PMI’s ALP displays a number of similarities with the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) which a 
number of U.K. food retailers participate in (for more on which see Hughes, 2005). 
138
 In the first (and at time of writing only) progress report on ALP Code implementation (PMI, 2012c), it is 
interesting to note that “affiliates” and “suppliers” are used almost interchangeably.  This is representative 
of the extent to which ICCs govern and control their supply chains, a topic to which we will return in detail in 
the case of Malawi in Chapter 6.  Indeed, PMI even conducted the ALP Code training for the global 
agronomy teams of the two leading international leaf merchants (PMI, 2012c, p 12).   
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The ALP Code implementation will be evaluated by a supposedly independent third 
party139, Control Union.  PMI (2012c, p 4) states that this organization  
…will assess a representative random sample of farms in the market, interviewing 
farmers and workers and verifying that the labor conditions on the farms meet the 
measurable standards in our ALP Code. 
…Control Union plans to start external monitoring in the latter part of this year, and 
we expect to publish the first report under this new system in the first half of 2013.  
Once the system is fully operational we expect that Control Union will conduct 
approximately six audits every year.   
 
Similar to codes described by Barrientos et al. (2001) in Chapter 1, the ALP Code is mainly 
implemented and monitored by leaf technicians, whose training background lies 
predominantly in agronomy (PMI, 2012c, p 9).  For the extent of leaf technician training 
(on the ALP Code) by region, as well as the number of farms reached through the Code, 
see Tables 3.19 and 3.20, respectively (below). 
 
Table 3.19: PMI Field Technician Training on ALP Code, by Region 
 
 Total Field Techs Trained Training Sessions 
Latin America & US 799 729 46 
Africa 1,100 1,100 33 
Asia 825 714 33 
Europe & Oriental 476 409 25 
Total 3200 2952 137 
        Source: modified from PMI (2012c, p 13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
139
 The level of this independence is called somewhat into question by the fact that PMI and Verité are 
involved in the elaboration of the assessment and the training of the code evaluators (PMI, 2012c). 
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Table 3.20: Communication of PMI Code to Farmers, by Region 
 
 Total Farms Initial Outreach 
Latin America & US 104,427 65,017 
Africa 227,406 188,246 
Asia 89,815 16,354 
Europe & Oriental 95,353 67,318 
TOTAL 520,004 226,935 
Source: modified from PMI (2012c, p 14). 
 
The importance of CSR and “ethical” practices in ICC business strategies is paramount.  
Likewise ICCs have become increasingly concerned with environmental issues and being 
seen to operate in an environmentally sustainable manner.  For example, JT has emissions 
reductions targets and elaborates an environmental management plan in the “JT Group 
Environmental Charter” (JT, 2012, p 32).  BAT has an afforestation programme, and the 
company’s Annual Report 2012 also discusses initiatives in the areas of biodiversity, and 
human rights (pp. 19-20).  PMI (2012a, p 17) claims it focusses on “Hunger and Poverty, 
Education, Rural Living Conditions, Domestic Violence and Disaster Relief.” 
As can be seen in some of the voluntary marketing (and other) codes above, it is 
common for ICCs to engage in a certain amount of self-regulation, and to greatly publicize 
these engagements140.   For example, PMI (2012a, p 29) claims: 
                                                          
140
 Another peculiar feature of the ICC public relations initiatives (which will be seen in more detail in 
Chapter 6) is the extent to which these companies collaborate, e.g. on child labour initiatives.  The 
collaboration is also necessitated when the companies are on the defensive such as in litigation.  This 
collaboration has historical precedence as can be seen in Goodman’s (1993, p 110) account of how the 
tobacco industry responded to the first publication by the American Cancer Society of the causal link 
between smoking and cancer: 
Tobacco chiefs responded in a number of ways, including, not insignificantly the creation 
of a powerful industry lobby and publicity organization called the Tobacco Industry 
Research Committee, and then in 1958 the more influential Tobacco Institute Inc., both of 
which, in their own way, sought to undermine the smoking-cancer equation… 
This collaboration bears striking resemblance to Fold’s (2005) description of the cocoa-chocolate industry: 
…over the years the global cocoa-chocolate industry has been involved in other ‘common 
battles’, for instance on nutritional issues, cocoa butter substitutes and the recent child 
labour issues.  Perhaps this previous experience of mutual exchange of concerns, 
coordination of statements and positions and lobbying of public institutions for common 
interests have resulted in some kind of shared ‘cooperative capital’ that is not found in 
other global value chains (p 235).   
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…we have long advocated for laws that strictly prohibit the sale of tobacco products 
to minors, limit public smoking, mandate the placement of health warnings on 
tobacco product packaging, and regulate product content to ensure that changes to 
the product do not increase the adverse health effects of smoking and to establish a 
regulatory framework for future reduced risk products.  We also strongly support 
the use of tax and price policies to achieve public health objectives, provided that 
they do not result in increased illicit trade. 
 
There are a number of interpretations of these CSR (and other initiatives).  Indeed, one 
interpretation that has been put forward, notably by the anti-smoking lobby, is that in a 
context of restricted advertising opportunities that ICCs use sponsorship of events and 
publicity of CSR engagements as a form of advertisement (e.g., WHO, 2013, p 20).  
However, it is interesting to note the connection between shareholder value on the one 
hand, and CSR, public relations, and self-regulation on the other.  For example, BAT (2012, 
p 19) states:  
We continue to address our social, environmental and economic impacts to 
build value for the business, for our shareholders and for all the wider 
stakeholders affected by our business. 
 
Among the responsibilities listed for the Corporate Social Responsibility committee of 
BAT’s Board of Directors, is “monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of the Group’s 
strategy for, and management of, significant social, environmental and reputational issues” 
(BAT, 2012, p 64).  Anecdotal evidence also suggests that some ICC shareholders are 
interested in seeing the companies they invest in behave ethically.  For example, at the 
annual shareholders’ meeting for Altria Group Inc. in 2009, there was a 25% vote in favour 
of a proposal to “Create Human Rights Protocols for the Company and its Suppliers” (Altria 
Group Inc., http://investor.altria.com/pheonix.zhtml?c=80855&p=RssLanding&cat=news& 
Id=1290019).  Furthermore, with regards to the development of the ALP Code, PMI (2012c, 
p 6) states that:  “we have drawn on the experience and gathered the input from various 
stakeholders including, in particular, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility.”  
This organization describes itself as a “coalition of active shareowners who view the 
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management of their investments as a catalyst to promote justice and sustainability in the 
world” (PMI, 2012c, p 6).  
Whilst further research would be required to establish clear causality, we would 
hypothesize that to a certain extent, the ICCs’ strategy of engaging in “ethical” practices, 
self-regulation, and CSR as a way of managing “reputational risk” is driven by concerns 
over shareholder value in three inter-related ways.  Firstly, and as seen in the example of 
the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility above, the strategy responds to 
concerns of existing shareholders, thereby encouraging them to maintain their 
investments.  Secondly, and given the decreasing social acceptability of smoking in 
countries where institutional (and other) investors dominate, the strategy is designed to 
pre-empt and/or assuage concerns of potential investors over the “ethical” implications of 
their investments.  And thirdly, to the extent that reputational damage has the potential 
to reduce demand for the ICCs’ products, the strategy is designed to reduce the perceived 
risk associated with investing in ICC shares.   
Of course, similar points to those presented in the above hypothesis could be made 
about a number of publicly-listed companies which engage in CSR141.  However, the ICCs 
are somewhat unique in two ways.  First, due to the taboo nature of the lethal product 
they market, the ICCs are under a heightened level of critical scrutiny.  We argue that this 
“ethical scepticism” necessitates enhanced efforts by ICCs to build shareholder value for 
investors.  These efforts are seen both in the share buyback schemes and in the CSR and 
self-regulation policies described above.  Second, and contrary to the “consumer-led” 
nature of improving the “ethical” standards of supply chains (e.g. Gereffi and Lee, 2012; 
Barling and Lang, 2005), based on our survey of the ICC sector (through annual reports, 
webcasts, communications with shareholders, and industry press), we are yet to observe 
even anecdotal evidence for the postulation that the ICCs’ increased concern with “ethical” 
practices is being driven by consumers.  Furthermore, these practices don’t appear to be 
marketed via particular brands.  In other words, unlike coffee consumers, who can buy 
                                                          
141
 For example, see Mayer and Pickles (2010) on the use of CSR in global value chains, which the authors 
subsume under the category of “private governance”.    
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sustainable, fair trade, or organic coffee, cigarette consumers do not appear able to 
“consume ethics” (Daviron and Ponte, 2005, p 37).   
The potential relevance of these insights for our analytical approach developed in 
Chapter 1 is that they may allow us to build upon Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) discussion of 
shareholder value doctrine, whilst retaining two of the key contributions of the latter: that 
lead firms are increasingly focused on maximizing shareholder value, and that this implies 
changes in the functions of their suppliers.  Our above hypothesis would lead us to believe 
that instead of (or in addition to) the outsourcing of capital-intensive production 
emphasized by Gibbon and Ponte (2005), that the shareholder value doctrine would imply 
ICCs seeking to increase control over their suppliers in order to obtain their “ethical” 
objectives.  As stressed in other GVC literature reviewed in Chapter 1, this control could be 
obtained via vertical integration or via hands-off forms of governance.  Both of these will 
be discussed below as well as in Chapter 6 for the case of Malawi.     
 
 
3.2.3 First Tier Suppliers: Independent Leaf Merchants 
 
The majority of the ICCs’ tobacco leaf is procured through the independent leaf 
merchants, of which there are only two major global competitors 142 : Universal 
Corporation143 and Alliance One International144.  For example, ITG bought over 218 000 
tonnes of tobacco leaf in 2009 (ITG, 2009, p 29), of which the majority  
                                                          
142
 It is important to note that there are a number of national and/or regional competitors, as will be seen in 
our case study of Malawi in Chapters 5-7.  However, this node of the chain, like the ICC node, has been 
subject to increasing concentration in recent years. 
143
 This company, which specialises in the procurement of burley and flue-cured tobacco, claims to have 
traditionally sold 20%-30% of Brazilian production of these crops (annually) and 35%-45% of African 
production.  The company also procures substantial quantities of oriental leaf through its 49% ownership 
share in Socotab, L.L.C., a leading oriental leaf supplier based in Southeastern Europe (UC, 2013, p 5).  
However, 90% of company revenues in fiscal year 2013 were derived from burley and flue-cured operations 
(UC, 2013, p 7).    
144
 AOI is the outcome of a merger - completed in May of 2005 (see AOI, 2005) - between DIMON 
Incorporated and Standard Commercial Corporation, the world’s second and third largest leaf merchants 
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…is purchased through the leading international leaf supplying companies.  Only a 
small portion is purchased directly from growers, mainly in Morocco, Madagascar 
and Laos.   
 
Similarly, two thirds of PMI’s tobacco  
…is purchased through independent leaf suppliers, principally the two largest 
international companies (Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, Inc. and Alliance One 
International, Inc. and their affiliates) (PMI, 2012c, p 7). 
 
Likewise, these leaf merchants sell predominantly to the ICCs discussed above.  For 
example, in fiscal years 2010-2013, the five major ICCs (including the Chinese state 
monopoly), accounted for over 60% of Universal Corporation’s sales revenue145 (UC, 2013, 
p 6).  Similarly, JTI, PMI, and ITG each accounted for more than 10% of AOI’s revenues for 
the fiscal year ending 31 March, 2012 (AOI, 2012a, p 5)146.  For revenues accruing from 
three of Universal Corporation’s customers in recent years, see Figure 3.10 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
respectively (AOI, 2004).  Displaying strong resonance to issues of governance highlighted by Gibbon and 
Ponte (2005), the press release announcing the merger (AOI, 2004, p 1) stated that the new company  
…is also expected to benefit from a combined portfolio of value-added service capabilities, 
and an enhanced ability to compete for future outsourcing of similar services from its 
customers, thereby providing a more comprehensive solution to customer supply needs.   
145
 For fiscal year 2013, UC’s two largest customers were PMI and ITG, both of which accounted for over 10% 
of sales revenues (UC, 2013, p 6).   
146
 PMI, JTI, and BAT each accounted for over 10% of AOI’s revenues in the fiscal years ending on 31 March, 
2010 and 2011 (AOI, 2012a, p 5). 
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Figure 3.10: Universal Corporation’s Revenues from Major Customers (US$ millions), 2011-2013 
 
 
*Figures are recorded for 31 March (end of the respective fiscal year). 
Source: Created by author from UC (2013, p 79). 
    
As seen in lead firm-first tier supplier relationships in other GVCs, both the ICCs and the 
independent leaf merchants have focused on developing long-term partnerships.  For 
example, Japan Tobacco International’s procurement strategy includes “assurance of 
supply” and optimizing “…spend through consolidation of suppliers and standardization of 
specifications” (JTI, 2010, p 6).  Universal Corporation (Key Operating Principles, 
http://www.universalcorp.com/AboutUs/AboutUs-Strategy.asp), on the other side of the 
lead firm-first tier supplier relationship, takes a similar approach: 
Universal fosters strategic alliances with its major customers to the benefit 
of all parties.  These alliances with major manufacturers are, in its opinion, 
especially appropriate to the leaf tobacco industry where volume at an 
appropriate price is a key factor in long-term profitability. 
 
However, and as alluded to above, a number of the ICCs have increasingly integrated 
backwards to include leaf procurement.  For example, in 2009 JT acquired a number of 
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leaf merchant businesses147 and established JTI Leaf Services (US) LLC (JT, 2012, p 41)148.   
Likewise, in 2010 PMI’s Brazilian affiliate149 purchased assets and contractual relationships 
with 17,000 farmers from AOI’s and Universal Corporation’s Brazilian subsidiaries150.  The 
total cost to PMI was US$ 83 million151, and the amount of tobacco sourced from these 
farmers is expected to represent about 10% of PMI’s total tobacco leaf sourcing (PMI, 
2012a, pp. 36-37)152.  In total, PMI purchases about one third of its tobacco leaf directly153 
(PMI, 2012c, p 7).  BAT, widely considered to be the industry leader on vertical integration, 
contracts over 100,000 tobacco farmers globally (BAT, 2012, p 13).  Furthermore, the 
China National Tobacco Corporation is arguably the largest leaf procurer in the world.  It 
can therefore be argued that the major competitors to the two leading independent leaf 
merchants are not other leaf merchants but rather backwards integrated cigarette 
companies (Brown, personal communication, 26 April, 2011)154.    
The increase in direct sourcing from ICCs has increased power asymmetries between 
them and their leaf merchant suppliers (more on this for the case of Malawi in Chapter 6).  
Increased direct sourcing reduces overall demand for leaf merchants’ tobacco which 
consequently increases competition for the remaining market.  This occurs in a context of 
increasing competition between ICCs and leaf merchants in sourcing tobacco.   
Although the sector is being encroached upon by ICCs, the nature of the leaf 
merchant business entails a number of entry barriers which protect these firms’ 
                                                          
147
Acquisitions include Kannenberg & Cia. Ltda. (Brazil), Kannenberg, Barker, Hail & Cotton Tabacos Ltda. 
(Brazil), and Tribac Leaf Limited (UK) (JT, 2012, p 41).  We will return to the 2009 acquisition of Tribac and 
the relevance of this acquisition for our country case study, in Chapter 6.  
148
 AOI (2012a, p 22) partially attributes its 30.2% reduction in gross profit between the fiscal years ending 
on 31 March 2011 and 2010 to JTI’s vertical integration.   
149
 Philip Morris Brasil Industria e Comercio Ltda. 
150
 Alliance One Brasil Exportadora de Tabacos Ltda. and Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda., respectively.   
151
 Universal Corporation (2013, p 81) records the value of the sale of contractual relationships with farmers 
and related assets at US$ 34.9 million.  The arrangement with PMI also entailed that UC would continue to 
process tobacco for PMI in Brazil.  This is similar to other arrangements with customers who source leaf 
directly.  For example, AOI processes tobacco leaf in the U.S. which is owned by its customers (AOI, 2012a, p 
5).    
152
 The number of farmer contracts transferred to PMI (by AOI) represented about 20% of AOI’s Brazilian 
suppliers at the time (AOI, 2012a, p 33). 
153
 The term directly here implies that purchases were conducted through affiliates rather than suppliers.   
154
 Gereffi (2013) notes a similar trend (of increasing direct procurement by lead firms) developing in other 
agricultural GVCs (such as cocoa, coffee, and sugar).  
148 
 
asymmetrical bargaining power and large market share (from non-ICC firms)155.  These 
entry barriers include the costs associated with research and development and physical 
capital, economies of scale, and the development of long-term relationships with a small 
number of buyers. 
The agronomical characteristics of tobacco require that it be processed shortly 
after curing to avoid perishability.  After it has been processed and packed it can endure 
for years.  The implications of this are that (leaf processing) factories tend to be located 
near major tobacco producing areas (UC, 2013, p 5), which has investment implications for 
companies in this sector.  Another factor contributing to the capital-intensity156 of this 
node of the chain is the requirement that major leaf merchants have the physical and 
financial ability to maintain inventories, particularly uncommitted stocks (tobacco with no 
immediate buyer).  Leaf merchants are pressured from both ends of the chain to 
occasionally buy more tobacco than is necessary for a given season.  For example, 
contractual obligations with farmers may entail leaf merchants being obliged to purchase 
an entire crop even in a situation of over-supply (UC, 2013, p 24).  Likewise, and given that 
part of the multi-national leaf merchants’ competitiveness derives from economies of 
scale and diversification of sourcing, these companies need to have access to a large and 
heterogeneous selection of inventories to be prepared to respond to customer orders.  
For world uncommitted stocks in recent years, see Figure 3.11 below.  For the example of 
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 In addition to (and partially as a result of) being protected by large entry barriers, these firms display a 
number of characteristics in common with lead firms.  For example, their market share gives them 
enormous bargaining power over their suppliers.  Also, and although they have subsidiaries throughout the 
world, both of these firms are headquartered in a developed country (the U.S.).  However, whilst PMI, BAT, 
and JT are headquartered in New York City, London, and Tokyo, respectively, Universal Corporation and AOI 
are headquartered in Virginia and North Carolina, respectively.  Whilst the ICCs have chosen to locate close 
to their relevant financial markets, the leaf merchants are located in the major tobacco-producing states of 
the U.S.  
156
 UC (2013, p 25) records roughly US$ 31 million, US$ 38 million, and US$ 39 million in capital spending in 
fiscal years 2013, 2012, and 2011, respectively.  Overall in fiscal year 2013, UC (2013, p 38) held 
US$ 287,468,000 in physical assets (i.e. land, buildings, machinery, equipment, minus depreciation).  
Likewise, AOI held US$ 259,679,000 in physical assets as of 31 March, 2012 (AOI, 2012a, p 47). 
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Universal Corporation’s tobacco inventories and the level of uncommitted stock, see Table 
3.21 below157. 
 
Figure 3.11: World Uncommitted Tobacco Stocks, 2008-2012* 
 
 
    *As of June 30, 2012 
    Note: Totals for burley and flue-cured exclude Asian monopolies’ and KT&G’s stocks 
    Source: created by author from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2012, pp. 2, 7, 10) 
 
 
Table 3.21: Universal Corporation Tobacco Inventories, 2012-2013 
 
Year Total Tobacco 
Inventories 
(US$ millions) 
Uncommitted 
Tobacco Inventory 
(US$ millions) 
Uncommitted 
Tobacco Inventory 
Percentage of Total 
2012 (31 March) 682 143 21% 
2013 (31 March) 623 117 19% 
Note: Figures are rounded and hence differ slightly from actual amounts. 
Source: created by author from UC (2013, pp. 24, 38) 
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 Although we do not have figures for the amount of uncommitted stock, we know that AOI held 
comparable (monetary) amounts of tobacco inventories.  For example, the company had US$ 796,152,000 
and US$ 756,590,000 worth of tobacco inventories in 2012 and 2011, respectively (AOI, 2012a, p 51). 
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Access to finance - either commercially or through internal sources, facilitated by 
economies of scale158 - on favourable terms is another entry barrier that protects the 
leading multi-national leaf merchants from serious competitors on a global scale.  For 
example, UC (2013, p 4) states: 
We believe that our financial strength is important, because it enables us to fund 
our business efficiently and make investments in our business when appropriate 
opportunities are identified.  We believe that lower interest and capital costs give us 
a competitive advantage.  Our financial strength also affords us financial flexibility in 
dealing with customer requirements and market changes.  We continually work to 
improve our financial condition and creditworthiness. 
 
Seasonal finance is also essential with regards to the considerable undertakings of leaf 
merchants to provide farmers with input loans for the purposes of contract farming (UC, 
2013). 
A further entry barrier, which relates both to our discussion of lead firms above as 
well as to arguments we will develop in Chapter 6, is the ability to respond to ICC 
demands for compliant production.  For example, UC’s 2013 Annual Report states: 
…our customers- tobacco product manufacturers- are increasingly demanding not 
only quality leaf, but quality compliant leaf.  Compliant leaf has many meanings, 
depending on the customer, but generally necessitates that the leaf supplier ensure 
that the tobacco was grown utilizing good agricultural practices (GAP) in a 
sustainable manner related not only to the environment, but also to social concerns 
and grower profitability.  We have invested significant resources in the programs 
and infrastructure needed to work with growers to produce compliant leaf and 
support our growers’ communities (p 6).   
 
In a letter to shareholders, UC Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer George C. 
Freeman, III emphasizes UC’s competitive edge in compliance: 
We expect that provision of compliant leaf, security of supply, and social 
responsibility concerns will continue to increase in importance in the future.  
Meeting these requirements will involve significant efforts on our part, and we are 
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 For example, Universal Corporation recorded cash flow of roughly US$ 234 million in fiscal year 2013, 
which it used for investments and debt reduction, among other things (UC, 2013, p 24).   
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well-positioned, both operationally and fiscally, to address those needs (UC, 2013, p 
5). 
 
The independent leaf merchants in turn source their tobacco leaf from tobacco 
farmers (second tier suppliers).  These transactions are often direct - between leaf 
merchants and farmers - but occasionally there are intermediaries between the two, such 
as independent buyers or transporters.  The leaf companies buy through a number of 
different marketing channels, the most common of which are contract farming, auctions, 
and state agricultural marketing boards (more on which below and in Chapters 5-8 for the 
case of Malawi).  However in most contexts and marketing arrangements, the 
independent leaf merchants maintain asymmetrical bargaining power over their suppliers 
through some combination of information asymmetries, market share, diversified 
sourcing, contractual agreements and in some cases legal monopsonies (more on which in 
Chapters 6-7 for the case of Malawi).   
Asymmetrical information regarding quality gives buyers enhanced bargaining 
power over growers.  As Universal Corporation states:  
…in all instances the grade selection and establishment of price has to be done by a 
corps of experienced tobacco experts (Tobacco Merchant Industry, 
http://www.universalcorp/com/Operations/Tobacco/Tobacco-Merchant.asp?Menu 
=) 
 
The companies’ large international market share and diversification of sourcing also 
contribute to asymmetrical bargaining power over individual suppliers, the implicit threat 
being that the supplier must sell at a price acceptable to the leaf merchant otherwise the 
latter will merely turn to one of its other suppliers in country X.159  Concessionary contract 
farming schemes epitomize the unequal relationship between grower and leaf merchant 
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 For example, UC operates in each of the major tobacco categories, and maintains a presence in over 30 
countries in 5 continents (UC, 2013, p 4).  Likewise, AOI operates in over 35 countries (AOI, 2012a, p 4).  
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as the former depends on the latter - the only legal buyer - for inputs and agronomical 
supervision.  Furthermore, contract farming schemes, particularly those whose form 
mitigates against side-selling (whether through concessions or 
monopsonistic/oligopsonistic buying practices160), have been criticized for representing a 
form of “proletarianization… without dispossession” (Oya, 2012, p 7).  Or as Reardon and 
Barrett (2000, p 200, cited in Oya, 2012, p 7) notes: “[CF] typically displaces decision-
making authority from the farmer to the downstream processor or distributor, turning 
farmers into quasi-employees”161.    
  
 
3.2.4 Second Tier Suppliers: Growers 
 
When looking at the conditions of production in some of the major producing and 
exporting countries in more detail, it becomes clear that the incentives to cultivate 
tobacco tend to consist of some combination of suitable agro-ecological conditions and 
favourable marketing schemes.  In this sub-section we will attempt to point out some of 
the common themes found in tobacco cultivation, as well as various sources of 
differentiation among tobacco-producing countries and farmers.  However, given the 
importance of product specificity, farmer differentiation, and the role of non-lead firm 
actors in shaping value chains in developing countries, and as emphasised in Chapter 1, 
this section will not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of tobacco production in 
developing countries.  Rather, the key contribution of this section should be understood 
as raising issues to be aware of when applying our analytical approach to a country case 
study, as well as setting the context in which Malawi will be analysed.    
 
                                                          
160
 For a discussion of some of the contract farming literature on the dependency of contract farming 
success on effective forms of side-selling prevention, see Oya (2012).   
161
 However, this is not to imply that increased power asymmetries necessarily negate any possibility of 
benefit for smallholders in contract farming schemes.  For the example of benefits accruing to smallholder 
participants in an (organic) contract farming scheme of Arabica coffee in Uganda, see Bolwig et al. (2009).  
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  Agronomy, Ecology, and Environment.  One of the reasons tobacco is considered an 
attractive crop is its adapatability to a wide array of agro-ecological conditions, and in 
particular its drought-resistance (MacDonald, 2009).   
 
Brazilian tobacco, for example, is grown in some areas that would be unsuitable for other 
crops, such as on hilly land in the South.  Also, the low soil requirements of tobacco make 
this crop more attractive for some farmers than other profitable Brazilian crops like garlic 
or asparagus (FAO, 2003b).  
Oriental tobacco is particularly suitable to arid environments.  In addition, the crop 
does not perish easily after cultivation (ITGA, Alternative Crops, 
http://www.tobaccoleaf.org/conteudos/default.asp?ID=50&IDP=20&P=5).  However, this type 
of tobacco is extremely labour intensive as curing requires threading together and hanging 
characteristically small leaves (Gooden, personal communication, 18 April, 2011).  Oriental 
tobacco is traditionally sun-cured but is shifting towards being cured in “plastic covered 
tunnels” in Turkey (the principal oriental-producing country) (FAO, 2003b, p 75).   
Production of flue-cured and burley tobacco follows a series of procedures if done in an 
ideal way.  First trays are prepared with the tobacco seeds and left to germinate in a green 
house for 7-8 weeks. The green house is ideally regulated at 68 degrees farenheight at 
night and 86 degrees farenheight during the day.  Temperature regulation is important in 
that too high a temperature can cause seedling damage.  Seed growth is encouraged with 
some use of nitrogen fertilizers.  Clipping is also done 3-5 times during the germination 
period.  At the end of this process the plants are “transplanted” to the field (Tobacco Farm 
Quarterly- TFQ, 2007, pp 8-10, 30-32). 
Once the plants are in the field, managing soil nutrients becomes important.  The three 
main steps in any fertilization programme are soil testing, fertilizer selection, and fertilizer 
application.  Soil testing is done to asertain pH and nutrient levels.  In most states in the 
U.S., the state government will administer this process.  Soil pH levels should be between 
5.8-6 (FCV) or 5.5-5.8 (burley).  If the soil is not at this level, the level can be changed 
through liming.  Liming can increase the health of the plant and enhance drought 
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resistance and nutrient absorption, all of which can lead to increased yields.  Typical 
fertilizers are of the N-P-K (nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium) variety with the 
distinguishing factor being the ratios of the ingredients.  On average, 50-80 pounds of 
nitrogen (for FCV, and significantly more for burley) should be applied to each acre of 
tobacco field.  Timing of the fertilization is extremely important, and should be done 
during the transplant and ten days afterwards (for FCV).  If administered correctly, the 
nitrogen will be depleted at the time of harvest as ripening of the tobacco plant is caused 
by “nitrogen starvation” (TFQ, 2007, pp 8-10, 33-34). 
Following the above procedures properly, in addition to crop rotation, can also help 
manage weeds.  Crop rotation is also useful in disease control in that many diseases are 
tobacco-specific.  Therefore planting other crops removes the tobacco plants from the soil 
and cleanses the area. The ideal schedule is three years of alternate crops followed by one 
year of tobacco. After each tobacco harvest the stalks and roots should be completely 
removed from the soil and destroyed.  As diseases can be spread through contaminated 
machinery, it is advised that diseased portions of a field be harvested last (TFQ, 2007, pp. 
16-25).   
When the flowers start to bud they should be removed immediately.  This process is 
called “topping” and can lead to the growth of “suckers” which in turn can be controlled 
with chemicals (TFQ, 2007, p 26).  At the point of harvest, a ripe plant is essential in 
commanding high quality classification (TFQ, 2007, pp. 27-28).   
Nitrogen uptake, rainfall, temperature, root health and variety are all 
factors in ripeness, but the most critical is weather conditions.  Drier 
conditions will see tobacco ripen quickly and hold for 10 to 20 days before 
quality declines in excessive heat, while wetter conditions see a slow 
ripening followed by a quick deterioration due to wet conditions (TFQ, 2007, 
p 27). 
 
Separation by stalk position is used as an indicator of quality.  After the crop is harvested it 
is cured (by the farmers).  Flue-curing takes place in a heated curing barn in three steps: 
yellowing (moisture removal), leaf drying, and stem drying.  Each step takes approximately 
48 hours.  Temperatures are increased at about 2 degrees farenheight per hour during 
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leaf drying and 3 degrees farenheight per hour during stem drying.  As is evident, 
temperature and humidity (determined by fresh airflow, controlled by a damper) are 
critical in the curing process (TFQ, 2007, pp. 27-28).  Unlike FCV, burley tobacco is air-
cured and the entire stalk is hung in the barns.  As the curing is normally done without the 
aid of central heating, the key to good curing is appropriate ventilation (TFQ, 2007, p 44; 
Gooden, personal communication, 18 April, 2011).                     
As can be seen above, crop quality is dependent on adherence to a number of complex 
and resource-intensive procedures.  The ability to implement the above guidelines 
depends on, among other things, the access of farmers to extension services, physical 
capital, inputs, labour, and laboratory facilities.  The access to and quality and/or 
productivity of the above-listed things constitute key sources of differentiation among 
tobacco farmers and the quality and category of tobacco they produce (more on which 
below).   
 
Differentiation.  According to the FAO (2003a, p 1) “…tobacco production returns and 
tobacco profitability in most developing countries are much higher than in any other cash 
crop…”  However, production is driven by different forces in different contexts.  For 
example, the FAO (2003b) argues that Chinese farmers are drawn to tobacco production 
by the low risk (the crop is sold under contract) associated with the crop rather than 
prices (which have been higher in other crops such as cotton and sugarcane).  On the 
other hand, 
…tobacco in India generally provides higher net returns per unit of land 
than most other cash crops and substantially more than food crops (FAO, 
2003b, p 3).     
 
Tobacco in the United States is one of the most valuable (field) crops, generating 
about US$ 4 000 per acre (Parker, 2009).  In South Carolina, U.S.A., efficient tobacco 
farmers can often generate up to US$ 1 500 per acre, net of variable costs (Gooden, 
personal communication, 18 April, 2011).  Given that many of these farmers farm 100 
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acres of tobacco (in addition to a number of other crops), this means that at least some of 
these farmers are generating an income of over US$ 150 000 per year, placing them in the 
upper income brackets in the U.S.A.   
In Brazil, 96% of tobacco production occurs in the South (Afubra, Informações 
Gerais, http:www.afubra.com.br/principal.php?acao=conteudo&u_ID=1&menus_site_ID= 
20) where mainly FCV is produced for cigarettes.  Tobacco production in this region occurs 
primarily on small farms and is high-yielding, having an average yield of 3.74 tonnes per 
hectare in 2000/01 (FAO, 2003b).  North East Brazil162, on the other hand, is focussed on 
tobacco for cigars.  Tobacco in both regions of Brazil is produced according to the 
“integration system” whereby the tobacco leaf buyers (usually multinationals) provide 
inputs (and in some cases finance and transport) and guarantee purchase (Afubra, 
Evolução da Fumicultura, http://www.afubra.com.br/principal.php?acao=conteudo&u_ID 
=1&menus_site_ID=23; FAO, 2003b).  It can be seen by this example that finance and 
affordability are also important determining factors of tobacco cultivation.  In 2000/01 
season, family farmers averaged US$ 5000 gross income (FAO, 2003b, p 2).  Afubra (an 
association representing tobacco farmers in Southern Brazil) provides crop insurance 
which is considered better than those available for other crops (FAO, 2003b, p 14), which 
again highlights the importance of risk mitigation associated with tobacco cultivation. 
 Indeed, marketing systems are one of the key sources of differentiation of tobacco 
production in different countries.  For example, whilst most tobacco is sold directly to leaf 
merchants from farmers, there are still important auction markets163 in such countries as 
India, Malawi164, and Zimbabwe.  Also, there are a number of countries where it is 
common for leaf merchants or ICCs to purchase tobacco from intermediaries rather than 
the farmers themselves.  The intermediaries may be parastatal agricultural marketing 
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 Tobacco production in this region of Brazil can be traced back to the 16
th
 century (Goodman, 1993, p 140). 
163
 This is the intermediary through which PMI sources roughly 10% of its global tobacco leaf requirements, 
mainly in Malawi and India (PMI, 2012c, p 8). 
164
 We will return to this theme in Chapters 4-8. 
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boards or private traders165.  For example, in China AOI purchases tobacco from 
intermediaries that purchase and process tobacco from farmers (AOI, 2012a, p 3).  
In addition to the type of marketing system under which farmers sell their tobacco, 
there are a number of other aspects which differentiate tobacco-producing countries and 
farmers.  One of the most obvious is farm size.  As seen above, large (over 100 acres) and 
super-large (over 1,000 acres) tobacco farms are increasingly the norm in the major flue-
cured producing state of North Carolina, in the U.S.A.  On the other hand, small family 
farms predominate in many tobacco-producing countries in Africa and elsewhere.  Indeed,  
In 2011 PMI purchased around 440,000 tons of tobacco grown by more than 
500,000 contracted farmers in over 30 countries.  The vast majority of the tobacco 
purchased by PMI is grown by small-scale family farms ranging in size from half a 
hectare to just a few hectares (PMI, 2012c, p 7).   
 
Producer countries are also differentiated by the type of tobacco they produce.  In 
addition to the tobacco types discussed thus far (i.e. burley, oriental, flue-cured, and dark), 
tobacco-producing countries are commonly segmented (by leaf merchants and ICCs) into 
either “flavour” or “filler” categories, depending on the type and purpose of tobacco leaf 
produced.  For flue-cured tobacco, the U.S., Brazil, and Zimbabwe are usually classified as 
flavour-producers, whereas India and Tanzania are filler-producers.  Likewise for burley, 
the U.S., Brazil and Argentina are considered flavour-producers whereas the remaining 
exporting countries are filler-producers (Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, 2012, pp. 3, 7).  
Just within the burley sector (our main focus in this work), there is substantial 
differentiation.  Of course, as a point of departure for a discussion of burley differentiation, 
it is perhaps worth briefly re-iterating burley’s166 relation to and distinction from its flue-
cured counterpart.  One important distinction, emphasized by Goodman (1993) and which 
we will return to in our case study of Malawi, is the degree of mechanization, or capital-
intensity.  As mentioned above, the curing of flue-cured tobacco is mechanized while 
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 PMI also sources about 10% of its tobacco in this manner, principally in Indonesia and to a lesser extent in 
Thailand and the Philippines (PMI, 2012c, p 8). 
166
 Despite its global importance, burley is a relatively new form of tobacco, not believed to have been 
discovered until 1864 (Goodman, 1993, pp 208-9). 
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burley tobacco is air-cured.  The lower capital requirements of burley production can lend 
themselves to the feasibility of smaller landholdings.  For example, Goodman (1993) 
emphasizes this relationship in explaining the fact that flue-cured land allotments were 
over three times as large as burley ones in the U.S. in 1970 (p 202).  However, also of 
relevance to burley producers is the dependence of burley production on the production 
of its flue-cured counterpart.  For example, American Blend cigarettes, which combine 
burley, flue-cured, and oriental tobacco, are dependent on flue-cured for the largest 
proportion (Goodman, 1993).  The other main type of cigarette, Virginia, does not use any 
burley at all.  Combined with the unpalitability and harsh taste of burley mentioned above, 
this means that burley tobacco cannot be used in cigarettes without both flue-cured 
tobacco and artificial flavourings or additives.  This has the potential to increase power 
asymmetries between burley producers and buyers in that the former are more 
dependent on the latter to source complementary tobacco types as well as to have the 
ability to blend with non-tobacco inputs.  These two factors would not necessarily apply to 
flue-cured tobacco producers.      
Differentiation among burley-producing countries can be seen in a number of ways.  
For example, and likely related to the quality classifications described above, whilst burley 
is predominately smallholder-based in both Malawi and Argentina, prices in the former 
country have been considerably lower in recent years.  Whilst burley prices in Argentina 
averaged US$ 2.42 per kg in 2012, in Malawi they averaged US$ 1.22 in the same year167.  
Colombian burley, on the other hand, was characterized by yields roughly 27.5% higher 
than those in Argentina in 2012/13168 (ITGA, 2013).  The factors which influence total 
burley production are also markedly different in the various producing countries.  For 
example, the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association of the U.S.A. (cited in ITGA, 
2013, p 15) states that  
The 2013 world burley production is predicted to increase as well as the U.S. 
tobacco crop.  The actual results for U.S. production depend on many 
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 We will discuss pricing at length in Malawi in Chapters 6 and 7.   
168
 Burley yields in Argentina averaged 1,105 kgs/ha in 2013 (ITGA, 2013; author’s calculations) while in 
Colombia they averaged 1,410 kgs per hectare in 2012 (ITGA, 2013).  
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factors such as available labor, immigration reform, and global regulations 
but the outlook is very positive… 
…We believe U.S. burley tobacco will continue to be the gold standard for 
world production.  
 
 Entry Barriers.  Given the environmental, ecological, agronomical, and marketing 
conditions which have been identified as ideal for tobacco cultivation, one can identify a 
number of entry barriers for farmers wishing to engage in tobacco cultivation.  One 
obvious potential constraint on tobacco cultivation is land.  Tobacco has particularly 
burdensome requirements regarding land in that crop rotation is essential for disease and 
pest mitigation and for maintaining healthy soils.   
 Labour is another potential constraint.  Tobacco has always been a labour-
intensive crop.  Despite major advances in technology over the past couple hundred years 
(since the time when tobacco in the U.S.A. South was synonomous with slave labour) 
tobacco cultivation has remained very labour-intensive.  Labour costs can therefore be 
particularly burdensome.  This is especially relevant to poorer households in sub-Saharan 
Africa, for example, without access to much family labour (as seen in the case of Malawi in 
Chapter 4).   
 Credit and/or capital can be another major constraint.  Tobacco is input-intensive.  
As can be seen above in our description of the ideal production conditions, fertilizisation is 
particularly important in tobacco cultivation.  In poorer households without much savings 
or available cash, access to credit can be a determining factor of whether tobacco 
cultivation is feasible or not.  The need for credit is one of the rationales behind the 
contract farming schemes so prevalent in tobacco cultivation.  Leaf merchants become 
financiers (or partial financial guarantors) in locations where credit markets are 
particularly thin or non-existent.   
 However, whilst these entry barriers may be prohibitive for some smallholders and 
certainly impede many more farmers from producing high quality tobacco, overall the 
entry barriers at this node of the chain are relatively low.  This can be seen by the fact that 
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over a hundered countries and hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of smallholder 
farmers participate in tobacco cultivation (ILO, 2003), compared to merely a handful of 
firms located in primarily four countries that constitute the other chain nodes.   
 
 
3.3  Upgrading 
 
Different types of upgrading are common in the GVCT.  For example, intersectoral 
upgrading (i.e. diversification) is a common strategy for the ICCs, especially in food and 
logistics (van Liemt, 2002).  Upgrading has occurred at the national level as well in a 
number of instances.  Some countries (e.g. Mozambique) have moved from exporting 
unmanufactured tobacco to exporting processed tobacco.  With the caveat presented 
above that our discussion of upgrading is intended to contextualize our case study (rather 
than provide a comprehensive analysis of upgrading in the GVCT), we group the 
remainder of this section (loosely) into three of the four categories of upgrading outlined 
by the GVC-GHS variant: process, product, and functional.   
 
 
3.3.1 Process Upgrading 
 
Process upgrading - producing the same product but more efficiently and therefore 
increasing value - is arguably the most common form of upgrading in the GVCT.  World 
tobacco leaf production (in dry weight) was 4.3 million tonnes in 1970 and increased to 
8.1 million tonnes in 1997.  This increase was due to higher average yields (an example of 
process upgrading) rather than a net increase in area cultivated.  In 1970 (global) yields 
averaged 1.3 tonnes per hectare whereas in 2000 yields averaged 1.7 tonnes per hectare.  
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China is the exception to this rule in that as this country increased the amount of land 
under tobacco cultivation, increasingly low-quality areas were absorbed, bringing down 
the average yields from 2.1 tonnes per hectare in 1970 to 1.9 tonnes per hectare in 2000 
(FAO, 2003a).   
Process upgrading is common because it is usually in the interest of the downstream 
actors (leaf merchants and ICCs) that farmers produce a higher quality and quantity of 
tobacco.  However, process upgrading will depend largely on the environment in which a 
farmer operates.  Particularly important are a number of factors discussed above, namely, 
climate and agro-ecology, credit, access to marketing infrastructure, and agronomical 
advice/supervision.  As mentioned above, the operating environment in the Southeastern 
United States is in many ways ideal for process upgrading.  It is therefore unsurprising that 
one farmer in South Carolina interviewed by this author was able to produce tobacco in 
the 2010/11 growing season with yields of 4.04 tonnes per hectare169 (DuRant, personal 
communication, 18 April, 2011).   
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Product Upgrading 
 
One potential for product upgrading would be switching to more valuable types of 
tobacco.   However, this could be difficult due to climate or input constraints.  For 
example, switching from burley tobacco (mainly a smallholder crop in Malawi and 
Mozambique) to FCV would entail substantial capital investments in flue-curing barns.  
Switching to oriental tobacco would entail increased labour costs.  In many cases, 
particularly in contract farming schemes, the potential for product upgrading will depend 
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 Figures were converted and rounded by author from 3,600 pounds per acre. 
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on the leaf merchants in two ways.  Firstly, the leaf merchants must believe that sourcing 
a different type of tobacco from the same farmers is a viable strategy.  Second, the leaf 
merchants must be willing to provide the necessary (agronomical, financial, etc.) support 
for farmers to make this transition.   
   Vargas (2001) emphasizes the important role of the buyers (leaf merchants and 
ICCs) in determining the potential process and product upgrading in the Rio Pardo Valley 
in southern Brazil.  The buyers and growers engage in “integrated production systems,” 
whereby the buyers provide the necessary inputs, technical assistance, and transportation 
to smallholder tobacco growers who are in turn bound to sell their output to the buyers 
(as in other contract farming schemes).  This gives the buyers complete control over 
production processes and hence over upgrading possibilities regarding production.   
  Vargas (2001) points out that product upgrading necessitates research and 
development (R&D).  Whilst the Rio Pardo Valley has two universities and other 
governmental institutions engaged in R&D, the tobacco cluster still bases most of its 
innovation on R&D from external (leaf merchant and ICC) sources.  Therefore product 
upgrading in the Rio Pardo Valley tobacco cluster appears to be constrained by two factors: 
consent of the buyers and access to enormous R&D resources (Vargas, 2001).   
 
 
3.3.3 Functional Upgrading 
 
 Functional upgrading - moving up a node of the GVC and engaging in a function 
associated with higher value added and greater proximity to end users - is extremely 
difficult for tobacco farmers given the entry barriers associated with the first tier suppliers 
described above.  Functional upgrading for tobacco farmers would entail processing 
tobacco and selling it to the ICCs.  As can be seen from our above description of the first 
tier suppliers, a farmer wishing to move up the GVCT would need to make substantial 
capital investments in a processing factory, acquire the technologies necessary for such a 
163 
 
factory, and develop relationships with buyers.  In Mozambique, functional upgrading has 
occurred at the national level.  The Mozambican government used incentives to 
encourage one of the leaf merchants to establish processing facilities in the country 
(Hanlon, 2006).  However at the farmer level, examples of functional upgrading into the 
leaf merchant sector are less common.   
 Functional upgrading by farmers or leaf merchants into cigarette production is 
made difficult by the enormous level of entry barriers associated with the ICC node of the 
chain, as discussed above.  However, the agronomical properties of tobacco also play a 
role in determining the possibilities of functional upgrading.  As seen above, the nature of 
perishability of tobacco dictates that the crop needs to be processed and packed shortly 
after curing and hence requires that tobacco processing plants be located in relative 
proximity to major sourcing sites.  However, given that processed tobacco has a much 
longer shelf life (as seen above), cigarette manufacturers do not experience the same 
need to locate their factories in tobacco-producing countries170.  Rather, ICC factory 
location is more driven by proximity to key markets.  Combined with business strategies 
increasingly based on cost rationalization and economies of scale in manufacturing (BAT, 
2012), the location of an ICC factory is becoming more selective.  Given that rises in 
smoking rates are largely determined by increasing income and population, the outlook 
for upgrading into cigarette manufacturing in poor tobacco-producing African countries 
with low population densities is particularly dim.  For example, out of 42 manufacturing 
locations globally, PMI currently has only one location in Africa (PMI, PMI around the 
World, http://www.pmi.com/eng/pages/homepage.aspx)171.   
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 For example, AOI (2012a, p 4) states: “Processed flue-cured, burley and oriental tobacco is redried to 
remove excess moisture so that it can be held in storage by customers or us for long periods of time.” 
171
 This discussion of the role of agronomical characteristics and technology in functional upgrading has 
some parallels with Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) discussion of coffee.  For example, the authors note:  
Although green coffee (the usual form of export) can be stored for a couple of years under 
good conditions, roasted coffee becomes stale much more quickly.  Second, most coffee 
roasters in the commercial market use blends of a variety of origins from around the world.  
This restricts the nature of the final product and therefore the market for Africa-based 
roasting (p 153). 
However, there are also examples of commodities whose perishability characteristics imply less fatalistic 
outcomes with regards to functional upgrading.  For example, in their discussion of the South African dairy 
sector, Mather and Kenny (2005) describe how the perishability of milk implies that multi-nationals need to 
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However there are some emerging market economies which are both sources of 
production and consumption.  In these countries it makes sense in some cases (from the 
ICCs’ perspective) for tobacco to be cultivated, processed, manufactured, and sold all in 
one country.  In the GVCT we therefore see some countries with a nearly autonomous 
tobacco value chain.  This is notably the case in China, the world’s largest tobacco 
producer and home to the world’s largest cigarette company.  South Africa also produces 
both tobacco leaf and manufactured tobacco products.  The sector consists of just under 
150 farms covering roughly 4 000 hectares of tobacco cultivation and employing more 
than 10 000 workers (Fox, 2010; see Table 3.22 below).  South Africa is also notable in that 
farmers have functionally upgraded by co-owning a processing plant (see below).   
 
Table 3.22: South African Crop Estimate 2009/2010 
 
 Flue-Cured Dark Air-Cured Total 
Number of farmers 82 65 147 
Estimated number 
of hectares planted 
3 050 900 3 950 
Farm weight: kg 8 235 000 2 900 000 11 135 000 
    Source: reproduced from Fox (2010, p 8) 
 
Francois van der Merwe172 (personal communication,173 18 April, 2011) sums up the 
process below:  
FCV tobacco is cured and graded on the tobacco farms and then 
sold under contract to Afgri Tobacco. The tobacco from the farmers is 
pooled and processed in the GLT (green leaf threshing plant). This plant is 
co-owned by the farmers and Afgri. During processing, the stem and the 
leaf of the tobacco are separated, and the different types, qualities, colour 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
invest in processing facilities in close proximity to the (developing country/emerging economy) markets they 
wish to serve.    
172
 Chief Executive and Chairman of the Board of the Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa (at the time of 
interview).  He is currently President of the International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA). 
173
 After reading through my paraphrasing of an interview with him, Mr. van der Merwe re-worded what I 
had written.  It is this re-wording which is cited here. 
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and other characteristics of the tobacco is used to make up the different 
blends required by the cigarette manufacturers.  
At this stage, more than 95% of the total SA flue cured crop is sold 
to the South African subsidiary of British American Tobacco (BATSA). At the 
cigarette factory further processes take place where cut rag (finely cut 
tobacco) is made where after the cigarettes are made in technically 
advanced and modern making machines.  
 
After the cigarettes are produced, they are sold to wholesalers who then sell to retailers, 
which is where consumers buy their cigarettes (Fox, 2010). 
Upgrading (particularly in the broader GVC-GPD conceptualization) has also occurred in 
different segments of the GVCT, especially in developed countries, as a result of 
government intervention.  Indeed, the role of governments in the global tobacco industry 
has been pervasive, especially in rich countries where for years many governments 
pursued seemingly contradictory policies of supporting and protecting tobacco producers 
(farmers) while at the same time heavily regulating and taxing cigarettes in an effort to 
decrease consumption.  Until recently the U.S. also had a system of quotas and minimum 
price guarantees for tobacco production and the E.U. subsidized tobacco production. 
As with other agricultural commodities, the U.S. provides an interesting case study of 
both direct and indirect support and protection for tobacco farming.  In the United States, 
tobacco farming was for decades directly supported under a quota and minimum price 
system.  The system was created in the 1930’s with the objective of stabilizing and raising 
prices and existed in some form or another through 2003.  Due to a system of loans and 
assessments, the programme was supposed to be self-financing, however the costs of the 
programme to the federal government in a given year were not necessarily nil.  For 
example, in FY2003, the programme cost the federal government US$ 60 million (Womach, 
2003).   
For decades, particularly in the 1950’s and 60’s, the quota system kept the price of U.S. 
tobacco (artificially) high as Southern Rhodesia was the only serious competitor for quality 
flue-cured tobacco.  The political violence in Southern Rhodesia interrupted supplies and 
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gave the U.S. near monopoly status of global FCV production.  However in the late 1970s, 
the tobacco companies started investing in Southern Brazil in areas with agro-ecological 
conditions similar to the South-eastern U.S.  In the 1990’s Brazil surpassed the U.S. in FCV 
production and remains today the only serious competitor for quality FCV tobacco in the 
world174.  Given this increased competition in the global FCV market, the U.S. quotas had 
to become smaller and smaller to keep the same prices for farmers.  This gave momentum 
to a movement to de-regulate tobacco production, and the quota system was finally 
eliminated in 2004 with a buy-out whereby the tobacco companies “bought” the quotas 
from the farmers (Brown, personal communication, 26 April, 2011).   
In the U.S. burley market there was less momentum for and more resistance to ending 
the quota and minimum price system.  While Brazil had emerged as a serious competitor 
to the U.S. for FCV, Malawi was the only main competitor for burley and this country still 
produced a substantially lower-quality version of this crop.  Although the tobacco 
companies (leaf merchants and cigarette companies) took similar approaches to burley as 
to FCV, i.e. going to South America to develop new sources of production175, these 
companies initially had a more difficult time in replicating U.S. quality with burley than 
with FCV.  One explanation that has been offered for this is climatic conditions.  Whereas 
the conditions in these new areas were suitable for tobacco-growing, they seemed to be 
less adequate for tobacco-curing.  Since burley curing is much more dependent on climate 
than flue-curing (the former is done with air whereas the latter with regulated central 
heating), quality burley curing seems to be more difficult to replicate than quality flue-
curing (Brown, personal communication, 26 April, 2011).   
     As a mechanism for guaranteeing minimum prices the U.S. government mandated a 
small number of grower cooperatives such as the “Flue-Cured Tobacco Stabilization 
Corporation” and the “Burley Growers’ Cooperative.”  However, with the end of the 
farmer-support system in 2004, these entities were able to turn themselves into leaf 
merchants, procuring and processing tobacco leaf and selling it to the ICCs (Brown, 
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 Zimbabwe’s current political situation has once again eroded its status as a global producer of quality FCV. 
175
 Tobacco companies creating new (country) sources of production in response to uncompetitive 
conditions in current (country) sources is a theme we will return to in Chapter 8. 
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personal communication, 26 April, 2011).  This is an example of government-supported 
functional upgrading176.   
Other direct support for tobacco farmers in the U.S. in the past has included payments 
to producers as compensation for natural disasters or low commodity prices (US$ 471 
million in FY2001), a short-lived domestic content requirement for American cigarettes177, 
a tariff-rate quota on imported tobacco, and subsidized crop insurance (US$ 39 million in 
FY 2003) (Womach, 2003).  Indirect support occurs more at the state and/or local level 
and includes such things as free (or cheap) extension services or soil analysis.  For example, 
the North Carolina State University Production Guide (2011, p 3) states that:  
Tobacco growers in North Carolina are fortunate to have an Extension 
agent with tobacco responsibilities in each tobacco-producing county.  
These agents are supported by research and extension faculty in the 
College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at North Carolina State University.  
 
Other government support/protection programmes in the past in major producing 
and/or rich countries have included: direct price supports (European Community, Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, Brazil, Zimbabwe, Argentina), export subsidies (European Community, 
Canada, Korea, Turkey), input subsidies (Korea, Canada, Brazil, India, Indonesia), tariff 
barriers (European Community, Brazil, Korea, Zimbabwe, Canada, Australia, China, India, 
Indonesia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey), pesticide residue restriction 
(European Community, U.S.) and mixing regulations and/or import quotas (Australia, 
Brazil, China, Finland, India, Malawi, Zimbabwe) (FAO, 2003b, p 97).  Of course, the biggest 
example of government intervention in the GVCT is the China National Tobacco 
Corporation, a state-owned enterprise and the largest cigarette manufacturer in the world. 
With regards to Daviron and Ponte’s (2005) conception of upgrading as creating 
and controlling the value associated with quality attributes (discussed in Chapter 1), it is 
important to re-iterate a key distinction between coffee (the commodity for which these 
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 There is also considerable scope for investigation into the associational power of the cooperative 
members and the impact of this on upgrading.   
177
 This was later struck down as being in violation of GATT rules (Brown, personal communication, 26 April, 
2011). 
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authors’ framework was developed) and tobacco.  In tobacco, the symbolic quality 
attributes, with the exception of branding, tend not to be marketed.  For example, one 
does not buy fair trade or organic cigarettes, or cigarettes identified with a particular 
region of tobacco production.  The implications of this are that unlike coffee, where there 
exists (at least a theoretical) possibility of upgrading through producers obtaining control 
over the ability to market their products as fair trade, organic, or as originating from a 
particular region, in the case of tobacco the symbolic quality associated with consumption 
depends entirely on branding.  As we have seen above, branding in the tobacco industry is 
associated with particularly high entry barriers.     
 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have attempted to answer part of Research Question 1.a, i.e. What 
is the territoriality of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco?  We have emphasized that 
production has increasingly shifted to smallholders in developing countries.  Production of 
tobacco leaf is highly fragmented and dispersed, occurring in over 120 countries.  
Production of tobacco leaf is segmented by type of tobacco (i.e. burley, flue-cured, 
oriental, dark) as well as primary use for the tobacco (e.g. filler versus flavour).  Although 
sometimes mediated by auction houses, private traders, or agricultural parastatal 
companies, tobacco farmers most often sell their tobacco leaf directly to leaf merchants 
and international cigarette companies.  The leaf merchant sector of the chain is highly 
concentrated and is dominated by two American corporations: Alliance One International 
and Universal Corporation.  However, international cigarette companies such as BAT and 
PMI are becoming increasingly involved in direct procurement.   
After the tobacco leaf is purchased and processed the leaf merchants then sell it to 
cigarette manufacturers.  The cigarette manufacturing sector is also highly concentrated 
and is dominated by a handful of multi-national companies headquartered in the U.S., 
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U.K., and Japan, as well as the Chinese state-owned tobacco company.  A very small 
portion of this sector is represented by small private and state-owned cigarette 
manufacturers who compete mainly on a regional rather than international basis.  We 
refer to these companies as non-lead firm cigarette manufacturers.  With the exception of 
the Chinese state tobacco company, the multi-national cigarette manufacturers are 
captive to the shareholder value doctrine, with the three largest multi-nationals 
headquartered in close proximity to their respective stock markets: New York City, London, 
and Tokyo.  Despite the concentration of location of multi-national cigarette 
manufacturers in developed countries, consumption is increasingly shifting to developing 
countries, and is highly dispersed.   
 We have also addressed parts of Research Question 2.a, specifically: Is the Global 
Value Chain for Tobacco driven?  If so, by who?  What enables the drivers to maintain their 
power?  We have argued in this chapter that the GVCT is driven by the international 
cigarette companies, which constitute the lead firms in the chain.  The drivenness can be 
seen in that these firms are able to set and enforce rules and standards for production on 
their suppliers, who in turn enforce them on the farmers they buy tobacco from.  This is 
seen in the lead firms’ attempt to deal with child labour, in their Codes of Conduct, and in 
PMI’s recent Agricultural Labour Practices Code.  The power of lead firms over their 
suppliers can also be seen in the lead firms’ definition of the suppliers’ functions more 
generally in that the lead firms are now demanding “compliant” tobacco leaf from their 
suppliers.   
 There are a number of factors which contribute to the asymmetrical power that 
lead firms have over the chain. First, the high level of concentration of the lead firm sector 
and enormous market share of the lead firms enhances their ability to dictate terms to 
suppliers.  This high level of concentration is compounded by the highly fragmented and 
dispersed nature of production of tobacco leaf.  Hundreds of thousands of tobacco 
farmers in over a hundred countries all compete to serve a handful of cigarette 
manufacturers concentrated in five countries.  Of course, the leaf merchant sector is also 
highly concentrated, however the lead firms mitigate against the build-up of bargaining 
power in their supply base by engaging in substantial direct sourcing of tobacco leaf.  
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Furthermore, and unlike the cocoa chain (e.g. Fold, 2002), the leaf merchants have few 
alternative outlets for their product.     
Second, the lead firms are focused on branding and marketing, the most profitable 
node of the chain.  The blends and recipes for different cigarette brands are top secret 
and include a number of non-tobacco ingredients.  The brands are also marketed primarily 
by their psychological or symbolic features, rather than by the quality of tobacco used, 
thereby reducing the importance of tobacco as a component of cigarettes.  Furthermore, 
the lead firms have exclusive knowledge of key consumer trends due to their investment 
in marketing, and hence are uniquely positioned to market manufactured tobacco 
products.        
 Finally, the lead firms are protected by an enormous array of entry barriers, which 
enhance and solidify their bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers, as well as the chain 
more generally.  Some of the key entry barriers discussed in this chapter include: 
asymmetric information, the level of capital- and technology-intensity of production, and 
the costs associated with marketing, litigation, R&D, conforming to regulations, lobbying, 
and public relations.  
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PART 3:  THE MALAWI SMALLHOLDER 
BURLEY TOBACCO VALUE CHAIN 
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Chapter 4: Historical Formation of the 
Smallholder Burley Tobacco Sector in 
Malawi 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The GVC-GPD variant of the literature emphasises the importance of the historical 
formation of chains (also see Campling, 2012b) and even occasionally criticises the GVC-
GHS variant for its dehistoricized approach (e.g. see Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Gibbon and 
Ponte, 2005).  Having touched briefly on some of the more prominent historical trends in 
the GVCT in Chapter 3, in this chapter we will seek to engage in more detail with the 
historical formation of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain.   
Colonial settlers started growing tobacco in Malawi as early as the 1890’s (Jaffee, 2003, 
p 1).  As the country moved from British protectorate to semi-independence to 
independent one-party dictatorship to liberal democracy, tobacco continued to gain in 
political and economic importance, to become the most tobacco-dependent country in 
the world, with the crop accounting for more than sixty percent of export revenues 
(Prowse, 2009).   
Malawi grows burley, flue-cured Virginia (FCV), and Malawi Western (an assortment of 
dark air- and fire-cured types).  The production of tobacco in Malawi has been marked by 
its dual structure of estates and smallholdings, from colonial times until the present.  
Estates are defined as “holdings operating leasehold or freehold tenures”178 whereas 
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 For an estate to register with the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC),  
the piece of land on which the estate owner intends to plant the tobacco must have a valid sketch 
map issued by the Survey Department of the Ministry of Lands, a title deed for the land must also be 
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smallholders are characterised by their “usufruct rights to customary land” (Orr, 2000, p 
347).    
However, and as noted in previous chapters, the smallholder burley sector did not 
emerge in Malawi until the early 1990’s.  In this chapter we will trace this sector’s 
emergence by highlighting different trends and policies that led to the sector’s creation.  
In so doing, we will partially address the first part of Research Question 1.b, i.e. How has 
the territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain come to be 
shaped over time?  We will start by describing government policy towards and the 
development of the Malawian tobacco sector in an evolutionary manner with Sections 4.2, 
4.3, and 4.4 devoted to the colonial regime, the Banda years, and the democracy years, 
resepectively.  Section 4.5 will conclude. 
   
 
4.2  “Why not Persuade Them to Grow Tobacco”179: Tobacco in Colonial 
Malawi 
    
4.2.1 The Beginnings: Tobacco in the Southern Region 
 
From the 1870’s until the beginning of the Protectorate in 1891180, large quantities of 
freehold land were acquired by European settlers (Mulwafu, 2002).  Malawi’s first colonial 
ruler, Harry Johnston, sanctioned much of this acquired land through “certificates of claim” 
(Mulwafu, 2002, p 27).  Johnston also instituted a land classification system, with 
ramifications lasting until today.  The three classifications were: public land, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
available and must be in the name of the person/institution that intends to register the estate 
(Tobacco Control Commission- TCC, Grower Information, http://www.tccmw.com/growers.htm). 
179
 This is a quote from A.F. Barron, an influential settler in colonial Malawi who introduced tobacco 
sharecropping/tenancy in the Central Region.  I have borrowed the idea of using this as a section title from 
Woods’s (1993) article: “’Why Not Persuade Them to Grow Tobacco:’ Planters, Tenants, and the Political 
Economy of Central Malawi, 1920-1940.” 
180
 The British Central Africa Protectorate later became Nyasaland in 1907 (Prowse, 2011b). 
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freehold/leasehold land, and Trust Land (Mulwafu, 2002).  Woods (1993) suggests that the 
combination of Johnston’s land allocations in the South plus this region’s more market-
accessible geographic characteristics (i.e. via water) led to the concentration of the 
Malawian plantation sector in the Southern Region.  Designation of the Southern Region 
as plantation-oriented resulted in the remaining two provinces becoming “reservoirs of 
labor for both the southern estates and mines in neighboring territories181” (Woods, 1993, 
p 132).  The original plantation crop was coffee, followed by cotton, and finally FCV 
tobacco182 at the beginning of the twentieth century183 (Woods, 1993).  With striking 
similarity to the reasons given in interviews for the extensive cultivation of tobacco in 
Malawi today (more on which in Chapters 6-8), Wilshaw (1994, p 16) argues that tobacco 
originally gained traction with the settler community in colonial Malawi due to the reliable 
market with minimal fluctuations.   
Settler tobacco in Malawi originally struggled to gain accesss to lucrative export 
markets184 such as the U.K.  South Africa constituted a somewhat less exigent market yet 
access was still hindered by such things as substantial domestic (Boer) production and 
trade laws.  However, exports increased markedly during the Anglo-Boer War (from 4,000 
to 14,000 pounds) (Wilshaw, 1994, p 17).  The opening of Imperial Tobacco Company’s 
(ITC) Malawi factory in 1908 helped divert sales to the U.K. (McCracken, 1983; Wilshaw, 
1994).  For example, Prowse (2011b) points out that whilst 99 per cent of tobacco exports 
were destined for South Africa in 1905, in 1908 94% of tobacco exports were shipped to 
the U.K.   Both the timing and location (Limbe) of the ITC factory coincided with those of 
the Nyasaland Railways, which contributed to an effective export-orientation of the 
developing industry (Wilshaw, 1994).   
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 McCracken (1983) notes migration to farms in the Rhodesias as well. 
182
 At the time of the declaration of the British Protectorate it appears there was already tobacco cultivation 
occurring in Malawi yet of Nicotania Rustica, not of FCV tobacco (Wilshaw, 1994, p 7).   
183
 Although coffee lost importance after the turn of the century (Wilshaw, 1994, p 13), cotton continued to 
be an important crop through much of the colonial era (Ng’ong’ola, 1986) and at the time of fieldwork was 
being promoted by Government as an alternative to smallholder burley tobacco.  Tea was another colonial 
estate crop which is still important today.  Coffee remains one of the few principal exports today, but cannot 
compete with tobacco in terms of importance.     
184
 Wilshaw (1994) argues that this was mainly due to the curing techniques employed in Malawi at the time. 
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The Imperial Tobacco Company implemented a number of policies which were later 
replicated by other tobacco companies (more on which in Chapters 7 and 8).  Wilshaw 
(1994, p 25) writes:   
The Imperial Tobacco Company Ltd (ITC) adopted an aggressive tobacco purchasing 
policy promising to buy any marketable tobacco.  ITC’s aims were to obtain the best 
quality ‘brights’ and to encourage its production.  To help achieve this they launched 
a grower’s assistance programme- the industry’s first- which offered advice either 
on the spot or by correspondence on growing, harvesting, curing and grading 
aspects of production.      
 
Consistent with contract farming schemes mentioned earlier in this work and with themes 
which we will develop in Chapters 6 and 7, many growers were attracted to ITC as a 
marketing outlet due to the company’s offer of spot cash for tobacco (Wilshaw, 1994).  
Wilshaw (1994, p 50) argues that 11 years after the coming of the ITC to Malawi that FCV 
tobacco exports to the U.K. were further enhanced through a customs duty rebate known 
as the “Imperial Preference” which was introduced in part to offset the greater 
transportation costs associated with African (as compared to American) tobacco185.  
In 1912, the colonial government ceased granting freehold tenure in favour of 
leasehold tenure.  In 1918 Governor Sir George Smith ceased even this type of land grant 
in the Shire Highlands, arguing that the land was needed for evicted African tenants 
(Palmer, 1985).   Also in the Southern Province, tobacco led to a rapid depletion of soil 
nutrients.  This, combined with land pressure, compared to more tobacco-suitable (sandy) 
soil and land abundance in the Central Province, led to interest among tobacco settlers in 
this area (Woods, 1993).   
A.F. Barron, an early and important tobacco settler in Malawi, on a trip to the Central 
Province  
saw the fertile land of the Lilongwe plain and strong men loafing around their 
villages, and thought ‘why not persuade them to grow tobacco under my guidance, I 
will tell them how to do this, and will promise to buy it from them when grown and 
                                                          
185
 Wilshaw (1994, p 50) argues that both the Malawian and the Southern Rhodesian FCV tobacco sectors 
benefited from the Imperial Preference. 
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then re-sell it to the Imperial Tobacco Company’ (Widdas, cited in Woods, 1993, pp 
132-33). 
This marketing system186 has many parallels with contract farming schemes (more on 
which in Chapters 6, 7, and 8).  In 1920 Barron and another settler, R.W. Wallace, 
instituted the former’s plan in the Central Province187.  Although he began with FCV, the 
tobacco variety associated with settlers at the time, Barron instituted his tenancy scheme 
for dark fired tobacco (van Donge, 2002a; Wilshaw, 1994; Prowse, 2011b).  Barron wanted 
to turn his marketing system into a concessionary scheme by obtaining  a legal 
monopsony on tobacco purchases in his production areas but this wish was not granted by 
the colonial authorities.  Initially protected naturally by geographic dispersion and a lack of 
competitors, Barron’s protection from competition eroded over time as other settlers 
attempted to achieve his success by emulating his choice of location and marketing 
system, particularly in the 1930’s (Woods, 1993).   
The settler tobacco growers instituted a sharecropping system using what were called 
“visiting tenants”188, which continued after independence (McCracken, 1983, p 173) and 
which Woods (1993) suggests evolved as a way around the monopsony issue.  Woods 
(1993) also argues that this system was indeed beneficial to participating African farmers 
in that they got more land and higher prices for their output.  However, he acknowledges 
that there existed a certain amount of forced labour in this scheme.  McCracken (1983, p 
186) describes the system: 
Most tenants were permanently indebted to the estate owners who supplied them 
with hoes and watering cans on credit, in addition to maize, on the security of the 
next season’s crop, and it was frequently asserted that the estate-owner made a 
good profit on these advances when he purchased his tenants’ tobacco.    
                                                          
186
 There was a precursor to this marketing system in Malawi in that Robert Spenser Hynde, an influential 
tobacco grower at the turn of the century, ran a tenant scheme for the production of FCV tobacco (Wilshaw, 
1994, pp 9-10).  Likewise, the Blantyre and East Africa Company (B&EA) “…supplied seed, offered instruction 
to growers and assisted the better growers with barn accommodation for both flue and fire cured tobacco” 
(Wilshaw, 1994, p 31).   
187
 Legend has it that the land allocations between Barron and Wallace were the result of a coin toss 
between the two men (interviews; Wilshaw, 1994, pp. 44-45).  Barron’s descendants still play a key role in 
the Malawian tobacco industry today, in particular through participation in farmer and government 
organisations, more on which in Chapter 7 (interviews; direct observation).   
188
 There were about 6 500 of these types of workers by the end of the 1930s (McCracken, 1983). 
177 
 
   
Production in Malawi expanded until 25 000 acres were planted in the country in 1927 
(McCracken, 1983).  For example, in Lilongwe and Dowa districts (in the Central Region) 
alone, production of fire cured tobacco increased from 193 tons in 1924 to 1,500 tons in 
1926 (Wilshaw, 1994, p 47).   Simultaneous expansion of cultivation in Southern Rhodesia 
caused an oversupply and consequent price collapse in 1927.  This in turn led to a 
decrease in FCV production in Malawi by the mid 1930’s  (McCracken, 1983).   
 
 
4.2.2 Colonial Tobacco Policies from the 1930’s until Independence  
 
In 1926 the Native Tobacco Board (NTB) was established, along with the requirement 
that tobacco growers and buyers must be registered.  The NTB was to be funded through 
a levy on tobacco buyers, which was in practice passed on to the sellers (producers) 
(McCracken, 1983).    Among other roles the NTB was given a legal monopsony on 
smallholder tobacco purchases (Orr, 2000).  The NTB also took on grower supervision, a 
role that used to belong to the settlers in tenant schemes (Ng’ong’ola, 1986).   
The NTB instituted an obligatory grading system of marketed tobacco189 (van Donge, 
2002a), and began a policy (that would last long after independence) of restricting 
smallholder tobacco production, especially by limiting the physical locations where it 
would buy smallholder tobacco (McCracken, 1983).  Prowse (2011b) emphasises the 
major shift in production from estates to smallholders in the years leading up to and 
immediately after the creation of the NTB by pointing out that whilst in 1917 estates 
produced 96% of Nyasaland’s tobacco, by 1929 this had this had dwindled to merely 37%.  
Likewise the number of tenants continued to increase in subsequent years, especially in 
the Central Region where the number went from 500 in 1927 to more than 7,500 in 1938 
(Prowse, 2011b).   
                                                          
189
 This asymmetrical information is a common theme in the tobacco trade, as seen in Chapter 3.   
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Labour was a major source of anxiety for settlers.  Prowse (2011b) identifies the 
following four labour regimes: estate labour production, estate tenant production, estate 
outgrower production, and peasant/smallholder production.  Some settlers agitated for 
regulation of the peasant sector (mainly dark tobacco) due to fears “that profitable 
peasant production could reduce the reservoir of cheap African labour for the estates190”  
(Ng'ong'ola, 1986, p 248). The labour issue was later one of the main points of debate 
among white settlers when considering joining a federation of neighboring colonies (i.e. 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia) which offered higher wages (Palmer, 1985).  Labour 
migration, which was common in the 1930’s, was another contentious issue and hence 
...white tobacco growers in the Central Province complained bitterly about the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association being allowed to open depots in Dedza 
and Lilongwe (Palmer, 1985, p 233).   
 
However, these frustrations were voiced more forcefully in the South and eventually 
resulted in the cessation of labour recruitment for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa 
(Palmer, 1985).  
Peasant economic crops were subject to a complicated web of rules and regulations, 
supposedly to increase production and quality, however  
...special and different considerations influenced the regulation of the estate crops.  
For most of the colonial period, the political clout wielded by the settlers and their 
representatives in constitutional forums kept to a minimum statutory interference in 
the production and marketing of the estate crops (Ng'ong'ola, 1986, p 242). 
 
Ng’ong’ola (1986, p 257) argues that  
...state intervention in the marketing of peasant produced commodities was 
originally justified by the paternalistic assumption that the peasants could not 
comprehend world commodity price fluctuations and were gullible to exploitation 
by unscrupulous middlemen.  
                                                          
190
 Estate owners attempting to influence smallholder production due to labour concerns appears to be a 
common theme.  As Prowse (2011b, p 7) notes: “…estate owners have always attempted to foster or 
constrain smallholder production dependent on the complementarities or competition with estate 
production.” 
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However, other authors have pointed out that the discriminatory policies towards the 
peasant sector were not motivated strictly by paternalism.  For example, conservation 
practices (which can be burdensome in the short term) were much more rigorously 
enforced in the peasant sector than on estates (Mulwafu, 2002).  As seen above, some 
government policies (such as migration restriction) were motivated by a desire to respond 
to the demands of the White settlers.    Also, Woods (1993) argues that the colonial 
government was hesitant in allowing the development of an African bourgeoisie.    
There are different views on the influence of settler interests on colonial policy.  Whilst 
a number of authors have written about the enormous influence of the settlers on 
colonial agricultural policy, Palmer (1985) emphasizes the disunity of the settlers, whose 
policy objectives often differed as a function of their farm size, primary crop, etc.191.  
Palmer also argues that the colonial administration, for most of the inter-war period, was 
of the view that Nyasaland was not suitable for small White farmers.  Kydd and 
Christiansen (1982) take the more nuanced view that the colonial administration 
commenced with a policy-bias towards the estates but later shifted to promote the 
peasant sector. 
High levels of production, low demand, and prices at an all-time low in 1937 led to 
reforms of the NTB.  An auction system was instituted192 in the same year and in 1938 the 
NTB began to provide transportation services for independent peasant growers from farm 
to auction.  The previous source of financing (levy) was replaced with a “working margin”, 
i.e. the spread between auction and farm-gate prices.  By 1939 this spread accounted for 
53% of auction prices which caused widespread malcontent among peasant growers.  This 
led to another restructuring, and in 1942 Trust Land (African) tobacco production was to 
be overseen by the Department of Agriculture rather than the NTB (McCracken, 1983). 
                                                          
191
 There is ample scope for investigating the differentiation (as per our discussion in Chapter 1) of the 
settler tobacco farmers as well as the influence of this differentiation on colonial tobacco policy.  However, 
that investigation lies beyond the scope of this chapter, the main purpose of which is to provide a brief 
historical account of the formation of the smallholder burley sector. 
192
 At this time Tobacco Auctions Limited and Producers Warehouse Limited were running auctions in Limbe.  
They would go on to merge in 1962 and become Auction Holdings Nyasaland Limited, the colonial precursor 
to today’s Auction Holdings Limited  (Auction Holdings Limited- AHL, Our History, 
http://www.ahlmw.com/history.php). 
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During this (inter-war) time period, the peasant production of tobacco - either through 
sharecropping or independent cultivation - increased massively (see Table 4.1).  At the 
same time, (direct) estate production of FCV tobacco declined (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3) 
(Palmer, 1985; McCracken, 1983).  Palmer (1985) suggests that this process occurred as a 
result of a host of unfavourable (agronomical and economic) conditions for White farmers 
and the rise of the sharecropping schemes.  Palmer (1985) suggests that African farmers 
were more successful with crop rotation than White farmers.  Also, many hectares of land 
were abandoned in the 1930’s in the Central Province by failing White tobacco farmers, 
only to be returned to tobacco cultivation in the 1970’s (Palmer, 1985). 
     
Table 4.1: Changes in Tobacco Production Schemes (in pounds), 1926-1938 
 
Year Tenant Production on 
Estates 
Native Trust Land 
Production 
1926 330 000 4 000 000 
1938 6 000 000 10 000 000 
   Source: created by author from Palmer (1985, p 238) 
 
Table 4.2: The Collapse of FCV Tobacco in Malawi, 1928-1935 
 
Year Number of 
European Planters 
Quantity of Exports 
(pounds) 
Value of Exports 
(GBP) 
1928 229 5 419 595 232 579 
1935 82 1 020 107 29 982 
    Source: created by author from McCracken (1983, p 174) 
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Table 4.3: Percentage of Total Nyasaland Tobacco Produced by White Farmers, 1915-
1937 
 
Year Percentage 
1915 94 
1920 89 
1921 94 
1922 94 
1923 85 
1924 86 
1925 67 
1926 59 
1927 57 
1928 63 
1929 37 
1930 41 
1931 35 
1932 32 
1933 28 
1934 26 
1935 19 
1936 16 
1937 16 
Source: modified from Palmer (1985, p 236) 
 
During World War II, the Malawian tobacco industry benefited from the decreased 
supply of American tobacco which in turn led to increased demand from the U.K. for 
Malawian tobacco.  This increased prices of all types of Malawian tobacco and the NTB 
adopted a policy of encouraging expansion of production.  Quality decreased, however, as 
a consequence of this expansion (McCracken, 1983).   
There was slight deregulation during this time, in the context of rising tobacco prices, 
with the Tobacco Ordinance of 1946.  Partially due to concerns over quality and partially 
due to concerns over sufficient food production, in 1948 Geoffrey Colby, Malawi’s new 
governor, adopted a policy of lower prices for smallholder tobacco growers (McCracken, 
1983). However, it has been argued that this was merely a facade and that the real reason 
behind the policy reversal was the recognition that a relaxation of NTB monopoly power 
could seriously reduce government revenues (Ng’ong’ola, 1986).     
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In the second half of the 1940’s and early 1950s, estates focused more on burley and 
FCV (McCracken, 1983).  This was reinforced by Tobacco Ordinance No. 39 (of 1952) which 
mandated that burley and FCV be produced solely by estates (Orr, 2000).  By the mid-
1950’s the tobacco sector was once again successful to the point where McCracken (1983, 
p 172), claims that the Central Province was “...one of the most prosperous agricultural 
districts in Central Africa...”  
The Central African Federation of 1953 joined Nyasaland with Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia (today Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe respectively) (Palmer, 1985).  The 
political ramifications of this colonial policy were profound.  Indeed, when Kamuzu Banda 
returned to Malawi, one of the main themes of his independence campaign was to break 
the federation193  (Lwanda, 2009).  However for our purposes it is worth noting that 
European tobacco farmers appeared to endorse the policy of federation in the belief that 
it would lead to improved government-supported research on tobacco (Wilshaw, 1994).  
The policy appears to have borne some results, but it certainly did not offer a major boost 
to the FCV tobacco sector: 
Nothing was more static in the Federation years than flue cured tobacco production.  
In most years it remained below 3 million lbs. with the 1958 crop of 2.1 million being 
the lowest.  Seldom, if ever, did it meet trade estimates or expectations.  In 1959 the 
flue cured crop of 2.2 fell 5 million short of the 7.3 million lbs. requirement.  Despite 
this consistent shortfall there was a general improvement in the quality of the flue-
cured crop produced.  This was an important factor and one that relates directly to 
the significant developments in tobacco research that took place during the 
Federation period (Wilshaw, 1994, p 95).     
 
In 1955 the government merged the NTB with its cotton and produce counterparts to 
form the Agricultural Production and Marketing Board (APMB), in a drive for greater 
bureaucratic efficiency (Ng’ong’ola, 1986).  In the context of increasing politicization of an 
African merchant class engaged in tobacco trading and intermediary functions, the APMB 
continued its policy of maintaining low producer prices.  The Farmers Marketing 
Ordinance of 1962 renamed the APMB the Farmers Marketing Board (FMB) and instituted  
                                                          
193
 Banda eventually succeeded in 1963 (Lwanda, 2009, p 4).  
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...an expansion of the powers and duties of the Board to cover the appointment of 
buying agents, the establishment and management of seed farms, and the provision 
and distribution of inputs like fertilizer at subsidized costs (Ng’ong’ola, 1986, p 254).  
  
The following year the institution took on a financial capacity in providing loans 
(Ng’ong’ola, 1986).    
 
 
4.3  The Rule of His Excellency Life President H.K. Banda 
 
When Malawi achieved independence in 1964194, agriculture dominated its economy, 
accounting for 55% of GDP and 90% of labour.  The government, under the leadership of 
H.K. Banda of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), initially supported smallholder tobacco 
production (Prowse, 2011b), but eventually adopted an estate-centred export-oriented 
economic policy.  The government attempted to keep wages low and the Kwacha 
(Malawi’s currency) weak to maintain competitiveness (Harrigan, 2001, pp 12-15).  The 
results of this policy tended to be good in terms of strong growth rates, increased savings 
and investment, increased government revenues and moderate budget deficiits from 
independence to the late 1970’s (Harrigan, 2001, pp 18-24).  The 1966 United Nations 
sanctions on Rhodesia195 also gave Malawi’s estate tobacco sub-sector an extra boost (Orr, 
2000).  The steady rise in burley tobacco from the late 1960’s can be seen in Figure 4.1 
below.   
 
 
                                                          
194
 Malawi became a “self-governing entity” in 1961 whereby the head of state was a representative of the 
British Government (specifically, Governor Glyn Jones).  H.K. Banda officially became Prime Minister in 1963 
(Lwanda, 2009).   
195
 These sanctions were in response to the White minority government’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) in 1965.  The UN sanctions were expanded in 1968 (Wilshaw, 1994, p 108). 
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Figure 4.1: Volume (kg) of Tobacco Sales in Banda Era 
 
 
Source: created by author from TCC (Annual Sales Data, http://www.tccmw.com/index.htm) 
 
In 1968 dark fired tobacco was designated as a smallholder-only crop, to the detriment 
of estate-run sharecropping schemes for this tobacco variety (van Donge, 2002a).  In 1971 
the Farmers Marketing (Amendment) Act renamed the FMB the Agricultural Development 
and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC).  The legislation also included a number of 
structural changes ranging from the Board’s governance to its objectives.  Whilst the 
newly created ADMARC focused on increasing quantity and quality of peasant crops (as 
did some of the colonial-era marketing legislation), the price stabilization objective of the 
colonial government was replaced with a focus on profit and economic development 
(Ng’ong’ola, 1986).   This can be seen in an excerpt from one of President Banda’s 
speeches in parliament (cited in Ng’ong’ola, 1986, p 257): 
...Today paternalism is...out of date, out of place...The purpose of the Board must no 
longer be confined to or even concerned with...the narrow limits of stabilizing prices 
of farm produce,...but must be widened to include actual development...of 
agricultural resources in the country...Not only that, but even more, those 
concerned with “management” must be taught to think in terms of active managers 
of development and of a business concern which must develop our agricultural 
resources and make a profit at the same time.     
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In 1972 an amendment to the Special Crops Act made engagement in production or 
marketing of “special crops” (e.g. burley tobacco) contingent on ministerial (presumably 
Agriculture) permission (Ng’ong’ola, 1986)196.   
Kydd and Christiansen (1982) argue that the post-colonial period (up until time of 
writing) was characterized by a strong policy bias in favour of estate agriculture to the 
detriment of peasant agriculture.  However, the authors note that this policy bias was not 
without some results: “Between the periods 1965-1969 and 1975-79 average production 
levels of the major tobacco variety, flue-cured, increased by 886%” (p 362).  See Figure 4.1 
for the trends in tobacco production by type.   
During the 1970’s tobacco (estate) cultivation became popular with the political elite 
(Prowse, 2009), or as Lwanda (2006, p 530) put it: “...relatively few, mostly senior civil 
servants, police and army officers and high-ranking MCP officials...”  In the most extreme 
example of this, a number of tobacco estates were run on expropriated White settler 
farms taken over by Press Holdings Ltd.197, which was owned by President Banda.  Press 
also owned 42% of Universal Corporation’s198 Malawian subsidiary (Limbe Leaf, more on 
which below) (van Donge, 2002b).   
 
Kydd and Christiansen (1982, p 374) stress further intra-sectoral bias in that:  
...in the face of a deteriorating balance of payments the government has resorted to 
rationing credit by sector to control money supply growth.  In the implementation of 
this policy agriculture has received very favourable treatment and the commercial 
banks have been encouraged to continue to support clearly non-viable tobacco 
companies. 
                                                          
196
 Similar laws restricting smallholder production include the 1952 Tobacco Ordinance (mentioned above) 
and the 1962 Africans on Private Estates Ordinance (Prowse, 2011b). 
197
 Press was an enormous corporation whose tentacles reached various parts of the Malawian economy, 
ranging from agriculture to commercial banking.  The IFI’s treated it as a parastatal and one author (van 
Donge, 2002b) likened it to the South Korean chaebol.  In 1977, the gross turnover of Press and its 
subsidiaries constituted one third of Malawian GDP (Lwanda, 2009, p 202).   
198
 Universal Corporation is one of the world’s leading leaf merchants, (see Chapter 3).  The company’s 
Malawian subsidiary was incorporated in Malawi in 1962 (Wilshaw, 1994, p 114).  The political significance 
of this 42% ownership will be elaborated upon further in Chapter 7. 
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As during the colonial era, access to cheap labour was a source of anxiety for estate 
farmers.  Burley estate production tended to use the tenant (sharecropping) system 
inherited from colonial times whilst FCV cultivation tended to rely on hired labour (Prowse, 
2009).  Restrictions on migration enhanced the labour supply for estates (Palmer, 1985).  
Similar to colonial policies, Kydd and Christiansen (1982) argue that ADMARC’s pricing 
policies were used in part to decrease the profitability of peasant agriculture which in turn 
increased the relative attractivess of wage-labour on estates (see Table 4.4). 
Kydd and Christiansen (1982) argue that in addition to labour, estate agriculture 
depended on adequate supplies of land, managerial and technical skills, and finance.  
Whilst the government had extensive control over land allocation199, and the sector was 
able to draw on the experience of expatriate managers, the government used ADMARC in 
part to meet the estate sector’s financial needs, both directly and indirectly.  For example, 
in 1978, 50.9% of ADMARC’s investments and loans went to the estate tobacco sub-sector 
(p 368).  ADMARC also provided finance for estates indirectly through its ownership 
interests in the country’s small commercial banking sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
199
 In addition to land allocation powers, the government kept the cost of leased land low, making the policy 
an implicit subsidy of estate production (Tobin and Knausenberger, 1998).   
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Table 4.4: ADMARC Pricing Policies for (dark) Peasant Tobacco 
 
Year 5-year moving 
average of price 
received by peasant 
growers 
(kwacha/lb.) 
5-year moving 
average of price 
received by 
ADMARC at auction 
in Malawi 
(kwacha/lb.) 
Grower Percentage 
of ADMARC Price* 
1953 0.062 0.126 49.21 
1954 0.067 0.135 49.63 
1955 0.076 0.138 55.07 
1956 0.081 0.141 57.45 
1957 0.081 0.135 60.00 
1958 0.077 0.129 59.69 
1959 0.076 0.133 57.14 
1960 0.078 0.135 57.78 
1961 0.075 0.139 53.96 
1962 0.078 0.155 50.32 
1963 0.086 0.161 53.42 
1964 0.090 0.161 55.90 
1965 0.089 0.152 58.55 
1966 0.084 0.153 54.90 
1967 0.082 0.172 47.67 
1968 0.081 0.192 42.19 
1969 0.088 0.234 37.61 
1970 0.089 0.268 33.21 
1971 0.096 0.290 33.10 
1972 0.101 0.325 31.08 
1973 0.106 0.405 26.17 
1974 0.114 0.491 23.22 
1975 0.130 0.610 21.31 
1976 0.156 0.653 23.89 
1977 0.187 0.661 28.29 
1978 0.194 0.637 30.46 
1979 0.208** 0.500** 41.60 
       *Author’s calculations 
       **3-year moving average 
       Source:  modified from Kydd and Christiansen (1982, p 369); author’s calculations 
 
Throughout the Banda era, increasing prices (see Figure 4.2) helped encourage 
production.  In 1979 Auction Holdings Limited (AHL) opened a new auction floor in 
Lilongwe to respond to increasing production (AHL, Our History, 
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http://www.ahlmw.com/history.php)200.   However, this period was not without problems.  
The Malawian economy went into crisis in the late 1970’s, sparked by a downturn in the 
terms of trade.  Export prices for key commodities such as tea and tobacco decreased and 
prices of essential imports such as fuel increased.  The detrimental economic impact of 
this terms of trade shock was aggravated in following years by drought, transport route 
disruption, and high international interest rates.  The resulting deterioration in economic 
indicators led to discussions with the International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) (Harrigan, 
2001, pp. 40-45).  The talks led to three structural adjustment loans (SAL I-III) from the 
World Bank in the 1980’s, which, true to the predominant Washington Consensus of the 
time, aimed to remove price distortions from the economy and reduce the role of the 
state.  Within these objectives:  
Key reforms focused on increasing the production of smallholder exportable cash 
crops, namely tobacco201, groundnuts and cotton, by increasing the producer prices 
offered by ADMARC.  At the same time maize prices were held down to reduce the 
relative price of food crops so as to encourage more export crop production 
(Harrigan, 2003, p 849). 
 
The focus of these loans reflected the divergent priorities of the World Bank and 
the Government of Malawi as the former was foccussed on generating cash and the latter 
with food202.  However, the pricist approach was weak in that whilst price-elasticity of 
supply was high at household levels, it was low at aggregate (agricultural sector) levels 
due to non-price structural constraints on production (Harrigan, 2001; Peters, 1996).   
The 1980’s also witnessed the begining of the shift in estate cultivation from FCV 
to burley203 (Harrigan, 2001) (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.5).  Much of the increase occuring 
                                                          
200
 This move was in line with Banda’s plan to develop the Central Region by moving the capital to Lilongwe 
from the previous capital Zomba, which was located in the Southern Region (Lwanda, 2009; Wilshaw, 1994, 
p 113).   
201
 Although smallholders could not legally produce burley and FCV, they did produce oriental and Western 
Malawi tobacco types (Orr, 2000).   
202
 The Government’s tactic of limiting smallholder cash crop cultivation in the interest of food security is not 
dissimilar to colonial government policies seen above.   
203
 Prowse (2011b) points out that the shift in estate production in the Central Region from fire-cured to 
burley began in the 1950s.   Likewise, the production of oriental tobacco began in earnest in the 1950’s 
(Wilshaw, 1994, p 100).  
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in this decade (see Figure 4.1) was from new small estates formed on previously 
customary land (Jaffee, 2003, p 2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Average Price of Sold Tobacco in Malawi (tambala/kg), by Type 
 
 
Source: created by author from TCC (Annual Sales Data, http://www.tccmw.com/index.htm) 
Note: FCV and MW are not 0 but just missing data for years when not positive 
Note: Malawi Western average price was calculated by author (amalgamating data for SDF, NDDF, 
and SUN/AIR tobacco types). 
    
Table 4.5: Increase in Number of Registered Burley Growers, 1980's 
 
Year Growers 
1983 3,858 
1990 8,707 
Source: created by author from van Donge (2002a, p 102) 
 
Until 1989 all tobacco producers had to be licensed through the Tobacco Control 
Commission (TCC) (FAO, 2003b, p 64).  In 1990, a new loan from the World Bank, the 
Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (ASAC, 1990-93) called for a small allocation of FCV 
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and burley production quotas to smallholders (Orr, 2000).  This reflected the Bank’s view 
that food security could (and should) be achieved through entitlements, both at 
household and national levels (Orr, 2000; Harrigan, 2001).  The argument that smallholder 
cash from tobacco cultivation could be used to purchase maize also helped achieve the 
Bank’s objective of eliminating fertilizer subsidies (Orr, 2000).  The Government created 
the Malawi Rural Finance Company in 1993/94, which provided credit for many of the new 
smallholder tobacco growers (Jaffee, 2003, p 16).  
Towards the end of the Banda-era, van Donge (2002a, p 103) describes:  
Looser controls meant that estates could move into trading, marketing tobacco 
grown by smallholders in their vicinity.  They could also pay very low prices, as there 
were no other marketing outlets.  Indirect access to the auction floors was therefore 
already significantly opening up before the onset of liberalisation.  Liberalisation was 
thus, in large part, legalisation of an existing situation. 
 
 
4.4  Democratisation and Liberalisation 
 
In June, 1993, there was a referendum (which passed) on the introduction of multi-
party democracy (Lwanda, 2006).  In May, 1994, Bakili Muluzi204 of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) won the first multi-party presidential election in the country’s history and a 
new constitution was introduced the following year (Harrigan, 2001, p 290).  One of 
Muluzi’s first policies was free primary education (Harrigan, 2001, p 292-93) and part of 
the UDF political campaign focussed on land reform (Harrigan, 2001, p 307).  And in 
striking contrast to Banda and the MCP, Muluzi held poverty alleviation as a top policy 
                                                          
204
 Like many of the other prominent politicians at the time, Muluzi had a history with the former ruling 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP).  In fact, he became secretary general of this party in 1979 (Lwanda, 2006) 
until his resignation in 1982.  It later emerged that Banda had forced him to resign “because he had allegedly 
been implicated in the illegal handling of tobacco from Banda’s farms and in the misappropriation of party 
cheques” (Lwanda, 2009, p 456). 
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priority (Harrigan, 2003, p 852), which was used as justification in some of the 
liberalisation efforts205. 
 
 
4.4.1 The Economics of Liberalisation 
 
The UDF’s general approach to economic policy was market-oriented, and included 
initiatives in privatisation and trade liberalisation (Harrigan, 2001)206.  The government 
also took a more liberal approach to managing the exchange rate.  In 1994 the 
government let the Kwacha float, which in turn led to devaluation.  After this the Reserve 
Bank intervened occasionally (notably to devalue the currency in 1998) but attempted to 
let the currency float (Harrigan, 2001, pp. 327-328).  However, as Jaffee (2003) points out, 
there is not necessarily a clear link between a cheap currency and tobacco exports due to 
the import-intensive nature of tobacco production (notably for fertilizer)207.  Burley-
liberalisation (in the Malawian context meaning allowing smallholders to grow burley) was 
implicitly endorsing one of Kydd and Christiansen’s (1982, p 372) policy conclusions: “We 
believe that a broad based and effective development strategy for Malawi must be based 
on prosperous and productive peasant agriculture.” 
Harrigan (2003, p 854) points out that: “The Bank saw burley, the most profitable crop, 
as the driving force in agriculture, with all farmers who could being encouraged to 
cultivate it.”  As in the 1980’s the World Bank argued that the food problem be resolved 
through cash crop revenues.  This is seen in the Bank’s Financial Restructuring and 
                                                          
205
 However, van Donge (1995) describes how political parties came to represent geographic regions (rather 
than ideologies), with the two major parties - MCP and UDF - representing the Central and Southern Regions, 
respectively.   
206
 UDF policy has been interpreted by some to signify a neglect of agriculture.  For example, Lwanda (2009, 
p 528) writes:  
The first violent casualty of Banda’s retirement was the Malawi economy itself.  The UDF 
ruling comprador class had little interest in agriculture, manufacturing or other creative 
industries.  Their interests lay in marketing and retail.  Agricultural estates became run-
down and Malawi suffered from the aggressive South African export drive. 
207
 Exchange rate policy was a topic of great controversy in policy and donor circles during the time of 
fieldwork, more on which in Chapter 7.   
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Decentralization Programme, which completed the liberalisation process of burley 
production and marketing (Harrigan, 2003, p 854)208.  There was a big initial response to 
liberalisation.  By 1996, as many as 200 000 smallholders became tobacco farmers (Jaffee, 
2003, p 2) and five years later smallholder tobacco accounted for 70% of total production 
(Jaffee, 2003, p 15).      
In response to delivery quotas and immediate needs for cash, an independent buyer 
(IB) system was introduced in 1994 (Jaffee, 2003, pp. 42-44).  The IB scheme also grew out 
of the removal of ADMARC’s (legal) monopsony of smallholder tobacco (Harrigan, 2003).  
IB’s offered lower prices than could be obtained at auction but payment was immediate.  
The IB’s fulfilled similar roles as estates in the tenancy system (Jaffee, 2003).  Many of the 
IBs were indeed estate owners themselves, although to the surprise of the government 
many with no tobacco industry experience also joined the profession.  The number of IBs 
peaked in 1997 at more than 4000 but rarely accounted for more than 10 % of tobacco 
sold at the auctions (Jaffee, 2003, pp. 42-44).  Van Donge (2002a, p 104) describes the 
system in comparison to the tenancy schemes:       
Sharecropping had, in some cases, changed its form: smallholders grew tobacco on 
their own land, but the person with access to the auction floors would advance 
inputs, even money to buy food, on condition that they could buy the tobacco. 
 
This description has similarities with some aspects of contract farming209. 
Jaffee (2003) points out that IBs were accused of harming the industry in a number 
of ways such as increasing credit default, encouraging tobacco theft, and decreasing 
quality, among others, but argues that IB’s are not guilty of all acusations.  According to 
classification data from the Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA), Jaffee (2003) points 
out that years of active IB involvement were not associated with a generally lower quality 
crop.  In a similar vein the author points out that these years were not associated with a 
                                                          
208
 In the 1960’s the Banda government considered and then aborted plans to allow smallholder production 
of burley (Prowse, 2011b). 
209
 In later chapters we will discuss the desire of tobacco companies to implement contract farming (Chapter 
6), the response of government and farmers’ organizations (Chapter 7), and some of the impacts of these 
responses on both the Malawian and the regional tobacco industries (Chapter 8). 
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large number of MRFC credit defaults.  Jaffee (2003) does concede that the IB system 
probably was associated with increased tobacco theft.  Jaffee (2003, p 44) describes 
changes in the IB sector:   
By 2000, the IB function was beginning to evolve with a sub-set of IB operators 
providing inputs on credit and selected other services to growers.  That evolution 
ceased with the official announcement that the IB system would end. 
 
However, by 2001, the system was (officially) phased out (Jaffee, 2003, pp. 42-44) (see 
Table 4.6). 
 
Table 4.6: Prevalence of Independent Buyers (excluding ADMARC) of Burley Tobacco, 
1994-2001 
 
Year Number of licensed 
buyers 
Quantity sold (tons) Share of national 
crop (%) 
1994 79 398 0.6 
1995 1074 4854 4.8 
1996 3106 3834 3.3 
1997 4012 19287 14.4 
1998 3239 13889 12.2 
1999 1402 3089 2.8 
2000 671 3547 2.5 
2001 148 542 0.5 
    Source: modified from Jaffee (2003, p 45) 
   
Burley clubs were another new phenomenon associated with liberalisation and 
promoted by both the government and USAID 210  (Jaffee, 2003).  These “clubs” 
                                                          
210
 In particular, the Smallholder Agribusiness Development Project, which Jaffee (2003, p 41) credits with 
having  
…made some considerable headway in bringing a commercial orientation to farmer clubs 
and in incrementally improving their management and record keeping.  The functions 
handled by these clubs have been extended to include collective input procurement, 
collective transport of tobacco, and, in some cases, collective marketing of other crops.  A 
stronger understanding about the value and underlying costs of borrowed finance has 
been developed among many such club members. 
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represented burley smallholders who banded together to get credit, organize 
transportation, receive tobacco payments, and other services211 (see Table 4.7).  Clubs 
often consisted of between 12 and 20 individual farmers (Prowse and Moyer-Lee, 
forthcoming).  In the case of the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi 
(NASFAM)212, clubs were then grouped into Group Action Committees, consisting of 
roughly 5 clubs, which would help facilitate transportation arrangements (Koester et al., 
2004).           
 
Table 4.7: Volume of Burley Tobacco Marketed through Burley Clubs, 
Liberalisation-era 
 
Year Volume Sold (millions kgs) 
1994 3.8 
1995 4.7 
1996 12.8 
1997 16.8 
1998 19.2 
1999 27.4 
            Source: modified from van Donge (2002a, p 110) 
 
The post-liberalisation period saw a decline of the estate sub-sector in both relative 
and absolute terms due to low productivity, underutilized land and low returns to capital 
(Harrigan, 2003) (see Table 4.8).  The decline of the estate sub-sector was exacerbated by 
the fact that (former) tobacco tenants, upon which much of this sub-sector depended, 
took advantage of the removal of production restrictions in order to engage in direct 
production of burley tobacco themselves (Jaffee, 2003).  Jaffee (2003) also attributes part 
of the decline of this sub-sector to the independent buyer (IB) system, which was accused 
of encouraging theft of tobacco estates by tenants and managers.   Therefore, 
                                                          
211
 By 2001 there were already 23,363 registered burley clubs, however not all of these registrations were 
genuine smallholder clubs, as some times club registration was used by other actors as a way of avoiding 
certain fees associated with the sale of their tobacco (Jaffee, 2003).    
212
 However, by mid-2004, only 16% of registered clubs were part of NASFAM (Koester et al., 2004).  We will 
discuss NASFAM further in Chapter 7.     
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concomitant with the decline of the estate sub-sector was a shift in the labour regime of 
this sub-sector from one of tenancy to direct labour (Jaffee, 2003).     
In addition to private estates, another casualty of the liberalisation programme 
was Banda’s Press Holdings, which was taken over by the Muluzi government in 1997.  
Press Agriculture (the subsidiary of Press Corporation213 which was involved in burley 
tobacco production) dramatically decreased its production volumes following 
liberalisation.  It has been suggested that the tobacco theft by tenants associated with 
burley liberalisation was the culprit (van Donge, 2002b).  But Press still benefited from 
tobacco since “A quarter of all the profits of Press in 1995-98 came from its minority 
interest (31.9 per cent) in Limbe Leaf Corporation214” (van Donge, 2002b, p 666).  In 
addition, Press continued to engage in direct production of FCV tobacco (van Donge, 
2002b). 
 
Table 4.8: The Decline of the Tobacco Estate Sub-Sector in the 1990's 
 
Year Quantity 
Produced (tons) 
by Estates 
1990 95,400 
1998 40,300 
Source: created by author from Harrigan (2003, p 859) 
 
At the same time as the decline in estate production described above, there was an 
increase in smallholder burley production (see Table 4.9).  The Bank’s ASAC therefore 
appears to have achieved major structural adjustment.  As Harrigan (2001, p 297) notes:  
                                                          
213
 Press Holdings Ltd. went through a number of changes and restructuring starting in the 1980’s.  A 
detailed explanation of these changes is not necessary for our purposes.  Suffice it to say that one of these 
changes resulted in the formation of Press Corporation and Press Trust out of Press Holdings Ltd., hence our 
reference to Press Corporation in the text (van Donge, 2002b).   
214
 This is Universal Corporation’s Malawian subsidiary.  Apparently the stake had been reduced from the 42% 
originally held.  However, according to Appendix 3 of van Donge (2002b), the share was back to 42% in the 
year 2000.  Interviews reveal that the stake was 42% at the time of fieldwork as well, more on which in 
Chapter 7.   
196 
 
The smallholder-led growth in the second half of the 1990’s represented a major 
shift in the structure of the Malawian economy, which in previous decades had been 
dominated by estate growth. 
 
Table 4.9: The Rise of Smallholder Burley Production in Malawi, Liberalisation-era 
 
Year Smallholder 
Percentage 
1994 16 
1995 24 
1996 39 
1997 54 
1998 64 
1999 68 
2000 66 
2001 70 
Source: modified from Jaffee (2003, p 15) 
 
The trends described above (declining estate sub-sector and increasing smallholder 
sub-sector) mirror trends in the colonial period from the 1930s on.  When looking at 
production trends in the 1990’s in terms of type of tobacco, there are also some 
similarities with the colonial (inter-war) period, e.g. declining FCV (see Figure 4.3).  
Although it is important to note that as burley has become a viable crop for many 
smallholders since liberalisation, the traditional types of smallholder tobacco (Malawi 
Western) have decreased.  This of course was not the case in the colonial period. 
Cross-border trade, or “smuggling” of tobacco (as it is illegal), was another common 
feature of the smallholder burley sector post-liberalisation.  Indeed, Jaffee (2003, p 24) 
estimates the smuggled tobacco to account for between five and ten per cent of total 
tobacco production in Malawi in the year 2001.  In the early 2000s, the reasons for 
smuggling include the transaction costs associated with the Malawi auction system, the 
potential for avoiding re-payment of loans (which were deducted at the auction), and the 
shorter delay in obtaining payment.  Ironically, the growers were often selling to the same 
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buyers, yet in buying stations across the borders in Mozambique and Zambia215 (Prowse 
and Moyer-Lee, forthcoming).   
 
Figure 4.3: Tobacco Sold (kg) in Malawi by Type, Liberalisation-era 
 
 
Source: created by author from TCC (Annual Sales Data, http://www.tccmw.com/index.htm) 
Note: Malawi Western data was calculated by author (amalgamating data for SDF, NDDF, and   
SUN/AIR tobacco types. 
 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2003b, p 66) notes that: 
…although more inputs- including land, labour, fertilizer and others – were used in 
tobacco production in 2000, and more tobacco leaf was produced, the revenue was 
much less than in 1996, when about 25 percent less land was used for tobacco. 
 
The FAO (2003b) argues that an excessive production increase occurred to the detriment 
of quality and productivity.  This is consistent with Jaffee’s (2003, p 18) interviews with 
people in the industry which revealed the view that quality had decreased since 
                                                          
215
 By the 2009/10 season the Malawi, Auction Holdings had set up a number of smaller district markets, 
designed to and largely perceived to be effective in, mitigating against tobacco smuggling (Prowse and 
Moyer-Lee, forthcoming). 
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liberalisation.  Jaffee (2003, pp. 18-19) offers a series of possible explanations including 
more production by smallholders with fewer resources, environmental constraints, 
logistical constraints, and an insufficient price premium on higher quality tobacco.  Some 
of these same constraints can account for the decreasing yields in this period (see Figure 
4.4 and Table 4.10 for price and yield declines respectively216. 
 
Figure 4.4: Tobacco Prices (US$/kg) in Malawi by Type, Liberalisation-era 
 
 
Source: created by author from TCC (Annual Sales Data, http://www.tccmw.com/index.htm) 
Note: Malawi Western average price was calculated by author (amalgamating data for SDF, NDDF, 
and SUN/AIR tobacco types. 
 
 
 
                                                          
216
 Whilst we point to a number of Malawi-specific factors which contributed to the price decline, and 
bearing in mind the major caveat that we do not have access to comparative price data, it is important not 
to lose sight of the international picture.  More specifically, these changes in Malawi occurred in a context of 
increasing concentration and hence buying power of ICCs, as well as increasing fragmentation of tobacco 
leaf production as well as a shift in the latter to developing countries (see Chapter 3).   
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Table 4.10: Yield Declines During the Liberalisation-era (kgs/ha) 
 
Year Burley FCV 
1990 1150 1760 
2001 922 973 
Source: Jaffee (2003, p 20) 
 
 
4.4.2 Liberalisation, Household Poverty, and Profitability  
 
The World Bank (1995, p 4, cited in Tobin and Knausenberger, 1998, p 408) argued 
that 
permission to grow burley tobacco is perhaps one of the most powerful, and 
feasible, tools available to [the Government of Malawi] to redistribute wealth and 
reduce poverty within a reasonable period of time.  
 
 The World Bank and USAID pushed for production quotas to mainly target 
households with less than one hectare, in order to enhance the poverty-reducing impact 
of the programme (Prowse, 2009).   As can be seen in Table 4.11, the general findings 
from a number of studies, is that whilst liberalisation of burley tobacco has benefited 
some, it did not benefit the poorest households.  This is often due to the uneven adoption 
of the crop, which is attributable to a number of factors.  For example, burley adoption in 
Malawi may be limited for those who lack tobacco experience as estate workers (Orr, 
2000).  Tobacco cultivation in Malawi is also more associated with male-headed 
households and higher expenditure/income groups (seen in our tabulation of studies and 
in Table 4.12 below). 
Access to labour appears to be a serious entry barrier for many households wishing 
to engage in burley tobacco production.  For example, from the tabulation of studies in 
Table 4.11, Orr (2000, p 355, referring to a national survey) points out that “Of the 572 
households in the sample which provided reasons for non-adoption of burley, 173 cited 
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labor as the primary adoption constraint.”  An example of the extent of the dependence 
on hired labour can be seen in Takane’s (2005) study (see Table 4.13).  Takane (2005, p 
108) suggests that 
The labor-intensive nature of tobacco production may explain why most female-
headed households (which usually have fewer laborers available than male-headed 
households) did not cultivate tobacco in the villages studied. 
 
Furthermore, Peters (1996, p 23) points out that not everyone has the luxury of being able 
to work on their own farm: 
A long recognized problem for the poorer rural households is that they are forced to 
look for temporary work in the deficit (rainy) season, usually working on the fields of 
neighbors or local estates, so failing to work as much on their own fields as they 
should. 
 
Fertilizer can be another prohibitively expensive requirement associated with burley 
tobacco.  For example, Takane’s (2006) survey of tobacco-growing households in four 
villages found that hired labour and fertilizer were the most costly inputs, representing 27% 
and 49% of production costs, respectively.  
Land, as Orr (2000) stresses, can be another important constraint.  Growing burley 
tobacco under ideal conditions involves crop rotation, which has certain land implications 
(as seen in Chapter 3).  Also, given a small and finite amount of land, tobacco might not be 
viewed as a priority crop.  For example, Takane (2005) found that with some land-scarce 
households who did not have enough land to plant both maize and tobacco that maize 
was prioritized.  However as Orr et al. (2001) point out, the relative importance of land 
versus fertilizer in determining maize production can depend to a large extent on the level 
of soil fertility.  
The studies in Table 4.11 vary somewhat in terms of how beneficial they view burley-
liberalisation.  For example, Orr and Mwale (2001) find that burley liberalisation led to 
increased trade and services in rural areas.  The authors further note that “Most 
households that now felt better off had also increased their maize production, mostly 
through the provision of fertilizer credit for burley growers” (p 1340).  These authors also 
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argue that burley income was used as a sort of investment in other highly remunerative 
economic activities such as micro-enterprises.  Takane (2006) came to similar conclusions 
regarding re-investment of burley income.      
 
Table 4.11: Selected Findings from Studies on the Relationship between Burley 
Liberalisation and Poverty 
 
Source Study Period Description Findings Caveats/Other 
Peters (1996) 1986/87-
1990/91 
Longitudinal 
study of 200 
households 
(HHs) in Shire 
Highlands, 
Southern 
Region 
Share of income 
from tobacco and 
maize more than 
tripled for richest 
quartile; poorest 
quartile became 
worse off in terms of 
income and food 
security; increased 
demand for labour 
for burley did not 
lead to increased 
wages 
- 
Orr (2000) 1993/94 Based on SDA 
Project survey, 
818 HHs from 
throughout 
the country 
Burley-grower HH’s 
have more land, 
more people,  
“…grow more hybrid 
maize, use more 
fertilizer, and are 
more food-secure” 
(p 347); 
microenterprises in 
burley-growing 
areas are more 
successful 
Author recognizes 
correlation of certain 
attributes with burley-
growing does not 
necessarily mean 
causation; unusual 
crop year in terms of 
credit and drought. 
Orr et al. (2001) 1998/99 Data from 22 
off-farm 
enterprises 
and 15 HHs in 
Blantyre Shire 
Highlands, 
Southern 
Region 
The 2 HHs with 
highest net incomes 
were burley-growers 
- 
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Table 4.11 (continued) 
 
Orr and Mwale 
(2001) 
1990-2000 Sustainable 
livelihoods 
approach 
assessing 
impact of 
structural 
adjustment on 
50 HHs in 
Blantyre Shire 
Highlands, 
Southern 
Region 
Burley-growing HHs 
had the highest 
average incomes; 
90% of burley HHs 
believed themselves 
to be better off at 
end of study period, 
10% saw no change; 
crop income as 
percentage of total 
income for burley-
growing HHs rose 
from 31% to 56% 
According to HHs, 
burley was not their 
most important cash 
crop, ranking behind 
field pea and pigeon 
pea; authors 
recognize that burley-
growing strategy may 
not be possible for 
poor HHs with sub-
optimal access to 
labour 
Takane (2005) August-
October, 
2004 
HH interviews; 
all 31 HHs of 
Kachamba 
village, Central 
Region, 30 HHs 
from Belo 
village in 
Southern 
Region 
In both villages, 
burley-growers had 
average incomes 
more than three 
times greater than 
non-growers 
The author does not 
claim the chosen 
villages to be 
representative on a 
national scale; the 
author points out that 
2004 was a bad 
season for burley 
growers, 
characterized by low 
prices and delayed 
payments; burley 
income is not the 
whole story as burley-
growers also earn 
more from other 
sources, e.g. livestock 
Takane (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
May-
September, 
2005 
Comparison of 
tobacco 
growing and 
non-growing 
HHs in 4 
villages (2 
from North, 1 
from Centre, 1 
from South) 
Tobacco-growing 
HH’s had on average 
more assets and 
significantly higher 
incomes than non-
growing HHs, mainly 
from livestock and 
crop income.  
Tobacco-growing 
HHs also produced 
more maize in all 4 
villages. 
The author does not 
claim the chosen 
villages to be 
representative on a 
national scale; the 
year of study 
experienced 
significant dry spells 
which affected 
production; tobacco-
growing HHs in 2 of 
the 4 villages had (on 
average) negative 
income from tobacco 
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Table 4.11 (continued) 
 
Prowse (2009) 2003/04 Fieldwork 
undertaken for 
doctoral thesis 
at University 
of 
Manchester; 
HH survey and 
focus group 
study in 
Kasungu 
Most of burley 
income is spent on 
food, fertilizer, 
clothing, household 
maintenance, and 
repaying credit but 
author stresses 
prevalence of 
“conspicuous 
consumption” from 
burley income as 
well 
- 
Prowse (2011a, 
personal 
communication) 
2003/04, 
2009/10 
tobacco 
seasons 
HH survey and 
focus group 
study in 
Kasungu 
Tobacco-growing 
HHs increased their 
food security 
through growing 
tobacco.  
Mechanism was 
through food 
purchases from 
enhanced tobacco-
income rather than 
increased food 
production. 
- 
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Table 4.12: Proportion of Agricultural Households who Cultivated Tobacco according to 
Background Characteristics, 2005 
 
Background Characteristics Proportion of agricultural 
households who cultivated 
tobacco 
Proportion of tobacco 
growing households who 
were burley tobacco 
growers 
Malawi 20.2 92.7 
Sex of household head   
Male 23.3 92.9 
Female 10.2 91.0 
Household per capita 
expenditure quintile 
  
1st 11.1 90.6 
2nd 18.8 93.2 
3rd 22.9 93.5 
4th 24.2 92.0 
5th 22.9 90.8 
  Source: modified from National Statistics Office-NSO (2005, p 106) 
 
Table 4.13: Source of Labour in Tobacco Production (Person Days per Hectare) in 
Takane’s (2005) Study 
 
Labour Type Kachamba (Central Region) Belo (Southern Region) 
Family Labour 742 (79%) 337 (41%) 
Hired Labour 202 (21%) 494 (59%) 
Total 944 (100%) 831 (100%) 
   Source: modified from Takane (2005, p 107) 
 
With regards to the proftibaility of those smallholders who were able to engage in 
burley production, it is important to note that measurement is an extremely complex task.  
This is due to the varying levels of input-intensity and hence costs of production, differing 
use and costs of labour, transportation, and the multitude of different quality grades with 
a corresponding multitude of prices.  With this complexity in mind, as well as the caveat of 
data limitations, we can point to some broad indicators and/or trends.  For example, 
despite lowering costs of production, Jaffee (2003) argues that the profitability of 
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smallholder burley tobacco production declined sharply post-liberalisation, a 
phenomenon the author attributes in part to declines in price, quality, and productivity, as 
well as to inefficiencies in the marketing chain more broadly.  Jaffee (2003) provides data 
on both the aggregate decline of smallholder tobacco profits (see Table 4.14 below) as 
well as on the declining profitability of a representative NASFAM smallholder (see Table 
4.15 below).  Similarly, the World Bank (2005) also points to a general decline in 
profitability of both high- and low- input burley tobacco production between the 1993/94 
and 2003/4 seasons (see Table 4.16 below).  The World Bank (2005) also attributes this 
decline primarly to inefficiencies in the marketing chain.  Finally, and whilst arguing that 
pricing collusion by oligpsonistic buyers also played a crucial part in reducing smallholder 
burley profits, Prowse and Moyer-Lee (forthcoming), show that profitability for a Kasungu 
smallholder burley farmer differed markedly in the 2003/04 season by marketing channel, 
with an estimated net margin of US$ 0.59 per kg, US$ 0.41 per kg, and US$ 0.02 per kg 
associated with using the auction floors, cross-border trade, and independent buyers (IBs), 
respectively.  For the direct costs (charges) associated with using the auction system in the 
2003/04 system, see Table 4.17 below.     
 
Table 4.14: Decline in Aggregate Smallholder Tobacco Net Profits, 1997-2001 
 
Year Aggregate Smallholder Tobacco Net 
Profits (US$ millions) 
1997 26 
1998 26 
1999 26 
2000 16 
2001 8 
            Source: created by author from Jaffee (2003, p 28) 
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Table 4.15: Net Returns (US$) for NASFAM Smallholder Burley Growers, 1997-2001 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Average 
Sales Price 
(US$/kg) 
1.56 1.30 1.42 1.05 1.10 
Net 
Returns/kg 
(US$) 
0.36 0.37 0.34 0.17 0.09 
Net Returns 
per Farmer 
(US$; 
output= 
300 kg) 
108 111 102 51 26 
Net Returns 
per Hectare 
(US$) 
540 555 510 255 130 
Net Returns 
as 
Percentage 
of Average 
Price 
23 28 24 16 8 
         Source: Modified by author from Jaffee (2003, p 21) 
 
 
Table 4.16: Gross Margins (US$/ha) for Burley Production, 1993/94 and 2003/04 
Seasons 
 
 1993/94 2003/04 
Low-input 790 373 
High-input 838 791 
Source: Created by author from World Bank (2005, p 16). 
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Table 4.17: Levies and Deductions on Auction Floors in 2004 
 
TCC levy US$ 0.10 per kg 
AHL levy 3.25% of total proceeds 
Hessian levy US$ 0.30 per bale (TAMA) 
ARET levy 1% of total proceeds 
TAMA/NASFAM levy US$ 0.70 per kg, applicable to members 
Withholding tax 7% (not applied to smallholders earning 
less than MWK 36,000) 
Transport variable 
    Source: modified from Prowse and Moyer-Lee (forthcoming, p 11) 
 
  
4.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have reviewed the history of tobacco production in Malawi from its 
beginnings as a settler crop until the smallholder burley prevalent today.  From the 
beginning of tobacco cultivation in Malawi there have been large fluctuations in 
production, prices, and policies.  When comparing the trends and fluctuations in 
production, prices, and policies between the colonial and the Banda eras, one can see 
many similarities.  However, one of the themes in the history of the Malawian tobacco 
industry, which is worth emphasising by way of conclusion, is that of conflict over pricing.  
As Wilshaw (1994, p 120) sums up: 
…Malawi’s tobacco history is littered with disputes between growers and buyers 
over tobacco prices.  One of the earliest was when growers in 1910 shunned 
Imperial Tobacco’s prices and shipped their tobacco directly to brokers in the United 
Kingdom.  In the 1930s Imperial themselves took a hard line on prices by demanding 
better quality and grading from growers.  The establishment of the ‘American 
Auction’ solved many problems but did not end the seminal grower complaints 
about prices or the buyers’ complaints over quality.   
 
This is a theme we will return to in Chapter 7.   
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In this chapter we have also attempted to partially address the first part of Research 
Question 1.b217: How has the territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco 
Value Chain come to be shaped over time?  Specifically, we have described how tobacco 
production was encouraged in Malawi by both government (colonial and post-colonial) 
and the private sector (e.g. ITC).  We have also described the long history of smallholder 
(dark) tobacco production in Malawi as well as the coming of prominence of burley 
tobacco among estate producers (especially in the 1980s).  Smallholder tobacco 
production was encouraged by the World Bank in the 1980s, and estate production of 
burley tobacco was encouraged by President Banda throughout his time in office.    
However, probably the most important event in the history of tobacco cultivation in 
Malawi is the liberalisation of burley tobacco in the 1990’s.  The liberalisation programme 
was designed (in part) in order to achieve dramatic poverty reduction by creating cash-
generating opportunities for smallholders.  Burley production did transfer en masse to the 
smallholder sector, but the impact on poverty reduction was mitigated by the constraints 
on burley adoption for poorer smallholders.  An important result of the liberalisation 
programme for our purposes is the creation of a large sector of society with potentially 
common political interests218.  As seen in Table 4.12 above, in 2005 roughly one fifth of 
agricultural households produced tobacco.  The political and policy consequences of this 
will be explored further in Chapter 7.    
 
 
 
                                                          
217
 Research Question 1.b will also be partially addressed in Chapter 5 as well as in the thesis conclusion 
(Chapter 8). 
218
 It is also worth emphasizing here the contrast between the historical trajectory of the smallholder burley 
sector in Malawi with that of other African export crops mentioned in earlier chapters (e.g. see Daviron and 
Gibbon, 2002; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).  “Liberalisation” in the Malawian (burley tobacco) context meant a 
shift in production from estates to smallholders, rather than the removal of a state marketing board as 
intermediary. 
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Chapter 5: Territoriality of the Malawi 
Smallholder Burley Tobacco Value 
Chain 
  
  
5.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will address part of Research Question 1.a, specifically, What is the 
territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain?  Our starting point 
in this chapter is the distinction made in Chapter 1, following Daviron and Ponte (2005), 
between the Global Value Chain for Tobacco (GVCT) and the Malawi (smallholder burley) 
Tobacco Value Chain.  In Chapter 3 we addressed the territoriality of the former, i.e. from 
the lead firms looking upstream, whilst in this chapter we will discuss the territoriality of 
the latter, i.e. from the Malawi smallholder burley sector looking downstream.  We will 
also, albeit to a lesser extent, engage in a discussion of power asymmetries between leaf 
merchants and farmers, and relate this discussion to end-market segmentation.    
Given our discussion of lead firms in the GVCT and the extent of their market 
concentration (in Chapter 3), we would expect smallholder burley tobacco in Malawi to be 
mainly sold to these firms.  We would also expect the quality, price, and (ability to meet 
regulatory) standards of Malawian tobacco to be largely controlled by the ICCs, who easily 
enforce their demands on their upstream suppliers.  And we would further expect that the 
ICCs significantly control the extent of upgrading of farmers and leaf merchants in Malawi, 
and that power relations are reproduced between leaf merchants and farmers, with the 
former benefitting from asymmetrical bargaining power due to access to lucrative 
markets, asymmetric information, and prohibitively high protective entry barriers.       
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Indeed, and despite the lack of precise figures for Malawi, we know (from interviews) 
that Philip Morris International (PMI) is the biggest buyer, industry leader, and trend 
setter for the country.  Japan Tobacco (JT) is the second biggest buyer due (in part) to its 
acquisition of RJ Reynolds International which is a major producer of American 
Blend cigarettes (see Chapter 3).  British American Tobacco (BAT) also has a large presence 
in Malawi though BAT appears to have stopped purchasing tobacco from one of the leaf 
merchants.  Philip Morris USA (PMUSA)219, Imperial Tobacco Group (ITG), and Reynolds 
American Inc. (RAI) also buy tobacco from Malawi.  These companies are the “Blue Chips” 
(or in GVC terminology “lead firms”) and are the clients most sought by leaf merchants in 
Malawi.  The China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) does not appear to have a major 
presence in Malawi since it is mainly concerned with FCV tobacco for the Chinese market 
(which consumes predominantly Virginia Style cigarettes)220.  
Although the Blue Chip (BC) firms do dominate the Malawian tobacco industry (more 
on which in Chapter 6), nevertheless a significant portion of the Malawian tobacco 
industry is oriented towards serving a very different end-market, i.e. the Non-Blue Chip 
(NBC) customers (or non-lead firm cigarette manufacturers).  Led by Eastern Tobacco 
Company of Egypt221 , a multitude of smaller cigarette companies 222  is playing an 
increasingly important role as customers for Malawian tobacco.  These companies have a 
                                                          
219
 As explained in Chapter 3, this company is owned by Altria (which also buys tobacco separately in 
Malawi).  Phillip Morris International (PMI) was spun off from the parent company in 2008. 
220
 However there is a “government-to government” scheme whereby Malawi sells a small amount 
(estimated at 5 million kgs) of FCV tobacco to China.  President Mutharika also decided to cease recognising 
Taiwan - originally recognized by H.K. Banda in 1966 (Lwanda, 2009, p 169) - as an independent country in 
favour of improved diplomatic relations with China, although it is doubtful that this was a “tobacco move.”.  
This is because the president was certainly aware of the fact that China is a mainly FCV-consuming country 
and Malawi a mainly burley-producing country.  It is more likely that this diplomatic calculation was done in 
order to attract infrastructure investments from China such as the new parliament building.  In some cases 
the Chinese have even taken over construction of the same roads that the Taiwanese were in the process of 
building.  Although it is interesting to note that one informant stated that bringing China to Malawi was 
President Mutharika’s greatest achievement in terms of tobacco policy (interviews).     
221
 Eastern is owned by Egypt’s Holding Company for Chemical Industries, and produced an estimated 60 
billion cigarettes in 2011 (Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, 2012, p 18). 
222
 Other companies in this category include but are not limited to Elwarda (Egypt), KT&G (South Korea), 
small American, Dutch, and German manufacturers, Jordan Tobacco, GRE, BulgarTabac, and Karelia (Greece) 
(interviews).  Nyasa Manufacturing, a cigarette manufacturer located in Malawi, would presumably fit in this 
category.  However, none of the leaf merchant officials interviewed named Nayasa Manufacturing as a 
customer, and according to government (TCC) statistics Nyasa Manufacturing did not buy tobacco on the 
auction floors.  We would therefore conclude, based on both the statistics available and the (lack of 
attention) given to this company throughout dozens of interviews with tobacco industry stakeholders, that 
Nyasa Manufacturing is at best a minimal player in the Malawian tobacco industry.   
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very different set of objectives than the Blue Chip companies.  They also - due in part to 
their smaller size - lack the power over their suppliers that their Blue Chip counterparts 
enjoy.  In fact, the differences between these two sets of companies (and hence end-
markets) are stark enough that we would postulate that there is actually a bifurcation of 
the Malawian tobacco end-market.  Lest the BC-NBC distinction appear tautological, it is 
important to note that the terminology and categories were consistently referred to by 
respondents, were not the invention of the author, and were not predicted by our 
analytical framework or analysis of the global tobacco industry.  Although this chapter is 
mainly descriptive, given its focus on territoriality, one of the main aims is to demonstrate 
the extent to which non-lead firm cigarette manufacturers are present as buyers of 
Malawi tobacco.     
Other GVC work has also identified and/or theorized end-market segmentation, e.g. 
Gibbon (2003b), Selwyn (2007, 2012), and Palpacuer et al. (2005), as discussed in Chapter 
1.  However, rather than focus on the geographical or regulatory features of the end-
market segmentation, and following Gibbon and Ponte (2008), this chapter will assess the 
segmentation through the differentiation of the sourcing objectives of the firms in each 
segment.  There are a number of reasons for why this bifurcation of the Malawian tobacco 
end-market has developed, many of which will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.  However 
in this chapter we aim to clearly demonstrate the existence of this end-market bifurcation 
and the ramifications of this throughout the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.   
In Section 5.2 we will establish the bifurcation of the end-market for Malawian 
tobacco by emphasizing in particular the different sets of objectives that characterize the 
firms which dominate each end-market.  Section 5.3 will explain the extent to which the 
end-market bifurcation affects the operations of the leaf merchants, and their relations 
with farmers.  Section 5.4 will conclude.   
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5.2   End-Market Bifurcation 
 
In Chapter 3 we identified the sources of power that the ICCs have over first tier 
suppliers and in Chapter 6 we will examine how the (BC) ICCs attempt to use this power in 
order to drive the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain.  However, in this 
chapter we will build on the empirical discussion in Chapter 3 by identifying the particular 
objectives of cigarette companies in Malawi, as a differing set of objectives is one of the 
key distinguishing features between the two end-markets.     
As seen in Chapter 3, traditional objectives of the ICCs in terms of their tobacco leaf 
sourcing include reliable supply of quality tobacco at competitive prices.  For example, 
Japan Tobacco International’s procurement strategy includes “assurance of supply” and 
optimizing “…spend through consolidation of suppliers and standardization of 
specifications” (JTI, 2010, p 6).  This is one of the reasons why the ICCs tend to 
concentrate much of their business (globally) with a small number of international leaf 
merchants.  ICCs also have objectives similar to other lead firms in GVCs such as shifting 
more costly and burdensome functions (such as warehousing) upstream to their 
suppliers.  As highlighted by the GVC literature this reduces capital expenditure which can 
have the benefit of increasing perceived efficiency and hence share values.   
However, in addition to these more traditional objectives, ICCs are increasingly 
concerned with compliance and traceability (C&T).  This means that they want to have 
intimate knowledge of the production processes for the tobacco they 
purchase.  Compliance and traceability imply concerns over the chemical inputs used 
(pesticides, fertilizers, etc.) and, in particular, adherence to good agricultural practices 
(GAP), reforestation, the labour practices involved in production (especially the use of 
forced and child labour)223, and the integrity of the leaf in terms of guaranteeing that 
                                                          
223
 As seen in our discussion of PMI’s Agricultural Labour Practices Code in Chapter 3.  Not only is child 
labour in tobacco very prevalent in Malawi but a decent road infrastructure, widespread use of English, and 
easy accessibility of tobacco growing regions from major urban centres makes the country particularly 
vulnerable to journalistic coverage of the practice (interviews; direct observation).  In fact, it has been 
suggested that one of the reasons for the recent explosion in burley production in Mozambique is that the 
ICCs are more insulated from exposure to child labour practices by the Portuguese language and the remote 
and sparsely populated rural setting of tobacco production in this country (interviews).  However, an 
alternative explanation is that Mozambique burley tobacco is produced essentially entirely though IPS, 
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there are no non-tobacco substances present (non-tobacco related materials or NTRM in 
the industry jargon).   ICCs have become increasingly vigilant regarding the presence of 
NTRM in cigarettes due to potential lawsuits from consumers.   
The Non-Blue Chips (NBCs), on the other hand, appear to have a very different set of 
objectives.  They are not as concerned with issues of branding, public image, corporate 
social responsibility, and litigation.  They are more concerned with traditional objectives 
more characteristic of arms-length market interactions, such as price and quality.  These 
differences are borne out in a survey I conducted during my fieldwork.  The survey was 
modelled on Kaplinsky and Morris (2000, pp. 55-69), and was used to identify what these 
authors refer to as “critical success factors” (CSFs), i.e. the determining factors of whether 
a product succeeds in a given value chain.  Although designed to measure the extent to 
which lead firms are able to communicate the CSFs upstream to their suppliers, we 
adapted the survey to compare the CSFs in the two end-markets224.  
Based on previous research on the global tobacco industry, as well as observation and 
semi-structured interviews, we have identified seven CSFs for the Malawi Tobacco Value 
Chain.  Although we conducted this survey with a number of respondents at different 
nodes of the chain (more on which in Chapter 6), in Table 5.1 we show the results of the 
survey when conducted with the managing directors (MDs) of the four major leaf 
merchants225 in Malawi.         
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
which gives leaf merchants greater control and oversight over the extent to which child labour is used 
(interviews; more on which in Chapters 6 and 8).  
224
 For a more detailed explanation of this survey and our adaptations, see Chapter 2.  Our survey results will 
be discussed in full in Chapter 6.   
225
 These are Alliance One International (AOI), Limbe Leaf (a subsidiary of Universal Corporation), Premium-
TAMA, and Malawi Leaf.  We will discuss each of these in more detail below.   
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Table 5.1: CSFs for BCs and NBCs According to Leaf Merchant MDs 
 
CSF Blue Chips* Non-Blue Chips* Level of 
Bifurcation** 
Price 5 6 -1 
Quality (grade) 6.5 4.75 1.75 
Integrity (No NTRM, 
residue) 
7 3.25 3.75 
No child labour 6.75 2.75 4 
GAP 6.5 2.25 4.25 
Volume (being able 
to buy large 
quantities from a 
single supplier) 
5.5 3.5 2 
Long term 
relationships with 
suppliers 
6.75 2.75 4 
* Each factor is rated on a scale of 1-7 where 7 is extremely important and 1 is not at all important. 
** Level of bifurcation is the value of the NBC score subtracted from the BC score. 
  
 
The score in each category in Table 5.1 represents the average of the four scores given 
by the leaf merchant MDs.  The individual scores for each MD are not provided for 
confidentiality reasons.  There are a few caveats to this survey which need to be 
highlighted.  First of all, notably absent from the respondents is Japan Tobacco 
International (JTI)226, which, although it purchases tobacco directly in Malawi, is an ICC, 
not a leaf merchant.  It could be argued that the MDs of the leaf merchants are in a 
position to give more honest and objective responses as they are responding on behalf of 
their customers rather than on behalf of their own companies’ official policies.  As will be 
discussed further below, the ICCs are much more concerned with their public images and 
hence are much more cautious in their public statements, than are the leaf merchants.  
Anecdotal evidence for this claim can be seen by the fact that whilst officials at all of the 
leaf merchants in Malawi granted me interviews, my repeated requests for a non-cited 
interview with JTI was subject to approval by headquarters in Switzerland (which was 
never granted).     
                                                          
226
 This is Japan Tobacco’s international tobacco business, which purchases tobacco directly in Malawi, more 
on which below and in Chapter 6. 
215 
 
However, a case could be made for JTI being included in the survey in that the 
company directly purchases a substantial amount of tobacco in Malawi227 and its own 
CSFs play a role in determining the CSFs of the Malawian tobacco industry. In particular, 
and taking into consideration our discussion in Chapter 3, JTI’s objectives correspond to 
the Blue-Chip end-market.  Given the high concentration of firms in this end-market, JTI is 
one of merely a handful of companies which determines this end-market’s CSFs228.  
  Had JTI been surveyed, the company most likely would have responded “7” to most 
of the CSFs, which would have resulted in a higher level of bifurcation in all categories 
except “price” and “integrity”.  We postulate that their responses would have been 
skewed towards 7 because the company (like other BCs) invests a great deal of resources 
in its public image, in an effort to convince the public that it is concerned with such issues 
as GAP and child labour.  However, the leaf merchant MDs are in a more objective 
position in that they can rate their clients in how important these issues actually are when 
it comes to making purchasing decisions from suppliers.  
The other major caveat to the survey is that one of the four respondents, Malawi Leaf, 
sells essentially all of its tobacco to NBCs (more on which in Chapters 7 and 8).  Given this 
fact, the company has very little direct experience with BC customers and the issues that 
these customers would deem as CSFs, whilst the other three companies have experience 
and deal with both BC and NBC customers.  One final caveat is that the responses are pure 
arithmetic means and are not weighted either in terms of market share, experience in the 
industry, or proportion of tobacco sold to BCs versus NBCs.   
Despite all of the above caveats one can identify a number of trends.  First of all, the 
most important issue for BC customers appears to be integrity of the crop (no NTRM or 
residue), followed by no child labour, GAP, and quality.  This fits quite well with themes 
brought to our attention by GVC analysis, such as lead firms being driven by branding and 
product differentiation.  Litigation for pieces of plastic and chemical residues found in a 
                                                          
227
 As can be seen in Table 5.3 below, JTI accounts for roughly 10-15% of the Malawian tobacco market.  It is 
also the second biggest buyer of Malawian tobacco in terms of cigarette companies (interviews).  Both AOI 
and Limbe Leaf buy more Malawian tobacco each than JTI but the leaf merchants, as explained elsewhere, 
then go on to sell this tobacco to a multitude of customers.    
228
 The very fact that JTI, an ICC, is operating in Malawi is evidence of this in that the firm chose to vertically 
integrate backwards in order to better achieve its objectives and ensure that the tobacco it purchased was 
meeting the company’s CSFs (interviews; more on which in Chapter 6).   
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cigarette, and bad press exposing the use of child labour in tobacco production could 
greatly damage the public image of certain ICCs and hence the “equity” of their 
brands229.  The fact that price is ranked as the least important concern of BCs is further 
evidence of the importance of branding and product differentiation, as highlighted by 
much of GVC analysis.  This is the case not merely because the BCs are greatly concerned 
with issues related to their public image, but also because it is evidence of the fact that 
tobacco is actually a very small price component of a cigarette, as compared to marketing, 
for example230. 
For the NBCs, on the other hand, price appears to be the most important CSF, 
evidence of the fact that arms-length market interactions are the norm with this category 
of customers.  The three CSFs with the lowest scores for the NBCs are GAP, no child labour, 
and long term relationships with suppliers.  This is further evidence of the fact that these 
companies are not driven by concern over their public image and/or brands and that 
finding cheap and readily available tobacco is more important than developing consistent 
sources of supply.  
When looking at the level of bifurcation, one can see that there is a clear difference in 
the level of importance of each and every CSF for the BC and NBC end-markets.  The 
biggest differences are in the categories of no child labour, GAP, and long term 
relationships with suppliers.  However, the importance of long term relationships with 
suppliers can also be seen as evidence of the importance of branding and public image, in 
that only through serious partnerships with highly capable first tier suppliers, can lead 
firms really enforce their standards, as highlighted in other GVC work.  In particular, this 
trend of lead firms developing relationships with first tier suppliers with high capabilities 
can be seen in the Kenya-UK fresh fruit and vegetables chain (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004; 
Dolan et al., 2000), in the global coffee chain (Ponte, 2002a), and in the global apparel 
chain (Gereffi, 1994), among others.   
The NBC customers, on the other hand, due in part to their smaller size, lower level of 
concentration, and less remunerative purchases, do not benefit from the asymmetrical 
                                                          
229
 For a more detailed discussion on this topic, refer to Chapter 3.  
230
 This point has been made previously in Chapter 3 and is similar to Ponte’s (2002a) example of the 
proportion of the price of a Starbucks Latte that is spent on coffee. 
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bargaining power over their suppliers that GVC analysis would ascribe to lead firms 
(interviews), nor do they appear to place a premium on doing business with highly capable 
suppliers.  This latter point is borne out by the fact that (in proportional terms) Malawi 
Leaf is the most NBC-oriented leaf merchant, and undoubtedly the least able to respond 
to customer demands231.   
 
 
5.3  Leaf Merchants and Farmers Cater to Different End-Markets 
 
The majority of tobacco in Malawi is bought and sold by subsidiaries of the two leading 
international leaf merchants: Alliance One International (AOI) and Limbe Leaf (Universal 
Corporation).  These two firms together constitute about 60-70% of tobacco purchases in 
Malawi.  AOI exports more than it purchases because it imports tobacco from 
neighbouring countries for processing in Malawi before re-exporting (interviews).  Until 
2009 when it was acquired by JTI, AfricaLeaf (owned by Tribac) was another leaf merchant 
operating in Malawi.  Two additional leaf merchants in Malawi include Premium-TAMA 
and Malawi Leaf.  Premium-TAMA is a subsidiary of Premium Tobacco Holdings (U.K.) 
although the Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA 232 ) owns 14% of the 
company233.  Malawi Leaf, on the other hand, is a subsidiary of Auctions Holdings 
Limited234, and was created in 2006 as a pet project of President Bingu wa Mutharika in an 
effort to inject pricing competition at the auction floors (interviews; more on which in 
Chapter 7).  
  
                                                          
231
 Ironically, the one issue which according to leaf merchant MDs is the most important CSF to the NBCs – 
price - is a CSF which Malawi Leaf appears to be particularly ill-equipped to satisfy.  According to numerous 
interviews, Malawi Leaf, for a number of reasons (more on which in Chapter 7), is perceived to attempt to 
raise the leaf prices accruing to farmers on the auction floors.    
232
 TAMA is the largest farmer association representing tobacco growers in Malawi (more on which in 
Chapter 7).   
233
 We will return to this ownership stake, with particular reference to upgrading, in Chapter 7. 
234
 Which is in turn a subsidiary of ADMARC, the agricultural marketing parastatal.  Although ADMARC does 
not own an absolute majority of AHL shares, AHL is widely perceived to be under state control (interviews).  
Refer to Chapter 4 for more on ADMARC and its origins.   
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All four of the leaf merchants sell to both end-markets, although as mentioned above 
Malawi Leaf is primarily orientated towards the NBC market.  See Table 5.2 below for the 
percentage of tobacco that is destined to each end-market, for the leaf merchants and JTI.  
Notably absent from the table are the figures for Premium-TAMA.  These were not 
obtained, although we know from interviews that this leaf merchant sells to both end-
markets.  For a schematic of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain, see Figure 5.1 below. 
Although we will argue in Chapter 6 that only the BC end-market is driven by lead firms, 
it appears that leaf merchants are able to maintain substantial asymmetrical bargaining 
power vis-à-vis their (farmer) suppliers, regardless of the end-market destination of the 
tobacco being purchased.  In addition to controlling access to customers for Malawian 
tobacco, the leaf merchants have this power over their suppliers due to a high level of 
market concentration and asymmetric information.  We will consider each of these in turn 
below.    
 
Table 5.2: Percentage of Tobacco Accruing to Each End-Market 
 
Tobacco-Buying Company BC End-Market NBC End-Market 
AOI 60% 40% 
Limbe Leaf 50% 50% 
Malawi Leaf* 1% 99% 
JTI 100% 0% 
Source: Interviews 
Note: Figures are rough estimates. 
*According to interviews, 99% of this company’s tobacco is destined to NBCs.  However upon further   
investigation it was revealed that included in this 99% are some American BCs.  It is probably safe to assume 
that these companies make up a very small proportion of this 99%.  Of this 99%, roughly 20% is sold to 
Eastern Tobacco Company of Egypt. 
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Figure 5.1: Schematic of Malawi Tobacco Value Chain 
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Blue Chip International 
Cigarette Companies 
(excluding JT) 
JT Non-Blue Chip 
Cigarette Companies 
AOI, Limbe Leaf, 
Premium-TAMA Malawi Leaf 
Auction Holdings Limited 
Smallholders 
Intermediate 
Buyers 
Estates Non-Malawian 
farmers (smuggled 
tobacco) 
AOI Direct 
Production 
Labour Tenants 
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As can be seen in Table 5.3 below, the leaf merchant node of the chain is highly 
concentrated.  100% of the market is controlled by merely five firms (including JTI), only 
four multi-nationals account for 92% of the market, and the top two firms control up to 70% 
of the market235.  This is characteristic of the global tobacco industry, and some reasons 
for this high (global) level of leaf merchant market concentration have been provided in 
Chapter 3.  However, in Malawi the international leaf merchants are able to maintain their 
key market positions in particular due to access to finance on more favourable terms (due 
to NYSE-listed parent companies as financial guarantors as well as internal finance from 
them), long-term relationships with customers, and prohibitively expensive capital costs of 
investing in a factory236.  In addition to the financial benefits, the agronomy departments 
of these multi-nationals - which are becoming the most important part of the leaf 
merchant business (more on which in Chapter 6) - benefit from cross-pollination of 
policies and R&D with agronomy departments in other subsidiaries or with centralised 
agronomy research237 (interviews).  Ironically, it has been asserted in interviews that this 
node of the chain might have been characterised by a higher level of market 
concentration had it not been for the promotion of the ICCs of more competition, in 
particular in encouraging the participation of Premium-TAMA in the Malawian tobacco 
market (interview).    
  
Table 5.3: Leaf Merchant (Average) Market Share in Malawi 
 
Leaf Merchant Market Share 
Alliance One International 34-35 % 
Limbe Leaf 30-35% 
Premium-TAMA 15% (burley) 
JTI* 10-15% 
Malawi Leaf 8% 
Source: Interviews 
                                                          
235
 Although extreme, this level of concentration is not unprecedented among export sectors of agricultural 
commodity chains in developing countries, e.g. Bendini and Steimbreger (2005) on the case of Argentinian 
fresh fruits and vegetables. 
236
 For example, AOI (2012a, p 77) valued its physical assets in Malawi (property, plant, and equipment, net) 
at US$ 27,918,000 in 2012.   
237
 For example, the agronomy director for the Africa Region at AOI is based in Malawi.   
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*As explained elsewhere, JTI is an ICC and not a leaf merchant.  JTI has been included here because it buys   
tobacco directly in Malawi rather than through leaf merchants. 
The asymmetrical bargaining power that leaf merchants often have over their suppliers 
(discussed in Chapter 3), derived in part from information asymmetries, can be seen in the 
case of Malawi in the following passage:  
The only quality classification system that really counts is that of the international 
buyers of Malawi’s tobacco.  These classifications, however, seem to be regarded as 
something of a trade secret, and the underlying data on the quality mix of the 
Malawi crop is not available in the public domain (Jaffee, 2003, p 19). 
 
The asymmetric information is experienced not just in terms of quality classifications, 
however, but also in terms of familiarity with the demands of the customers.  This takes us 
back to our survey of the critical success factors.  At the farmer node of the chain we 
conducted the CSF survey with farmers in executive positions at four of the leading farmer 
associations representing tobacco farmers238.  Comparing the responses given by these 
farmers with those given by the leaf merchant MDs demonstrates the lack of familiarity of 
farmers with the differentiated demands of the customers in the end-markets to which 
their tobacco is sold (see Tables 5.4-5.7 below).  One major caveat to this comparison is 
that it is heavily biased towards underestimating the extent of asymmetric information.  
This is because the farmers surveyed are not a representative cross-section of smallholder 
tobacco farmers in Malawi, but rather, it could be argued, are amongst the best-informed 
tobacco farmers in the country as they direct tobacco farmer associations, and often 
weigh in on public policy debates regarding the tobacco industry.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
238
 These were TAMA, NASFAM, Phindu, and Farm Produce. 
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Table 5.4: Farmer Responses to CSF Survey 
 
CSF Blue Chips Non-Blue Chips Level of Bifurcation 
Price 6.25 4.5 1.75 
Quality (grade) 6.75 6.5 0.25 
Integrity (No NTRM, 
residue) 
7 6.5 0.5 
No child labour 6.75 7 -0.25 
GAP 5.5 5.75 -0.25 
Volume (being able 
to buy large 
quantities from a 
single supplier) 
6.5 6.25 0.25 
Long term 
relationships with 
suppliers 
6.5 6 0.5 
 
 
Table 5.5: Difference in Responses on Blue Chips between Leaf Merchants (MDs) and 
Farmers 
 
CSF Leaf Merchants 
(MDs) 
Farmers Difference 
Price 5 6.25 -1.25 
Quality (grade) 6.5 6.75 -0.25 
Integrity (No NTRM, 
residue) 
7 7 0 
No child labour 6.75 6.75 0 
GAP 6.5 5.5 1 
Volume (being able 
to buy large 
quantities from a 
single supplier) 
5.5 6.5 -1 
Long term 
relationships with 
suppliers 
6.75 6.5 0.25 
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Table 5.6: Difference in Response on Non-Blue Chips 
 
CSF Leaf Merchants 
(MDs) 
Farmers Difference 
Price 6 4.5 1.5 
Quality (grade) 4.75 6.5 -1.75 
Integrity (No NTRM, 
residue) 
3.25 6.5 -3.25 
No child labour 2.75 7 -4.25 
GAP 2.25 5.75 -3.5 
Volume (being able 
to buy large 
quantities from a 
single supplier) 
3.5 6.25 -2.75 
Long term 
relationships with 
suppliers 
2.75 6 -3.25 
 
 
Table 5.7: Difference in Perception of End-Market Bifurcation, Leaf Merchants (MDs) 
and Farmers 
 
CSF Leaf Merchant 
(MDs) Level of 
Bifurcation 
Farmer Level of 
Bifurcation 
Difference 
Price -1 1.75 -2.75 
Quality (grade) 1.75 0.25 1.5 
Integrity (No NTRM, 
residue) 
3.75 0.5 3.25 
No child labour 4 -0.25 4.25 
GAP 4.25 -0.25 4.5 
Volume (being able 
to buy large 
quantities from a 
single supplier) 
2 0.25 1.75 
Long term 
relationships with 
suppliers 
4 0.5 3.5 
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  As can be seen in Tables 5.4-5.7 above, there are a number of salient differences in 
the responses to this survey between the Leaf Merchants MDs and the farmers.  Starting 
with the ratings that each group gave to the Blue Chip customers, it can be seen in Table 
5.5 that there were not major discrepancies.  Most of the scores differed by 1 point or less.  
For both integrity and no child labour both groups gave the same scores.  The biggest 
difference was on the price ranking where Leaf Merchant MDs ranked this CSF as 5 and 
farmers as 6.25.  Based on this comparison of responses, one can assert that Leaf 
Merchant MDs and the farmers surveyed largely concur on the importance of the CSFs to 
Blue Chip customers.       
However, turning to the CSFs of the NBC end-market, there are major differences 
in the scores given by our two surveyed groups (see Table 5.6).  The differences in 
rankings are minor on the more traditional CSFs of quality and price.  However, there are 
major differences in the other 5 CSFs.  Of particular interest is the issue of no child labour, 
which the farmers have ranked as being extremely important to the NBC end-market 
(average score of 7) whereas Leaf Merchant MDs have given this an average score of 
merely 2.75.  Likewise for the importance of GAP, where farmers believed this to be a 
relatively important CSF for the NBC end-market (average score of 5.75) and leaf 
merchant MDs ranked it as largely unimportant (average score of 2.25).  Also of particular 
interest to the GVC literature are the scores given to integrity of the crop and importance 
of long term relationships with suppliers.  In both cases the farmers believed these CSFs to 
be important to the NBC end-market (average scores of 6.5 and 6 respectively) and leaf 
merchant MDs ranked them as relatively unimportant (average scores of 3.25 and 2.75, 
respectively).   
The evidence presented in Tables 5.5-5.6 can therefore be used to argue that there 
is asymmetric information between leaf merchants and farmers in that leaf merchants 
clearly understand that there are two end-markets for Malawian tobacco, one of which is 
driven by concerns with branding and public relations and the other driven by price, 
whereas the farmers in charge of associations perceive merely one end-market driven by 
branding, public relations and price.  However, given that the rankings are subjective, it 
could be argued that these differences are exaggerated and that the absolute value of a 
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score for a farmer might have a different meaning than the same absolute value for a leaf 
merchant MD.  Following this line of argument, what would be important in terms of 
examining whether the farmers in the survey recognize the end-market bifurcation, would 
be the relative scores given by the farmers to the CSFs of the two end-markets.  In other 
words, do the farmers rank price as being more important to NBCs than BCs?  Do the 
farmers rank GAP as being more important to BCs than NBCs?  However, Table 5.7 
demonstrates that this is not the case.  The farmers surveyed rank price as being more 
important to BCs than NBCs, whereas the leaf merchant MDs assert the contrary.  
Furthermore, and although by a small margin, the farmers surveyed rank GAP and no child 
labour as being more important to the NBC end-market than to the BC market, in stark 
contrast to the leaf merchant MDs surveyed. 
Based on this evidence, we argue that the leaf merchant MDs clearly distinguish 
between two end-markets for Malawian tobacco, each with its own set of objectives or 
CSFs.  The farmers leading four of the most important tobacco farmer associations in the 
country, on the other hand, do not distinguish between the CSFs of the two end-markets.  
Hence, there is a considerable amount of asymmetric information, which contributes to 
the power that leaf merchants have over their (farmer) suppliers.  More specifically, leaf 
merchants exploit and/or attempt to create the perception of farmers that all customers 
demand crop integrity, no child labour, GAP, and low prices in order to implement 
measures to guarantee these production characteristics and hence serve their more 
lucrative (BC) end-market whilst at the same time lowering costs.               
However, despite their power over growers, many of these efforts by leaf 
merchants are frustrated by heavy government intervention.  For example, the 
introduction of minimum prices in the 2006/07 season has mitigated (but certainly not 
eliminated) the leaf merchants’ control over prices paid to producers (more on which in 
Chapter 7).  One key method that leaf merchants use at the auction, in addition to bidding 
down prices amongst themselves, is rejecting bales of tobacco that they deem of low 
quality or of being worth less than the minimum prices attached to their grades.  Bales are 
often rejected for containing NTRM, mouldy tobacco, nesting239, and where the part of 
                                                          
239
 Where low quality tobacco is mixed into a bale rated as higher quality. 
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the tobacco leaf in the bale does not conform to orders from ICCs.  When a bale is 
rejected it has to repeat a lengthy process at the auction company to reappear on the 
auction floors.  Often these bales are bought when they reappear despite insignificant (or 
no) changes to the issues which ostensibly caused the bale to be rejected, e.g. mould, 
nesting, etc. (interviews; observation).  This process may contribute to lowering prices in 
two ways.  Firstly, by lowering the perceived quality of the bale, farmers may be willing to 
accept lower prices.  And secondly, due to concerns about the potential inability to sell 
their tobacco, farmers will occasionally attempt to intervene to reduce the official grade 
of their tobacco, which in turn implies a lower minimum price (interviews; more on which 
in Chapter 7). 
 
  
5.4  Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter we have partially addressed Research Question 1.a, i.e. What is the 
territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain?  In particular, we 
have identified two key end-markets for Malawi burley tobacco.  One end-market consists 
of Blue Chip tobacco companies.  These companies are the same as those identified as 
lead firms of the GVCT in Chapter 3, i.e. the international cigarette companies (ICCs).  The 
other end-market for Malawi tobacco consists of the Non-Blue Chip companies, or the 
non-lead firm cigarette manufacturers identified in Chapter 3.  These firms, the most 
prominent (in Malawi) of which is Eastern Tobacco Company of Egypt, differ from the ICCs 
in that their sourcing decisions are driven mainly by price, rather than concerns over 
compliance and traceability. 
 The tobacco buying companies which purchase tobacco directly in Malawi are 
highly concentrated and consist of one ICC (JTI) and four leaf merchants.  In total, just five 
companies account for 100% of Malawi tobacco, four companies account for over 90%, 
and just two companies account for up to 70%.  Four of these buying companies are multi-
nationals and one is (indirectly) state-controlled.  One of the multi-nationals is part-owned 
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by TAMA, the largest tobacco farmer association in Malawi.  Although not discussed in this 
chapter, we saw in Chapter 4 that tobacco production in Malawi is highly fragmented and 
dispersed with smallholders accounting for the bulk of production.     
 It is important to re-iterate here that other work in the GVC tradition has identified 
and analysed end-market segmentation.  Indeed Gibbon (2003b) identifies multiple end-
markets, with distinct governance forms, for clothing exports from African countries.  As 
another empirical example, as noted in Chapter 1, Selwyn (2007, 2012) identifies four end-
markets for grape production in the North-East of Brazil240.  Furthermore, and as pointed 
out in Chapter 1, one of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) GVC governance types is “market”, which is 
characterized by low levels of power asymmetries between lead firms and first tier 
suppliers.  Whilst other work has focused on end-market segmentation due (primarily) to 
geography, regulation, trade laws, and/or high-end versus low-end markets, the main 
distinguishing factor of the end-markets presented in this chapter relates to the type of 
lead firm.  Indeed, the lead firms discussed in Chapter 3 operate in multiple geographies, 
regulatory and trade frameworks, and they cater to multiple market segments within each 
of these241.  Furthermore, and as seen in Chapter 3, tobacco products regulations are 
characterized by both their global reach and by their increasing presence in developing 
countries.  Of course, further research could identify a number of other features which 
represent the NBC and BC buyers, however for our purposes in this work, the CSFs which 
appear to distinguish the firms in each end-market, are (or relate to) some of the main 
concerns of GVC analysis of governance.   
 These findings bring us back to our discussion in Chapter 1 of the question posed 
by GVC analysts of whether a GVC refers to a specific strand of a chain, a specific form of 
the commodity in question, or specific end-market (among other sources of intra-chain 
differentiation).  Although we do not attempt to provide a definitive answer to this 
question, it is worth re-iterating here that our analytical focus in this work is on the value 
                                                          
240
 However his analysis is limited primarily to the U.K. end-market. 
241
 For example, a common topic for ICC annual reports is the extent to which consumers are “up-trading” or 
“down-trading” between higher or lower-end segments, usually due to socio-economic and wealth factors.  
The combination of premium-, mid-, and low-price brands pertaining to an ICC is referred to as the “product 
mix” in industry jargon (PMI, 2012a, p 21).   
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chain that connects smallholder burley tobacco in Malawi to the international cigarette 
companies.  This focus is in large part based on our survey and interviews, which reveal 
that only the ICCs can be said to be driving the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain (more on 
which in Chapter 6).  Finally, and whilst further research would be required to enhance 
our understanding of the sources of differentiation within the cigarette industry 
globally242, in this work we will attempt to explain some of the reasons for the existence of 
this end-market bifurcation within Malawi.  This is a task we will return to in Chapter 8, 
building on insights presented in Chapters 6 and 7.             
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
242
 Given the simultaneous trends of increasing regulation and increasing consumption of tobacco products 
in emerging economies, we would build on our discussion of the shareholder value doctrine in Chapters 1 
and 3 by hypothesising that one of the key sources of differentiation in the global cigarette industry lies in 
the geography of financial markets, rather than consumer markets.  Whilst the ICCs’ consumer markets are 
truly global, their key financial markets are New York, London, and Tokyo, where they must overcome 
concerns and satisfy expectations of investors who operate in these markets.  Of particular relevance is the 
ability to address issues relating to “ethical” concerns and “reputational risk”, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
Further research on investment patterns and ICC relations with shareholders would be required in order to 
test this hypothesis.     
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Chapter 6: How the International 
Cigarette Companies Govern and 
Control Upgrading in the Malawi 
Tobacco Chain 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3 we established the sources of power that Blue Chip ICCs (lead firms) have 
over leaf merchants (their first tier suppliers) globally.  In particular in Malawi, in recent 
years the ICCs have used their informational asymmetries, oligopsony power, “punishing 
and rewarding” buying patterns, and the (implicit) threat of vertical integration in order to 
achieve more beneficial cost structures, impose functions upstream, and most importantly, 
to achieve compliance and traceability (C&T).  In Chapter 5 we discussed the particular 
objectives of these lead firms.  We emphasized that price (of tobacco) was not the key 
Critical Success Factor (CSF), but rather issues relating to C&T - or credence (as discussed 
in Chapter 1) - such as certification that production did not involve child labour, assuring 
good agricultural practices (GAP), etc.   
In this chapter we will partially answer Research Questions 2.a, 3.a, and 4.a.  
Specifically, we will address the following: 
2.a How do lead firms drive the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain? 
3.a How is the lead firm-first tier supplier node of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain 
coordinated?  Does the coordination observed correspond to the predictions of Gereffi et al. 
(2005)? 
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4.a Have lead firms promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in what form and for whom?  
  In this chapter we will build on our discussion of governance in the Global Value Chain 
for Tobacco (GVCT) in Chapter 3 by analysing how lead firms drive the Malawi Tobacco 
Value Chain243 (Section 6.2).  In Section 6.2 we will also assess how lead firms coordinate 
the lead firm-first tier supplier node of the chain. In Section 6.3 we will discuss upgrading 
within the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain and the extent to which lead firms control this 
upgrading.  Section 6.4 will conclude244.   
 
 
6.2  Governance 
 
 In Section 6.2.1 we will develop our argument that lead firms benefit from 
asymmetrical power over first tier suppliers by incorporating evidence gathered in field 
work.  In particular we will further demonstrate the level of asymmetrical information, 
which contributes to power asymmetries, and the extent to which lead firms define 
functions of their suppliers.  In Section 6.2.2 we will engage with governance as 
coordination by testing Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon’s (2005) theory of GVC 
governance.      
 
 
6.2.1 Governance as Drivenness 
  
In Chapter 5 we discussed the extent of asymmetric information at the leaf merchant-
farmer node of the chain.  In particular we compared the results of our survey which 
                                                          
243
 For the distinction between the Global Value Chain for Tobacco, and the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain, 
refer to Chapter 1. 
244
 There is considerable overlap between this chapter and Moyer-Lee and Prowse (2012).  My contributions 
to the latter will not be cited in this chapter; however I will cite any material that was produced either jointly 
or by the other author.  
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asked respondents to rank the levels of importance of various “Critical Success Factors” in 
the two end-markets: Blue Chips (BCs) and Non-Blue Chips (NBCs).  We discussed the 
results of the survey when conducted among Leaf Merchant Managing Directors (MDs) 
and farmers in executive positions of four of the leading tobacco farmer associations.  Our 
key findings were that whilst the leaf merchant MDs clearly distinguished between these 
end-markets, the farmers failed to distinguish between purchasing objectives of the two 
end-markets.   
Below we expand on these findings to incorporate the results of the survey when 
conducted among the Agronomy Directors (ADs) of the four leaf merchant companies (see 
Table 6.1).  The survey results reveal that with the exception of “price” (where ADs ascribe 
the same level of importance to both end-markets), the ADs do distinguish between the 
two end-markets in terms of the importance that each ascribes to the remaining six CSFs.  
However, what is interesting about the results is when the level of bifurcation (given by 
the ADs) is compared with that given by the leaf merchant MDs on the one hand, and the 
farmers on the other (see Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1).    
 
Table 6.1: CSF Survey with Leaf Merchant ADs 
 
Critical Success 
Factor 
Blue Chips Non Blue Chips Level of Bifurcation 
Price 6 6 0 
Quality (grade) 5 4.5 0.5 
Integrity (No NTRM, 
residue) 
5.75 4.75 1 
No child labour 6.25 4 2.25 
GAP 5.25 3.25 2 
Volume (being able 
to buy large 
quantities from a 
single supplier) 
5.5 3.25 2.25 
Long term 
relationships with 
suppliers 
5.5 4.5 1 
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Table 6.2: Level of Perceived End-Market Bifurcation by Various Chain Nodes/Sub-
Nodes 
 
Critical Success 
Factor 
Leaf Merchant 
MDs 
Leaf Merchant ADs Farmers 
Price -1 0 1.75 
Quality (grade) 1.75 0.5 0.25 
Integrity (No NTRM, 
residue) 
3.75 1 0.5 
No child labour 4 2.25 -0.25 
GAP 4.25 2 -0.25 
Volume (being able 
to buy large 
quantities from a 
single supplier) 
2 2.25 0.25 
Long term 
relationships with 
suppliers 
4 1 0.5 
 
 
Consistent with our assumption in Chapter 5 that the leaf merchant MDs’ rankings 
are the most accurate descriptors available of the purchasing priorities in the two end-
markets, it can be seen in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 that in six out of the seven CSFs, leaf 
merchant ADs were less accurate in their responses than MDs but more accurate than 
farmers.  In other words, the ADs perceive less of a bifurcation of the two end-markets 
than do their MD bosses, but perceive more of a bifurcation than do the farmers.  The 
notable exception to this is “price” where the ADs perceive no difference in the value 
ascribed to this CSF by the two end-markets whereas the farmers perceive the BC end-
market as being more concerned with price than the NBC end-market.  As explained in 
Chapter 5 and as can be seen in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 above, this is opposite to the 
perceptions of the MDs.  The conclusion that can be drawn from the results presented 
here is that not only are there informational asymmetries between customers and farmers, 
but that these asymmetries actually increase as one moves along the chain upstream 
away from consumers and towards producers.  
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Figure 6.1: Levels of Perceived End-Market Bifurcation by Chain Nodes/sub-Nodes 
 
 
 
 
Pricing.  The extent of ICCs’ control over their (first tier) suppliers can be seen in the 
description of former Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) general manager Godfrey 
Chapola (cited in Otañez et al., 2007, p 263): 
The [raw tobacco] price that is paid to the producer, it starts from the cigarette 
manufacturer.  Because the manufacturer tells, [Limbe Leaf or Alliance One] ‘can 
you buy me so much tobacco, deliver it at my doorstep at four dollars 
twenty?’  The local supplier [with Limbe Leaf or Alliance One] here will then do 
his arithmetic, putting all their costs.  So, that will be the price that at the end of 
they will be competing for at the auction floor. 
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The traditional pricing model used for tobacco sales from leaf merchants to Blue 
Chips is known in industry jargon as “in the box”.  This refers to a customer demanding a 
certain type of tobacco and a certain price (as in the quote above).  This model is 
implemented between the leaf merchants’ sales departments and Blue Chip purchasing 
department.  Great emphasis is placed on the personal relationships that the salespeople 
are able to establish with the customers.  This is particularly important in that the (non-
contract farming) tobacco being sold by Alliance One International (AOI) and Limbe Leaf, 
for example, is indistinguishable (interviews).   
However, coinciding with the increasing professionalization of the global tobacco 
industry and the increasing power of lead firms over suppliers, the model is shifting 
towards “cost-plus.”  In this model the customer pays the price of the tobacco plus the 
costs of processing and a small (6-12%) profit margin.  In this model, the leaf merchants’ 
cost structures become the main selling point and hence represent an increased role for 
accountants and finance directors and a decreased role for salespeople (interviews).  The 
shift in pricing models from “in-the-box” to “cost-plus” is also representative of an 
increase in information asymmetries between lead firms and first tier suppliers in that the 
former are able to obtain detailed cost structures of the latter without offering 
information on their own cost structures in return (interviews).   
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Gibbon and Ponte (2005, p 123) state that  
...the most important element of power relations between lead firms and 
first-tier suppliers is control over the definition of the functions that first-
tier suppliers should play, rather than the externalization of low-profit 
functions as argued in earlier literature. 
 
This definition of functions is seen in particular in ICC policies on durations as well as on 
C&T tobacco.   
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Durations.  Policies on durations - which refer to the amount of tobacco stocks 
maintained by ICCs - are an example of lead firms defining functions of their suppliers.  
The ICCs are very secretive about this, even in regards to their suppliers, however they are 
perceived by some to be intentionally decreasing their durations to about 12 months’ 
worth of stock (interviews)245.  This is a reflection of drivenness in two ways.  Firstly, given 
our discussion of the importance of product differentiation, branding, and marketing for 
ICCs, less importance is attached to the tobacco component of the ICCs’ products.  
Dedicating fewer financial and physical resources to the tobacco side (i.e. stocking) is 
representative of the increasing importance of marketing as ICC business strategy.  
Decreasing durations also unties capital which can be perceived as efficiency gains and 
raise share values (as with other buyer-driven chains246).  Secondly, decreased durations 
imply increased burden on first tier suppliers in that they will have to fill more timely and 
accurate orders by ICCs to make up for what the ICCs could have drawn from their own 
stocks.  The process of decreasing durations, i.e. cigarette companies depleting their 
tobacco stocks instead of purchasing new tobacco for cigarette production, also has the 
potential to increase their (short-term) power over their first tier suppliers in that it could 
artificially decrease demand for tobacco beyond that due to cigarette consumption trends, 
which are more easily predicted by multi-national leaf merchants.  More specifically, and 
given both the secretive nature of durations policies (mentioned above) and the various 
forms of tobacco leaf market segmentation (e.g. by quality, flavour versus filler, etc., 
discussed in Chapter 3), drawing on durations may enable ICCs to overcome the price 
implications of shortages of certain types of tobacco in a given season.      
 
Compliant and Traceable (C&T) Tobacco.  The most significant example of lead 
firms defining functions of their first tier suppliers is through the implementation of 
compliance and traceability in tobacco leaf sourcing.  Indeed, a number of the Blue Chips 
                                                          
245
 For example, the value of leaf tobacco held by JT decreased from 359,152 million yen in 2010 to 343,198 
million in 2011, to 294, 813 million in 2012 (JT, 2012, p 111).  However, one important caveat to this 
anecdotal evidence is that it is based on value rather than volume, and hence could potentially represent a 
decrease in high-value tobacco rather than a decrease in overall tobacco.   
246
 For more on this see Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) shareholder value doctrine, as well as our discussions in 
Chapters 1 and 3. 
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have even threatened to stop buying non-C&T tobacco from Malawi within a number of 
years (some as early as 2013/14 season).  As contract farming is the primary method used 
to attain compliance, leaf merchants are obliged to develop agronomy departments, 
relationships with farmers and banks, and methods of demonstrating traceability to the 
Blue Chips (interviews).   
Interviews reveal two key issues regarding C&T tobacco: firstly, leaf merchants aim 
to achieve 100% contract farming C&T tobacco, and secondly, they only have this aim due 
to customers’ demands247.  The shift to C&T tobacco has required significant investments 
on the part of the leaf merchants.  Taking into account the fact that interviews have 
revealed that leaf merchants are focusing on C&T tobacco merely to satisfy customers, 
and that the leaf merchants have expanded their agronomy departments essentially for 
the purpose of obtaining more C&T tobacco, one can therefore see the recent expansion 
of leaf merchant agronomy departments as evidence of lead firm function definition.     
For example, AOI has more than doubled its agronomy department budget in the 
span of just two seasons, moving from a budget of roughly US$ 1 million in the 2010/11 
season to US$ 2.1 million in the 2011/12 season, to US$ 2.8 million in the 2012/13 season.  
The company intends to keep expanding the department until an end-state budget of 
roughly US$ 4.5 million (see Figure 6.2 below).  Given the quantity of tobacco AOI intends 
to purchase, this end-state budget would equate to US$ 0.06 – US$ 0.11 per kg of tobacco 
by 2016 or 2017 (interviews). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
247
 As seen in Chapter 5, Malawi is rather unusual in that its marketing system (at the time of fieldwork) was 
auction  (rather than contract farming) based.  Indeed, PMI (2012c, p 8) sources roughly 80% of its global 
tobacco leaf through contract farming. 
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Figure 6.2: AOI Agronomy Department Budget (US$ Millions) 
 
 
Source: Interviews 
 
Like AOI, Limbe Leaf has also massively increased outlays for its agronomy 
department.  The company moved from spending roughly US$ 400 000 on the agronomy 
department in the 2010/11 season to about US$ 2.7 million in the 2012/13 season (see 
Figure 6.3 below).  Although we have not obtained precise figures, we do know that the 
agronomy department for this company was quite large in the years 2000-2006; however 
this was mainly for the purposes of contract FCV tobacco.  For political reasons, FCV 
tobacco has been treated quite differently than burley tobacco in Malawi (more on which 
in Chapter 7).  Therefore our interests in this chapter lie in the expansion of agronomy 
departments for the purposes of increasing C&T burley tobacco.   
We also know that ensuring traceability was one of the main rationales behind 
JTI’s decision to vertically integrate in 2009, and although we do not have precise figures 
we do know that establishing an agronomy department which can deliver C&T tobacco 
has had major cost implications for the company.  Premium-TAMA did not have an 
agronomy department for the first two years (2006-2008) of the company’s existence.  
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Although its agronomy department was initially launched for the purposes of NDDF 
tobacco for the NBC end-market, the following season it expanded into burley.  The 
agronomy department currently costs roughly US$ 0.20 per kg of tobacco.  Malawi Leaf 
opened its agronomy department in the 2012/13 season and at the time of fieldwork was 
still developing its first budget.  The department had three employees (interviews).   
  
Figure 6.3: Limbe Leaf Agronomy Department Budget (US$ Millions, Rough Estimates) 
 
 
Source: Interviews 
 
In terms of employment, AOI has massively increased the number of smallholder-
related employees in the agronomy department in recent years.  Smallholder-related is a 
relevant category because these employees are hired primarily for the purposes of 
implementing contract farming and compliance issues.  An agronomy department requires 
minimal smallholder-related employees if the smallholder tobacco is being bought via an 
auction system alone.  As can be seen in Figure 6.4 below, this category of employment at 
AOI has increased from merely 8 people in 2004 to 154 people in 2012.  This tallies with 
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AOI’s operations globally in that at the time of research roughly one third of AOI’s 
employees worldwide were in agronomy departments (interviews).   
 
Figure 6.4: Smallholder-Related Agronomy Employees at AOI, 2004-2012 
 
 
Source: Interviews 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.3 below, the majority of these employees are leaf 
technicians (agronomy extension officers).  At the time of the interviews there were 105 
leaf technicians and the agronomy department had an eye to an end-state of 110 leaf 
technicians.  The majority of these leaf technicians have diplomas from the Natural 
Resources College and certificates in tobacco production from Mwimba Farm Institute.  
Previously AOI would recruit them as trained leaf technicians, but starting in August, 2011 
the company introduced its own 18 month trainee course (interviews).    
As can be seen in Table 6.4 below, Limbe Leaf has a similar employment pattern in 
its agronomy department in that it is heavily orientated towards leaf technicians - which 
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are used to disseminate C&T-related agronomy practices - and compliance-related staff 
(e.g. GAP, ALP, etc.).  Although we do not have detailed data on the expansion of 
employment in the Limbe Leaf agronomy department, we do know that in the 2010/11 
season there were no leaf technicians or zone leaders, which would have made contract 
growing near impossible (interviews).         
 
Table 6.3: Smallholder-Related Agronomy Employees at AOI, 2012 
 
Job Number of Employees Description 
Leaf technicians 105 (5 vacancies) Extension officers 
Supervisors 12 - 
Area managers 4 Oversee leaf technicians 
Operations managers 2 - 
Senior agronomist 
(smallholders) 
1 - 
Country agronomist 1 - 
Compliance officers 6 Auditors- cross-check that 
farmers are who they say 
they are; cross-check 
fertilisers, hectarage, 
chemicals, tree counts, plant 
counts, bank account details 
Agro-forestry 4 - 
Motorcycle mechanics 3  
    Source: Interviews 
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Table 6.4: Agronomy Department Employees at Limbe Leaf, 2012 
 
Job Number of Employees Description 
Zone leaders 350 Lead farmers used to 
disseminate best practices, 
expenses paid (only) 
Leaf technicians 77 Agronomy extension officers 
ALP 4 Staff responsible for 
implementation of PMI’s 
Agricultural Labour Practices 
GAP 3 Staff responsible for 
implementation of Good 
Agricultural Practices 
Forestry 4 Staff responsible for 
implementation of Limbe 
Leaf forestry programme 
Area coordinators 8 - 
Operations manager 1 - 
Market liaison staff 8 Linking area officers to 
floors, sales 
Monitoring and evaluation 
systems management 
2 - 
Support logistics 2 Procurement, inputs 
Admin officers 16 (2 per area) - 
Accounts personnel 2 - 
    Source: Interviews 
 
Beyond investing in an agronomy department, the implementation of contract 
farming entails a number of further costs and risks from the leaf merchants’ perspective248.  
The leaf merchants need to source inputs for the farmers, develop relationships with 
banks that will provide finance for the purchase of these inputs and accept part of the 
liability for these loans as smallholders do not generally have sufficient collateral for the 
banks to provide loans (interviews).   
The model being used by AOI and Premium-TAMA (which appears to be similar to 
those being used by competitors) was developed over the first couple years of (burley) 
contract farming (introduced in the 2005/6 season).  The farmers are given loans by 
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 The implementation of contract farming from the farmers’ perspective will be discussed in further detail 
below in Section 6.3 of this chapter on upgrading.   
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Malawian commercial banks on a joint liability basis through the so-called “burley clubs”.  
The clubs are responsible for the first 15% of the loan in the case of default and the leaf 
merchant for the next 6-10%.  This leaves the banks responsible for (at most) 69% of the 
loan in the case of default.  Although all parties appear to be happy with the model the 
burden rests significantly on the leaf merchants (as opposed to the bank) as they are not 
only partially reliable in the case of default but also do much of the work that one would 
normally consider to be the responsibility of the lender such as screening of customers, 
follow up in case of default, etc. (interviews).  
In addition to working with banks, Limbe Leaf also does direct lending to some of 
its farmers (estimated at about 20%).  The interest rates available to farmers through this 
sort of lending are much lower than those offered through commercial bank loans 
(roughly 3.75% versus 37%) and hence appear to be beneficial to the farmer.  Limbe Leaf 
of course bears much more risk through this sort of lending (interviews).  
However, interviews reveal that some leaf merchants do not deem financial 
implications of the shift to C&T tobacco to be the most burdensome, but rather training.  
Training is carried out by leaf merchants in a number of ways, including but not limited to: 
field days, workshops, and conferences with farmers, via leaf technicians which work 
directly with farmers, and via growers’ representatives in farmer organisations (more on 
which in Chapter 7) (direct observation; interviews). This point has been emphasized in 
light of the fact that part of what is required is changing long-time practices such as the 
use of child labour and deforestation (interviews).   
 
 
6.2.2 Governance as Coordination 
 
The main contribution of Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) is their elaboration 
upon the variety of value chain governance forms which fall in between the two end-
points of vertical integration and arms-length market interactions.  As explained in 
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Chapter 1, the authors refer to these governance types as “network relationships.”  The 
authors postulate three main types of network relationships - modular, relational, and 
captive - which are functions of the complexity of transactions, ability to codify 
transactions, and capabilities in the supply base, see Table 6.5 (reproduced from Chapter 
1). 
It is important to note that although this is one of the more complex and developed 
theories regarding value chain governance, an important caveat - which the authors 
themselves point out - is the subjective nature of the evaluation of the degrees of 
complexity of transactions, codification, and capabilities in the supply base.  Furthermore, 
for the purposes of this model of governance, the three previously-mentioned indicators 
are designated as either “high” or “low”.  In reality, these indicators are much more likely 
to be located on a continuum with “high” and “low” representing end-points, rather than 
dichotomous alternatives.  However, within the restrictions of the model, we will discuss 
each of these indicators, as well as their predictive implications for governance (as 
coordination) at the lead firm-first tier supplier node of the ICC-Malawi Tobacco Value 
Chain.   
 
Table 6.5: Key Determinants of GVC Governance 
 
Governance type Complexity of 
transactions 
Ability to 
codify 
transactions 
Capabilities 
in the 
supply-base 
Degree of 
explicit 
coordination 
and power 
asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low 
Modular High High High 
 
Relational High Low High  
Captive High High Low  
Hierarchy High Low Low High 
      Source: Modified from Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005, p 87) 
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Gereffi et al.’s (2005, p 85) first factor is “The complexity of information and 
knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular transaction, particularly with respect 
to product and process specifications…”  The complexity of transactions is considered to 
increase when lead firms increase demands on their suppliers and considered to decrease 
through standards (re codification).  With the previously stated caveat that the degree of 
complexity of transactions is measured subjectively rather than scientifically, we argue 
that the transactions between ICCs and leaf merchants are highly complex.  Referring back 
to the Critical Success Factors - established in Chapter 5 - which drive buying decisions of 
ICCS in Malawi, one can see that establishing the degree to which each CSF is met requires 
a large amount of detailed and complex information. 
The more traditional CSFs, such as price and quality, are less complex than some of 
the others.  In particular, quality is relatively easily established through visual inspection.  
Price is somewhat more complex however, in that ICCs are increasingly demanding 
detailed information on leaf merchants’ costs structures in order to determine how much 
they are willing to pay for tobacco.  This implies increased flow of information between 
accountants and finance directors rather than just on-the-floors negotiations between leaf 
merchants’ salespeople and buyers.  Crop integrity can to a certain extent be established 
through physical inspection (e.g. NTRM); however chemical residues need to be 
established through lab tests.  GAP and the use of child labour, however, cannot be 
established through physical inspection.  To credibly establish these credence issues for 
ICCs, leaf merchants need to first disseminate methods of combatting non-GAP cultivation 
and the use of child labour and then collect an extensive amount of data on farmer 
cultivation practices and communicate this data in a simple manner to ICC buyers  
(interviews; more on which below).     
Codification refers to   
…the extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and, 
therefore, transmitted efficiently and without transaction-specific 
investment between the parties to the transaction (Gereffi et al., 2005, p 
85)… 
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Contract farming is only part of ensuring C&T.  In fact, it could be argued that contract 
farming is merely a method of improving compliance.  The other essential part entails the 
ability to prove compliance to customers, i.e. traceability.  Interviews suggest that ten 
years ago the Blue Chips appeared to be much less concerned with traceability.  They 
would arrive occasionally in Malawi and demand to visit one of the farmers who was 
producing the tobacco they were buying.  It was common practice for leaf merchant 
officials to bring the ICC representative to one of their “model farmers” who they knew 
met all of the ICC’s compliance standards.  As concerns regarding traceability started to 
increase the ICC representative would start to demand to see a particular farmer.  The leaf 
merchants would respond in kind by bringing that farmer to their “model farm” thereby 
creating the appearance of conformity to ICC standards.  However, interviews revealed 
that at the time of fieldwork this model was no longer feasible.  The ICC representatives 
may arrive unannounced, with lawyers and agronomists in tow, and demand to see a 
particular farmer at a particular location.  The ICCs are also demanding more generalized 
data on their farmers in order to control the amount of pesticide use, child labour, etc.  
The leaf merchants selling to the Blue Chips have responded by embarking on enormous 
data collection endeavours with their contracted farmers.  Two of the three leaf 
merchants selling large amounts of tobacco to the Blue Chips have hired Agronomy 
Technologies, a private company, to provide data collection services249 (interviews), in 
what could be interpreted as a massive attempt to codify information. 
Agronomy Technologies designs a number of questionnaires in order to gather 
information from contract growers which are of interest to the leaf merchants; this in turn 
reflects what is of interest to the ICCs.  This information includes crop estimates, chemical 
use, use of child labour and other compliance concerns, as well as a number of social 
issues such as presence of clinics and schools in the area, prevalence of malaria and green 
tobacco sickness, and sources of income for tobacco-growing families.  Agronomy 
Technologies trains the leaf merchants’ agronomy officials on how to administer the 
survey on a handheld device with GPS positioning.  The agronomy officials then conduct 
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 JTI is believed to have its own system of data collection.  The third leaf merchant selling to blue-chips is 
believed to have a similar system to Agronomy Technologies. 
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the survey in five different visits to the farms, with the GPS confirming that the agronomy 
officials actually visited the farm.  In addition to a series of closed questions the survey 
also has room for the agronomy officials to note observations such as the presence of 
child labour on the farm despite a farmer’s denial.  As the information is entered onto the 
handheld devices it flows automatically to Agronomy Technologies which then cleans the 
data and produces reports for the leaf merchants.  This enables the leaf merchants to 
indicate to their (Blue Chip) customers the prevalence of child labour among their contract 
growers, which tasks children are doing, which pesticides are being used, etc.  This system 
is new and expensive250 yet provides the traceability that the ICCs are demanding.  In fact 
the ICCs want this type of system extended to cover all of the farmers that are producing 
the tobacco they buy (interviews).        
Gereffi et al. (2005, p 85) list “…the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in 
relation to the requirements of the transaction” as one of the determinants of GVC 
governance.  To the extent that capabilities in the supply base can be measured by 
suppliers’ abilty to meet new demands of lead firms, we argue that the capabilities of leaf 
merchants in Malawi which serve the BC end-market are high and increasing.  The 
evidence for this is that in a very short period of time, AOI, Limbe Leaf, and Premium-
TAMA have created and/or expanded agronomy departments (as demonstrated above), 
disseminated desirable farming processes to farmers, established relationships with 
farmers which lead to better (in the view of the ICCs) practices, and established systems of 
monitoring and evaluation of farmers and methods of communicating this information 
back to customers.  The level of capabilities in the above-listed leaf merchants, as well as 
at JTI, can also be established by point of comparison with Malawi Leaf, which has not 
been able to achieve the objectives listed above to the same degree.  Malawi Leaf could 
therefore be considered to have a low level of capabilities.   
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 Costs for the leaf merchants average US$ 6.30 per farmer per season but the exact cost will depend on a 
number of factors (interviews).  These costs are considerable when one considers the thousands of farmers 
that are being contracted.   
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 Predictions and Outcomes.  Referring back to Table 6.5 above, and given our 
assertion that transactions are highly complex, that information can be codified and that 
there is a high degree of capabilities in the supply base, Gereffi et al.’s (2005) theory 
would predict that governance is modular and that there is a relatively low degree of 
power asymmetry between lead firms and first tier suppliers.  Indeed, as predicted by this 
theory of governance, transactional dependence does not appear to be particularly 
prevalent in that leaf merchants sell to various ICCs and ICCs buy from various leaf 
merchants.  ICCs do not appear to “lock-in” certain leaf merchants.   
However, a striking discrepancy between the theory’s predictions and our 
observations is the degree of power asymmetries between lead firms and first tier 
suppliers (more on which below).  Of course, in the case of JTI, GVC governance is 
hierarchical as this company has vertically integrated in order to achieve its objectives.  
However, in terms of power relations between the remaining ICCs and the leaf 
merchants, the degree of power asymmetry more closely corresponds to that ascribed 
to “captive” value chains: 
…power is exerted directly by lead firms on suppliers, which is analogous to the 
direct administrative control that top management at headquarters might exert over 
subordinates in an off-shore subsidiary or affiliate of a vertically integrated firm (or 
‘hierarchy’ in our framework).  Such direct control suggests a high degree of explicit 
coordination and a large measure of power asymmetry (Gereffi et al., 2005, p88)…     
 
 Whilst Gereffi et al.’s (2005) theory of governance did not provide accurate 
predictions in our case study, it is still useful because it expands upon the network forms 
of governance typical of buyer-driven chains.  In so doing, the theory draws our attention 
to three factors in particular which have the potential to explain/predict the degree of 
explicit coordination and power asymmetry in a global value chain.  Our case study of the 
ICC-Malawi Tobacco Value Chain also highlights a number of weaknesses in these authors’ 
theory and potentially contributes to an expansion of the theory with greater explicative 
power in other case studies.  We consider these weaknesses below. 
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 As emphasized above, and as pointed out by the authors themselves, the theory 
relies on subjective measures of the main determinants.  Of particular concern in our case 
study is the measure of capabilities in the supply base.  We have argued that there is a 
high degree of capabilities in the supply base as evidenced by the fact that leaf merchants 
serving the BC end-market have been able to meet the ICCs’ new requirements for C&T 
tobacco and by the fact that the one leaf merchant that has been unable to meet new 
demands has also been largely unable to serve the BC end-market.  However, one could 
counter-argue that supplier capabilities are actually low in that the leaf merchants have 
received major support from ICCs in these endeavours.  For example, PMI has financed 
some of the leaf merchants’ equipment and provided guidance on and interpretation of 
laws relating to child labour in order to enable leaf merchants and farmers to more easily 
eliminate the latter.  The ICCs are also involved in training leaf merchant officials and 
aiding the leaf merchants in training their staff on compliance issues251.  Furthermore ICCs 
often either conduct their own audits or contract outside organization to conduct audits 
to make sure that C&T tobacco is actually compliant (interviews).     
 Another potential weakness in the theory is its (in)ability to capture certain 
dynamic elements of the governance predictors.  Although the authors claim that one of 
the strengths of the theory is its ability to capture the dynamics of global value chain 
governance, it is important to note that the measures of the three governance predictors 
can change over time and hence would lead one to predict different forms of governance 
depending on when these measures are evaluated.  Whilst the authors do point this out, 
what is relevant for our case is that even testing the theory at different points in time 
does not bear accurate results.  Continuing on from our discussion above on the level of 
capabilities in the supply base, and putting aside for the moment that this measure is 
subjective, it could be argued that the measure would be different if evaluated in the year 
2009 than if evaluated in the year 2012.  As can be seen in Figures 6.1-6.3 above, the 
major expansion in leaf merchant agronomy departments started after 2009.  Prior to this 
expansion, the leaf merchants had relatively low abilities to deliver C&T tobacco and 
hence meet the demands of their customers.  The ability to codify information was also 
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 For the specific case of PMI and the ALP Code, refer to Chapter 3. 
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low because the leaf merchants had not yet embarked on their massive data collection 
endeavours.  Therefore, Gereffi et al.’s theory would have predicted that the hierarchy 
form of value chain governance would have prevailed.     Their predictions proved partially 
correct in that in an effort to achieve their objectives by directly sourcing their own 
tobacco rather than by imposing their demands on suppliers, JTI decided to vertically 
integrate by acquiring AfricaLeaf in 2009 (interviews).   
 Furthermore, although the theory does account for the fact that different nodes of 
a value chain can be characterized by different forms of governance, it does not appear to 
account for the situation where one node of a value chain - consisting of a group of similar 
lead firms originally purchasing from the same supply base - is characterized by two 
different forms of governance.  This is notably the case in the lead firm-first tier supplier 
node of our value chain case study.  Given that the theory does not account for multiple 
governance forms at one node of the chain, it by logical extension cannot account for how 
one form of governance can influence other forms of governance at the same node of the 
value chain.  In our case study, we argue that JTI’s decision to vertically integrate has had 
major consequences for the power asymmetries between ICCs and the remaining leaf 
merchants. 
 
Table 6.6: Lead Firm-First Tier Supplier Chain Governance 
 
Lead Firms (Cigarette 
Companies) 
First Tier Suppliers (Leaf 
Merchants) 
GVC Governance Type 
JT JTI (Malawi subsidiary) Hierarchy 
Blue Chips (excluding JT) Limbe Leaf (Universal 
Corporation) 
Alliance One International 
Premium-TAMA 
Captive (in terms of power 
asymmetries and explicit 
coordination) 
 
JTI’s vertical integration has increased power asymmetries between ICCs and leaf 
merchants in a number of ways.  For one, JTI’s move to directly source its own tobacco 
removed one of the major BC customers and hence increased the concentration of the BC 
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end-market for Malawian tobacco.  Increased buyer concentration, as emphasized by 
much of GVC analysis, often leads to increased negotiating power of buyers over suppliers 
as suppliers become more beholden to the smaller number of remaining buyers.  
Furthermore, JTI’s vertical integration has consequences for the level of competition in 
the leaf merchant sector in Malawi.  Although JTI’s vertical integration does not represent 
an increase in the number of buyers (because the integration occurred through the 
acquisition of AfricaLeaf, a pre-existing leaf merchant), JTI does have the potential to 
represent more serious competition for the multi-national leaf merchants operating in 
Malawi.  This is because JTI also benefits from a number of the characteristics which 
enhance the multi-national leaf merchants’ competitiveness, e.g. access to finance on 
favourable terms, access to agronomy R&D, etc.  Anecdotal evidence of this assertion is 
seen in interviews with various officials at farmer associations, who looked favourably 
upon JTI’s vertical integration as the company was perceived to offer better contracts 
and/or prices to the farmers it contracted (interviews).   
Secondly, and as stated above, JTI’s vertical integration serves as an implicit threat 
to leaf merchants of what can happen if they do not conform to buyers’ demands.  In fact, 
interviews reveal that some leaf merchants have considered the possibilities of joint 
ventures with ICCs.  A joint venture, it could be argued, would lead to a form of 
governance somewhere between captive and hierarchy.  However, the threat of further 
vertical integration may actually negate its occurrence.  As one leaf merchant official 
stated, there’s no need for vertical integration because “when they (ICCs) say jump, we 
say how high?” (interviews).  
    Another element of our case study which is not predicted by Gereffi et al.’s (2005) 
theory is that interviews reveal that PMI is the leader of the BC end-market.  In other 
words, the compliance standards that PMI sets for its suppliers appear to be accepted by 
PMI’s BC competitors.  This “leader of the pack” role of PMI was confirmed by numerous 
respondents in interviews.  For example, the GAP and child labour issues appear to be 
driven by PMI’s pressure and the Agricultural Labour Practices (ALP) Code.  Furthermore, 
the surveys that Agronomy Technologies designs are largely based on templates provided 
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by PMI, even though the data collected serves multiple BC customers (interviews)252.  The 
extent of PMI’s involvement and leadership is somewhat revealed in the following passage 
from PMI (2012c, p 28): 
PMI’s leaf purchases in Malawi are entirely conducted through leaf suppliers who in 
turn have to procure the bulk of the tobacco through the auction system.  PMI does 
not have Malawi-based personnel and much of our effort is carried out in close 
coordination with or by our suppliers.  In the absence of direct contracts, PMI has 
been pursuing a three-pronged approach for dealing with child labor and other labor 
practices issues in Malawi: 
 Engage with the government to implement a supply chain system where 
leaf suppliers or tobacco manufacturers can establish direct contractual 
relationships that allow for ongoing support of farmers by field technicians; 
 Support multi-party efforts to improve the regulatory framework and 
define concrete actions and accountabilities to implement the national 
action plan on child labor; 
 Continue to support community level initiatives to tackle the root causes of 
child labor. 
 
This is a particularly interesting finding in that although GVC analysis often draws 
attention to power asymmetries and the role of lead firms, it often does not usually allow 
for distinct levels of power between different lead firms, or for the role of a leader within 
the lead firm sector.  In terms of Gereffi et al.’s theory, PMI’s role as “leader of the pack” 
has a particular impact on the ability to codify transactions and consequently on the 
degree of transactional dependence between lead firms and first tier suppliers.  PMI’s 
status as lead firm leader goes a long way in explaining why Gereffi et al.’s (2005) captive 
value chains predictors do not hold in our case study.  Regarding the power asymmetries 
of captive value chains, Gereffi et al. (2005, pp. 86-87) state the following: 
…low supplier competence in the face of complex products and specifications 
requires a great deal of intervention and control on the part of the lead firm, 
encouraging the build-up of transactional dependence as lead firms seek to lock-in 
suppliers in order to exclude others from reaping the benefits of their efforts.  
Therefore, the suppliers face significant switching costs and are ‘captive’. 
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 There is scope for investigation into the extent to which PMI acts as lead firm leader in other countries.  
For example, PMI (2012c, p 31) states that one of its major suppliers has agreed to implement the ALP Code 
in all of its tobacco sourcing locations and that the other major supplier is considering the same.  
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However, as established above, PMI does not seek to “lock-in” its suppliers but rather 
appears to allow other BC customers to reap the benefits of its C&T programmes.  
Therefore transactional dependence is minimized yet power asymmetries remain high.   
 
First Tier-Second Tier Coordination.  Although our principal area of investigation in 
this work relates to how lead firms govern the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain, with a 
particular emphasis on interactions at the lead firm-first tier supplier node, and our main 
interest in the impact of this governance (as coordination) on famers lies in the 
smallholder burley sector (more on which below), we can still make a number of general 
observations on the governance of the first tier-second tier supplier node of the chain.  
However, and in light of the above caveat, we will retain Gereffi et al.’s five governance 
typologies here for the purpose of description, and will not attempt to test the predictive 
powers of the theory at this node of the chain.  
Our observations suggest that elements of several of Gereffi et al.’s governance 
typologies can be seen in the first tier-second tier supplier node of the chain.  For instance, 
in some instances the hierarchy mode of governance is present, notably in the case of leaf 
merchants vertically integrating to administer their own farms for production of FCV 
tobacco.  For example, AOI’s agronomy department leases or owns 19 FCV tobacco farms 
which it runs directly, producing 2.9 million kgs of flue-cured tobacco per year (interviews).  
We argue that different elements of the network governance types - modular, relational, 
and captive - can be seen in the various forms of contract farming (more on which below).  
Indeed the very word “contract” implies a “locking-in” of suppler and buyer.  The level of 
transactional dependence will depend on the amount of support given by the buyers (in 
this case, with the exception of JTI, the first tier suppliers are the buyers) to the (second 
tier) suppliers.  As will be described in more detail below, some forms of contract farming 
provide extensive supervision, finance, and inputs, whereas others merely apply a 
contractual obligation to buy tobacco in a given season.  Therefore, relations between leaf 
merchants and (contracted) large burley farmers who are able to produce a high quality 
crop whilst adhering to compliance requirements of buyers may more closely approximate 
Gereffi et al.’s (2005) modular form of governance. 
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With regard to C&T tobacco produced by burley smallholders (the details of which 
will be discussed below), we argue that relations between leaf merchants and growers 
correspond to the captive governance type.  Indeed, and in addition to being “locked in” 
to the transaction due to contractual obligation, smallholder burley farmers producing 
C&T tobacco are dependent on leaf merchants for finance, inputs, and detailed 
instructions.  Interactions of this node of the chain also correspond to Gereffi et al.’s (2005, 
p 84) description of this type of governance: 
In these networks, small suppliers are transactionally dependent on much larger 
buyers.  Suppliers face significant switching costs and are, therefore ‘captive’.  Such 
networks are frequently characterized by a high degree of monitoring and control by 
lead firms.         
 
 The apparent heterogeneity of governance (as coordination) types at this node of 
the chain is a reflection of a number of themes which are highlighted throughout this 
work.  These include but not are limited to: the level of differentiation among tobacco 
farmers (discussed in Chapter 4, more on which in Chapter 7), the existence of two end-
markets characterized by firms with different sourcing objectives (discussed in Chapter 5), 
the somewhat unique (in terms of tobacco-producing countries) dual-marketing system 
(auction and contract farming, more on which below and in Chapters 7 and 8), and the 
changing nature of the global tobacco industry, i.e. the increasing importance of 
compliance and traceability (discussed in Chapter 3).  The level of transactional 
dependence of farmers on leaf merchants, the increase in contract farming, and the shift 
from auction to C&T tobacco, are all intimately connected with the key GVC concept of 
upgrading.  It is to this subject that we now turn.      
 
 
6.3  Upgrading 
 
It may be a stretch to consider participation in the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain a 
dynamic learning curve in the Gereffi sense, however the industry is certainly dynamic.  
Just within the past decade, there have been numerous changes in key actors in the 
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industry and a number of examples of different types of upgrading.  There have been 
some (limited) instances of functional and inter-sectoral upgrading and extensive 
examples of product and process upgrading, notably through contract farming (more on 
which below).  
In terms of functional upgrading the key example, and indeed a major priority of 
government, would be the establishment in Malawi of a cigarette factory by a multi-
national company, orientated towards exports.  As we have established in Chapter 3, 
there are considerable and indeed prohibitive, entry barriers for leaf merchants wishing to 
venture into cigarette production.  This is the case not just globally but also in Malawi.  In 
fact when asked about the possibility of venturing into cigarette production in an 
interview, one respondent replied that leaf merchants could never do that because the 
ICCs would perceive them as competitors and cease tobacco purchases (interviews).   
This leaves two possible options for functional upgrading into cigarette production: 
either JTI will start producing cigarettes or a different ICC will be persuaded to establish 
operations in Malawi.  However, at the time of completion of fieldwork, no BCs were 
manufacturing cigarettes in Malawi253, and no leaf merchants were considering venturing 
in to cigarette manufacturing.  Furthermore, and following on from our discussion in 
Chapter 3 where we highlighted both the fact that ICCs tend to locate their manufacturing 
facilities near key markets and the trend of ICCs to rationalise manufacturing facilities, 
Malawi appears to be a particularly unattractive location for an ICC cigarette plant.  For 
example, Eriksen et al. (2012, pp. 98-105) list Malawi as having one of the lowest cigarette 
(per capita) consumption rates in the world.  For cigarette per capita consumption in 
slected countries, see Figure 6.5 below.  Given the population sizes of the countries in 
Figure 6.5, when comparing the size of overall cigarette markets (i.e. the total amount of 
cigarettes consumed per annum) Malawi appears an even less attractive option for 
manufacturing plant location.     
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 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Nyasa Manufacturing was producing cigarettes at the time of fieldwork, 
however their purchasing and market size appeared to be minimal.  According to the TCC the company did 
not purchase tobacco directly on the auction floors, and no leaf merchant official interviewed during 
fieldwork named the company as a customer. 
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Figure 6.5: Cigarette Per Capita Consumption in Selected Countries 
 
 
           Source: Created by author from Eriksen et al. (2012, pp. 98-105). 
     
 
6.3.1 Product and Process Upgrading: The Case of Contract Farming 
 
From our discussion above, and indeed from the perspective of the ICCs, we can 
identify two principal types of tobacco, or two different products.  On the one hand there 
is the traditional burley tobacco, produced by smallholders and sold via auction.  We refer 
to this sort as standard tobacco (Moyer-Lee and Prowse, 2012).  On the other hand there 
is the integrated production system (IPS) tobacco which is grown on contract and 
produced with all the correct inputs and adheres to all the appropriate standards, i.e. 
compliant and traceable (C&T) tobacco (interviews).   
In the IPS system, farmers receive an input package which includes a number of items 
such as fertilizer, maize seeds, transport, chemicals, tobacco seeds, and hessian254.  In 
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addition, the farmer is also often linked to a commercial bank for financing (or receives 
direct financing from leaf merchants), receives agronomical supervision and purchase is 
arranged in advance.  The combination of the above factors results in much higher yields 
for IPS tobacco of roughly 1700/1800 kilogrammes per hectare compared to the standard 
tobacco yields of 700/800 kilogrammes per hectare255 (interviews).   
  Measures to increase food security tend to be a key component of IPS, hence the 
inclusion of maize seed in many of the input packages.  Also, one of the company’s input 
package includes a cash advance of US$ 107 for three months of the lean season256.   A 
different leaf merchant provides groundnuts as part of the input package and yet another 
is experimenting with including seeds for vegetables.  There are a number of potential 
reasons for the leaf merchants to include food security as one of the objectives of their 
input packages.  One of the more cynical reasons is that promoting food security is an 
effective means of mitigating against side-selling, whereby a contracted farmer sells 
his/her tobacco early in the season to a trader or independent buyer in order to obtain 
cash for purchase of food in the lean months.  Side-selling from the leaf merchants’ 
perspective leads to accumulation of bad debt and reduction in tobacco obtained 
(interviews).   
A slightly less cynical interpretation of the rationale for food security content is that it 
can be used to lobby government.  The leaf merchants (at time of fieldwork) were still in 
the process of lobbying the government in an effort to obtain permission to run the entire 
Malawian tobacco market via contract farming rather than auction.  The government had 
been extremely reluctant to allow this for a number of reasons (more on which in Chapter 
7).  One of these reasons, at least ostensibly, is concern for the welfare of the smallholder 
farmer growing tobacco by contract.  Demonstrating that this smallholder farmer will 
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 Moyer-Lee and Prowse (2012, p 17) note that  
This latter figure tallies broadly with wider estimates.  For example, the average smallholder burley 
yield in Kasungu Agricultural Development District (ADD) in 2001 was 280.4 per acre (701 kgs per hec) 
whilst a small-n survey in Kasungu district in 2004 found an average burley yield of 360 kgs per acre 
(900 kgs per hec). 
256
 The lean season in Malawi is the time (usually January to March) after which many smallholders have 
consumed most or all of the previous season’s maize harvest and before the following season’s harvest.  
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obtain a number of benefits from contract farming, including improved food security, is a 
strong arguing point for the leaf merchants (interviews).   
C&T tobacco, produced through IPS, contains different elements of product and 
process upgrading.  In the case of product upgrading, as stated above, it is plausible that 
the characteristics of IPS (C&T) tobacco are different enough from standard tobacco for 
the two to be considered different products.  In line with our discussion of product 
differentiation through credence factors (Chapter 1), it could be argued that IPS (C&T) 
tobacco is essentially differentiated through its process atributes and traceability (Moyer-
Lee and Prowse, 2012).  Of these two, IPS tobacco is of much more value to the lead firms, 
which is why they have been insistently demanding that all tobacco be IPS tobacco.  Of 
course, one of the key characteristics of IPS tobacco from the lead firms’ perspective (and 
as seen in our discussion of Agronomy Technologies above) is that it be tracebale, i.e. that 
data on the production processes and producers are available.   
In terms of the product upgrading concept, the prices associated with IPS tobacco have 
been higher in the 2009/2010 (by about US$ 0.60) and 2010/11 (by US$ 0.30-0.40) 
seasons than the national average price (interviews).  According to a leaf merchant official, 
their IPS farmers earned 193 MKW257 per person-day (above minimum wage) as compared 
to the average (standard tobacco) farmer who earned 106 MKW per person-day, which is 
not only below minimum wage, but also potentially a loss on investment (interviews).  
From the farmers’ perspective, in addition to being a product that the lead firms are 
demanding, IPS tobacco can also be considered a product upgrade in that it is associated 
with very real benefits for the farmer such as measures to improve food security and cash 
advances for the lean season.   
Many of the elements in Gibbon’s (2001, p 352) description of upgrading are present as 
well: 
…the capture of higher margins on exports of existing forms of unprocessed raw 
material, by moving up the quality grade ladder, increasing volumes and reliability of 
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supply, securing more remunerative contracts through forward sales and becoming 
active in hedging risk via utilizing futures and options instruments. 
 
The IPS system exhibits many of the characteristics outlined in the quote above, as well as 
with common elements of “process upgrading” highlighted by the GVC-GHS literature, 
namely improved quality, increased volumes, increased reliability, and hedging of risk.  
The agronomical supervision associated with IPS leads to a better quality crop.  The 
supervision combined with improved inputs leads to increased volumes by individual 
farmers (as seen in the yields above), and risk is reduced and financial management 
improved with the signing of a contract months prior to sale (interviews).  For an example 
of one company’s quality comparison between standard and IPS tobacco, see Table 6.7 
below. 
 
Table 6.7: AOI IPS Quality Benefits, 2006-11 
 
Quality(a) Auction(b) % AOI IPS % 
1 6 15 
2 16 22 
3 41 37 
4 23 18 
5 12 7 
6 2 1.5 
Source: Modified from AOI (2012b, p 11)   
(a) AOI uses its own quality grading system which is different from the TCC.  There are 6 
grades, ranging from 1 (best quality) to 6 (worst quality). 
(b) “Auction” tobacco in this case is synonymous with standard tobacco.  
 
 
The Complexities of Upgrading.  Whilst for analytical purposes it is convenient to 
portray the options for process and product upgrading as a simple dichotomy of standard 
(non-upgraded) tobacco on the one hand and IPS (upgraded) tobacco on the other, the 
reality of upgrading possibilities is more complex than this.  In fact we argue that it is more 
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useful to conceptualize product and process upgrading as continuous rather than 
dichotomous258.  For example, there are a number of different types of contract farming in 
the burley smallholder sector in Malawi.  The first useful distinction is between contract 
selling and contract growing.  Contract selling refers to an agreement between producer 
(farmer) and purchaser (leaf merchant) to buy/sell a given amount of tobacco.  There is no 
provision of inputs, agronomical supervision, or finance arrangement.  Contract growing 
on the other hand, implies some involvement of the purchaser in the growing process, 
usually through a combination of input provision, supervision and in some cases finance.  
Of course, as seen above, IPS involves all of these, however there are a number of 
different levels of buyer involvement in the growing process ranging from mere provision 
of seeds and limited supervision on the one hand to the full IPS on the other (see Figure 
6.6 below) (interviews).              
 
Figure 6.6: Degree of Buyer Involvement in Contract Farming (Process Upgrading) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The prevalence of the different types of contracts will depend on a number of 
factors including leaf merchant resources, past experience with given farmers, 
geographical locations of farmers, and in some cases, the ability of farmers to make a 
down payment or provide collateral.  Past (successful) dealings with individual farmers are 
seen as good indicators for future contracts (from the leaf merchants’ perspective) in that 
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the farmer has demonstrated that he/she will not default on the loan or side-sell 
(interviews).    
For example, Malawi Leaf (at the time of fieldwork) only engaged in contract 
selling and was planning on venturing into IPS in the 2013/14 season.  AOI was involved 
heavily in contract growing yet operated a number of different types of contract growing 
refferred to as tiers259.  This company’s contracted growers are therefore classified as first 
tier, second tier, or third tier contract growers (tier four refers to contract selling), 
depending on where they are located on the continuum in Figure 6.6.    For example, 
whilst Tiers One and Two include financing arrangements for growers, Tier Three is 
restricted to seed bed inputs and agronomical supervision (interviews).  See Table 6.8 for 
yield estimates for different tiers for AOI in the 2011/12 season.   
 
Table 6.8: Yield Estimates for AOI Contract Growing, by Tier (2011/12) 
 
Tier Yield (kgs/ha) 
Tier 1 1864 
Tier 2 1640 
Tier 3 1300 
  Source: Interviews 
 
Likewise, Limbe Leaf offered contracts with differing levels of buyer involvement in 
the growing process.  This company distinguished the contracts according to tiers as well 
with Tier One amounting to full IPS and Tier Three essentially contract selling.  For the 
yield estimates for Limbe Leaf contract farming according to tier level of the contract, see 
Table 6.9 below.  Premium-TAMA also offers its contracted farmers different tiered 
contracts with Tier One representing IPS, Tier Two containing seeds and agronomical 
supervision, and Tier Three representing contract selling (see Table 6.10 below).  Within 
Tier One there are three sub-categories with different input levels (interviews).  To the 
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extent that inputs (such as fertilizer) partially determine increased yields, which according 
to the GVC-GHS literature is a form of process upgrading in agricultural value chains, the 
various tiers of contracts offered by leaf merchants can be taken to represent different 
degrees of process upgrading for the contracted farmers.   
 
Table 6.9: Limbe Leaf Yield Estimates for Contract Farming, According to Tier 
 
Tier Yield (kgs/ha) 
Tier One 1400 
Tier Two 1200 
Tier Three 1000 
Source: Interviews 
 
Table 6.10: Input Levels in Premium-TAMA Contracts, According to Tier 
 
Tier Inputs 
Tier One- Full Gap Super D (NPK) fertiliser 225kgs/0.5ha; CAN 
fertiliser 100 kgs/0.5ha; maize fertiliser; 
hybrid maize seed; plastic sheets; certified 
tobacco seed; hessian; 3 month cash advance 
at US$ 33/month; US$ 33 allowance for 
curing barn; agronomy supervision; financing; 
aforestation; 
Tier One- Full Gap Economy Same as above without hessian; Super D 
fertiliser at 200 kgs/0.5ha; no plastic sheets; 2 
months cash advance; no curing barn 
allowance 
Tier One- Half Gap Same as above except Super D at 150 
kgs/0.5ha; 
Tier Two Certified seed; agronomy extension 
Tier Three Contract selling 
Source: Interviews 
 
In total, in the 2012/13 season, out of AOI’s 22.5 million kgs of contracted tobacco, 
11 million kgs were contracted through the IPS system (AOI, 2012b, p 5).  One of the leaf 
merchants’ main objectives of operating different tiers is to progress farmers through to 
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Tier One.  For AOI’s planned progression of farmers through tiers in coming seasons, see 
Table 6.11 below.  Premium-TAMA also plans on moving contracted farmers up the tiers 
and into IPS (see Table 6.12 below).        
 
Table 6.11: AOI Desired IPS Projected through 2015 Crop 
 
 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 
Tier 1 5,300 8,000 12,000 15,000 
Tier 2 2,800 5,000 7,500 10,000 
Tier 3 3,600 8,000 10,500 15,000 
Tier 4 28,300 19,000 10,000 - 
Total 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 
    Source: Reproduced from AOI (2012b, p 9) 
 
Table 6.12: Premium-TAMA Farmer Objectives by Tier 
 
Tier 2011/12 2012/13 (target) 
Tier 1 1,650 2,500 
Tier 2 15,000 22,000 
    Source: Interviews  
 
 Product upgrading, to the extent that it is proxied by the degree of compliance and 
traceability (i.e. credence attributes as per Chapter 1 and Moyer-Lee and Prowse, 2012), 
can also be situated on a continuum (see Figure 6.7 below).  Contract farming in general, 
and IPS in particular, is no guarantee of meeting the ICCs’ C&T demands.  It is merely 
perceived to be the best method in attempting to meet these demands.  Some elements 
of compliance are easier to address than others.  For example, use of pesticides and 
chemicals that conform to ICC standards is controlled by including the correct products in 
the input package.  Traceability is also relatively easy to implement (although not 
inexpensive) as seen with the example of Agronomy Technologies above.  Compliance on 
other issues, however, such as child labour, is much more difficult to ensure.  Indeed, IPS 
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tobacco with comprehensive data is merely a first step in dealing with such compliance 
issues in that it provides the ICCs with more information on these issues.  Information on 
which specific tasks in the harvesting process are performed by children can lead to more 
appropriate solutions (interviews).         
 
Figure 6.7: Degree of Compliance and Traceability (Product Upgrading) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
An example of this notion of the continuous nature of C&T can be seen explicitly in 
AOI’s own evaluations of the degree of compliance in the different types of contracts the 
company offers to growers (see Table 6.13 below).  Likewise, the sub-categories of Tier 
One contracts at Premium-TAMA are Full GAP, Full GAP economy, and Half GAP, implying 
different levels of compliance with good agricultural practices.  In terms of traceability, 
data on farmers on Tiers One and Two at Premium-TAMA are collected with the 
Agronomy Technologies system described above (interviews).  
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Table 6.13: AOI Compliance Levels by Tier 
 
Target Issue Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Contract marketing 
 Compliance levels Low 
GAP Full Full Reduced 
inputs ability 
N/A 
ALP Full Full Full Only contractual 
Total Product 
Integrity 
Full Full but with 
reduced 
inputs ability 
Full but with 
reduced 
inputs ability 
Reduced 
       Source: Modified from AOI (2012b, p 10) 
   
The continuous nature of C&T, buyer involvement in contract farming, and hence 
product and process upgrading, are brought together in Figure 6.8 below.  As argued 
above, we can see in Figure 6.8 that the degree of product upgrading increases with 
increasing compliance and traceability.  Likewise, the degree of process upgrading 
increases with increasing involvement of the leaf merchants in the growing process of 
their contracted growers.  Box A in Figure 6.8 therefore represents the standard tobacco 
farmer where tobacco is grown with minimal inputs, no agricultural or labour practices are 
purposefully adhered to, and the tobacco is sold via auction.  Box A is representative of 
the majority of smallholder burley tobacco being produced in Malawi at the time of 
fieldwork.  Box B would represent the IPS system in terms of inputs provided and the 
consequential increase in yields and quality of tobacco.  Box B would imply that the IPS 
system is in operation without any data collection or attention paid to compliance factors 
such as child labour and/or pesticide use.  This would be unlikely in the Malawian context.  
Likewise Box C would be unlikely: full C&T without a beneficial input package and 
increases in yields and quality.  Box D, on the other hand is what the ICCs are demanding: 
full compliance and traceability through the IPS system.  Our discussion above can be 
represented graphically by conceptualizing smallholder burley farmers in Malawi as 
moving gradually from quadrant three (Q3) in Figure 6.8 towards quadrant two (Q2).   
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Figure 6.8: The Continuous Nature of Upgrading 
 
Degree of Product Upgrading  
 
    Degree of Buyer  Q1   Q2         Degree of Process 
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    Q3   Q4 
        
         Degree of Compliance and Traceability 
 
 
6.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have extended our earlier discussions of lead firm governance and 
upgrading in the GVCT to the case of Malawi.  In particular, we have addressed part of 
Research Questions 2.a, 3.a, and 4.a.  With regards to the part of Research Question 2.a 
answered here, i.e. How do lead firms drive the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco 
Value Chain?, we have emphasized issues of pricing and the definition of functions of first 
tier suppliers.  With regards to pricing we have shown how lead firms are increasingly 
demanding detailed cost structures of their suppliers in order to control the margin of 
profit accruing to the latter.  With regards to defining functions, we have discussed the ICC 
policy of decreasing durations, which logically shifts part of the warehousing and 
inventories burden to first tier suppliers.  However, the most important example of lead 
firms defining first tier suppliers’ functions is seen in the obligation of leaf merchants to 
shift procurement from standard to C&T tobacco.  As demonstrated in this chapter, this 
has required leaf merchants to massively expand their agronomy departments (both in 
B D 
A C 
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terms of budgets and employees), and to develop financing arrangements with banks, a 
system of contracts, and methods of codifying traceability.  The demand of the ICCs that 
production shift from standard  to C&T  tobacco is a good example of governance as 
drivenness because the impact is not limited to merely the lead firm-first tier supplier 
node of the chain.  As seen above, the demand for C&T tobacco has also dramatically 
altered the first tier supplier- farmer node of the chain, as farmers increasingly market 
their tobacco via contract and are encouraged to change standard production processes.   
Our discussion of the “big picture” of how lead firms are driving the Malawi Tobacco 
Value Chain, provokes the two further questions of how the lead firms coordinate their 
first tier suppliers, and whether the shift from standard to C&T  tobacco entails a form of 
upgrade for tobacco farmers.  The first of these two questions corresponds to Research 
Question 3.a, i.e. How is the lead firm-first tier supplier node of the Malawi Tobacco Value 
Chain coordinated?  Does the coordination observed correspond to the predictions of 
Gereffi et al. (2005)?  To answer this question we have attempted to test Gereffi et al.’s 
(2005) theory of value chain governance (as coordination) by evaluating the theory’s three 
independent variables and asking if the form of governance (as coordination) observed 
corresponds to the predictions of the theory.  We have argued that the theory would have 
predicted a modular form of value chain governance to prevail, whereas what we observe 
are both captive (in terms of power asymmetries and explicit coordination) and hierarchy 
forms of governance.  We have argued that this discrepancy occurs primarily as a result of 
the theory’s inability to differentiate the lead firm sector.  This is seen in our example both 
in the case of two forms of coordination occurring at one node of the chain and in the role 
of PMI as “leader of the pack”.   
Research Question 4.a asks: Have lead firms promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in 
what form and for whom?  In this chapter we have centred discussion of lead-firm 
promoted upgrading on the shift in smallholder burley production from standard to C&T 
tobacco.  We have engaged with the upgrading concept advocated by both the GVC-GHS 
and GVC-GPD variants.  With regards to the former we have highlighted the aspects of 
smallholder upgrading which correspond to both product and process upgrading, e.g. 
increased remuneration in the case of the former, higher yields and quality in the case of 
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the latter.  However, we have also engaged with a Gibbon-Ponte conceptualization of 
upgrading as improving the position of developing country suppliers by stressing the 
continuous (rather than dichotomous) nature of upgrading, as well as stressing aspects 
such as improved food security and security of sale.  This conceptualization has proved 
useful in that we have found the smallholder burley sector to be moving (upgrading) 
gradually from a position of low yielding, standard tobacco, to one of high yielding and 
more remunerative C&T tobacco.              
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Chapter 7: The Role of Government and 
Associational Power in Value Chain 
Governance and Upgrading 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will continue on from Chapter 6 by analysing chain governance (as 
drivenness) and upgrading within the ICC-Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value 
Chain.  We will continue to temporarily disregard the Non-Blue Chip end-market for 
Malawian tobacco (which we will return to in Chapter 8).  However, in this chapter we will 
draw on our analytical approach developed in Chapter 1 - in particular on our discussions 
of the developmental state and associational power - in order to address the following 
Research Questions: 
2.b Does the Malawian government play a role in driving the Malawi (smallholder burley) 
Tobacco Value Chain? 
4.b Has the Malawian government promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in what form 
and for whom? 
4.c Has farmer associational power contributed to upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in what 
form and for whom?   
In the remainder of this introduction we will provide a brief institutional context with 
particular reference to governmental and farmer organisations.  Section 7.2 will concern 
itself with chain governance (as drivenness).  This will be followed by Section 7.3 on 
upgrading and Section 7.4, which will conclude.       
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7.1.1 The State 
 
The Malawian state has a history of strong intervention in general and in the tobacco 
industry in particular (see Chapter 4).  The state has intervened in a number of ways 
ranging from a multitude of state-owned, -controlled, or –affiliated enterprises (e.g. 
ADMARC260, AHL261, Malawi Leaf262, MRFC263, Malawi Savings Bank), regulatory bodies (e.g. 
ARET264, TCC265), legislation, research and education (e.g. Bunda College of Agriculture266), 
establishing minimum prices, production quotas, and monetary and exchange rate policies, 
among others.  Rather than provide an encyclopaedic listing of these different 
institutions/policies and their impacts on the tobacco industry, we introduce them in our 
analysis below in relation to their role in the governance of and/or upgrading in the 
Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.   
However, in terms of understanding the context in which these institutions operate, it 
is perhaps useful to refer back to Mkandawire’s (2001) elaboration upon the notion of the 
Developmental State, with reference to Africa267.  In particular Mkandawire highlighted 
the importance of both ideology and structure in the definition of a developmental state.  
The Malawian state, during the Bingu wa Mutharika presidency (2004-2012) appears to 
correspond to Mkandawire’s (2001, p 291) definition of a developmental state 
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 Agriculture Development and Marketing Corporation (agricultural parastatal; see Chapter 4).  
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 Auction Holdings Limited is a subsidiary of ADMARC.  All tobacco sold in Malawi must pass through the 
auspices of this company. 
262
 Malawi Leaf is the only entirely Malawian-owned leaf merchant, and is a subsidiary of AHL (more on 
which below). 
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 The Malawi Rural Finance Corporation is a state-owned enterprise which provides micro-finance to 
farmers.   
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 Agricultural Research and Extension Trust is a research body in charge of accrediting the introduction of 
new technologies and products in the tobacco sector (more on which below).   
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 The Tobacco Control Commission is the governmental body in charge of regulating and licensing the 
stakeholders in the industry.   
266
 Bunda College of Agriculture offers degrees in agronomy and is responsible for training a large portion of 
agronomy-related staff in the Malawian tobacco industry. 
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 Of course, a comprehensive analysis of the Malawian state during the Mutharika presidency, and the 
relation of the latter to the developmental state literature, is far beyond the scope of this work.  However, 
we do intend to draw on some elements of the developmental state literature discussed in Chapter 1, with 
the far more modest objective of analysing two of the GVC literature’s key concerns - governance and 
upgrading - in the tobacco industry. 
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...as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously 
attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic 
development.       
 
In addition to continuously claiming publicly to have “developed Malawi beyond 
recognition”, this is exemplified by President Mutharika’s (2010) book The African Dream: 
From Poverty to Prosperity, and in particular the following passages: 
The deepest and most delicate challenges of African development and poverty 
reduction have always been at the forefront of my entire professional career- first in 
Malawi, then in the Diaspora at the United Nations, the World Bank and COMESA, 
and back in Malawi again as its leader.  The African dream is for me the epitome of 
my aspirations as I apply what I have learned, experienced and believed that the 
entire continent of Africa can emerge from poverty to prosperity. 
…it does provide an overview of African nations who share a common agenda to 
fight extreme poverty, hunger, deprivation and underdevelopment, a vision to bring 
about fast macroeconomic growth (p xiv-xv).   
 
Indeed with an average economic growth rate of 8.3% from 2007-2010268, the ideology of 
President Mutharika and his developmental state appear to be borne out in 
macroeconomic results269 (World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKT 
P.KD.ZG/countries/MW-ZF?display=graph). 
 With regards to Mkandawire’s (2001) reference to African states being captured by 
BWI interests rather than by national capitalists, it is important to note that one of the 
defining characteristics of the Mutharika regime was its defiance of donors’ policy 
prescriptions.  This defiance came to the fore in two major policy contentions: the Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) and the IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF).  The FISP, 
which primarily targeted maize production, was initially met with the characteristic free-
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 This is compared with a world GDP growth rate of 1.85% for the same time period (World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/1W?display=graph). 
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 Mkandawire (2001, p 296) discusses the relation between macroeconomic results and political legitimacy 
of the developmental state in Africa: 
…whereas the first generation of African leaders concentrated their energies on the politics of nation 
building, there are signs of a new leadership whose focus is on the economics of nation building.  
These new leaders swear by economic growth and seem to view good growth indicators as the main 
source of their legitimacy. 
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market antipathy to state subsidies and promotion of national food security270.  The policy 
- which Mutharika implemented despite donor opposition - became extremely popular 
and successful, turning Malawi from a country once stricken by famine in the early 
2000’s271 (Devereux, 2002) into a maize-exporter (Denning et al., 2009).  The policy 
eventually even attracted donor funds (interviews).   
 Mutharika’s resistance to the ECF, on the other hand, had mixed results.  Although 
the ECF contained a number of policy prescriptions, the most contentious one was its 
insistence that Malawi devalue the Kwacha, largely perceived by donors to be overvalued 
and hence contributing to the foreign exchange crisis occurring in the country during the 
time of fieldwork (interviews).  Without unnecessarily distracting our discussion with an 
exposition of the theoretical merits of the debate on exchange rate policy and its impact 
on the balance of payments, it is useful for our purposes to note that the economic 
consequences of Mutharika’s refusal to devalue the Kwacha went far beyond those 
associated merely with an over-valued exchange rate.  In particular, those donors who 
participated in direct budget support (Common Approach to Budget Support, CABS272), cut 
off their direct budget support because they understood Malawi’s failure to comply with 
the stipulations of the ECF as an indicator of a lack of macroeconomic stability in the 
country, one of the conditions of budget support (interviews).  
Although some of these donors did re-allocate some of their funds towards direct 
projects and/or investments, the foreign exchange shock on the country was huge.  For a 
country that depended on CABS for up to 30-40% of its foreign exchange, the removal of 
CABS was believed by many (ironically) in the donor community to be putting real 
depreciative pressure on the currency, and hence accentuating the over-valuation of the 
official exchange rate (interviews).  The relevance of this discussion is not to suggest that 
exchange rate policy is the defining factor of a developmental state, but rather to suggest 
that whilst Malawi under Mutharika quite clearly did not dance “to the tunes of the BWIs” 
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 Malaw/Nyasaland also experienced a famine in 1949 and food crisis in 1987 (Prowse, 2011b). 
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 This group of donors includes but is not limited to the World Bank (WB), the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), the European Union (EU), Germany, and the U.K. (interviews).  
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as suggested by Mkandawire (2001, p 301), the BWIs did wield enormous influence on the 
Malawian economy.        
As a result of the foreign exchange shock, Malawi during the period of fieldwork 
was in a state of economic crisis.  The black market for forex was thriving and petrol 
queues were often kilometres long with widespread instances of motorists waiting in 
queue for days (direct observation; popular press273).  The effects of the foreign exchange 
crisis and resulting fuel crisis were felt throughout the economy, and the tobacco sector 
was no exception.  Agricultural extension officers had to rationalise on field visits, tobacco 
transportation from auction floors to processing plants was interrupted, and fertiliser 
imports were reduced, thereby affecting the following season’s production (interviews; 
direct observation274). 
Although the ideological orientation and economic results of the Mutharika 
government appear at first glance to correspond to those of a Developmental State, our 
aims in drawing on the developmental state (DS) literature do not lie in evaluating the 
extent to which Malawi corresponds to a “Developmental State”.  Rather, having 
established here that the possibility of the Malawian developmental state cannot be 
discarded, the test of the usefulness of selected concepts from the DS literature for our 
purposes will be in whether they help us to explain governance and upgrading in the 
Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  This test is one of the main foci of the remainder of this 
chapter.            
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 In particular national dailies such as The Nation and The Daily Times. 
274
 My research was also impacted by these phenomena in a number of ways.  Many of my field visits were 
cancelled or delayed due to a lack of petrol.  At one point early on in the fieldwork I attempted to conduct a 
case study of one of TAMA’s farmer co-operatives yet decided against this as my planned visits to the co-op 
were repeatedly cancelled for the above-mentioned reason.   
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7.1.2 Farmer Associations and Associational Power 
 
Farmer associations in Malawi are particularly important in that smallholder burley 
tobacco farmers are grouped into “burley clubs” of 10-15 farmers which are in turn 
members of a tobacco association which usually helps organise transportation to the 
auction floors and technical operations such as grower registration cards.  They may also 
serve to negotiate contracts with leaf merchants for contract farmers.  The farmer 
association system is not unique to the tobacco sector as many of the same associations 
cater to farmers producing other crops and other associations exist solely for non-tobacco 
producers.  These associations are grouped together within the Farmers Union of Malawi 
(FUM) (direct observation; interviews).  Indeed in addition to the FUM having a very 
powerful political voice, the lines between the political power of farmers and government 
itself can sometimes become blurred, as exemplified by FUM’s President Felix Jumbe 
declaring his candidacy for President (of Malawi) in the 2014 elections (Nation Online, 
2013).  Likewise the (illegal yet omnipresent) intermediate buyers (IBs) are perceived to 
have enormous policy influence in government (albeit promoting policies which are not 
necessarily in the best interests of farmers) in that many of the IBs are alleged to be 
government employees working in relevant bodies such as the Ministry of Agriculture or 
the Tobacco Control Commission (interviews)275.  
During the H.K. Banda years all burley farmers were obliged to be members of the 
Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA), and indeed it was during these years that TAMA 
came to prominence.  However, after liberalisation of the tobacco sector in the 1990s, 
alternative farmer associations started to increase, with particularly exponential growth 
during the Mutharika years.  These new and often under-resourced associations are 
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 As discussed in Chapter 4, an Independent Buyer (IB) system developed in parallel with liberalisation 
whereby the buyers provided  immediate cash compensation for tobacco to farmers (albeit at a lower price 
than the auctions) and would then take on the responsibility of transporting and selling the tobacco to the 
leaf merchants (Jaffee, 2003; Chapter 4).  Although the IB system was officially phased out in 2001, evidence 
from fieldwork, e.g. Takane (2006) and this author’s observations, indicate that independent buyers/traders 
are still very much active in some parts of the country.  The relationship between IBs and farmers, and the 
potential correlation between the use of IBs and socio-economic indicators of farmers, could constitute an 
area of further research.  
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referred to by many in the sector as “briefcase associations” and are often accused of 
corruption, misleading farmers, and/or existing for the personal benefit of the directors 
rather than the farmer-members (interviews).  These new associations are also perceived 
as a major threat by the more established associations in terms of recruiting members.  
The newer associations often draw in less-resource-endowed farmers with smaller 
landholdings, due to an array of financial incentives, e.g. paying the farmers’ registration 
fees.  
There is considerable scope for investigation into the nature of free-riding in the 
tobacco farmer association sector.  In particular, one of the distinguishing features of 
TAMA is its political voice, in both national as well as international forums (e.g. TAMA was 
a founding member of the International Tobacco Growers’ Association).  TAMA claims to 
use its influence for the benefit of the entire Malawian tobacco sector despite its 
membership numbers coming under consistent competitive pressure (interviews).  Indeed, 
and according to interviews, the Farmers’ Union of Malawi undertook an assessment of 
these associations and found only 50% to be genuine.  This explains why FUM is 
advocating for the introduction of new legislation which would increase the accountability 
of these associations276 (interviews).  Yet despite the recent proliferation of associations, 
TAMA, and to a lesser extent NASFAM277, still remain dominant (interviews; direct 
observation). 
Our discussion of farmer differentiation in Chapter 1 is pertinent in terms of 
understanding the composition and internal dynamics of the farmer associations.  TAMA 
membership and governance structures constitute a particularly interesting example of 
tobacco farmer differentiation in that TAMA is a democratic organisation whose 
administrative secretariat is accountable to 21 elected councillors, all of whom are 
tobacco growers.  Whilst these councillors include both small and large growers, for 
historical and political reasons as well as differing levels of formal education, the large 
growers tend to dominate the governance of TAMA (interviews; direct observation). 
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 At the time of fieldwork the relevant (existing) legislation was the Trustees Incorporation Act or 
Cooperative Act 1998 (interviews).   
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 National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi (more on which below).   
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Although there is an extensive level of material differentiation among TAMA members, 
this is mainly due to TAMA’s expansion in later years to include smallholder farmers, as 
the origins of the organisation are firmly rooted in the estate sub-sector278.  At times 
(before the inclusion of smallholders) TAMA members’ interests directly opposed the 
interests of smallholder producers279.  Discussing pricing in the 1980’s, Prowse (2011b, p 
26) notes:  
Prices paid to tenants by estate owners were set nationally by the Tobacco 
Association of Malawi (TAMA) which were only nineteen to forty per cent 
of average prices received on the floors…  
 
Furthermore, and of potentially even greater importance, TAMA was opposed to the 
liberalisation of burley tobacco due to fears of a decrease in tenant labour supply (Prowse, 
2011b).   
The origins of NASFAM, on the other hand, lie in the burley liberalisation process.  As 
Prowse (2011b, p 31) states: 
…through institutional support the reform process created the Smallholder 
Agricultural Development Project (SADP), which subsequently became the National 
Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi (NASFAM), to enable even land-
constrained smallholders to commercialise through burley production. 
 
Differentiation among NASFAM members, and among smallholder farmers more 
generally, however, cannot be ruled out.  As seen in Chapter 4, a large number of studies 
on the impact of burley tobacco liberalisation in Malawi find that (smallholder) burley 
tobacco growers were often better off than non-growers and that there was uneven 
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 Although we do not have statistics, we do not have reason to believe that smallholder members of TAMA 
are necessarily wealthier than smallholder members of NASFAM. 
279
 Indeed, the interests of the so-called “big farmers”’, which have historically dominated TAMA, do diverge 
in a number of ways from those of the smallholder burley farmers, in that they tend to perceive the latter as 
contributing to a disorderly market flooded with an oversupply of low quality tobacco full of non-tobacco 
substances.  Over-supply and low quality contribute to a market characterized by lower average prices.  
Furthermore, a failure on the part of the tobacco-farming sector as a whole - which is dominated by 
smallholders - to deal with issues such as GAP, child labour, and NTRM, has reputational consequences for 
Malawian tobacco and the country’s industry more broadly.  These farmers’ interests are perceived by many 
to have been better represented during the H.K. Banda years where supply and quality were tightly 
controlled and tobacco producers in general were on more equal footing with leaf merchants (interviews).  
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adoption of the crop.  The households able to take up burley tobacco cultivation often had 
larger landholdings and/or more access to labour, proving that the liberalisation process 
occurred in the context of an already differentiated rural population.  Furthermore, 
among tobacco-adopters there is considerable differentiation as well.  For example, at the 
time of liberalisation many tobacco-adopting households had serious cash constraints 
which made it difficult to follow the formal procedures of auctioning tobacco and waiting 
to be paid.  Other farmers were constrained by inputs and/or land size, resulting in small 
total amounts of tobacco produced.   
One of the major sources of differentiation among TAMA members corresponds to the 
first of Bernstein’s (2010, p 22) four questions used to analyse rural differentiation: “who 
owns what?” (see Chapter 1).  As explained in Chapter 4, smallholders in Malawi are 
defined primarily by the fact that they use communal land whereas estate farmers either 
lease or own their land280.  Furthermore, it could be argued that there are TAMA members 
who correspond to several of Bernstein’s (2010) and Kautsky and Lenin’s (cited in Mueller, 
2011) categories of poor, middle, and rich farmers.  If one were to undertake a study of 
TAMA members based on Oya’s (2004) criteria for class classification281, one would 
uncover an even greater degree of differentiation.  Indeed, an investigation into the 
nature of differentiation of TAMA members and the impact of this differentiation on 
TAMA governance and policies could constitute the basis of a doctoral thesis in and of 
itself and is only partially analysed here.   
However, this differentiation presents a potential conundrum for us in that we are 
using TAMA (and other farmer associations) as an example of the realisation of Wright’s 
(2000) associational power, a theoretical concept developed for the purpose of explaining 
class compromise, thereby implying (and indeed explicitly stated by Wright) that 
associational power corresponds to collective class interests.  In the spirit of the gross 
simplifications used in Wright’s representations of class relations, we attempt to resolve 
                                                          
280
 As seen in Chapter 4, during colonial times the differentiation of tobacco farmers by land tenure 
corresponded to differentiation by race, type of tobacco grown, and marketing system, as estate producers 
tended to be White farmers growing burley or flue-cured and smallholders tended to be Black farmers 
growing Malawi Western and selling via a parastatal.  Tobacco farmers in post-colonial Malawi continued to 
be classified by land tenure, tobacco type, and marketing system.     
281
 These include: “nature of labour relations”, “patterns of land use/ownership”, “degree of capitalisation”, 
“education”, and “surplus use patterns” (Oya, 2004, pp 307-08; Chapter 1). 
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this conundrum by focussing on the subjective nature of class formation presented by 
Thompson (1963, p 8, cited in Selwyn, 2011, p 219): 
Class happens when some men [and women], as a result of common experiences 
(inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between 
themselves, and as against other men [and women] whose interests are different 
from (and usually opposed to theirs)…    
 
Focusing on Wright’s (2000) sphere of exchange, we argue that we can still consider the 
TAMA members to be realising their collective interests through associational power in 
that they have a common interest in obtaining higher prices for their tobacco, increasing 
the value added associated with it, as well as increasing the status and sustainability of the 
association, and that these interests are opposed to those of the tobacco companies.  The 
articulation of this associational power and how this power contributes to chain 
governance and upgrading will be elaborated upon further below.            
One of TAMA’s (and Government’s) most important forms of influence in the 
Malawian tobacco industry is through the Agricultural Research and Extension Trust 
(ARET).  ARET282  was formed from a merger between the tobacco section at the 
(Government) Chitedza Research Station (the Tobacco Research Institute of Malawi; 
TRIM283) and TAMA’s extension system (Estate Extension Trust) in 1995.  Both TAMA and 
Government are considered to be 50% owners of ARET.  At its inception Government 
donated the physical assets (e.g. land, building, etc.) with the understanding that TAMA 
would fund the organisation.  Government’s main source of influence in the organisation 
is through its board members.  Out of eight board members (at the time of fieldwork), two 
were from the Ministry of Agriculture (one of which was usually the director of research at 
the Ministry).  A member of the NASFAM executive (i.e. a smallholder farmer), and a 
representative from the leaf merchants (usually an agronomy director) also held posts on 
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 The institution’s name purposely omitted the word “tobacco” in order to obtain funding from the E.U. 
(interviews).    
283
 TRIM was originally run by TAMA, and grew out of the government’s Malawi Tobacco Research Authority 
(MTRA) (Wilshaw, 1994, p 129). 
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the board.  The remaining four board positions (including the chair) went to TAMA 
councillors (farmers) (interviews). 
In addition to calculating the costs of production which are used as a starting point for 
calculating minimum prices (more on which below), ARET also produces all of the certified 
seed in the country, conducts the necessary tests before new technologies can be 
introduced in the country, trains leaf technicians284, and has a number of agricultural 
extension workers in the field assisting farmers.  ARET carries out these operations 
through three research stations, 28 field offices, a training centre and 31 leaf technicians 
(interviews).  However, of particular relevance for our purposes, is ARET’s responsibility 
for certifying new technologies.  In many cases these are technologies that the leaf 
merchants or ICCs are already using in other locations and want to implement in Malawi.  
However, ARET conducts a one to three year evaluation285 of the technologies in order to 
ensure that the given technologies are in the interests of Malawi and not just the tobacco 
companies (interviews).  Through this example it can be seen that both farmer 
organisations and the state play a direct role in answering one of the main questions 
about value chain governance: what is produced and how it is produced286.  However, 
ARET is merely one example of the influence of non-lead firm actors on the Malawi 
Tobacco Value Chain.  It is to other examples of intervention by these actors and their 
analysis that we now turn.             
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 For example, ARET has trained over 100 leaf technicians that at the time of fieldwork were employed by 
JTI (interviews). 
285
 If the technology has already been tested in a SADC country then ARET requires only one year of testing 
(interviews).   
286
 A more comprehensive evaluation of the influence and power of ARET could be based on the frequency 
with which and reasons for the institution’s rejections of the introduction of new technologies.  This could 
constitute an area for further research. 
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7.2  Governance 
 
We will argue below that through minimum prices, contract farming production 
quotas, the creation of a leaf company, and other interventions, the Malawian 
government has had a direct role in driving the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain. 
 
 
7.2.1 Malawi Leaf 
 
One of the Mutharika government’s main concerns with regards to the tobacco 
industry was farm-gate prices (interviews).  One notable example of government 
intervention to influence prices is the creation of Malawi Leaf Company Ltd., in 2006.  It 
was created as a subsidiary of the state-controlled company, Auctions Holding Limited 
(AHL)287 and deals only in Malawian tobacco (AHL, Subsidiaries, http://www.ahlmw.com/s 
ubsidiaries.php).  The company was initially created for the purpose of injecting pricing 
competition into the market by reducing the level of concentration in the leaf merchant 
sector in Malawi288.  As Prowse and Moyer-Lee (forthcoming) note:   
In the first few days Malawi Leaf bought up to 26% of leaf at higher prices than 
Limbe Leaf and Alliance One. In the following weeks this market share slumped to 
less than 1%.   
 
Ironically however, the company does not have that much autonomy when it comes to 
price setting.  After stabilising at roughly 8% of market share, when others in the sector 
have over 30% market share, Malawi Leaf may seem much more of a market price 
follower than price setter.   
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 It is interesting to note that although Mutharika created Malawi Leaf specifically in order to have a state-
run tobacco company, the company was created as a subsidiary of AHL rather than ADMARC as in this 
manner it appeared to be further removed from state control, a move designed to please tobacco-wary 
donors (interviews). 
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 Part of the rationale for its existence is that by being Malawian they have a better understanding of the 
Malawian smallholder, especially on such issues as pricing (interviews). 
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 Yet although Malawi Leaf is (by comparison) a small operation in terms of market 
share, employment (roughly 50 permanent and 300 seasonal staff), and annual budget 
(roughly US$ 40 million), the company’s entrance in the market is perceived by many to 
have shaken the pricing cartel289.  Despite the company’s reduced ability to influence 
auction prices due to market share, its institutional design (as a subsidiary of AHL) is 
conducive to higher prices for two reasons.  Firstly, given that the parent company, AHL, 
receives a levy on the tobacco sold, to the extent that Malawi Leaf is able to push up 
prices, the parent company will benefit financially.  Secondly, on AHL’s board (at the time 
of fieldwork) were at least three large tobacco farmers (who presumably would be 
sensitive to pricing issues).  Three of these farmers were Andrew Barron290, Duncan 
MacPherson, and Henry Nthaba.  It is worth pointing out that all three of these growers 
were at the time of fieldwork elected officials in and heavily involved with TAMA291.  In 
particular, Nthaba was formerly the President of TAMA and at the time of fieldwork was 
the chairman of ARET (interviews).     
 Whilst Malawi Leaf was widely credited with having (positively) influenced prices, 
this influence has been interpreted as both positive and negative, depending on the 
perspective of the stakeholder.  For example, whilst farmer associations and farmers will 
generally perceive increased prices as good for the industry, Malawi Leaf has been 
criticised by its competitors for distorting the market in that it is not motivated by 
competition and profit but rather by raising prices for the benefit of its parent company 
(as above).  The company has also been reproached by some of its competitors for 
(allegedly), among other things, operating on an uneven playing field because the 
company didn’t invest in a factory292 , benefiting from Mutharika’s intervention in 
arranging customers, receiving tobacco which AHL had diverted from other leaf merchants, 
and potentially not following payment rules prescribed by AHL (interviews).  Indeed, 
Malawi Leaf provides an interesting case study of how government intervention reduces 
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 For more on the pricing cartel see Prowse and Moyer-Lee (forthcoming).   
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 Andrew Barron is the grandson of A. Barron, who introduced tobacco tenant farming to the Central 
Region (see Chapter 4).  
291
 TAMA also held a tiny portion of AHL shares at the time of fieldwork.  
292
 At the time of fieldwork the company processed its tobacco at Limbe Leaf’s factory (interviews).  
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and/or eliminates what appear to be insurmountable entry barriers associated with the 
leaf merchant sector (see Chapter 3).  Further research is required in order to understand 
the politics of Limbe Leaf processing tobacco for Malawi Leaf and thereby negating the 
need for the latter to invest in a factory.  However, and given the Mutharika 
administration’s targeting of Limbe Leaf (more on which below), we would hypothesise 
that the processing arrangement is related to a public relations initiative towards 
government.       
 
 
7.2.2 Minimum Prices 
 
Minimum prices were introduced by President Bingu wa Mutharika and are established 
at the beginning of the tobacco season every year.  The starting point for the 
establishment of minimum prices is ARET’s calculations of the average costs of production.  
The annual ARET study benefits from contributions from industry stakeholders such as AOI 
and the prices are largely based on fertiliser prices.  A politically calculated margin is then 
added on to the costs of production, followed by adjustments for the 87 grades of burley 
tobacco (made by the TCC293).  The final prices are then negotiated by industry 
stakeholders (interviews).   
However, the minimum prices have not been implemented entirely as planned.  In 
particular, in a situation of massive over-supply in 2011, the average (burley) price was 
US$ 1.13 whereas it should have been US$ 1.80 (interviews).  In this same season an 
additional grade of tobacco (with an associated lower minimum price) was introduced in 
order to “clear the market”, as the leaf merchants were unwilling to buy all of the tobacco 
on the market at the contemporary minimum prices.  Furthermore, after individual bales 
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 As a further example of the collaboration between government and farmers’ associations, grading in 
Malawi is done by the TCC.  Grading used to be done by TAMA but TAMA’s grading department transferred 
en masse to the TCC (interviews).   
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of tobacco were occasionally rejected by leaf merchants on the grounds that they were 
not worth the minimum price attached to the grade of the bale, it was common practice 
for the farmers/sellers to lobby officials at the Tobacco Control Commission to lower the 
grades of their bales thereby lowering the minimum price attached to them and increasing 
the chance of sale (interviews; author’s observations). 
Due to issues with implementation, Mutharika turned to increasingly aggressive forms 
of enforcement, notably through removing government officials (such as former TCC CEO 
Dr. Chapola) as well as deporting non-Malawian tobacco leaf merchant managing 
directors294.  Ironically, there was a near consensus among respondents during fieldwork 
that Mutharika’s best and worst tobacco policy was minimum pricing.  Most respondents, 
even including various leaf merchant officials, viewed Mutharika’s effort to ensure 
minimum prices for farmers as a positive measure, however nearly all respondents viewed 
his enforcement of the policy and the consequential politicisation of the latter as having a 
profoundly negative impact on the tobacco industry (interviews).   
Although for our purposes it is difficult to disentangle the pricing effects of government 
intervention, ICC policies on durations, international tobacco prices, increased 
competition on auction floors, and the forces of supply and demand, it can be seen in 
Figure 7.1 below that prices increased dramatically in the years 2007-2010.  Given that 
Malawi Leaf was created in 2006 and minimum prices were introduced in 2007, it can be 
reasonably interpreted that government intervention had much to do with the dramatic 
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 The deportations are seen by some to be related to the general mistrust and animosity between the 
Mutharika government and the leaf merchants.  Although much of this was based on the minimum pricing 
policy, some of it also related to the conflict over the implementation of contract farming, with leaf 
merchants insisting on shifting to an IPS model and government resisting (more on which below).  For 
example, in the case of Limbe Leaf, the former managing director Charlie Graham was deported after 
suggesting that contract farming was the way forward for Malawi.  However it is important to note that 
there were also (party) political tensions between Limbe Leaf and Mutharika.  This is because Limbe Leaf, 
which was (at the time of fieldwork) 42% owned by Press Corporation, was seen as being close to the 
Malawi Congress Party (the party of former President Kamuzu Banda) and its leader John Tembo (also 
official leader of the opposition at the time of fieldwork).  This is exemplified by Tembo holding a position on 
the board and one of his relatives holding the position of finance director at the company (interviews).  
Furthermore Tembo had previously held the position of Chairman at both Limbe Leaf and Auction Holdings 
(Lwanda, 2009, p 220).  The effect of the deportation on Universal Corporation’s policies was questionable 
at best, however.  In this company’s 2013 Annual Report, Charles Graham was listed as the Managing 
Director, Africa Region (p 3).     
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price increases.  A possible exception to this could be the year of 2008 which is perceived 
by stakeholders to have had a situation of undersupply which drove up prices.  However, 
given that the following three years were widely perceived to be characterised by a 
situation of over-supply (more on which below), the fact that prices were higher than 
previous years is potentially indicative of pricing intervention (interviews).   
 
Figure 7.1: Average Burley (Nominal Current) Prices, US C/KG, 1995-2011 
 
       Source: Tobacco Control Commission   
      *Widely perceived to be in a situation of under-supply (interviews). 
      **Situation of massive over-supply (interviews). 
 
 
7.2.3 Quotas and Participation  
 
One of the main factors influencing the pattern of production is the fact that unlike 
neighbouring countries such as Zambia and Mozambique, there is still a vibrant and 
dominant auction system in Malawi and the leaf merchants are not legally allowed to 
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source all of their tobacco through contracting.  This forces them to buy standard tobacco 
via the auction system.  In fact, in addition to pricing, Mutharika’s refusal to allow the 
entire Malawian tobacco market to evolve towards contract farming and IPS (as in other 
African countries, more on which below) was one of the main sources of contention 
between industry stakeholders and government (interviews).  For a breakdown of the 
burley tobacco contract farming quota allocations for the years 2009-2011, see Tables 7.1-
7.2 below. 
 
Table 7.1: Contract (Burley) Farming Allocations and Purchases for Major Tobacco 
Companies, 2009-2011 
 
Company Volumes (KG) 
 2009 2010
a 
2011 
 Allocated Actual 
purchase 
Allocated Actual 
purchase 
Allocated Actual 
purchase 
JTI 
13,800,000 13,657,845 9,800,000 9,813,327 14,000,000 13,996,998 
AOI 
15,500,000 15,348,497 9,600,000 9,575,861 17,550,000 17,467,601 
Limbe 
Leaf 14,900,000 14,476,621 9,800,000 9,754,991 18,000,000 17,567,009 
Malawi 
Leaf 900,000 862,101 300,000 236,036 50,000 48,931 
Premium-
TAMA 14,900,000 14,785,590 9,800,000 9,765,967 15,400,000 14,697,332 
Total 60,000,000 59,130,654 39,300,000a 39,146,182a 65,000,000 63,777,871 
   Source: Tobacco Control Commission 
(a) In 2010 the Associated Tobacco Company (ATC), a minor player in the Malawian tobacco industry 
which did not appear to be operating at the time of field work, was allocated 700,000 kgs and 
actually purchased 582,092 kgs of burley tobacco.  This allocation and purchase have been omitted 
from this table in order to continue the focus on the five companies that have been at the heart of 
our analysis throughout this work.  However, if included for the year 2010, the ATC figures would 
bring the total allocation to 40,000,000 and total actual purchase to 39,728,274 kgs.    
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Table 7.2: Burley Tobacco Contract Farming Allocation as Percentage of Total Crop, 
2009-2011 
 
Year Allocation (kgs) Total Crop (kgs)a Percentage 
Allocation 
2009 60,000,000 208,301,519 28.8% 
2010 39,300,000 193,238,632 20.34% 
2011 65,000,000 208,324,837 31.2% 
       Source: Tobacco Control Commission and author’s calculations 
(a) It is important to note that whilst Malawi does have an extensive system of record keeping and 
control with regards to tobacco sold, these figures are not 100% accurate in that they do not 
account for cross-border trade.  More specifically, tobacco grown in Malawi yet smuggled out of 
the country will not show up in these statistics and tobacco grown in neighbouring countries and 
sold in Malawi will show up in these statistics even though it is not Malawian tobacco.   
   
These quotas are evidence of government chain driving in two important ways.  Firstly, 
with regards to the questions of what is to be produced and how it is to be produced, 
there was a clear divergence of interests between lead firms and the Mutharika 
government.  Whilst the ICCs desired C&T tobacco, to be produced via contract farming, 
the Mutharika government desired auctioned tobacco, which by default in the Malawian 
context meant standard, rather than C&T tobacco.  As can be seen in Table 7.2 above, the 
government won the debate in that the majority of Malawian tobacco was sold via 
auction rather than via contract in the years 2009-2011.  This first example of the role of 
the state displays some similarities with Gibbon and Ponte’s “publicly regulated break” in 
buyer-drivenness in the cocoa (Ghana) and coffee (Kenya and Ethiopia) chains (2005, p 
145).   
The second way in which the contract farming allocations represent a form of state 
driving is due to the role that the allocations play in determining who participates in the 
value chain.  This issue is particularly pertinent when discussing C&T versus auctioned 
tobacco in that fully-IPS C&T tobacco tends to have twice the yields as standard auctioned 
tobacco (see Chapter 6).  As many leaf merchant officials openly point out, a full transition 
from standard to IPS tobacco in Malawi would mean doubling the yields and halving the 
number of farmers (interviews).  Preventing this transition, through contract farming 
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quotas, is hence preventing a massive reduction in the number of burley tobacco farmers 
in Malawi295.    
In addition to state-led governance determining how tobacco was produced, it also 
helped determine how much was produced.  For example, since liberalisation of 
production in 1994 until the 2011/12 season, there has been essentially no regulation of 
total quantity of tobacco production in Malawi which can lead to a situation of over-
supply given the lack of economically viable alternatives for smallholder farmers296.  Since 
the 2006/7 season this problem has been compounded by the introduction of minimum 
prices which are widely perceived to have induced an over-supply situation in the seasons 
of 2008/9, 2009/10, and 2010/11 (interviews).   
The other prominent factor determining chain participation is a political economy 
aspect peculiar to the Malawian tobacco industry: the leaf merchants are expected (by 
government) to buy all of the tobacco produced, or mop up the market.  The leaf 
merchants comply in order to keep government happy and in order to preserve the 
Malawian tobacco industry.  Given the fact that leaf merchants essentially buy all of the 
tobacco on the market, even in situations of “over-supply,” one may wonder how “over-
supply” is defined.  Indeed the leaf merchants are often accused of inventing the over-
supply narrative in order to artificially lower prices.  This is a complex issue and the 
complexity is compounded by the secretive nature of the industry.  However, the leaf 
merchants tell government in advance the amount of tobacco they would like to buy and 
(according to interviews) the Tobacco Control Commission attempts to verify the numbers 
through looking at the global supply and demand situation of burley tobacco and by trying 
to establish ICC demand.  However, one of the most compelling pieces of evidence for the 
over-supply narrative is the nature of financing that the leaf merchants use to purchase 
                                                          
295
 A similar pattern of government - rather than lead firms - determining what’s produced, how it’s 
produced, and who produces it, can be seen with the effect of government’s restriction on (leaf merchant) 
estate-farming to merely flue-cured tobacco rather than FCV and burley.  Had leaf merchants been allowed 
to vertically integrate by acquiring burley tobacco estates, presumably the major leaf merchants would have 
done so in order to achieve full control over production processes and achieve C&T tobacco (interviews).  
296
 A quota system was re-introduced in the 2011/12 season in response to a three year period of over-
supply.  However this quota system is perceived as largely irrelevant for the 2012 season in that supply 
appears to be much lower than industry demand due to a number of non-quota factors (more on which 
below) (interviews).   
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tobacco.  Under normal conditions the merchants take out seasonal loans at favourable 
rates for “committed stock.”  This refers to a situation where a bank will finance a leaf 
merchant for the purpose of buying tobacco in order to satisfy an order from an ICC.  
Under these conditions the buying order serves as a sort of collateral.  However, in the 
2010/11 season, one of the major leaf merchants had been forced to turn to the financial 
markets to acquire 2-3 year loans as they were buying tobacco to place in storage since 
the supply well exceeded the demand of the ICCs (interviews).      
Furthermore, although we do not have data on the levels of uncommitted stock in 
Malawi, the data we do have access to indicates there were high levels of uncommitted 
(burley tobacco) stock in 2011 globally (as seen in Chapter 3).  For a comparison of the 
levels of uncommitted burley tobacco between 2008 and 2012, see Figure 7.2 below.  
 
Figure 7.2: World Uncommitted Burley Stocks (million kgs, dry weight), 2008-2012* 
 
 
*As of June 30, 2012 
Note: Totals exclude Asian monopolies’ and KT&G’s stocks 
Source: modified from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2012, p 7). 
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7.2.4 Definition of Functions 
 
With regards to the definition of functions, it is perhaps worth returning to Gibbon and 
Ponte’s (2005, p 123; also cited in Chapters 1 and 6) statement that  
...the most important element of power relations between lead firms and first-tier 
suppliers is control over the definition of the functions that first-tier suppliers should 
play, rather than the externalization of low-profit functions as argued in earlier 
literature. 
 
In Chapter 6 we argued that the leaf merchants’ development of agronomy departments, 
for the purposes of implementing C&T tobacco at the behest of the ICCs, was an example 
of lead firm function-definition.  However, in this chapter we will argue that (with the 
possible exception of Malawi Leaf), the fact that during the years 2009-2011 these leaf 
merchants were still purchasing the majority of their tobacco via auction rather than via 
contract (as they desired) can be seen as an example of state-imposed function definition.  
Indeed, none of the firms were allowed to acquire anywhere near the 100% of their 
tobacco via IPS, as was being demanded by Blue Chip customers. 
 In addition to playing a major role in defining functions of the leaf merchant sector 
and hence in governing the chain, the Mutharika government also played a differentiated 
role in defining functions of leaf merchants in that not each leaf merchant was equally 
affected by the quota allocations.  Table 7.3 below presents the burley tobacco contract 
farming quota allocations for each tobacco company, as a percentage of the total quota 
allocation for the industry as a whole.  At first glance (putting aside for the moment the 
notable exception of Malawi Leaf) the quota allocations appear to be relatively evenly 
distributed among the four tobacco companies.  However, when one compares the 
average quota allocations over the period 2009-2011 with the market share accruing to 
each of the tobacco companies, one can see the distorted allocations.  In particular, whilst 
JTI and Premium-TAMA enjoyed market shares of merely 10-15% in the case of the former 
and 15% in the case of the latter, their quota allocations were 23.16% and 24.49% 
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respectively.  In other words they were allocated a disproportionately high quota for 
contract farming.  Likewise, both AOI and Limbe Leaf, with market shares of at least 30% 
were given quota allocations averaging under 26%.  Possible explanations for these 
allocations will be explored in Section 7.3.1 below, however for our current purposes 
suffice it to interpret these allocations as state-led first tier function definition.     
  
Table 7.3: Percentage of Burley Tobacco Contract Farming Allocation by Company, 
2009-2011 
 
Company 2009 2010a 2011 
JTI 23% 24.94% 21.54% 
AOI 25.83% 24.43% 27% 
Limbe Leaf 24.83% 24.94% 27.69% 
Malawi Leaf 1.5% 0.76% 0.08% 
Premium-TAMA 24.83% 24.94% 23.69% 
       Source: Tobacco Control Commission and author’s calculations 
(a) See (a) in Table 7.1 above 
 
Table 7.4: Comparison of Burley Tobacco Contract Farming Allocation Shares and 
Overall Market Shares 
 
Company Average Burley 
Tobacco Contract 
Farming Allocation, 
2009-2011a 
Market Share Over- or Under-
Allocation 
JTI 23.16% 10-15% Over 
AOI 25.75% 34-35% Under 
Limbe Leaf 25.82% 30-35% Under 
Malawi Leaf 0.78% 8% Under 
Premium-TAMA 24.49% 15% Over 
        Source: interviews; Tobacco Control Commission; author’s calculations 
        (a) See (a) in Table 8.1 above  
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7.2.5 Analysis 
 
In terms of understanding the above examples of state-led governance of the Malawi 
Tobacco Value Chain, one could draw parallels to Gibbon and Ponte’s (2005) discussion of 
market mediation policies.  Gibbon and Ponte (2005) explain the role of an interventionist 
state in their empirical examples as a result of “intertia”.  However, we argue that in our 
case study, these state policies have specific objectives which relate directly to GVC 
concerns of governance and upgrading, and are therefore not the result of inertia.   
The state interventions in pricing and quota allocations described above also do not 
appear to conform to those policies highlighted by the developmental state literature and 
discussed in Chapter 1.  In particular, and although it has been argued in Section 7.1.1 of 
this chapter that Malawi under Mutharika did correspond to Mkandawire’s (2001) 
definition of a developmental state at least in terms of its ideological underpinnings, the 
policies concerned do not appear to correspond to those presented in our discussion of 
the developmental state literature.  More specifically, slowing down the pace of product 
and process upgrading (from standard to C&T tobacco) appears counter-intuitive from the 
perspective of a state wishing to promote economic development.     
It is perhaps useful to return briefly to our discussion of industrial policies in Chapter 1.  
In particular, and bearing in mind that for our purposes we are only interested in tobacco 
policy, in the debate between Lin and Chang (2009), Lin advocates for government playing 
a comparative advantage-conforming role whereby policies are put in place to address 
externalities, market failures, and coordination problems in order to promote a country’s 
comparative advantage.  Chang, on the other hand, advocates for comparative 
advantage-defying policies whereby governments seek to create a new comparative 
advantage.  If we take as our starting point that C&T tobacco is of higher value and that 
Malawi could easily have a comparative advantage in its production if the right policies 
were put in place, Mutharika’s resistance to the introduction of contract farming does not 
appear to be comparative advantage-defying or conforming.  In fact, the quota allocations 
in particular could be interpreted as comparative advantage-resisting.  This is because 
rather than promoting the industry as a whole and Malawi Leaf (the one state-controlled 
company) in particular to move towards higher value added through a focus on C&T 
291 
 
tobacco (as comparative advantage-conforming policies would imply), the Mutharika 
government has done just the opposite.  It has largely prevented the industry as a whole 
from shifting entirely to C&T tobacco and in particular Malawi Leaf has received 
disproportionately small contract farming quota allocations297.   
We argue that this phenomenon can be partially explained by understanding 
Mutharika’s main objectives in terms of tobacco policy to be price and employment.  This 
has particular resonance with the rationales for price stabilization schemes presented by 
Chang (2009b, p 481): 
…in countries where there is no citizenship-based welfare state or well-designed 
safety nets, certain ‘distortionary’ policies (such as tariff protection or a price 
stabilisation scheme) may be the only mechanisms that can provide income stability 
to small farmers.  Greater income stability in the rural area may bring greater 
political stability, which is good in itself and also may contribute to growth by 
encouraging long-term investments. 
 
Likewise the deliberate efforts by Government to increase prices and increase 
(smallholder farmer) participation in the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain could correspond to 
Khan and Gray’s (2006) political stabilization in that these policies could be interpreted to 
constitute off-budget transfers used to placate what in Malawi is a very large group: 
smallholder burley farmers (nearly 20% of rural households in 2005, see Chapter 4).  
 This story fits quite well with the Gibbon-Ponte approach to upgrading defined as 
improving and/or maintaining the (profitable) position of developing country suppliers 
(see Chapter 1).  Given the stated objective of the tobacco companies in Malawi to reduce 
the amount of tobacco farmers by 50%, the strict limitation on the amount of tobacco that 
can be procured via yield-enhancing methods that would ultimately reduce the number of 
farmers can be understood as a form of government-induced upgrade.     
 In addition to being motivated to maintain prices and employment for the reasons 
stated above, interviews also reveal that AHL held particular influence with regards to 
Mutharika’s policies on contract farming allocations298.  Without wanting to entirely 
                                                          
297
 It is important to note that this does not constitute comparative advantage-defying policy as the concept 
implies creating a new comparative advantage, not a continuation of past patterns of production. 
298
 Repeated reference was made by respondents to familial and village ties between the directors of AHL, 
ADMARC, and Mutharika.  Of course the impact and relevance of this is extremely difficult to quantify.    
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discount the potentially altruistic motivations for AHL’s resistance to the introduction of 
contract farming in Malawi, the company’s stance could also be interpreted as a form of 
institutional self-preservation and the influence wielded by the President as a form of 
rent-seeking.  This is because if the entire country were to shift to contract farming, the 
industry would have progressively less use for an institution such as AHL which exists 
primarily for the purposes of auctioning tobacco299.  AHL’s position on contracted tobacco 
partially explains why Malawi Leaf, its subsidiary, was not given larger contract farming 
quota allocations. 
 In terms of corroborating our political stabilization explanation of Mutharika’s 
pricing and contract farming interventions, it is perhaps useful to draw a parallel with his 
other signature policies which have been mentioned above.  In particular, both 
Mutharika’s exchange rate policy (continuing with a fixed exchange rate despite significant 
IMF pressure to devalue) and his Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) were maintained 
in order to (in part) appeal to smallholder farmers.  With regards to Kwacha valuation, in a 
landlocked and intensely import-dependent economy without many developed export 
industries beyond tobacco, maintaining an over-valued currency also maintained a certain 
standard of living for smallholder farmers.  For example, currency devaluations in the past 
had led to increased price of transport (through increased price of imported fuel) as well 
as increased price of imported farm inputs.  The extent of the rural character of this policy 
was exemplified by the manner in which President Mutharika mobilized village chiefs and 
traditional authorities to publicly support the policy (popular press300).  FISP, likewise, was 
directly targeted at maize-producing smallholders for the purpose of increasing their food 
security. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
299
 Although during the period of fieldwork all smallholder tobacco, including contracted, had to be sold on 
the AHL floors (interviews; direct observation).   
300
 In particular articles in The Nation and The Daily Times. 
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7.3  Upgrading 
 
7.3.1 Functional Upgrading 
 
The major example of functional upgrading in the Malawian tobacco industry is TAMA’s 
participation in Premium-TAMA - a leaf merchant which began operations in 2007 - and its 
factory Kanengo Tobacco Processors301.  TAMA originally bought into the company with a 
21.25% stake, but this share was diluted as another shareholder invested in the factory 
through the parent company.  At the time of fieldwork, therefore, TAMA had roughly a 14% 
stake in Premium-TAMA and 25% stake in Kanengo Tobacco Processors, one of the few 
tobacco processing factories in the country (interviews). 
TAMA exerts its ownership rights mainly though participation on the executive boards 
of both Premium-TAMA and Kanengo Tobacco Processors.  Premium-TAMA’s board has 8 
members, two of which are TAMA representatives: the TAMA President (a tobacco farmer) 
and the TAMA CEO.  Kanengo Tobacco Processor’s board has 5 members, including one 
TAMA representative: the TAMA President.  Other board members include 
representatives from Premium Tobacco Holdings, members of senior management, other 
representatives from the Malawian private sector, and the largest individual flue-cured 
tobacco farmer in the Southern Hemisphere (based in Malawi) (interviews).   
In terms of the motivations for acquiring a stake in this company, interviews reveal 
those which could correspond to a classic text-book case study of functional upgrading: 
increased value added for the farmers, economic empowerment, possibility of working 
closer with lead firms, long-term financial sustainability of the organisation, etc.  
Furthermore, TAMA’s influence within the company is viewed by stakeholders as 
contributing to better communication and understanding between the company and 
producers on such issues as pricing and technology adaptation (interviews).   
However, the question that is provoked with this example of functional upgrading is: 
why has TAMA been able to functionally upgrade, contrary to the trend highlighted by 
much GVC analysis that lead firms block functional upgrading further upstream (see 
                                                          
301
 The factory is listed as an independent company. 
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Chapter 1)?  To answer this question we turn to Wright’s (2000) theory on positive class 
compromise.  In particular, Wright’s central argument - that once working-class 
associational power has attained certain levels that capitalists can actually realise their 
interests through increased levels of worker associational power - has great explicative 
power in that interviews reveal that one of the main motivations for Premium Tobacco 
Holdings to allow TAMA to buy into the Malawian subsidiary was in order to assure a 
secure source of supply.  Quite clearly the reason that Premium Tobacco Holdings chose 
to engage with TAMA in this venture is that TAMA is the most developed tobacco 
association with the most sustainable structures and largest farmer base.  In other words, 
it is the farmer association with the greatest level of associational power.  Allowing TAMA 
to buy into the company in order to secure supply resonates with Wright’s (2000, p 980) 
explanation below: 
The material interests of capitalists- their ability to sustain a high and stable rate of 
profit- depends upon the provision of various aggregate conditions within the 
sphere of exchange, and these require coordination and collective action.  The 
solution to at least some of these coordination problems can be facilitated by 
relatively high levels of working-class associational power. 
 
 
Contract Farming Quota Allocations.  Returning briefly to our discussion above on the 
government-issued contract farming quotas, and the differing allocations between 
tobacco companies (see Table 7.1 above) we argue that these (mis)allocations are not a 
result of mere oversight on the part of government, but rather a deliberate attempt to 
influence the functional definition of the tobacco companies.  This can be understood in 
the context of promoting functional upgrading in that it is an attempt on the part of 
government to provide a competitive edge for Premium-TAMA and JTI by creating 
conditions for them to more easily satisfy customer (internal in the case of JTI) demands.  
Government has a particular interest in promoting JTI in the hope that the company (an 
ICC) will establish a cigarette production plant in the country, which would constitute a 
functional upgrade for Malawi.  Likewise, in the case of Premium-TAMA, the functional 
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upgrade has already occurred (as detailed above), yet Government has an interest in 
promoting and maintaining the success of this upgrade.   
In order to understand this intervention, we return to Wade’s (1990, 2010) concepts of 
government “leadership” and “followership” policies, presented in Chapter 1.  The former 
refers to major interventions (often technology-intensive) which may lead to the creation 
of a new comparative advantage.  In the current example, if the Mutharika government 
were to have created a state-owned cigarette manufacturer, this would constitute a 
leadership policy.  Followership policies on the other hand are more minor interventions 
where government attempts to influence the incentive structure of firms in order to 
encourage a certain pattern of production or industrial upgrading.  Wade (1990) gives the 
example of the South Korean government encouraging FDI and later supporting private 
firms in the country’s semi-conductor industry (more on which in Chapter 1).  Likewise, 
the Mutharika government’s contract farming quotas, and the manner in which these 
benefited Premium-TAMA and JTI, could be reasonably interpreted to constitute 
followership policies, designed to support government’s public objectives of promoting 
functional upgrading in the industry.  Indeed, if one were to drop the more economistic 
and normative conceptualisation of functional upgrading in favour of Gibbon and Ponte’s 
(2005) “rewards structures” conceptualisation, we could argue that the government’s 
quota policies led to upgrading in the case of JTI and Premium-TAMA.  This is because the 
rewards structures associated with providing C&T tobacco are greater than those 
associated with standard tobacco.  Therefore, an incremental increase in the amount of 
C&T tobacco a company can provide can be understood as an incremental upgrade.          
       
 
7.3.2 Product and Process Upgrading 
 
In Chapter 1 we discussed product and process upgrading in agricultural global value 
chains, as well as the different ways in which agricultural products may be differentiatied, 
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with particular reference to the “credence good” concept.   Based on this discussion, in 
Chapter 6 we argued that C&T tobacco was differentiated from standard tobacco by its 
process attributes, and that C&T tobacco was of a higher value.  Furthermore, the 
agronomical supervision and increased inputs, integral to the production of C&T tobacco, 
resulted in higher yields, and hence C&T tobacco should be understood as both a product 
and process upgrade (in the GVC-GHS terminology) and as improvement of the position of 
farmers (as in the GVC-GPD conceptualisation of upgrading).  We also argued that the 
smallholder burley farmer sector as a whole was transitioning from standard tobacco to 
C&T tobacco, and that this transition was occuring largely at the behest of the lead firms 
in the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  However, further investigation into which farmers 
are able to make this transition and why, obliges us to look beyond the role of lead firms 
and to return to Wright’s (2000) associational power. 
There are a number of factors which determine which farmers are offered contracts 
and hence which are able to shift from standard to C&T tobacco.  For example, the ability 
to raise cash collateral appears to be a determining factor for some leaf merchants.  AOI 
has a screening process for contract farmer selection which, in addition to requiring cash 
colateral, requires a prior year of production, a valid TCC registration form, to be free of 
outstanding loans, and have been vouched for by the local chief (interviews)302.   
However, of most interest for our purposes is an examination of the extent to which 
the associational power of smallholder burley farmers has enabled them to undertake 
product and process upgrading by transitioning from standard to C&T tobacco303.  Of 
particular relevance is Wright’s (2000) sphere of production (presented in Chapter 1) 
which often concerns itself with how capital attempts to realise its interests of introducing 
new technologies or processes.  Positive class compromise can occur in the context of 
workers perceiving benefits of increased job security and involvement in the design and 
dissemination of these technologies and processes, and capital benefitting from the ability 
                                                          
302
 We could therefore conjecture (although we do not have data on this) that the average contracted AOI 
farmer is better capitalized than the average farmer which sells tobacco to AOI via the auction system. 
303
 In line with our conceptualisation of the product and process upgrade from standard to C&T tobacco 
presented in Chapter 6, this “transitioning” is understood to be occurring on a continuum, with a series of 
incremental product and process upgrades located in between the two end-points of standard and C&T 
tobacco. 
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of the workers to solve coordination problems through collective action (for more on 
which, refer to Chapter 1).           
In order to understand the extent of influence of associational power in product and 
process upgrading, it is useful to identify which farmers are upgrading.  For example, 
members of NASFAM (all of whom are smallholders) were much more likely to engage in 
contract farming of burley tobacco than non-members.  In the 2011 season, 92% of 
NASFAM tobacco growers sold their crops via contract (interviews).  This compares to only 
31.2% of the total tobacco crop being sold via contract in the same year (TCC; author’s 
calculations)304.    Likewise, when comparing the types of contracts obtained by NASFAM 
tobacco farmers versus members of less developed associations such as Farm Produce 
and Phindu, one can see that NASFAM farmers are also more likely sell their tobacco via 
contract growing (see Tables 7.5-7.7 below).   
 
Table 7.5: Percentage of NASFAM Burley Tobacco by Contract Type, 2011 
 
Leaf Merchant Contract Marketing (%)a IPS Contract Growing (%)a 
JTI 81.33% 18.65% 
AOI 90.46% 9.54% 
Limbe Leaf 94.13% 5.87% 
Premium-TAMA 91.85% 8.15% 
 Source: interviews 
(a) Sums of percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding of figures. 
 
 
                                                          
304
 However an important caveat to this comparison is that in the case of NASFAM, one is looking at 
percentage of farmers whereas the comparator is measured as percentage of tobacco.  In an egalitarian 
sector of smallholder farmers the importance of this would be minimal.  However, in a sector with 
significant farmer differentiation in terms of land and crop sizes, the differing units have the potential to 
skew the results of the comparison.  Although we do not have figures for the percentage of smallholder 
burley tobacco farmers who sold via contract in the year 2011, we would conjecture that if anything the 
figure is likely to be less than the 31.2% figure above.  This is because large farmers, many of whom grow via 
contract and may produce as much tobacco as dozens of smallholders, are likely to substantially increase 
this figure.   
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Table 7.6: Number of Farm Produce Farmers by Contract Type, 2012 
 
Leaf Merchant Contract Marketing IPS Contract Growing 
JTI 60 0 
AOI 0 235 
Limbe Leaf 65 0 
Malawi Leaf 100 0 
Premium-TAMA 270 0 
        Source: interviews 
 
Table 7.7: Number of Phindu Clubs by Contract Type, 2012 
 
Leaf Merchant Contract Marketing IPS Contract Growing 
JTI 0 0 
AOI 1,476 0 
Limbe Leaf 974 0 
Malawi Leaf 0 0 
Premium-TAMA 0 0 
          Source: interviews 
 
 However, the evidence presented thus far is not sufficient to argue that members 
of associations such as NASFAM and TAMA are more likely to engage in product and 
process upgrading due to their associational power (rather than other characteristics that 
differentiate them).  However, interviews reveal that leaf merchants chose some farmers 
by their association membership.  For example, AOI deals mainly with NASFAM, TAMA, 
and Phindu, as these are perceived to be more reliable (interviews).  Likewise, and as 
explained above in the section on functional upgrading, Premium Tobacco Holdings 
looked to incorporate TAMA in the company specifically in order to secure a steady supply 
of tobacco.  Furthermore, as a classic example of how the associational power of 
producers can benefit the tobaco companies, it is common practice for the companies to 
indicate to the farmer associations how much tobacco they desire and on which type of 
contract, and for the associations to then organise the farmers and deliver on the 
contracts (interviews; direct observation).  This practice indicates the necessity of the 
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tobacco companies to deal with organised, reliable, and preferably large associations to 
solve coordination problems through collective action.    
 Of particular relevance to Wright’s (2000) class compromise in the sphere of 
production, TAMA has undertaken a number of initiatives to facilitate the dissemination of 
IPS tobacco farming and the acquisition of the technologies and practices associated with 
IPS.  For example, TAMA has initiated 49 farmer cooperatives as a method of bringing 
farmers together for the purposes of training them with new technologies.  Furthermore, 
through the TAMA structures the country is divided into 21 zones, with three elected 
farmer representatives corresponding to each zone.  Members of the TAMA secretariat 
(often with tertiary education in agronomy) conduct regular field visits, in conjunction 
with the elected representatives, to educate TAMA members on the IPS system, the ICCs’ 
CSFs, and on contract farming (interviews; direct observation305).    And finally, TAMA 
organsies conferences for its members where the IPS system is explained and practices 
disseminated (interviews; direct observation306). 
 
 
7.4  Conclusion 
 
 In Chapter 3 we discussed at length the drivenness of the GVCT and some of the 
reasons for the development of this drivenness. In Chapter 5 we discussed the 
territoriality of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain, with a particular emphasis on the 
bifurcated nature of the end-market, and the extent to which GVC analysis provides 
insights into the nature of one of the end-markets.  Chapter 6 analysed lead firm 
governance (both as drivenness and coordination) and promotion of upgrading within the 
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 During my fieldwork I would often accompany TAMA officials into the field on these visits and 
participated in meetings with TAMA growers where the IPS system was explained and contracts were given 
out.   
306
 During my core fieldwork trip I attended a TAMA conference where guest speakers included an agronomy 
official from one of the leaf merchants who presented on IPS, Minister of Agriculture Professor Peter 
Mwanza, and President Joyce Banda. 
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ICC-Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain.  In this chapter we have continued 
our discussion of governance (as drivenness) and upgrading in this chain, but with a 
particular emphasis on the role of government and farmer associations.  In particular we 
have partially answered the following Research Questions: 
2.b Does the Malawian government play a role in driving the Malawi (smallholder burley) 
Tobacco Value Chain? 
4.b Has the Malawian government promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in what form 
and for whom? 
4.c Has farmer associational power contributed to upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in what 
form and for whom?   
 With regard to Research Question 2.b, we have demonstrated that the Malawi 
government under Mutharika has played a role in driving the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  
In particular we have argued that through establishing statutory minimum prices and by 
creating a leaf merchant (Malawi Leaf) that the government has been able to have a major 
influence on farm-gate prices.  The government’s pricing policies, in combination with 
both a limit on contract farming and a government expectation that leaf merchants will 
mop up the market, has played a major role in answering the governance questions posed 
by GVC analysts of how much is to be produced, who is to produce, and how the product 
is to be produced.  Furthermore, and in line with the GVC-GPD emphasis on power 
relations being determined by the ability to define functions, we have argued that 
government has played a role in defining the funcitons of leaf merchants by placing limits 
on the extent to which they can supply C&T tobacco to their customers.    
 With regard to Research Question 4.b, we have argued that the Malawian 
government, specifically the Mutharika presidency, has promoted upgrading in a number 
of ways.  In our discussion of government-promoted upgrading we have engaged primarily 
with the GVC-GPD (or more specifically the Gibbon-Ponte) approach to the concept as one 
focussed on identifying structures of rewards for developing country suppliers and the 
functional roles that improve these rewards.  For example, we have argued that the 
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government’s limitation of contract farming (which has the potential to reduce the 
number of smallholder burley farmers) can be seen as a sort of upgrade in that it 
maintains and protects the position of many smallholder burley farmers.  The 
government’s efforts at increasing and stabilizing farm-gate prices can be interpreted in 
the same manner.   
 We have also argued that the differentiated distribution of contract farming 
quotas to the tobacco-buying companies represents government promotion of upgrading 
in two ways.  Firstly, and to the extent that we can identify the ability of leaf merchants in 
Malawi to source and sell C&T (as opposed to standard) tobacco as an improvement in the 
position and rewards structures of these firms, we have proposed that the Malawi 
government has promoted upgrading - in the GVC-GPD sense - of Premium-TAMA and JTI.  
Secondly, we have argued that the government has allocated disproportionately high 
contract farming quotas to these two companies in order to promote functional upgrading 
(in the GVC-GHS sense of moving up a node of the chain).  In the case of Premium-TAMA 
the functional upgrading has already occurred in that the company is part owned by 
TAMA, a farmer association.  In the case of JTI, the only ICC in Malawi, the government is 
attempting to use incentives to promote the establishment of a cigarette manufacturing 
plant.   
 We have answered Research Question 4.c by again engaging with both the GVC-
GHS and GVC-GPD conceptualisations of upgrading.  In the case of the former we have 
argued that the associational power of TAMA farmers has facilitated their partial 
ownership (and hence functional upgrade) of Premium-TAMA and Kanengo Tobacco 
Processors.  We have further argued that the associational power of farmers, in particular 
of NASFAM and TAMA farmers, has greatly promoted these farmers’ upgrading of 
production from standard to C&T tobacco.  As outlined in Chapter 6, this upgrading 
displays both elements of (GVC-GHS) product and process upgrading as well as (GVC-GPD) 
a general improvement of the position of the smallholder burley farmers concerned.  We 
have argued that this associational power has been used in negotiating contracts with 
tobacco companies as well as disseminating information to members on the transition to 
IPS tobacco farming.    
302 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
Throughout this work we have attempted to broaden the scope of analysis beyond the 
firm-centrism of the GVC-GHS literature by building on the GVC-GPD variant in order to 
incorporate a key role for government and farmer associations.  However, and for the 
purposes of both clarity and analytical emphasis, our chapters on the Malawi Tobacco 
Value Chain have been organized by theme and/or key actors in a deliberate sequence.  In 
other words, Chapter 5 introduced the key (firm) actors in Malawi by describing the 
territoriality of the chain.  Chapter 6 then analysed the role of the lead firms in governing 
the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain and promoting upgrading in it.  In Chapter 7, where 
within a context of lead firms broadly determining the governance and upgrading in 
Malawi, we argued that both Government and farmer associations contributed to chain 
governance and upgrading.  However, these contributions occurred within a framework 
that was still broadly determined by lead firms.  For example, whilst farmer associations 
contributed to product and process upgrading, the introduction of C&T tobacco in Malawi 
was at the behest of the lead firms.  Likewise, whilst Government partially defined the 
functions of first tier suppliers through contract farming quotas, this policy was primarily a 
response to lead firms, rather than Government attempting to take the industry in a new 
direction.  Furthermore, the analysis in Chapters 5-7 has been presented in a largely static 
manner.  Therefore, in order to complete our analysis of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain 
and fully answer our research questions, we need to answer two pending questions.  First, 
how do the findings presented in Chapters 3-7 tie together?  For example, how does the 
role of government shape the territoriality of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain?  Second, 
what are the dynamic impacts of the policies of the key actors?  For example, how does 
government policy affect firms’ regional strategies?  In Section 8.2 of this chapter we will 
address these questions by drawing on some regional comparators.  In Section 8.3 we will 
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discuss how our work has answered the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, as well 
as the broader relevance of our findings.      
Our framework also raises a number of questions that could form the basis of a future 
research agenda for both the Global Value Chain for Tobacco in general and the Malawi 
Tobacco Value Chain in particular.  Some potential aspects of this research agenda will be 
presented in Sections 8.4 (on the global tobacco industry) and 8.5 (on Malawi).   
 
 
8.2 What Does it All Mean?: The Dynamic and Regional Impacts of Key Actors 
 
8.2.1 Putting Malawi in a Regional Context 
 
In order to better understand the role of the Mutharika government in the Malawian 
tobacco industry, one can draw some comparisons with the roles of other African 
governments in countries with important tobacco sectors307.  Of course, given the fact 
that we did not conduct fieldwork in these other countries, the comparisons are more 
anecdotal than systematic.  However, given that there are a large number of similarities 
between tobacco industries in these countries (more on which below), fleshing out some 
of the differences can still prove useful.  For example, many respondents indicated that 
the policy framework in Tanzania was more aligned to the interests of the leaf merchant 
sector.  Although Tanzania produces primarily FCV tobacco, the market is similar to 
Malawi in that it is orientated towards BC customers (PMI and JTI in particular) and in that 
the leaf merchant sector is dominated by three multinationals (Universal, AOI, and 
Premium).  Likewise, tobacco farmers were grouped into “primary societies”308 which 
                                                          
307
 Given the importance of Malawi as a regional hub for the African tobacco industry, interviews were 
conducted with a number of respondents, particularly in the leaf merchant sector, who were either 
responsible for or previously responsible for or familiar with leaf merchant operations in other African 
countries.  The interviews with these respondents form the basis of this section. 
308
 According to interviews, primary societies contained between 50 and 500 farmers. 
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were in turn grouped into unions309, which were heavily aligned with Government.  
Furthermore, leaf merchants and government in Tanzania appeared to have the same 
opposing interests as in Malawi in that the merchants wanted a limited number of highly 
efficient farmers whereas government wanted a greater number of farmers growing 
tobacco (interviews). 
Given the similarity in interests and actors, the difference in policy between Tanzania 
and Malawi is all the more noteworthy.  The Tanzanian tobacco sector is governed by a 
Tobacco Council, which comprises the tobacco buying companies, the unions, Ministry of 
Agriculture, and Tobacco Board.  According to leaf merchants this Council decides policy 
by consensus.    One of the most important policy differences is that the IPS system in 
Tanzania is not constrained by quota allocations as under the Mutharika presidency.  In 
fact, tobacco in Tanzania is produced entirely via contract farming310, with quantities and 
prices of tobacco being determined in advance (interviews).   
However, another important difference to note is that whilst Premium Tobacco 
Holdings in Malawi has facilitated the upgrading of TAMA in order to maintain assurity of 
supply, Premium’s subsidiary in Tanzania is wholly owned and hence has not been 
involved in farmer functional upgrading (interviews).  This begs the question of the extent 
to which Mutharika’s policies, in particular minimum pricing (which was introduced 
around the same time Premium-TAMA commenced operations) and contract farming 
quotas, have contributed to Premium’s anxiety about assuring supply.  We would 
hypothesize that Mutharika’s restrictions on contract farming are particularly relevant to 
Premium’s inclusion of TAMA in the Malawian subsidiary.  In Tanzania, with no restrictions 
on IPS tobacco, and Government interested in increasing the number of tobacco farmers, 
assuring supply is not as pressing a concern for leaf merchants.   
Zimbabwe provides another useful comparator for tobacco policy.  Like Tanzania, 
production in Zimbabwe is primarily FCV tobacco, however, like Malawi, Zimbabwe 
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 According to interviews there were seven main unions at the time of fieldwork. 
310
 Tobacco production in Kenya, where AOI also operates, is also entirely contract farming (interviews). 
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operates a dual marketing system of both auction and contract farming311.  Also like 
Malawi there is extensive differentiation among tobacco farmers with both smallholder 
and estate production.  Furthermore, and from the perspective of the ICCs, there are a 
number of compliance concerns.  In particular, the issue of land ownership and the 
potential for production of tobacco on land which was illegally redistributed, has resulted 
in PMI refusing to purchase Zimbabwean tobacco312.  Also noteworthy is the fact that 
whilst both BAT and JTI operate in Zimbabwe, they both are vertically integrated and 
purchase their own tobacco directly (interviews). However a full explanation of why BAT 
has vertically integrated (unlike in Malawi), as well as why PMI does not participate in the 
Zimbabwean market (as it does in Malawi), would require further research.  What is of 
relevance for our purposes here, is merely the fact that different (national) chain 
segments led by the same lead firms can take dramatically different forms, depending on 
the context in which they “touch down”.  We believe this provides a further rationale for 
an approach to global value chains that explicitly attempts to theorise and analytically 
incorporate the role of non-firm actors.             
 
    
8.2.2 Explaining Territoriality: The Malawi-Mozambique Comparison 
 
 A particular interest for our purposes relates to one of the main findings of this 
reasearch: that the end-market for Malawian tobacco is bifurcated.  Although in Chapter 5 
we identified the two distinct end-markets (BC and NBC), we did not attempt to explain 
why this market bifurcation occurred.  Although attempting to explain the existence of the 
NBC end-market on a global scale is far beyond the scope of this work, we will attempt to 
offer some reasons as to why the NBC end-market had such a disproportionately strong 
                                                          
311
 Like Malawi, Zimbabwe has a long history of using the auction system to market tobacco, which dates 
back to the creation of the auction floors in Southern Rhodesia in 1936 (Prowse, 2011b). 
312
 It is worth noting another potential explanatory factor for PMI’s refusal to participate in the Zimbabwean 
market: the fact that due to China’s status as market leader (purchasing 40-45% of the Zimbabwean crop), 
PMI is unable to enjoy the same extent of influence over the market as it does in other countries such as 
Malawi (interviews). 
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presence in Malawi.  We argue that the country’s long history of producing via an auction 
system (as seen in Chapter 4), together with the combination of Mutharika’s contract 
farming quotas with the expectation that leaf merchants will mop up the market were the 
main causal factors.  This is because the quotas limited ICCs’ acquisition of C&T tobacco, 
thereby dampening ICC demand for Malawian tobacco.  This excess tobacco that leaf 
merchants were expected to buy then had to be sold somewhere, and the NBC end-
market - which was not concerned with compliance issues, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 - 
provided a useful sales outlet.  As evidence for this claim, one can compare the Malawian 
tobacco industry with its counterpart in Mozambique. 
Tobacco production in Mozambique has a number of similarities with that of Malawi.  
For example, like Malawi, production in Mozambique is primarily based on smallholder 
burley (at the time of fieldwork, Mozambique was producing roughly 7% dark fired, 3% 
FCV, and 90% burley).  Also like Malawi, PMI is the industry leader in Mozambique.  
However, of notable difference between the two countries’ tobacco sectors is that whilst 
Malawi’s tobacco end-market is bifurcated, Mozambican tobacco is produced almost 
entirely for the BC end-market.  For example, whilst Universal Corporation’s Malawi 
subsidiary (Limbe Leaf) sells roughly 50% of its tobacco to BC customers in Malawi (see 
Chapter 5), in Mozambique the company313 sells roughly 90% of its tobacco to BC 
customers.  Likewise, whilst BAT was reducing its tobacco purchases in Malawi due to 
compliance issues, in Mozambique it was the biggest buyer after PMI314.  The Mozambican 
tobacco industry is not characterised by the same end-market bifurcation as Malawi for 
two reasons.  Firstly, because tobacco in Mozambique is produced entirely via IPS, ICCs 
are able to obtain the C&T tobacco they demand315.  Secondly, the higher costs of this C&T 
tobacco316 appear to have priced NBC customers out of the market (interviews).  
                                                          
313
 Mozambique Leaf Tobacco (MLT), Universal Corporation’s Mozambican subsidiary, has a virtual 
monopoly on the leaf merchant sector in Mozambique.  Whilst in 2011, MLT purchased 72,000 tonnes, the 
only competitor this author is aware of – Sonil - purchased on average 1-2,000 tonnes (interviews). 
314
 An example of upstream control by BAT can be seen in comments made by one large farmer (who 
engaged in both direct cultivation and in contract farming schemes with commercial and smallholder 
farmers) interviewed by Cramer (2003) who pointed out that he had to comply with strict regulations 
regarding social responsibility to satisfy BAT.   
315
 Mozambique has a long history of contract farming and concessionary schemes.  For example, cotton in 
colonial times used the concessionary system.  The cotton companies were briefly taken over by the state 
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8.2.3 Wider Regional Impact: Mozambique and Zambia 
 
Without wanting to over-extend our analytical coverage, we argue here that the 
effects of the roles of non-firm actors in Malawi are not confined to the Malawi Tobacco 
Value Chain, but rather can be seen in other chain segments, such as the Mozambique and 
Zambia Tobacco Value Chains.  Tobacco cultivation in Mozambique occurred during 
Portugal’s colonial rule and in small amounts during the one-party socialist rule of Frelimo 
in the post-independence period.  However, tobacco only began to become a significant 
export crop317 in the post-civil war period, which coincided with economic liberalisation 
and a shift to multi-party democracy (Hanlon, 2006).  Although initially developed as part 
of an initiative to increase supply of burley tobacco (UC, 2013, p 5), Universal Corporation 
continued to invest in Mozambique as it became clear that President Mutharika was not 
going to comply with the demands of the ICCs, in particular with reference to shifting to 
an IPS system (interviews)318.  Indeed and, surprisingly, given its relatively short history of 
large-scale tobacco production, PMI (2012c, p 7) lists Mozambique as among the top ten 
countries from which it sources tobacco.  For the increase in burley production in 
Mozambique in recent years, see Figure 8.1 below. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
after independence only to return to the original marketing scheme in the form of joint venture companies 
(JVCs) and eventually shift back to private firms (Stevano, 2010).  Today, along with cotton, tobacco is one of 
most widely used contract farming schemes in the country (World Bank, 2006, p 15).  Cultivation of tobacco 
spread rapidly, increasing from a minimal base to about 150,000 households in 2006 (Hanlon, 2006).   
Hanlon (2007) judges this rapid uptake of tobacco cultivation among smallhodlers to be in part through the 
attractive risk-mitigation characteristics of contract farming, as stressed in Chapter 3. 
316
 For example, during the peak of production MLT employed roughly 7,000 people in the agronomy 
department, which included 930 permanent employees, 480 of which were leaf technicians (interviews). 
317
 Tobacco has recently become the country’s biggest agricultural export (Hanlon and Smart, 2008, p 51).  In 
Tete province alone, tobacco exports increased (in value terms) by 46.4% between 2005 and 2008 
(allAfrica.com, 2009). 
318
 AOI also had operations in Mozambique until 2006 when the Mozambican government removed the 
company’s concession for tobacco purchase in Chifunde district, after which point AOI decided to cease all 
operations in the country (AOI, 2012a, p 9). 
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Figure 8.1: Estimated Burley Production (million green kilos) in Mozambique, 2003-2013 
 
 
*Estimate  **Projection 
Source: created by author from Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (2012, p 20) 
   
Likewise, AOI had (at the time of fieldwork) recently started to develop tobacco 
production in Zambia as its “back-up option” in case Malawi did not comply with ICC 
demands on shifting to an IPS system.  At the time of fieldwork AOI was purchasing 
roughly 16 million kgs of FCV and 8 million kgs of burley tobacco in Zambia.  AOI was 
investing heavily in FCV (in part to satisfy Chinese demand) and was waiting to make 
substantial investments in burley tobacco production to see if Malawi would change 
policies and embrace IPS (interviews).  Interviews revealed that if Malawi were to 
continue with the same policy of restricting IPS uptake, that Zambia would then become 
AOI’s main source of African burley.   
The examples of Zambia and Mozambique demonstrate that the implications of 
(Malawian) government policies have the potential to be felt beyond merely the Malawi 
Tobacco Value Chain319.  Indeed, as seen above, Mutharika’s policies on IPS appear to 
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 Tracing the roots of the development of the Zambian and Mozambican tobacco industries to specific 
policies of the Malawian government has interesting parallels within the development of the Malawian 
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have had a profound impact on the questions of value chain governance raised in Chapter 
1, in particular with regard to determining who participates in the value chain.  With 
regard to the role of non-firm actors in the tobacco industries of other African countries, 
and although one would have to undertake extensive research in order to fully account for 
the role of farmer organizations and government in countries mentioned above, 
preliminary evidence does indicate that these actors do play a role.  For example, the 
Tanzanian Tobacco Council, as stated above, comprises government, farmers’ unions, and 
leaf merchants (interviews).  Likewise, interviews reveal that Zambia has some of the 
strongest farmer organisations, and that Frelimo - the governing party in Mozambique - 
whilst not being overly interventionist in the tobacco sector does pay particular attention 
to performance and will not hesitate to visit MLT in order to pressure for better 
performance320 (interviews).     
Similarly in Mozambique, there has been much debate over the nature of functional 
upgrading.  Mozambican tobacco leaf was initially exported to neighbouring Zimbabwe 
and Malawi for processing, although the government was pushing for the concessionary 
companies to set up processing facilities in the country321.  In 2006 the government 
succeeded as MLT opened a US$ 53 million processing factory in Tete City which provided 
jobs for 1,600 workers (Hanlon and Smart, 2008, p 54).  By 2009, the factory employed 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
tobacco industry, in particular the impact of sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, as mentioned in Chapter 4.  As 
Prowse (2011b, p 24) states:  
The attractiveness of estate production increased as Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in 1965, and the imposition of sanctions on Rhodesia in 1966, increased demand for 
Malawian tobaccos, especially as international leaf companies - such as Universal Leaf - began to look 
towards Malawi as a location to increase supply…  
This pattern of tobacco companies developing new sources of production also resonates with our story in 
Chapter 3 of how U.S. tobacco companies went to South America to source tobacco in order to overcome 
the constraints of U.S. production quotas.  Although beyond the scope of this work, this theme is ripe for 
further investigation along the lines of other commodity chains work, which has examined the expansion of 
a commodity (production/sourcing) frontier, e.g. Campling (2012b).  Bendini and Steimbreger (2005), in 
their discussion of fresh fruits and vegetables in Argentina, went as far as to identify the ability to expand 
production frontiers as a key element of governance, by defining lead firms as “companies that seek out and 
develop new agri-food production sites” (p 155).  For a similar discussion with regards to cocoa, see Fold 
(2005).       
320
 At the time of fieldwork MLT was contracting 110,000 farmers, which through linkages impacted upon 
roughly 1,000,000 people and hence represented a significant political interest for government (interviews). 
321
 At this time, both Dimon and Stancom (prior to the AOI merger) were operating in Mozambique. 
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4,000 (allAfrica.com, 2009).  The government later withdrew the Chifunde district 
concession from Dimon (which had held it for a decade) and gave it to MLT (Hanlon, 2006).   
If one accepts that government and/or farmer organisations are significant actors in 
the segments of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco in other African countries, the 
relevant question for our purposes is: why have these actors pursued different policies in 
other African countries, thereby resulting in chain segments that look very different from 
that found in Malawi?  The answer to this question lies partially in the importance of 
historical context, as presented in Chapter 4.  Malawi distinguishes itself from 
Mozambique, for example, in that it has a long history of tobacco production, an 
enormously developed marketing infrastructure, and a significant proportion of 
smallholders dependent on burley tobacco322.  It is in this historical context that ICCs 
commenced their demands for C&T tobacco, thereby begging the question of what the 
impact of a shift to IPS would mean for the smallholder burley farmers who could not 
obtain contracts as well as for the auction system infrastructure and its employees. In 
Mozambique on the other hand, the tobacco sector was developed (partly) for the 
purposes of satisfying ICC demand for C&T tobacco and occurred in a context of 
essentially no pre-existing infrastructure.  This helps us to understand why Malawi’s 
government policies appeared to be based on political stabilisation as opposed to 
Mozambique being primarily concerned with promoting value added.   
 To frame this discussion in GVC terminology, one can return to the concept of 
“upgrading and exclusion”, which refers to the process whereby some firms and farms are 
able to meet the requirements demanded by lead firms, and thereby upgrade, whilst 
others are not, and hence are excluded from participation in the value chain.  These 
simultaneous processes of upgrading and exclusion are a common feature of agricultural 
value chains.  Or as Gibbon (2001, p 350) put it, [there is] “…clearly a tradeoff between 
upgrading and exclusion, whose identification is one of the key elements of GCC analysis.”  
In Malawi, unlike in Mozambique, it is this exclusion aspect which has so preoccupied the 
Mutharika government.  As the ICCs have demanded a shift from standard to C&T tobacco, 
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 Of particular importance in this regard is the impact of the liberalisation of smallholder burley tobacco in 
the early 1990’s (see Chapter 4). 
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which would necessarily imply exclusion323, the Malawian government has attempted to 
mitigate against this exclusion through contract farming quotas and by pressing leaf 
merchants to mop up the market.  In Mozambique on the other hand, given the absence 
of a history of auctioned standard tobacco production, there is no shift from standard to 
C&T tobacco, as the country’s sector was developed for the purposes of supplying IPS 
tobacco and so the political economy of tobacco production is markedly different.   
 
 
8.3 Research Questions 
 
Having partially addressed different parts of our research questions throughout this 
work, below we will draw on the analysis presented in Chapters 3-8 in order to answer our 
four sets of research questions, on territoriality, governance as drivenness, governance as 
coordination, and upgrading. 
 
   
8.3.1 Territoriality 
 
Research Question 1.a: What is the territoriality of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco?  
What is the territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain?  How 
are these connected?   
 In Chapter 3 we provided an overview of the territoriality of the Global Value Chain 
for Tobacco.  In our discussion of territoriality we described how the lead firm sector, 
comprised of the international cigarette companies (ICCs) was highly concentrated.  In 
particular, the Chinese state-owned tobacco company (CNTC) and four multi-nationals (JT, 
                                                          
323
 As stated earlier in this work, leaf merchant officials refer openly to the objective of “doubling the yields, 
and halving the number of farmers” (interviews). 
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PMI, BAT, and ITG) comprise nearly 80% of global market share.  Furthermore, of the 
remaining market share not accounted for by these five companies, part accrues to large 
cigarette manufacturing corporations which specifically target the U.S. market.  We have 
emphasized that, with the exception of the CNTC, these companies are all located in the 
U.K., U.S., and Japan and are beholden to the shareholder value doctrine.  However, a 
small portion of global market share accrues to what we have termed non-lead firm 
cigarette manufacturers.  These are small (private or state-owned) cigarette 
manufacturers which tend to have a more regional (rather than international) focus, and 
which do not enjoy the same amount of asymmetrical bargaining power over their 
suppliers as their competitors.   
 In Chapter 3 we also discussed the tobacco leaf merchant companies, which we 
have denominated as the first tier suppliers in the GVCT.  We have shown that this sector 
is also highly concentrated, with just two companies dominating the sector on an 
international scale.  However, we have noted that there are a number of regional and 
national competitors to these companies, as well as the fact that the ICCs are increasingly 
undertaking vertical integration in order to source tobacco leaf directly.   
 With regard to the tobacco farming sector (or second tier suppliers), we have 
shown how production has increasingly shifted from developed countries to developing 
countries.  We have also described how this sector is highly fragmented and dispersed, 
with production occurring in over 100 countries.  Furthermore, we have discussed various 
forms of market segmentation, such as by type of tobacco, curing method, and 
destination of tobacco (e.g. cigarettes or cigars; flavour or filler).   
 In Chapter 5 we discussed the territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) 
Tobacco Value Chain.  In particular, we emphasized that the burley tobacco sector was 
also highly fragmented, being dominated by smallholders, who farm the crop on 
customary land.  The leaf merchant sector on the other hand, is highly concentrated, with 
only five companies accounting for 100% of the market, four multi-nationals accounting 
for roughly 92% of the market, and the top two firms accounting for up to 70%.  However, 
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we also emphasized that the end-market for Malawian tobacco was bifurcated between 
Blue Chip and Non-Blue Chip customers.   
 In order to connect our discussions of the territorialities of the GVCT and the 
Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain, we have used the terminology “ICC-
Malawi (smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain”.  This chain originates with the 
smallholder burley tobacco sector, passes through the Malawian leaf merchant sector, 
which is dominated by the same two companies which dominate the international leaf 
merchant sector, and ends with the international cigarette companies.  This chain is 
dominated in particular by Philip Morris International, the largest ICC (excluding CNTC).   
 
Research Question 1.b: How has the territoriality of the Malawi (smallholder burley) 
Tobacco Chain come to be shaped over time?  
 After providing a very brief historical background of the global tobacco industry in 
Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 we discussed at length the history of tobacco production in 
Malawi.  In particular, we emphasized how tobacco production started in the Southern 
Region and then spread to the Central Region through settlers’ tenancy schemes.  We also 
discussed how this production was encouraged by both colonial and post-colonial 
governments as well as some of the tensions between smallholder and estate production.  
Furthermore, we described how burley came to prominence in the post-war period.  
However, of particular interest to a study of a value chain which originates with the 
smallholder burley tobacco sector, is the fact that the sector did not technically exist until 
the early 1990s.  Whilst burley tobacco production existed prior to this, and whilst 
smallholders in Malawi had a long tradition of tobacco production, they were not legally 
allowed to produce burley until market liberalisation in the early 1990s.  This liberalisation 
was encouraged by the World Bank as a poverty-alleviation policy.   
 With regard to one of the defining features of the Malawi (smallholder burley) 
Tobacco Value Chain’s territoriality, the end-market bifurcation, we have argued in 
Section 8.2 of Chapter 8 that government policy has played a large role.  In particular, 
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Malawi’s long history of an auction marketing system for tobacco, combined with 
government policies limiting the amount of tobacco that can be procured via contract 
farming, as well as government expectations that the leaf merchants will mop up the 
market, have all contributed to the leaf merchants in the country actively seeking out 
alternative sales outlets for their excess auctioned tobacco.  This trend has been 
exacerbated by the creation of Malawi Leaf, a government-controlled leaf merchant which 
has been largely unable to serve the Blue Chip end-market.   
 
 
8.3.2 Governance as Drivenness 
  
Research Question 2.a: Is the Global Value Chain for Tobacco driven?  If so, by who?  What 
enables the drivers to maintain their power?  How do lead firms drive the Malawi 
(smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain? 
 In Chapter 3 we argued that the Global Value Chain for Tobacco is driven by the 
international cigarette companies, the chain’s lead firms.  We argued that these firms 
enjoyed an enormous amount of asymmetrical bargaining power over their suppliers for a 
number of reasons.  In particular, and as commonly highlighted by GVC analysis, the lead 
firms sector is highly concentrated, with merely five firms controlling roughly 80% of 
global market share, and just one firm - Philip Morris International - controlling over a 
quarter of global market share (excluding the U.S. and China).  Whilst the leaf merchant 
(first tier supplier) sector is also highly concentrated on a global scale, we have argued 
that the lead firms have been able to mitigate, in part, against the build-up of bargaining 
power in the supply base by increasingly engaging in direct procurement of tobacco leaf.  
Furthermore, the international cigarette companies, unlike their suppliers, focus primarily 
on branding and marketing.  Finally, the international cigarette companies are protected 
by an enormous array of entry barriers.  These include: the asymmetric information 
associated with secret blends and consumer trends, the capital and technology-intensity 
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of production, and the costs associated with marketing in heavily regulated environments, 
litigation, R&D, lobbying, and public relations. 
 In Chapter 3 we argued that the ICCs used their power to drive the GVCT by writing 
and enforcing rules and standards, such as PMI’s Agricultural Labour Practices Code, and 
by forcing their suppliers to shift towards procurement of compliant leaf.  This form of 
drivenness was particularly acute in Malawi, where lead firms, in particular PMI, were 
transforming the industry with their demands for C&T tobacco.  As demonstrated in 
Chapter 6, the demand for C&T tobacco meant that lead firms were defining the functions 
of their first tier suppliers in the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  This is because, in order to 
source C&T tobacco, the leaf merchants in the chain had to massively expand their 
agronomy departments, develop relationships with farmers and banks, lobby government, 
and implement a complex and multi-tiered system of contract farming.  Whilst these 
changes in the industry occurred at the behest of the lead firms - in particular PMI - most 
of the changes occurred in the leaf merchant and farmer sectors.  The shift to C&T 
tobacco therefore, is an example of how the lead firms drive the entire chain, despite a 
lack of equity relations.   
 
Research Question 2.b: Does the Malawian government play a role in driving the Malawi 
(smallholder burley) Tobacco Value Chain? 
     In Chapter 7 we argued that the Malawi government, specifically under 
President Mutharika, has played a major role in driving the Malawi (smallholder burley) 
Tobacco Value Chain.  In particular, by instituting statutory minimum prices and creating a 
leaf merchant (Malawi Leaf), the government has played a major role in influencing 
smallholder burley farm-gate prices.  Furthermore, the government’s pricing policies, 
combined with contract farming quotas limiting the introduction of IPS, and government 
expectation that leaf merchants will mop up the market, has allowed government to play 
a part in determining how much tobacco is produced, who produces it, and how it is 
produced.  We also argued that government played a role in defining the functions of leaf 
merchants in Malawi by using contract farming quotas to limit the extent to which they 
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could transform themselves into suppliers of C&T tobacco.  In Section 8.2 of Chapter 8 we 
argued that the effects of the Malawi government’s driving could be felt in other parts of 
the Global Value Chain for Tobacco.  In particular, we argued that the Malawi 
government’s limitations on IPS production contributed to the expansion of smallholder 
burley production in Mozambique.   
 
 
8.3.3 Governance as Coordination 
 
Research Question 3.a: How is the lead firm-first tier supplier node of the Malawi Tobacco 
Value Chain coordinated?  Does the coordination observed correspond to the predictions of 
Gereffi et al. (2005)? 
 In Chapter 1 we discussed two prominent interpretations of governance in the GVC 
literature: as driving (as seen in much of the GVC-GPD variant), and as coordination (as 
preferred by the GVC-GHS variant).  Whilst noting and concurring with many of the 
critiques by the GVC-GPD of the governance as coordination concept, namely for its 
analytical narrowing of scope and inability to engage with chain-long dynamics, we have 
argued that Gereffi et al.’s (2005) theory of value chain governance still may prove 
illuminating if used for the very limited objective of analysing forms of coordination at the 
lead firm-first tier supplier node of the value chain.  For this reason we set out to test the 
theory in Chapter 6.  We did so by evaluating the three independent variables for the leaf 
merchant sector in Malawi, i.e. the capabilities in the supply base, the complexity of 
transactions, and the codifiability of transactions.  However, we argued that whilst Gereffi 
et al.’s theory would have predicted a modular form of governance, characterized by low 
degrees of power asymmetries and explicit coordination of first tier suppliers by lead firms, 
what was observed more closely approximated the hierarchy and captive forms of 
governance.   
 We argued that the main cause for the discrepancy between the theory’s 
predictions and actual outcomes was the theory’s inability to differentiate the lead firm 
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sector.  This was seen in two important ways.  First, although sourcing from the same 
supply base and presumably basing purchasing decisions on the same set of criteria, JT 
decided in 2009 to source tobacco directly in Malawi by vertically integrating while the 
remaining ICCs (PMI, ITG, and BAT) continued to source tobacco through leaf merchants.  
Therefore JT coordinated its first tier supplier through the hierarchy form of governance.  
We also argued that JT’s decision to vertically integrate increased power asymmetries 
between the remaining ICCs and leaf merchants by both shrinking the ICC end-market and 
increasing competition in the leaf merchant sector. 
 The second way in which lead firm differentiation played a role in governance as 
coordination is seen in PMI’s role as leader of the pack.  We argued in Chapter 6 that 
although there were high degrees of power asymmetries and explicit coordination, that 
transactional dependence between lead firms and first tier suppliers was mitigated 
against by PMI allowing other Blue Chip manufacturers to piggy-back on this company’s 
investments.  This is seen notably in the manner in which leaf merchants attempted to 
codify information by collecting data on contracted farmers to demonstrate conformity to 
C&T standards.  This codification was often done using survey templates provided by PMI 
yet the data served to satisfy other Blue Chip customers.   
 
 
8.3.4 Upgrading 
 
Research Question 4.a: Have lead firms promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If so, in what 
form and for whom? 
 Our discussion of lead firm promotion of upgrading centred on the transition of 
Malawi smallholder burley farmers from standard to C&T tobacco, in Chapter 6.  In this 
discussion we engaged with the upgrading conceptualisations advocated by both the GVC-
GHS and GVC-GPD variants.  In particular, we argued that the shift to production of C&T 
tobacco displayed elements of both product and process upgrading, emphasized by the 
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GVC-GHS variant.  In the case of the former, and following Moyer-Lee and Prowse (2012), 
we argued that C&T tobacco was differentiated from standard tobacco by its credence 
characteristics and that the former was of higher value to the ICCs and hence resulted in 
higher remuneration for its producers.  We also argued that production of C&T tobacco 
displayed elements of process upgrading such as higher yields and quality (due mainly to 
improved inputs and agronomical supervision).   
 With regard to the GVC-GPD variant’s conceptualisation of upgrading, we argued 
that production of C&T tobacco represented an improved rewards structure for 
smallholder burley farmers and hence constituted an upgrade.  In particular, C&T tobacco 
mitigated against risk by securing outlets via contracts, cash advances for the lean season, 
and resulted in higher prices and overall income for producers.        
 
Research Question 4.b: Has the Malawian government promoted upgrading in Malawi?  If 
so, in what form and for whom? 
 To answer this question, we have also engaged with both the GVC-GPD and GVC-
GHS variants’ conceptualisations of upgrading.  With regard to the former, we argued in 
Chapter 7 that one of the Mutharika government’s main priorities in tobacco policy lay in 
price and participation issues.  Bearing in mind that leaf merchants openly spoke of the 
transition to C&T tobacco implying a 50% reduction in the amount of smallholder burley 
farmers in the country, we have interpreted Mutharika’s limitations on the introduction of 
C&T tobacco as a form of upgrade for those smallholder burley farmers less likely to 
obtain contracts in the new C&T production system.  Similarly, the Mutharika 
government’s interventions in farm-gate prices, via statutory minimum prices as well as 
the creation of Malawi Leaf, have been interpreted in this work as an upgrade for 
smallholder burley farmers in the GVC-GPD sense that it improved the position of 
developing country suppliers.  In Chapter 7 we also drew on our discussion in Chapter 1 to 
argue that Khan and Gray’s (2006) concept of political stabilization helped us to partially 
explain the Mutharika government’s policies on pricing and contract farming.  In particular 
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we have argued that these policies could be interpreted as off-budget transfers designed 
to placate or respond to an important sector of the rural population.   
 In Chapter 7 we also discussed the government’s differentiated allocation of 
contract farming quotas to the leaf merchant sector and argued that this represented 
government promotion of upgrading in two ways.  First, and in line with the GVC-GPD 
conceptualisation, we have argued that disproportionately large quotas allocated to JTI 
and Premium-TAMA have allowed these two firms to upgrade in the sense that their 
position has been improved by being able to supply a greater quantity of C&T tobacco.  
Second, we have argued that these two companies were chosen by government for 
special treatment in an effort to promote what the GVC-GHS variant terms as functional 
upgrading.  In particular, government wanted to support the functional upgrade which 
had already occurred in the case of Premium-TAMA (i.e. a farmer association participating 
as part owner of a leaf merchant), and also wanted to encourage JTI to functionally 
upgrade by establishing a cigarette manufacturing plant in Malawi.  We have drawn on 
Wade’s (1990; 2010) concept of followership policies to help us understand these 
interventions.  In other words, we have argued that government has used modest policy 
interventions to change incentive structures for private firms in order to encourage 
functional upgrading.   
 
Research Question 4.c: Has farmer associational power contributed to upgrading in 
Malawi?  If so, in what form and for whom? 
 In Chapter 7 we engaged with Wright’s (2000) concept of associational power in 
order to assess the role that tobacco farmers played in upgrading in the Malawi Tobacco 
Value Chain.  In particular, we discussed the role of associational power in TAMA’s 
functional upgrade of participation in Premium-TAMA, as well as the role of associational 
power in the transition from standard to C&T tobacco.  In the case of the former, we 
argued that the associational power of TAMA farmers was essential in that Premium 
Tobacco Holdings invited the organisation to participate in the Malawi subsidiary due to 
the company’s concerns over security of supply.  We therefore argued that TAMA’s large 
320 
 
size and ability to solve collective action problems such as organizing a large number of 
smallholder farmers into various contract arrangements helped Premium-TAMA resolve 
its security of supply concerns.  With regard to the transition to C&T tobacco, we argued 
that farmer associations, and particularly the more organized and better-endowed ones 
such as TAMA and NASFAM, played a large role in assisting their members to upgrade into 
the new form of tobacco production.  In particular, these organisations negotiated 
contracts and disseminated information to members on the new system.  Furthermore, 
some leaf merchants used farmer association membership as a criterion for contract 
farmer selection.  
 
 
8.3.5 Contributions of the Research         
 
We believe that this work contributes to the empirical literature on both the global 
tobacco industry in general, and the Malawian tobacco industry in particular, as well as to 
the literature on global value chains.  With regard to the empirical literature, this work has 
contributed an extensive analysis on the entry barriers of international cigarette 
companies as well as on the relations between these companies and tobacco leaf 
merchants.  In particular, we have shown how compliance concerns of cigarette multi-
nationals such as PMI have caused dramatic changes in the operations of leaf merchants 
in Malawi, as seen in the massive expansions of agronomy departments.  In addition to 
demonstrating how compliance and traceability concerns are transforming the Malawian 
tobacco industry, we have also provided detailed information on the two end-markets for 
Malawian tobacco.   
In terms of contributions to the GVC literature, firstly we have contributed to the 
empirical coverage of the GVC literature by covering a new chain.  We have also expanded 
upon the GVC-GPD variant in order to incorporate a more prominent role for the state in 
our analysis.  We have done this by drawing on selected concepts in the developmental 
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state literature, however with the very limited scope of using them to analyse GVC 
governance and upgrading.  Therefore, instead of juxtaposing the analytical pre-eminence 
of the role of the lead firm with that of the state, we have attempted to incorporate both 
in a coherent framework which analyses the role that both actors play in governing 
(driving) and promoting upgrading in the chain.  Likewise, we have built on attempts of 
others, in particular Selwyn (2007; 2012) and to a lesser extent Riisgaard (2009), to 
analytically incorporate a role for actors at the supply end of the value chain.  Like Selwyn, 
we have drawn on Wright’s (2000) associational power.  However, whilst Selwyn used the 
concept to analyse the role of organized (hired) labour, we have analysed the role of 
farmer associations.         
Finally, we have contributed to the existing debate on the usefulness of Gereffi et 
al.’s (2005) theory.  Whilst we agree with many of the critiques of this theory offered by 
the GVC-GPD variant, we have sought to test the theory on its own terms.  Our finding 
that the theory did not accurately predict the outcomes observed in our case study 
constitutes a critique of the theory from a somewhat different angle.  This is because one 
of the main reasons we offer for the theory’s inaccurate predictions - the theory’s inability 
to differentiate the lead firm sector - is notably different from the more prominent 
components of the GVC-GPD critique, e.g. the theory’s failure to engage with the big 
picture. 
 
 
8.4  Areas for Future Research: Global Tobacco Industry 
 
Although in this work we have attempted to take a holistic approach by building on the 
GVC-GPD variant in incorporating the role for lead firms as well as other actors within 
Malawi, there are still a number of areas for future research which would enrich our 
understanding of the global tobacco industry, and potentially lead to an expansion of our 
analytical framework.  Two questions about the global tobacco industry are of particular 
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interest.  Firstly, what has contributed to the formation of the ICCs’ CSFs?  Secondly, what 
will the impact of the developing global trends in tobacco regulation be on the value chain? 
  
 
8.4.1 Shaping the Value Chain 
 
In Chapters 3 and 5 we established that the ICCs were particularly concerned with 
traceability and integrity of the crop, especially with regard to issues of child labour, 
NTRM, and GAP.  We offered some potential explanations for this with regard to public 
relations pressure and the shareholder value doctrine.  However, undertaking a more 
comprehensive study of what drives these CSFs would constitute an interesting area for 
further research.  Although we have critiqued the GVC literature in Chapter 1 for often 
failing to incorporate consumption and the influence of consumption on value chains, our 
own analytical approach is not very developed with regard to the retail node of global 
value chains.  Undertaking research into the formation of ICC CSFs could thereby 
necessitate an expansion of the framework in order to incorporate a role for consumer 
preferences324, and public relations motives, among other things.  Although access to 
developed country regulations (more on which below) would be somewhat 
straightforward, a potential difficulty in this research agenda would be gaining access to 
ICC sources.  If my experience with JTI in Malawi is anything to go by, this node of the 
value chain is extremely secretive and guarded.   
The role of China and its growing importance, as both a major consumer market and an 
influential player in international trade, has been highlighted in Chapter 1.  Likewise, it 
was pointed out in Chapter 3 that the world’s largest cigarette company is the (state-
owned) China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC).  Indeed in 2010 this company made 
more profit than the combined total of PMI, BAT, and Altria (Tobacco Journal, 2012c).  
And although the CNTC has played a minor role in Malawi, it has been mentioned in this 
                                                          
324
 Particularly in relation to certain regulations (more on which below). 
323 
 
chapter the important role that China is playing in other African countries such as Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.    Therefore, acquiring a greater understanding of the role of China in 
general and the CNTC in particular, in the Global Value Chain for Tobacco would constitute 
another area for future research.  Of particular interest is understanding the extent to 
which Chinese competition influences the CSFs of the ICCs.  A better understanding of the 
CNTC’s CSFs and of how and why these differ from those of the ICCs would also enhance 
our understanding of the global tobacco industry.  And understanding the extent to which 
differences in the nature of tobacco industries between countries which are geared 
primarily towards satisfying Chinese demand and those orientated towards ICC demand, 
would also enrich our comprehension of lead firm governance of the Global Value Chain 
for Tobacco.         
Another area ripe for investigation is the trade in illicit tobacco products.  As BAT (2012, 
p 40) states:  
Illicit trade in the form of counterfeit products, smuggled genuine products and 
locally manufactured products on which applicable taxes are evaded, continues to 
represent a significant and growing threat to the legitimate tobacco industry. 
 
The same source goes on to estimate the illicit trade to represent 12% of 
consumption325.  For the share of illicit cigarettes in selected markets, see Figure 8.2 
below. 
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Figure 8.2: Illicit Share of the Total Cigarette Market in Selected Countries 
 
 
    Source: created by author from Eriksen et al. (2012, pp. 106-112). 
   
 
8.4.2 Regulation 
 
There have been a number of developments on the regulatory front in the global 
tobacco industry which have the potential for greatly altering the balance of power 
between different actors in the Global Value Chain for Tobacco.  As many of these 
regulatory trends were merely starting to establish themselves at the time of writing326, 
we do not have a full understanding of their impacts.  However, investigating the impact 
of these trends on the governance of the Global Value Chain for Tobacco would constitute 
a particularly interesting future research agenda.  
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which was discussed in Chapter 
3, appears to be gaining momentum in recent years.  Indeed, even Malawi was 
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considering acceding to the treaty (Mwanza327, interview).  The FCTC is particularly 
relevant for our purposes for two reasons.  Firstly, because its focus partially (and 
explicitly) addresses issues of concern to GVC analysis such as branding.  This can be seen 
for example in advertising restrictions prescribed by the treaty (for more on which, refer 
to Chapter 3).  Secondly, Article 17 of the treaty specifically addresses finding 
economically viable alternatives to tobacco production for farmers (WHO, 2003).  Also, if 
the FCTC is successful in its stated goal of reducing demand for tobacco, this would 
presumably have an exclusionary impact on tobacco producers (although not due to 
upgrading as per Gibbon, 2001).  Therefore, the extent to which shifting to a viable 
alternative, or inter-sectoral upgrading as per the GVC-GHS terminology, is facilitated 
through an international treaty, could constitute a future line of enquiry with regard to 
the role of governments in the value chain.   
One particularly interesting development on the international regulatory front is the 
move towards plain packaging.  This refers to a regulation whereby cigarettes must be 
sold in packs of a single (usually unappealing) colour, free of any images except graphic 
health warnings, and where the brand name is depicted in uniform block letters.  With this 
measure the different brands are essentially indistinguishable.  Plain packaging is 
encouraged by the FCTC.  Indeed, WHO (2013, p 20) states: 
Parties should consider adopting plain (or generic) packaging requirements to 
eliminate the advertising and promotional effects of packaging.  Product packaging, 
individual cigarettes or other tobacco products should carry no advertising or 
promotion, including design features that make products more attractive to 
consumers.   
 
Plain packaging has notably been introduced at the end of 2012 in Australia.  The 
regulation required 75% of the front and 90% of the back of cigarette packs to be covered 
with health warnings (JT, 2012, p 59).  However other countries (such as the U.K. and New 
Zealand) have also considered its introduction.  Plain packaging is of particular interest to 
the GVC literature in that with plain packaging regulators attack the cigarette companies’ 
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greatest asset: branding.  One possible consequence is that consumers will place a greater 
emphasis on price rather than brands.  Another possible consequence is that the quality of 
the tobacco in the cigarettes will become more important as the latter will become 
distinguishable more by intrinsic characteristics than by psychological ones, i.e. a shift in 
emphasis of quality from symbolic to material (Daviron and Ponte, 2005).   
If plain packaging is to become the norm, this would provoke a number of important 
research questions: 
1. How does this influence the type of tobacco demanded by ICCs? 
2. How will ICCs continue to differentiate their products? 
3. How will ICCs continue to distinguish themselves from non-ICC competitors, such as 
those NBC buyers of Malawian tobacco? 
4. How will plain packaging impact the CSFs of ICCs? 
5. In particular, if the importance of branding is decreased, what will be the impact on 
ICC concerns for traceability and crop integrity? 
To the extent that plain packaging, and similar initiatives which decrease the prominence 
of branding and product differentiation328 , lead to a commoditisation of cigarettes, the 
results of this could be significant for Malawi, and for tobacco growers more generally329.  
If commoditisation leads to an increase in demand for lower priced products, PMI will be 
particularly affected by this in that its product mix is heavily oriented towards the 
premium categories (PMI, 2012a, p 48).  Given the importance of PMI in Malawi (as 
explained in Chapter 6), the impact of commoditisation on PMI and the effect this has on 
PMI’s role as industry leader in Malawi, could constitute another area of future research.   
                                                          
328
 Another regulation which could be classified in this same category is the recent display ban in the U.K., 
for more on which see (The Guardian, 2012).  This U.K. initiative follows on from similar legislation in Iceland 
(2001), Thailand (2005), Ireland (2009), and Norway (2010) (Tobacco Journal, 2012b).  Display bans are 
encouraged by the FCTC (WHO, 2013, p 20).  
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 For example, on the subject of plain packaging, the Chief Executive of the International Tobacco Growers 
Association writes:  
…it is not at all clear which impact it will have on consumption but it will have a sure 
impact on prices, as prices will become one of the few noticeable features distinguishing 
different brands.  Price wars will thus follow and, at the bottom of the supply chain, we 
will surely feel the squeeze (ITGA, 2013, p 6). 
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Another trend in tobacco regulation is banning additives and flavourings in cigarettes 
(Brown and Snell, 2011), which is premised on the notion that additives and flavourings 
that make cigarettes more palatable attract (especially youth) smokers.  This is particularly 
relevant for burley tobacco in that, unlike FCV, burley is considered to be unpalatable 
without additives and/or flavourings.  Given that China is a mainly FCV-consuming country, 
the impact of additive and flavouring bans in developed countries could be enormous for 
burley-producing countries.  Future research in this regard would entail investigating the 
extent to which ICC demand for burley tobacco is influenced by these regulations, as well 
as determining which burley-producing countries are most impacted by the shift in 
demand.  There is additionally considerable scope for investigation into the impact of 
further flavouring and additives restrictions on the global leaf merchant sector.  For 
example, Universal Corporation (2013, p 32) states:  
…given our global presence, we also have the ability to source different types and 
styles of tobacco for our customers should their needs change due to regulation of 
ingredients.   
 
To the extent that increased additives and flavourings bans result in increased demands of 
ICCs on their leaf merchant suppliers (with regard to major and rapid changes in sourcing 
origins and types), will this lead to a process of differentiation at the leaf merchant sector, 
whereby those firms most able to respond to the new demands increase their market 
share while their regional/national competitors are marginalised?      
 E-cigarettes, or “E-Cigs”, and other products developed to replace conventional 
cigarettes, is another important development in the industry.  Most ICCs are now 
producing some form of electronic cigarettes330 which simulate the effects of smoking a 
tobacco cigarette through the vaporisation of liquid nicotine.  This segment of the industry 
appears to be growing exponentially.  In fact, some analysts suggest that global sales 
could total US$ 1 billion in 2013 and that consumption could even surpass that of tobacco 
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 For example, BAT acquired CN Creative, an e-cigarette company in 2012.  This came on the heels of the 
creation of Nicoventures, for the purpose of developing non-cigarette nicotine products (BAT, 2012, p 6).  
Likewise PMUSA and RAI announced that they would commence sales of e-cigarettes in the U.S. market in 
the summer of 2013 (Tobacco Reporter, 2013). 
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cigarettes by 2023 (Tobacco Reporter, 2013).  One area to research is how these products 
will be regulated331.  However, of blatantly obvious importance for studies of the Global 
Value Chain for Tobacco, is that E-cigs do not contain tobacco.  Although, it appears that 
the demand for tobacco would not be eliminated as tobacco would still be used for the 
purpose of extracting nicotine.  Future research in this area would investigate the 
difference in demand patterns for tobacco used for nicotine extraction and tobacco used 
for cigarette production.    
 Another aspect of the shift in focus of ICCs away from conventional cigarettes and 
towards replacement products which is relevant to our discussion is the implication for 
the level of entry barriers.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that non-conventional nicotine 
products, or “Next Generation Products” (NGP), may require more capital-intensive 
production332.  This could increase the already high level of entry barriers at this node of 
the chain.                   
 
 
8.5 Areas for Future Research: Malawi 
 
In addition to investigating the impact of the developments on the regulatory front of 
the global tobacco industry on Malawi, there are also a number of areas which require 
further investigation in order to provide a richer analysis of our case study, as well as in 
order to understand the impact of recent policy initiatives.  Of particular importance is the 
major change in tobacco policy that was brought about by the death of President 
Mutharika in April, 2012 and the inauguration of his Vice-President, Joyce Banda.  As our 
period of study was limited to the Mutharika presidency we have not discussed policy 
changes implemented by the Banda presidency.  However, given that my core fieldwork 
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 For example, in announcing future expenditure on NGP factories in Europe of over US$ 600 million in the 
next three years, PMI (2012a, p 36) notes that “This expenditure will be close to double the level of a 
conventional cigarette factory of equivalent output.” To put the US$ 600 million figure in perspective, it is 
worth noting that PMI spent a total of US$ 3.7 billion on tobacco leaf in 2011 (Chapter 5; PMI, 2012b).    
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trip was conducted shortly after President Banda came to power (see Chapter 2), I was 
able to gather enough information on policy changes to identify an outline of a future 
research agenda. 
 
 
8.5.1 President Joyce Banda and Changes in Tobacco Policy333 
 
President Mutharika originally chose Joyce Banda as his running mate for his re-
election in 2009 after falling out with his former Vice-President.  However, soon after 
coming to power, Banda and Mutharika also had a falling out, which resulted in Banda 
leaving Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and forming her own People’s 
Party (PP).  Although she continued to officially hold her post as Vice-President, she was 
essentially an opposition politician.  When Banda took over the presidency in April of 2012, 
it was therefore not a great surprise that she soon announced a number of significant 
policy departures from the Mutharika presidency.  Whilst a full exposition of these policy 
differences is beyond the scope of this work, we argue that in the context of a political 
environment where political parties are not clearly distinguished by political ideology that 
many of Banda’s policies appear to be driven by the desire to represent a significant 
contrast to Mutharika’s policies.  These included a devaluation and subsequent float of 
the Malawi Kwacha and an increase in contract farming quotas to up to 80% of the 
Malawian tobacco market334 (popular press). 
With regard to tobacco policy, another major difference between the Mutharika and 
Banda presidencies appears to lie in the level of public confrontation between 
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 It is interesting to note, however, that although the contract farming announcement represented a major 
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reason for the shift to IPS was “as a response to some of the negative effects of the FCTC…” (The Nation, 
2012).  However our analysis would suggest that the policy was implemented in response to pressure from 
the ICCs and their threat of leaving Malawi, rather than pressure from the FCTC.   
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government and tobacco companies335.  Indeed, in an interview with Minister of 
Agriculture Professor Peter Mwanza, the minister extolled the benefits of working 
together with stakeholders in the industry, cited a number of meetings he was holding 
with tobacco company executives, and even went as far as to suggest that there were no 
major differences in terms of objectives of tobacco companies and government: indeed all 
stakeholders shared the objectives of eliminating child labour and protecting the 
environment (Mwanza, interview).   
With regard to the 80/20 proportion of IPS/auction tobacco, the Banda presidency 
decided not to allow a full implementation of IPS immediately for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, the 80% cap on IPS tobacco allows for a transition and sort of testing of the IPS 
system, in order for government to evaluate whether it deems IPS beneficial to the 
country.  Secondly, the 20% figure for auctioned tobacco allows room for new buyers 
(who may not want to purchase via contract) to enter the market (Mwanza, interview).  It 
is interesting to note that the minister gave the example of new potential buyers coming 
from Asia as a motive for the 20% figure, rather than current NBC buyers such as Eastern 
Tobacco Company of Egypt.  However, the minister did imply that if Government deemed 
the IPS system to be beneficial to the country that it foresaw increasing the quota to 100%.  
One of the important issues raised with regard to the implementation of an 80% quota 
for IPS tobacco is the necessity of a relevant regulatory framework.  Indeed, at the time of 
fieldwork, the Banda presidency was in the process of developing a regulatory framework, 
and was looking to include the major stakeholders (tobacco companies, farmer 
associations, etc.) in its development.  The government did give some indications that 
contract farming could be based on a system of zoning whereby tobacco buying 
companies would each be responsible for a different geographic zone of the country 
(Mwanza, interview).  If implemented, zoning (of IPS tobacco, as opposed to non-zoning of 
IPS tobacco) has the potential to greatly decrease competition and hence impact seriously 
on farmgate prices.   
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One area for further research lies in understanding what led to the dramatic change in 
tobacco policy.  Our analysis suggests that Banda understood the threat to the viability of 
the Malawian tobacco industry of continuing to limit the introduction of IPS tobacco, and 
hence abruptly changed the quotas in order to preserve the industry.  However, 
understanding the role of non-lead firm actors (e.g. BWIs) in this decision, as well as the 
role of political stabilization, or other motivating factors, would require further 
investigation.   
 
 
8.5.2 Impact on Chain Governance and Upgrading        
 
In Chapter 7 we argued that Mutharika’s contract farming quotas, minimum prices, and 
the expectation that leaf merchants would mop up the market, all contributed to state-led 
chain drivenness of the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.  In particular, we argued that these 
policies contributed to determining who was participating in the value chain as well as 
defining functions of first tier suppliers.  Banda’s policy shift would appear to represent an 
important decrease in the extent of government chain driving, as barring interference 
from government, lead firms appear to define the functions of their first tier suppliers (as 
seen in Chapter 6). However, understanding the impact of the quota change on the 
balance of power between ICCs and government would require further research. 
In Chapter 7 we also argued that Mutharika’s contract farming quotas represented a 
form of Wade’s (1990, 2010) followership policies in that the quotas were allocated in 
such a manner that Premium-TAMA and JTI received disproportionately large quotas, 
which we have argued was designed in order to encourage functional upgrading336.   
Government wanted TAMA’s upgrade into the leaf merchant sector to succeed in the case 
of Premium-TAMA and hoped that special treatment would result in the construction of a 
cigarette factory in the case of JTI (see Chapter 7).  However, the fact that IPS quotas have 
been increased dramatically would lead us to believe that the extent to which government 
can use quota allocations to influence tobacco companies has consequently decreased.  
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Therefore, a resulting area for further research is twofold: to identify the extent of 
proportionality of the new quotas; and to examine whether or not quotas are used as a 
tool to promote upgrading.  Logically following on from this is the question of how, if it all, 
the Banda government will promote upgrading within the sector (more on which below). 
Also of interest with regard to upgrading is the extent to which the massive reduction 
in and potential elimination of IPS quotas may influence TAMA’s functional upgrade 
(through participation in Premium-TAMA).  In other words, if Premium-TAMA is able to 
shift its customer base to orientate itself more towards the BC end-market, could this be 
considered a form of upgrade for TAMA farmers?  If so, would these farmers receive real 
economic benefits from the increased value added associated with selling to BC customers? 
Finally, with regard to the impact of the shift to IPS production on upgrading, is the 
issue of the consequences for smallholder burley producers.  This issue is twofold.  First, 
what will happen to those smallholders unable to obtain contracts?  Second, once the 
system has shifted entirely to IPS, and leaf merchants no longer see a need to use 
remunerative compensation packages neither to entice farmers nor to lobby government, 
will the benefits associated with IPS production decrease?  In other words, will IPS still be 
considered an upgrade for smallholder burley producers? 
     
 
8.5.3 Impact on End-Market Bifurcation 
 
In Chapter 5 we argued that the end-market for Malawian tobacco was bifurcated, with 
one end-market being dominated by BC (lead firm) international cigarette companies and 
the other end-market being dominated by NBC (non-lead firm) cigarette manufacturers.  
In Section 8.2 of this chapter, we have argued that the existence of the bifurcated end-
market for Malawian tobacco can partially be explained by the fact that Mutharika’s 
contract farming quotas and expectations that leaf merchants would mop up the market 
meant that leaf merchants had to find an alternative sales outlet for cheaper non-
compliant tobacco.  NBC customers such as Eastern Tobacco Company of Egypt provided 
just this outlet.  However, we have also argued in Section 8.2 of this chapter that 
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Mozambique’s orientation towards BC customers and consequential production of IPS 
tobacco has priced many NBC customers out of the market.  Therefore, an important 
research question is: to what extent will expansion of IPS quotas in Malawi change the 
current bifurcated end-market for Malawian tobacco?  And following on from this, what 
will be the consequences for Malawi Leaf, which exists primarily to satisfy demand of NBC 
customers?   
 
 
8.5.4 Impact on Farmer Associations and Their Associational Power 
 
Interviews reveal an apparent consensus among leaf merchants with regard to the role 
of farmer associations after Malawi has transitioned to an IPS-based system. Leaf 
merchants see the associations continuing to provide a collective voice for farmers but 
decreasing their involvement on the physical side of tobacco operations as these will be 
mostly taken over by leaf merchants.  For example, whilst organisations such as TAMA will 
continue to negotiate contracts with buyers on behalf of their members, as well as 
provide a political voice for the purposes of dialogue with government, they will most 
likely decrease their involvement in such things as transportation and extension services 
(interviews). 
Tobacco associations, on the other hand, do not necessarily agree with the reduced 
role that leaf merchants want to ascribe to them under an IPS system.  There does appear 
to be some consensus in the industry, however, that the associations should continue to 
exist for the purpose of providing a political voice for farmers.  However, associations tend 
to see this voice as one which speaks out against exploitation by tobacco buying 
companies (interviews).  An important research question that arises from this discussion is: 
what will the role of farmer associations be under a predominantly IPS system of 
production in Malawi and what will the consequences of this role be for the associational 
power of farmers?  Following on from this, one would want to investigate the influence of 
this associational power on governance and upgrading in the Malawi Tobacco Value Chain.   
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There appears to be some consensus among interview respondents that one example 
of farmer associational power – ARET - will continue to play an important role in the new 
system, particularly in certifying seeds and technologies.  However, some respondents 
implied that ARET needed significant support from the tobacco buying companies in order 
to remain relevant (interviews).  Likewise, ARET sees its role in technology development 
and dissemination as remaining relevant or even increasing under the IPS system.  In 
particular, given the CSFs of the ICCs, issues such as chemical residues, levels of 
carcinogens, and nicotine levels become increasingly important for ICCs.  As a research 
institute with relevant laboratories and equipment, ARET could become a key player in 
aiding Malawi to meets the CSFs of the ICCs (interviews). 
Likewise, ARET will likely continue its role in determining the costs of production which 
form the basis upon which minimum prices are established337, as well as training leaf 
technicians which will then go on to work at the tobacco companies (see Chapter 7).  ARET 
also sees its role - at least in the short term - as providing extension services for the 
farmers that produce the 20% of tobacco not included in the IPS tobacco quota 
(interviews). One line of further research is to investigate the impacts of the IPS transition 
on ARET.  If the relevance of ARET in the Malawian tobacco industry changes, what will be 
the impact of this on the associational power of tobacco farmers?        
 
 
8.5.5 Other Developments 
 
There are two other important government initiatives which have occurred since the 
completion of fieldwork, which merit mentioning here.  These are the announcement of a 
public-private partnership (PPP) with Nyasa Manufacturing, a cigarette producer, and the 
opening of a commodities exchange by Auction Holdings Limited338.  Both of these 
                                                          
337
 At the time of fieldwork there had been no indication that President Banda intended to dismantle the 
minimum pricing policy put in place by her predecessor. 
338
 For more on this, see The Nation (2013).   
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initiatives could be understood as a sort of government-promoted upgrade: functional in 
the first case and inter-sectoral in the second. 
Nyasa Manufacturing (which was mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7, yet has been largely 
absent from our analysis due to its miniscule production levels, the fact that it does not 
correspond to the BC end-market, and the fact that it was glaringly absent from nearly all 
interviews with industry stakeholders) is a Malawian cigarette company.  President 
Banda’s government has recently indicated an intention of entering into a PPP with the 
company by facilitating finance for an expansion which could result in an increase in 
productive capacity (potentially to a point of utilising 15% of Malawi’s tobacco) and 
employment (potentially from 200 to 600 people) (http://mwnation.com/business-news-
the-nation/20506-malawi-tobacco-firm-ready-for-ppp).  If Nyasa Manufacturing were to 
reach a point where it was purchasing 15% of Malawi’s tobacco, it would potentially 
become the biggest buyer after PMI.  This would provoke a number of research questions 
relating to the level of bifurcation of the Malawian tobacco market, as well as to the role 
of government in driving the chain and promoting upgrading. 
The other major development - the introduction of a commodities exchange under 
AHL339 auspices - is almost a textbook definition of inter-sectoral upgrading (see Chapter 
1).  Utilising the well-developed infrastructure of AHL for the purposes of providing a 
marketing outlet for non-tobacco crops would appear to go a long way in addressing what 
various respondents indicated (in interviews) to be the largest impediment to 
diversification out of tobacco: a lack of marketing infrastructure.  Further investigation 
into this initiative could be centred on the impact on governance in the chain as well as on 
the extent of inter-sectoral upgrading.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
339
 An article in the Nyasa Times (2013) estimated that AHL had invested US$ 10 million in the commodities 
exchange. 
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Appendices 
 
CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 2.A: Respondent Rosters 
 
Table 2.A.1: Respondents List Preliminary Fieldwork Trips 
Respondent Date 
Respondent 1 October 26, 2011 
Respondent 2 October 27, 2011 
Respondent 3 November 9, 2011 
Respondent 4 November 9, 2011 
Respondent 5 November 9, 2011 
Respondent 6 
Respondent 7 
November 11, 2011 
Respondent 8 November 14, 2011 
Respondent 9 November 14, 2011 
Respondent 10 November 14, 2011 
Respondent 11 November 14, 2011 
Respondent 12 November 16, 2011 
Respondent 13 February 13, 2012 
Respondent 14 February 14, 2012 
Respondent 15 February 14, 2012 
Respondent 16 February 14, 2012 
Respondent 17 
Respondent 18 
February 16, 2012 
Respondent 19 February 16, 2012 
Respondent 8 February 17, 2012 
Respondent 20 February 21, 2012 
Respondent 21 February 21, 2012 
Respondent 22 February 22, 2012 
Respondent 23 February 23, 2012 
Respondent 24 February 24, 2012 
Respondent 25 February 24, 2012 
Respondent 26 February 24, 2012 
Respondent 27 February 29, 2012 
Respondent 28 February 29, 2012 
Respondent 29 March 2, 2012 
Respondent 30 March 2, 2012 
Respondent 5 March 2, 2012 
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Table 2.A.2: Respondents List Core Fieldwork Trip 
Respondent Date 
Respondent 31 (date not recorded) 
Respondent 32 (date not recorded) 
Respondent 33 June 19, 2012 
Respondent 26 June 26, 2012 
Respondent 9 June 29, 2012 
Respondent 34 June 29, 2012 
Respondent 35 July 2, 2012 
Respondent 36 July 3, 2012 
Respondent 37 July 4, 2012 
Respondent 38 July 9, 2012 
Respondent 39 July 9, 2012 
Respondent 40 July 10, 2012 
Respondent 41 July 11, 2012 
Respondent 42 July 11, 2012 
Respondent 5 July 12, 2012 
Respondent 43 
 
 
 
Respondent 44 
 
Respondent 45 
 
Respondent 46 
July 12, 2012 
Respondent 47 July 17, 2012 
Respondent 48 July 17, 2012 
Minister of Agriculture July 19, 2012 
Respondent 49 July 24, 2012 
Respondent 50 July 24, 2012 
Respondent 51 July 27, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
356 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
